ISOT for WWII Britain

Miletus, as Steve says, you've got the wrong end of the stick.

The only possibly doubling up is in the case of the 1939 RN and 1945 RN, as the former did have a large number of ships out at sea as of 1/9/1939. They are now joined by all of the 1945 fleet, which I outlined above. Coming back are also the Far Eastern forces, all the troops on occupation in Italy, garrison forces from the Middle East, the British Army of the Rhine et al, appearing in the 1945 UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, replacing the 1939 landmass, men etc. 

So, you are wrong on Dowding, but that matters little. The speculative numbers are, dare I suggest, superceded by those in the link I supplied of ~1360 Lancasters, 269 Mosquito bombers and ~300 Halifaxes. Even that is enough to completely stuff up the 1939 Luftwaffe, which as you say, lacks the Kammhuber Line, more advanced radar, the sheer numbers of AA guns and half a hundred other components of a functioning air defence system.

The leftover US supplies are a constraint, but not a fatal one. If fighting continues for longer than that period, then they will necessarily be constrained, but not paralysed.

1. Bomber Command in 1945 has the capacity to knock out a German city every week with the main bomber force, operate with impunity around the clock with the Mosquito and knock out precision targets with No. 617 Squadron.
2. We know that Jerry has 1100 fighters, not all of which are Bf-109s, 290 Stukas and ~1100 bombers. We also know that their production rates in 1939 were nothing to write home about.
3. The RAF has more and better fighters than the Luftwaffe, even before jets are included in calculations, and is building at a rate that the Germans cannot match nor interrupt.
4. The carrier forces of the RN have sufficient numbers and weight that they could overwhelm German defences on a localised level if used in concert.
5. The British also have that crucial weapon of knowledge of the future.

Taking those five issues into combination, there is not a suggestion of a long term air war. I don't think that it will be won by bombing alone, but that will be the first means of attack, followed by movement of the fighter and tactical planes to France and a 10 division 3rd BEF going into the Saar alongside the French.

Sealift is an issue, but there isn't an absolute 'need it this 24 hours' urgency, nor a dearth of 1945 ships in port in Britain. The 1939 Merchant Navy will be at sea and can do service quite shortly and cross Channel administrative landings aren't the most difficult thing under the sun.

Just so we can keep the numbers straight.

1. Once you postulate a 1939 KGV with a PCU crew as she is still building and fitting out and you introduce that same KGV with a BPF crew who contain some of the same people... 1939 and 1945 means human collocation. Now aside from the very real Kaboom involved as the that sombrero hat of potential energy flattens out, we have the problem of that striker meeting his petty officer self; six years later.

But put the physics and Dowding 1939/1945 aside.

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We have the CBI medical casualties from Japanese prisoner of war camps and construction slave worker farms introduced into hospital on 1 September 1939. Since Allied prisoner recovery and receivership programs were going on into 1946 in the CBI, I find this interesting. 

But put that one aside and let us deal with the RAF. 

No 617 Squadron was the RAF equivalent of the 509th Composite Group USAAF. It was a specialist unit that scored spectacular strikes in Holland to neutralize a security issue when it bombed a Gestapo compound. Its other claim was the Roer (not the Ruhr) dams, hence the name "Dambusters". They attacked three target sets and only damaged in any significant degree two of them. The third was scratched at the cost of a lot of bombers and crews. The raids were conducted in May of 1943, and the Germans were back in business 90 days later.  The 3 months lost production and flood out was valuable indeed, but hardly war winning or war crippling as hoped. 

I read that RAF forces available list above as May 1945. I accept it as given. 270 more Lancasters is not going to matter all that much to me as to available effects. What I will point out...

Destroy one German city a week is the claim with this 1945 force in 1939.  I submit not without American help and I mean the kind the 8th Air Force supplied in 1945. Exzample? BERLIN. Other examples are Cologne, Munich, Hamburg, DRESDEN. This is 1945 when German defenses are flat. Some of those targets are at the limit of Lancaster range which means light as in half or less full rated bomb loads which is true for the Americans as well. Also remember that RAF bombing is by stream method where bombs are dumped at night into a fire beaconed target by single bombers in a file series one after another. The targets are not phalanx bombed in mass release as the Americans do in daylight. That makes a difference on how damage is distributed. Believe me, that matters as ARCLIGHT demonstrated.    

The RAF fighters universally due to a defensible at the time technical decision are severely restricted in range. The exception is the Mosquito in its fighter variant and look how few of them there are? About 400?        

The FAA is equipped with 70% American aircraft in 1945. Mainly Corsairs, Martlets *(Wildcats) and Avengers.  If the RAF spares are "tight", then imagine what the BPF stocks are like.        
After Pedestal which happened 2 months after Midway, I argue that the British probably knew a bit more about how to fight an aircraft carrier battle than the Americans did. Yet when the British showed up off Java to work over the Japanese held oil fields in 1945, the Japanese handed them their rumps. It was as if the RN had forgotten everything that they learned and taught US in early 1943. Okinawa was worse. Armored flight decks were needed because British fleet air defense was non-existent. Knowledge of the future is useless without refreshed perishable skillsets. 

Even so...


Get the Meuse bridges when the Germans come through the Ardennes, bomb the traffic jams on the roads all the way back to the Rhine, especially around Aachen  and arrange for Huntziger to be run over by a Cromwell by accident. The French will thank you for it later.


     

The British may just want to take a hands off, laissez-faire attitude while these two delightful regimes take swings at each other for awhile, Britain ensures Nazi Germany is dead, dead, dead, transitions itself and its empire to a good peacetime footing, and organizes postwar Europe to its liking. Might as well let the Red Menace shred the Yellow Peril in a blender and wait till Northeast Asia is "orange juice" that is easier to mop up at a lower cost.

Most pf these raids were also incidentalist and "temporary" in effect. The Tirpitz raid was the one instance where I think a permanent effect was achieved.

Example...



Note that by March of 1945, the Anglo-American armies were cruising through the North German Plain and that the raids were therefore "pointless" and a waste of bombs?

The point of an air campaign or even a raid is to dislocate and interrupt an enemy war effort to an immediate and catastrophic degree that shapes their overall war options and direction and decision making.

Pearl Harbor and Ploesti fits this criterion. The 617 targets aside from KMS Tirpitz do not.

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The fighter pilots of the USAAF thank you for that compliment.

It is actually based on 2020 hindsight, what I write hereafter, and how even a minimalist 1945 air defense forced another quite capable air force to adopt night intrusion and day fighter escort to defeat such an enemy.

When it comes to air tacticians, nobody holds a 1945 candle to Curtis Lemay. His tactics over Japan were based on RAF tactics over 1945 Germany. With regards to specific European conditions as the RAF found them... the RAF was unable to mount deep range escort or tactical strike into central Germany because of their decisions to create the kind of fighter park they created with their Hawker and Supermarine lines of fighters mid-war.

Because of wind-shear and sideslip drift in bomber streams the RAF was forced to bomb LOW to mid altitude to put bombs inside the optical target markers or radio markers that preset their bomb release points.

Because of JET FIGHTERS the RAF continued to fly mostly at night in 1945.

Now, no jet fighters in 1939?

Do not need them, the Germans do not. Their 1939 Luftwaffe actually has a flight line of sufficient "bomber destroyers" in numbers to make unescorted daylight Lancaster raids suicide. And their 1939 radar network is not suppressed yet. And worse... it is as good as the 1945 British air defense setup as to coverage, though not yet in command and control. Kannhuber does not have Holland yet.

I think if I were the 1945 RAF with a full strength 1939 LW, I would remember Regensburg and Schwinefurt if I were Bomber Command and not be eager to try day-lighters until Fighter Command has killed off those German pilot cadres.   



Hmmm. 

USS Robin

The exchange between HMS Victorious and USS Saratoga was in vectoring CAP patrols (British experience and 4 channel radio positive ground control) and deck park handling movement and aircraft fuel-rearm cycles (American experience against the Japanese.). If it was a master class, neither navy really learned enough to handle the Japanese who still outperformed them at such things as night deck landings, speed of rearm and refuel and landing circuit traffic management for multi-aircraft carrier task groups. Even in 1944 when Spruance saw off Ozawa, the Americans were not the plane handlers the Japanese were. That only happens by Korea. 

Why? 

Well... the Japanese had a primitive mechanical land-on system that did not require a landing signal officer. We know it today as the MEATBALL, but back then it was a set of lights that changed colors if you were above or below the proper glide slope for land-on as you trapped. In its 1944 version, it was unhooded and only three rows instead of what we use now, but the Japanese aviators were drilled on it until it was muscle memory-flying. That was why it took them so long to carrier qualify decent aircraft carrier pilots. 

Off Okinawa. 

The BPF operated a mixed aviation force of 6 medium and 4 light aircraft carriers. Altogether these operated about 330 fighters, a mix of about 220 Corsairs and 70 Seafires with a skein of 36-40 Hellcats. They handled about 400 count kamikaze intruders who broke through their CAP and hit six of the British aircraft carriers. If claims are accurate, the FAA fighter force splashed 50% of the intruders in air-to-air action.  200 leakers got through and scored 70 impacts on various ships.

The American force had about 11 heavy carriers and 6 light carriers. The fighter line was 1,000 aircraft that was mixed 60% Hellcat and 40% Corsair. They took on between 3,600 to 4,000 intruders. From claims and observed reports about 1,000 intruders broke through the CAP and 168-204 impacts (accounts vary) occurred, damaging 6 aircraft carriers enough to force retirement for repairs.

This is the record. 

The observation is that this showed that neither the Americans nor the British had developed a good low-low-low intruder defense.
Further, that without the British armored flight deck, a hanger event occurred which caused a loss of mission and aircraft carrier temporary withdrawal for repairs.
Further that the enemy attacker profile of side impact could be effective in permanently deforming and crippling through shock to the point of uselessness a through hull up to strength deck / flight deck framed aircraft carrier. This happened to 2 British flattops making them post battle complete write-offs. 

All in all, different experiences and different results. Teaboys and Ameri-boos take note: each navy chose its methods to fit the environment it was going to face and adopted methods and procedures that worked for it at the time these forces were built. What worked during the Club Runs and in the North Atlantic was less effective off Okinawa. What worked at Philippine Sea was also found to be lacking at Okinawa. 

That is war. The enemy learns. 

I am not sure the 1945 FAA fighter line was designed to handle a 1939 Luftwaffe. You see the FAA fighter line was tuned to fight best at medium altitude, same as the USNAS at the time. This was combat between 1500 and 3000 meters or between 5,000 and 10,000 feet.  They expected to attack land targets from the sea or fight enemy naval aviation. Combat was rare at 10,000 meters. or 33,000 feet at sea. The 1939 LW fighter line was designed to fight around 5000 to 7,000 meters. It was a land-based army cooperation and battlefield interdiction force which needed its intruder fighters to fly top cover for a force of medium bombers and dive bombers, like the early USN Wildcats which were expected to perform the same mission. High altitude meant high dive speeds and vertical fighting. Aside from the Corsair by 1944 that was not the way naval fighters worked. Their role was to swarm an intrusion at the intruders' altitude bands, which was mostly around or below 3,000 meters UNTIL Okinawa.  Then the Japanese became smart and used anti-radar tactics.      
    

 



      
  

There you go again.

1.) You are taking the wrong point out of the circumstance. 617 Squadron is a 1945 level precision unit ready to be applied against an unsuspecting enemy.

2.) Not quite.

The September 1939 Luftwaffe has this:
www.ww2-weapons.com/luftwaffe-orders-of-battle-september-2-1939/

Equipment of Luftwaffe First Line Units on September 1, 1939:
Aircraft type strength
He 111 bombers 780
Do 17 bombers 470
Do17 recon 280
Ju 88 bombers 20
Ju 87 dive-bombers 335
Me 109 D fighters 235
Me 109 E fighters 850
Me 110 heavy fighters 195
Ar66 fighters 5
Ar68 fighters 35
Hs126 tactical recon 195
He46 tactical recon 100
Coastal aircrafts 205
Miscellaneous 65
Total 3,960


195 Messerschmitt 110s, prior to any losses over Poland or elsewhere. That does not suggest a formidable or indomitable force up against the numbers of British heavy bombers, Mosquitoes and thousands and day fighters that the RAF has available. They won't be static after the shock of arrival

You keep on making reference to the RAF not having long range fighters, but they don't need them when they have French airfields. You expound in great detail on about tangential matters; I enjoy reading your stuff, learning new things and considering thought-provoking points, but it is also good to focus on the real question

3.) We aren't talking about Okinawa, so that entire section is not relevant. I made reference to the entire FAA having more aircraft than the Luftwaffe has fighters, based on the 1085 single engine early Me-109s and the 185 Me-110s and the FAA's 3700 aircraft. Now, plenty of those are trainers of no use for comparison, but there is still more aircraft back in Britain or on carriers off Scapa than were fielded on the BPF on ops in the Pacific.

Here's the bottom line:

- The RAF has over 8000 operational planes at this point, down from its peak of 9200 although many will have lost their pilots and ground crew with the non-transfer of Dominion and Allied personnel, if I understand Steve correctly. The Fleet Air Arm adds more as outlined above.
- They have thousands upon thousands more aircraft in storage, laid up or in second, third (and fourth!) line roles that have made the journey
- This gives a quite substantial numerical superiority
- The frontline types of both are overwhelmingly superior to the best German bombers and fighters of 1939
- Britain of 1945 had wound down from the aircraft production peaks of 1944, but has the capacity to ramp back up again. Even on 1945 numbers, they are to Germany as a 6'6" bully over a toddler
www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=116:british-production-of-aircraft-by-year-during-the-second-world-war&catid=48:production-statistics&Itemid=61
- They have the Avro Lincoln and Hawker Tempest in production, plus the de Havilland Hornet and Vampire, as well as the Bristol Brigand on the cusp of the same. Better than Jerry
- Britain of 1945 knows how to break German codes and also knows what ze Germans will do if they act historically
- The news of an entire country transferring through time will leak pretty quickly, providing ammunition to the German high command who were worried about Hilter dropping them in it
- The French will welcome thousands of British planes coming over to improve their defences and, dare I say it, the French body politic will have a bit of a think about the news that they have been given about what happened to them. They have been delivered and given a heaven sent chance
- British land forces, when they arrive, have better tanks, better mobility, better comms, better artillery and better close air support than Jerry

I would postulate that there would be a continued Saar Offensive which, in combination with RAF bombing by day and night. You don't need to kill off French generals, simply retire and replace them. About the only fellows in real trouble Frogside are Laval and his chums, who won't have a long or pleasant time of it.

As Steve says, I don't see the circumstances for a long war, nor for a cautious, stolid approach.

The heavies would stay in England and operate from there. Tactical aircraft would go to France.

The RAF fighter line are not stuck in England ad infinitum, as they would go to French airfields and build new ones from the beginning. It won't happen overnight, but it will happen. There are Hurricanes 'returning' from the Far East and Med that are able to operate from grass fields, in addition to Spits forum.12oclockhigh.net/archive/index.php?t-15234.html Extending French runways to take Tempests would be an urgent priority. In the meantime, with drop tanks, the Tempests can get a pretty decent range from Kent.

As said below on the FAA point, there are also several hundred each of RAF Mustangs and Thunderbolts, plus the Mosquito fighters

It is important to remember that this is an ISOT into a war. Previous considerations and peacetime production and development rates go out the window. The Hornet, Lincoln and more will be building and entering service at a wartime rate.

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The British aren't up against an Okinawa situation, but one of almost complete surprise. The Germans will have next to no knowledge about the 1945 RN's aircraft and capabilities and that will stay until they have protracted engagements and real intelligence.

Total deliveries to the RN were 1892 Corsairs and 252 Hellcats; the amount fielded by the Fleet was a much smaller fraction of that, as you say, and accidents/combat attrition will also have cut into it. However, there is still likely to be hundreds of Corsairs and a good number of Hellcats now back in Britain.

The FAA strikes hitting the North Sea ports of Kiel, Hamburg, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven etc will be larger than any that the Germans have ever trained for or contemplated. They will outnumber the ~150 German fighters in the areas perhaps 5 to 1 in fighters alone, not counting any RAF long range fighters (400-500 Mustangs and 400-500 Thunderbolts come to mind)

Notably, the Germans aren't going to be the ones flying out to find and hit any carriers 370km off the German coast, as the only aircraft they have that can go out on that range are busy over Poland (He-111 and Do-17s; Me-110s were not adapted to anti-ship operations at this point).

Then, at night, Hamburg gets bombed by the Halifax force, whilst the Mosquitos and Lancasters hit the Ruhr.

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The British artillery doctrine and response time will give the 1939 Germans conniptions, as it did in 1944 when there was Teutonic scuttlebutt about 'automatic 25pdrs'. Throw in most of the lessons of WW2 in @, and it is a formidable force. There will be more than a handful of Centurions, depending on timing, and the Comet alone will be trouble.
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Is Jerry going to be able to miraculously concentrate the entire 110 force, handwaving losses over Poland and every other mission, into specific night fighter operations over a particular part of Germany. Are all of those 110s and their pilots trained in night fighting operations? As of 1/9/1939, I would suggest not. The British numbers are also not going to be static, but increased by production of Lancasters, Halifaxes and Lincolns, as well as Mosquito night fighters and light bombers.

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Germany isn't just going to turn around and start fighting like it is 1942, where they have experience, intelligence, detailed planning and strategy. Everything they have on fighting Britain has gone out the window with a literally miraculous appearance of a superior future equivalent, loaded to the gills with forces and equipment. Hitler thought that the Allies would not fight over Poland, yet now will be facing a much hardened equivalent that will not hold back from Day 1.

I apologise as this is Wiki, but I'm not going to spend too much more time on this on my day off:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II

1939's numbers refer to September, October, November and December. In that time, they produced 449 109s and 156 110s, which gives an average monthly rate of 112.5 and 39 respectively. The RAF alone is averaging 290 Spitfires a month in 1945

weaponsandwarfare.com/2019/05/04/luftwaffe-air-war-poland-1939/

~579 losses of all kinds doesn't give us details of how many were fighters and types, but it can be presumed that some of both were among that number. That is the beginning of the attritional trap that the Luftwaffe finds itself in.
- Losing aircraft over Poland
- Losing aircraft in engagements against the RAF and RN over Northwest and Western Germany in daytime
- Losing aircraft from night operations
- Having airfields across the western part of the country hit by tactical bombers and intruders
- Struggling to increase production, but doing so above historical levels when facing a new threat
- Facing a much, much larger RAF that has better aircraft across the board
- Lancaster production is over 200 a month and that will now continue, rather than halting with both VE Day and the wind down in the Pacific

The Luftwaffe fighter force will be split up between the North Sea, Poland, Western Germany and Berlin/Saxony/Silesia, further cutting its capacity and effectiveness.

Now, the US supplies and aircraft are going to be running out soon if used up at a high intensity of combat. You're right there.

But that won't bring things to a complete stop, but rather alter their tempo. The damage, though, will be done to Germany in the initial blows and will be beyond their capacity to recover.

By Spring 1940, the British Army will be in France, airfields and supply dumps will be built, production rates will be ramped back up and hundreds of new tanks and aircraft will be available well beyond the capacity of Germany to cope with. It might well be that, by that time, the nervous German generals will have tried something.

Japan is in even more trouble, as the British have a fully modern fleet and submarine force ready to go out to Singapore, plus more aircraft than they can cope with in Malaya and French Indochina.