lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Sept 21, 2022 15:25:26 GMT
So this tweet below mentions how the Alaska class cruiser might have looked like had the United States decided to go full battlecruiser?
Never heard of it before, would it help the Alaska-class if it was a full battlecruiser ore would it still end up as OTL.
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Post by simon darkshade on Sept 21, 2022 15:31:24 GMT
No change at all. CA2D was the epitome of the super cruiser, not a battlecruiser. The USN didn't have a role for a battlecruiser prewar. It could well be argued that, if you are going to build a 40,000 ton ship, then you want proper armament on her.
It would end up exactly as the rest of the Alaskas did.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Sept 21, 2022 15:37:54 GMT
No change at all. CA2D was the epitome of the super cruiser, not a battlecruiser. The USN didn't have a role for a battlecruiser prewar. It could well be argued that, if you are going to build a 40,000 ton ship, then you want proper armament on her. It would end up exactly as the rest of the Alaskas did. So no benefit at all, better for here to remain a drawing then. |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Sept 21, 2022 17:58:42 GMT
No change at all. CA2D was the epitome of the super cruiser, not a battlecruiser. The USN didn't have a role for a battlecruiser prewar. It could well be argued that, if you are going to build a 40,000 ton ship, then you want proper armament on her. It would end up exactly as the rest of the Alaskas did. Waste of metal and men. So this tweet below mentions how the Alaska class cruiser might have looked like had the United States decided to go full battlecruiser? Never heard of it before, would it help the Alaska-class if it was a full battlecruiser ore would it still end up as OTL. This ship was a bollixed result of confused thinking. The short version:  When the General Board haggled over the designs for ships to be built under the 2 Ocean Navy Act there was a lot of infighting. There were three factions. The premier faction were what we moderns call the Surface Warfare crowd, (Black shoes), which were derisively labeled as "Gun-clubbers" by the naval aviators (Brown shoes) sent to the GB (Admiral King being the most famous one dumped there and rescued from the goofy beach.). The Third Faction the submariners kept their mouths shut and just plugged away at fleet boats. The Gun-clubbers wanted to match ship for ship, the supposed threat they saw, now that Congress opened the money valve. To them, this meant that the USG should build battlecruisers (The Iowa Class if you look at it closely.) and modern battleships *(The South Dakotas and then the Montana Class of 1940.). The Alaska Class were COMMERCE RAIDERS designed to prey on Japanese shipping like the Scharnhorsts or the Dunkirks were to prey on British shipping. Think about that lunacy for a moment. Inside the USN, the chief looney tunes in active command slots, who championed the raider cruiser were Admirals Pye, Leahy and STARK. They sold Roosevelt on the need and then Charles Edison, Secnav (an idiot), approved it. Next to the Iowas; the worst mistake in naval construction the Americans made, was these platforms. By 1930, even the Gun-clubbers knew the "battlecruiser" was a dead issue as far as the USN was concerned. That was an aircraft carrier mission. The only reason to continue the Alaskas was as bodyguard ships to protect US flattops from the Kongos in a potential Samar type situation; and THAT was supposedly the same reason the Iowas were built. How did that work out? NOT TOO GOOD. For that waste of metal and time we could have had: --2 Yorktowns. --2 ordinary light cruisers --4 destroyers --a dozen destroyer escorts --a dozen submarines --2 CVE / oil tanker conversions and AN ARMORED DIVISION. |
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jbg
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Post by jbg on Oct 12, 2022 22:42:10 GMT
As referred to above, the USN really had no interest in a BC, per se. CA2D was a large cruiser and at best obsolescent when the four were introduced.
Another aspect to the waste of resources was developing a new main rifle, for this class only. Friedman discusses much of this in his US cruiser book, which I thoroughly recommend.
Still, I find them to be handsome ships. But I am funny that way!
Jonathan
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belushitd
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Post by belushitd on Oct 19, 2022 20:00:42 GMT
While I don't disagree that the effort spent on the Alaska class was probably better spent elsewhere, I think your analysis that we could have had all that stuff is a bit off.
--2 Yorktowns. We were not going to build any more Yorktowns. The last one of these was launched in December of 1940. The first Alaska was laid down December of 1941. The first Essex class carrier was laid down at the end of April 1941. Maybe we could have laid down two Essex class at New York Shipbuilding in Camden instead of the Alaska class. Laying down another Essex in lieu of Hawaii in December of 1943 would have ended up with that ship suffering the same fate as Hawaii, so there's no gain there. Roughly 20K tons each, total of 40,000 tons.
--2 ordinary light cruisers - Do you mean the Cleveland class or the Atlanta class? Both were in series production at the time, but there's a large difference between the tonnages, 6,700 tons vs, 11,700 tons. Either 13,400 or 23,400 tons
--4 destroyers - Again, which class? The Fletchers are probably the best choice. could also have been the Benson, Gleaves or Sumner classes. Lets call it 2,200 tons for the Fletcher/Sumner class. Total of 8,800 tons
--a dozen destroyer escorts - Class? There's a half dozen to choose from. Lets split the difference and go with two from each class. 2 x 1,300 Evarts 2 x 1,700 Buckley, 2 x 1,200 Cannon, 2 x 1,200 Edsall, 2 x 1,700 Rudderow, and 2 x 1,300 Butler. Total of 16,800 tons
--a dozen submarines - The Gato and Balao class were the subs under construction at the time, and they are about the same tonnage, so, 12 x 1,500 so 18,000 tons
--2 CVE / oil tanker conversions Bogue class would be about the right timeframe. 2 x 8,300 so 16,300 tons. The Cimmeron class was a little smaller, roughly 7,500 tons, so 15,000 tons.
and AN ARMORED DIVISION. which was about 338 tanks for a heavy armored division or 239 for a light armored division. Call it roughly 30 tons on average, with the Sherman weighing more, and the Stuart weighing less. 30 * 239 = 7,000 tons, and a heavy division coming in at 10,000 tons.
Totals from a steel perspective, using the lightest weights above - 119,000 tons of steel.
Alaska class cruiser was about 30K tons. x3 is 90,000 tons. Your estimate is over by an entire Alaska class ship.
Now, talk about manning... 2,251 for the Alaska, total of 4,502, as the Hawaii never commissioned, but, lets call it 6,753 for fun. Essex class had 2,600 x 2 is 5,200, Cleveland had 1,255 x 2 is 2,510, Atlanta had 673, and so forth. An armored division had roughly 15,000 combat troops.
While everyone likes to pile on the Alaska class for its perceived uselessness, and waste of men and materials, while the US could have BUILT other stuff, it could not have MANNED all the other stuff. The US could build FAR more stuff than it could man.
Belushi TD
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oscssw
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Post by oscssw on Oct 30, 2022 20:08:46 GMT
If you ask me and you haven't but what the hell I'll put in my two cents anyway.
1. I agree the USN had no use for a Battle Cruiser because, as stated, the CV or even the CA with Scout planes could do that key long range scouting in contested waters Battle cruiser mission much better.
2. We are using a lot of 20/20 hindsight here. The idea for a large cruiser class originated in the early 1930s when the U.S. Navy sought to counter the Deutschland-class "pocket battleships" being launched by Germany. At that point in time, given the fact CVs had not been tested in combat yet and there were no plans to build more than a few of them a large cruiser with 11+ inch gns was not that dumb an idea. Add to that time showed that a small squadron of CAs or even CLs were a match for a single Pocket BB.
3. Calling Pye, Leahy and Stark Looney Tunes sure is funny but the Gun Club also had very good WW II admirals like Lee
and Oldendorf too. I think we are all a bit star struck by our much lauded Carrier admirals, many of whom were also flawed. That fact has been largely overlooked because, in the Pacific, the Bird farms were the decisive factor of victory,or so it seemed. Actually, I would say our logistics forces were the real war winner but they did not make for good news paper copy or thrilling movies.
4. As far as alternate ship acquisition schemes goes that is well beyond an E-8's pay grade. Thank God the US had the excess capacity to provide more than enough of the ships that were actually needed to win.
5. Manning the fleet.
5a IMO, it was an absolute miracle the US armed forces were able to train the number of adequately trained ex-civilians as quickly as was done. One of the KEY reasons for that was the fact he Regular pre WW II Armed forces, both Officer and NCO/POs were of such high quality. IMO, you have to credit the great depression for the fact so many of both were in uniform because the job prospects in the civilian world were so poor
AND
that allowed the recruiters to choose only the very best qualified for enlistment and commission. These pre war regulars were more than capable of filling billets well above what normally could be expected by their pre war rating/billets. It was these men who were essential in holding the line and then training the masses of "reservists".
5b. You want proof? Take a good look at the superb crew performance of the DDs and DEs off Samar. Those "Cans" were manned predominately by USNR officers and Sailors who were trained by the Pre war Regulars. They also had pre war sailors as their key Chiefs and most of the CO's.
5c. If you take a good look at the number of new sailors trained from 1942 to 1944 you will see an exponential increase and that was still going on in Sept 1945 to meet the needs of the proposed conquest and occupation of Japan.
6. I would also suspect there would be a wholesale decommissioning of our prewar and early war ships to free up crews for new construction if the A bombs did not do the job.
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1bigrich
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Post by 1bigrich on Oct 31, 2022 14:48:41 GMT
So this tweet below mentions how the Alaska class cruiser might have looked like had the United States decided to go full battlecruiser? Never heard of it before, would it help the Alaska-class if it was a full battlecruiser ore would it still end up as OTL. The USN designed something closer to a battlecruiser in the genesis of the ships that became the Iowas. A cruiser killer with 12 x 16in guns. The late, great CanisD did a drawing of the concept:  Regards, |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Oct 31, 2022 14:49:56 GMT
So this tweet below mentions how the Alaska class cruiser might have looked like had the United States decided to go full battlecruiser? Never heard of it before, would it help the Alaska-class if it was a full battlecruiser ore would it still end up as OTL. The USN designed something closer to a battlecruiser in the genesis of the ships that became the Iowas. A cruiser killer with 12 x 16in guns. The late, great CanisD did a drawing of the concept: Regards, A cruiser killer, nice name. |
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1bigrich
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Post by 1bigrich on Oct 31, 2022 15:29:49 GMT
If you ask me and you haven't but what the hell I'll put in my two cents anyway.1. I agree the USN had no use for a Battle Cruiser because, as stated, the CV or even the CA with Scout planes could do that key long range scouting in contested waters Battle cruiser mission much better. 2. We are using a lot of 20/20 hindsight here. The idea for a large cruiser class originated in the early 1930s when the U.S. Navy sought to counter the Deutschland-class "pocket battleships" being launched by Germany. At that point in time, given the fact CVs had not been tested in combat yet and there were no plans to build more than a few of them a large cruiser with 11+ inch gns was not that dumb an idea. Add to that time showed that a small squadron of CAs or even CLs were a match for a single Pocket BB. 3. Calling Pye, Leahy and Stark Looney Tunes sure is funny but the Gun Club also had very good WW II admirals like Lee and Oldendorf too. I think we are all a bit star struck by our much lauded Carrier admirals, many of whom were also flawed. That fact has been largely overlooked because, in the Pacific, the Bird farms were the decisive factor of victory,or so it seemed. Actually, I would say our logistics forces were the real war winner but they did not make for good news paper copy or thrilling movies. 4. As far as alternate ship acquisition schemes goes that is well beyond an E-8's pay grade. Thank God the US had the excess capacity to provide more than enough of the ships that were actually needed to win. 5. Manning the fleet. 5a IMO, it was an absolute miracle the US armed forces were able to train the number of adequately trained ex-civilians as quickly as was done. One of the KEY reasons for that was the fact he Regular pre WW II Armed forces, both Officer and NCO/POs were of such high quality. IMO, you have to credit the great depression for the fact so many of both were in uniform because the job prospects in the civilian world were so poor AND that allowed the recruiters to choose only the very best qualified for enlistment and commission. These pre war regulars were more than capable of filling billets well above what normally could be expected by their pre war rating/billets. It was these men who were essential in holding the line and then training the masses of "reservists". 5b. You want proof? Take a good look at the superb crew performance of the DDs and DEs off Samar. Those "Cans" were manned predominately by USNR officers and Sailors who were trained by the Pre war Regulars. They also had pre war sailors as their key Chiefs and most of the CO's. 5c. If you take a good look at the number of new sailors trained from 1942 to 1944 you will see an exponential increase and that was still going on in Sept 1945 to meet the needs of the proposed conquest and occupation of Japan. 6. I would also suspect there would be a wholesale decommissioning of our prewar and early war ships to free up crews for new construction if the A bombs did not do the job. Generally agree, Senior Chief. On Alaska, hindsight colors, or discolors as the case may be, the view from here. I don't buy into the 'black shoe/brown shoe' admiral labels. A key driver of the Alaska class was King, and he was Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force, i.e., a carrier admiral. With the advent of the treaties and the heavy cruiser, the carrier was viewed as vulnerable to raiding enemy heavy cruisers, a valid concern in the pre-radar era. A ship that could quickly and easily defeat an 8in-armed cruiser was therefore desirable as a carrier escort. Also King in particular saw the RN early in the war using battleships away from battleline duty as convoy escorts, He felt facing the IJN, the USN's battleline would be pre-occupied and couldn't afford to be so weakened (something the RN COULD afford when facing only Germany), so again, a ship with heavy guns able to defeat a cruiser would be useful. I think the admirals making the decisions that lead to Alaska and her sisters weren't 'carrier admirals' or 'battleship admirals', they were professionals trying to predict the future and equip their fleet with the best ships that could be had. That they didn't have perfect foresight for incredibly rapid development of radar and aircraft cannot be held against them, IMO. Excellent points on manning, training and civilian sailors. Professionalism should never be underestimated! Regards, |
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jbg
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Post by jbg on Nov 8, 2022 2:52:35 GMT
And, to go to bat against Admiral King and his temper would take MoH courage!
Jonathan
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Nov 8, 2022 7:41:42 GMT
While I don't disagree that the effort spent on the Alaska class was probably better spent elsewhere, I think your analysis that we could have had all that stuff is a bit off. --2 Yorktowns. We were not going to build any more Yorktowns. The last one of these was launched in December of 1940. The first Alaska was laid down December of 1941. The first Essex class carrier was laid down at the end of April 1941. Maybe we could have laid down two Essex class at New York Shipbuilding in Camden instead of the Alaska class. Laying down another Essex in lieu of Hawaii in December of 1943 would have ended up with that ship suffering the same fate as Hawaii, so there's no gain there. Roughly 20K tons each, total of 40,000 tons. --2 ordinary light cruisers - Do you mean the Cleveland class or the Atlanta class? Both were in series production at the time, but there's a large difference between the tonnages, 6,700 tons vs, 11,700 tons. Either 13,400 or 23,400 tons --4 destroyers - Again, which class? The Fletchers are probably the best choice. could also have been the Benson, Gleaves or Sumner classes. Lets call it 2,200 tons for the Fletcher/Sumner class. Total of 8,800 tons --a dozen destroyer escorts - Class? There's a half dozen to choose from. Lets split the difference and go with two from each class. 2 x 1,300 Evarts 2 x 1,700 Buckley, 2 x 1,200 Cannon, 2 x 1,200 Edsall, 2 x 1,700 Rudderow, and 2 x 1,300 Butler. Total of 16,800 tons --a dozen submarines - The Gato and Balao class were the subs under construction at the time, and they are about the same tonnage, so, 12 x 1,500 so 18,000 tons --2 CVE / oil tanker conversions Bogue class would be about the right timeframe. 2 x 8,300 so 16,300 tons. The Cimmeron class was a little smaller, roughly 7,500 tons, so 15,000 tons. and AN ARMORED DIVISION. which was about 338 tanks for a heavy armored division or 239 for a light armored division. Call it roughly 30 tons on average, with the Sherman weighing more, and the Stuart weighing less. 30 * 239 = 7,000 tons, and a heavy division coming in at 10,000 tons. Totals from a steel perspective, using the lightest weights above - 119,000 tons of steel. Alaska class cruiser was about 30K tons. x3 is 90,000 tons. Your estimate is over by an entire Alaska class ship. Now, talk about manning... 2,251 for the Alaska, total of 4,502, as the Hawaii never commissioned, but, lets call it 6,753 for fun. Essex class had 2,600 x 2 is 5,200, Cleveland had 1,255 x 2 is 2,510, Atlanta had 673, and so forth. An armored division had roughly 15,000 combat troops. While everyone likes to pile on the Alaska class for its perceived uselessness, and waste of men and materials, while the US could have BUILT other stuff, it could not have MANNED all the other stuff. The US could build FAR more stuff than it could man. Belushi TD 1. The Essexes were not quite ready. When the first Alaskas were keeled, the Yorktowns were the ready to use design alternative. 2. Juneaus. The Atlantas were garbage. 3. Probably Gleaves class. 4. Edsall. 5. Submerged displacement is not surface, so okay we still go 18,000 tons. 6. There were 5 Alaskas laid down and 3 cancelled in mid-construction (1 never was keeled) for a wastage of 70,000 tons of steel midwar for the hulls that were broken up. 7. Manning... The Alaskas sank nothing and shot down little. The alternativers offered per average... --an American aircraft carrier destroyed between 190 to 300 enemy aircraft and 2 to 3 enemy ships depending on whether they were light or heavy aircraft carriers. --an armored division inflicted its own weight in material losses and own numbers in the result of enemy human casualties The American army could have used another 1 in France when Bradley screwed up The Bulge. --the average US submarine sank 4 enemy ships. That is about 2x what the British or Germans did. --The average oil tanker CVE depending could be guaranteed to kill about 50 enemy planes, 2 enemy submaines and replace one fleet tanker, and sink 1/15 of an enemy cruiser in a surface battle. Total manning has to be analyzed for positive human capital invested returns. 25,000 for the lot doing the above kinds of damage, would be considerable; which in the submarine case specifically as an example (12 x 80= 960 men in 12 boats sink 48 Japanese ships at an average oif 3,000 tons displacement per target) = 144,000 tons killed. That is 2.4% more Japanese shipping on the bottom sooner and possibly a 3 month shorter Pacific war. How many Americans died in combatr dureing the summer of 1945 in the Pacific? About 2 Alaskas worth at least. 25,000 men could be squeezed out. We had a lot of shirkers, and if we had been rational (racism and genderism) we could have rousted the shirkers out and put them into the line along with the actually quite good human resources we refused to use because they were "not deemed suitable for combat or combat support". |
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