miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Sept 20, 2022 13:42:36 GMT
An emergency meeting of the cabinet is under way seeking to make sense of what has happened when the French ambassador contacts Mr Attlee to report he has received a strange message from Paris claiming to be from Prime Minister Édouard Daladier asking for an urgent meeting with Prime Minister Chamberlain! This gives an hint and telegraph messages and listening to foreign radio am amazed cabinet learns that somehow they and their country have found themselves back on 1st September 1939 listening a few hours later to the 1st reports of the German invasion of Poland. Dowding is very much in play on 1 Sept. 1939. The ISOT and OP has colocation of 1939 and 1945 British forces (which is why I mentioned the Pauli Exclusion Principle. These include human beings as well as two KGVs and so forth...) Dowding? What the dickens? He retired in 1942. This is an ISOT from 1945, so he is an irrelevant factor. Indeed, your paragraph on RAF leadership is irrelevant, as we aren’t talking about early war RAF leadership, but who comes back as of September 1945. Focus on the question and topic, not taking the opportunity to get on hobby horses, however accurate or not they may be. RAF leadership was a complete snarl throughout WWII. It is very relevant as to technical and op-art factors. Target priorities and allotments are human decisions. Example: Harris and the stubborn refusal to release bombers for naval support missions right up to the bitter end of the war. Or how about his ignorance of OPRES results as to the ineffectiveness of "dehousing"? It took a combined chiefs of staff order to shift the RAF heavies over to the oil targets sets and implement the transportation plan. I have yet to see an air campaign that took less than 3 months to effect changes in an adversary's actions. The closest I have seen is the First Gulf War and that was more a question of the Iraqis being led by an incompetent leadership. At the second go, the Iraqis with fewer resources did far better at concealment and dispersion in what was absolutely an air force's ideal targeting environment. Here in this ISOT we have 1939 Germany and the sole resources of the RAF. I believe the RAF heavy bomber forces never had more than 1200 4 engine bombers available at their peak WWII strength. Just to give a benchmark at end of conflict, it took 40% of British economic activity entoto to create and maintain that size of heavy bomber forces. That in this ISOT means 1945 Lancasters and there were only about 7,400 made total of which we have about ~1,100 in the transition. As for the Dehavilland Mosquito, an excellent airframe, about half of those 7,300 examples, made were recon and various fighter variants. That leaves 3,650 for night intruder pathfinder and marker and medium CAS missions. The Mosquito fleet at no time exceeded about 1,100 aircraft on hand and at end of war there were about ~700 still operational. ============================================================================= According to the ISOT, the Americans have vanished in the British isles. This does not detail about stocks and supplies on American used RAF fields, but I guess those vanished, too. What the British have of American supplied materials is about 2 engine swap-outs on hand, and 30 days of high octane av-gas at 1944 op-tempos. I do not know about bomb-filler. Call it 3 months? Explosives deteriorate and it is not smart to keep them stored long unless you have advanced inerts which we did not have in WWII. The British are still using cordite as a propellant for example. An aero engine of the WWII Pratt or Rolls variety needs a swap-out, tear down and rebuild about every 30 hours or 4 missions. These engines can be recycled about 4 times before they are scrap metal. That means the engines on hand can be predicted to last 2 months. Have I missed anything? I probably did.
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Sept 20, 2022 14:11:36 GMT
An emergency meeting of the cabinet is under way seeking to make sense of what has happened when the French ambassador contacts Mr Attlee to report he has received a strange message from Paris claiming to be from Prime Minister Édouard Daladier asking for an urgent meeting with Prime Minister Chamberlain! This gives an hint and telegraph messages and listening to foreign radio am amazed cabinet learns that somehow they and their country have found themselves back on 1st September 1939 listening a few hours later to the 1st reports of the German invasion of Poland. Dowding is very much in play on 1 Sept. 1939. The ISOT and OP has colocation of 1939 and 1945 British forces (which is why I mentioned the Pauli Exclusion Principle. These include human beings as well as two KGVs and so forth...)Dowding? What the dickens? He retired in 1942. This is an ISOT from 1945, so he is an irrelevant factor. Indeed, your paragraph on RAF leadership is irrelevant, as we aren’t talking about early war RAF leadership, but who comes back as of September 1945. Focus on the question and topic, not taking the opportunity to get on hobby horses, however accurate or not they may be. RAF leadership was a complete snarl throughout WWII. It is very relevant as to technical and op-art factors. Target priorities and allotments are human decisions. Example: Harris and the stubborn refusal to release bombers for naval support missions right up to the bitter end of the war. Or how about his ignorance of OPRES results as to the ineffectiveness of "dehousing"? It took a combined chiefs of staff order to shift the RAF heavies over to the oil targets sets and implement the transportation plan. I have yet to see an air campaign that took less than 3 months to effect changes in an adversary's actions. The closest I have seen is the First Gulf War and that was more a question of the Iraqis being led by an incompetent leadership. At the second go, the Iraqis with fewer resources did far better at concealment and dispersion in what was absolutely an air force's ideal targeting environment. Here in this ISOT we have 1939 Germany and the sole resources of the RAF. I believe the RAF heavy bomber forces never had more than 1200 4 engine bombers available at their peak WWII strength. Just to give a benchmark at end of conflict, it took 40% of British economic activity entoto to create and maintain that size of heavy bomber forces. That in this ISOT means 1945 Lancasters and there were only about 7,400 made total of which we have about ~1,100 in the transition. As for the Dehavilland Mosquito, an excellent airframe, about half of those 7,300 examples, made were recon and various fighter variants. That leaves 3,650 for night intruder pathfinder and marker and medium CAS missions. The Mosquito fleet at no time exceeded about 1,100 aircraft on hand and at end of war there were about ~700 still operational. ============================================================================= According to the ISOT, the Americans have vanished in the British isles. This does not detail about stocks and supplies on American used RAF fields, but I guess those vanished, too. What the British have of American supplied materials is about 2 engine swap-outs on hand, and 30 days of high octane av-gas at 1944 op-tempos. I do not know about bomb-filler. Call it 3 months? Explosives deteriorate and it is not smart to keep them stored long unless you have advanced inerts which we dod not have in WWII. The British are still using cordite as a propellant for example. An aero engine of the WWII Pratt or Rolls variety needs a swap-out, tear down and rebuild about every 30 hours or 4 missions. These engines can be recycled about 4 times before they are scrap metal. That means the engines on hand can be predicted to last 2 months. Have I missed anything? I probably did.
No it doesn't. I explicitly stated that 45 Britain replaced 39 Britain but that the British forces and equipment outside Britain in 39 was unaffected.
I also stated that the US and other non-British forces disappeared but that overseas 45 units and their equipment, spares, supplies etc were returned in replacement. [Possibly misreading that is why you made your other error in understanding]?
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Sept 20, 2022 14:40:45 GMT
Dowding is very much in play on 1 Sept. 1939. The ISOT and OP has colocation of 1939 and 1945 British forces (which is why I mentioned the Pauli Exclusion Principle. These include human beings as well as two KGVs and so forth...)RAF leadership was a complete snarl throughout WWII. It is very relevant as to technical and op-art factors. Target priorities and allotments are human decisions. Example: Harris and the stubborn refusal to release bombers for naval support missions right up to the bitter end of the war. Or how about his ignorance of OPRES results as to the ineffectiveness of "dehousing"? It took a combined chiefs of staff order to shift the RAF heavies over to the oil targets sets and implement the transportation plan. I have yet to see an air campaign that took less than 3 months to effect changes in an adversary's actions. The closest I have seen is the First Gulf War and that was more a question of the Iraqis being led by an incompetent leadership. At the second go, the Iraqis with fewer resources did far better at concealment and dispersion in what was absolutely an air force's ideal targeting environment. Here in this ISOT we have 1939 Germany and the sole resources of the RAF. I believe the RAF heavy bomber forces never had more than 1200 4 engine bombers available at their peak WWII strength. Just to give a benchmark at end of conflict, it took 40% of British economic activity entoto to create and maintain that size of heavy bomber forces. That in this ISOT means 1945 Lancasters and there were only about 7,400 made total of which we have about ~1,100 in the transition. As for the Dehavilland Mosquito, an excellent airframe, about half of those 7,300 examples, made were recon and various fighter variants. That leaves 3,650 for night intruder pathfinder and marker and medium CAS missions. The Mosquito fleet at no time exceeded about 1,100 aircraft on hand and at end of war there were about ~700 still operational. ============================================================================= According to the ISOT, the Americans have vanished in the British isles. This does not detail about stocks and supplies on American used RAF fields, but I guess those vanished, too. What the British have of American supplied materials is about 2 engine swap-outs on hand, and 30 days of high octane av-gas at 1944 op-tempos. I do not know about bomb-filler. Call it 3 months? Explosives deteriorate and it is not smart to keep them stored long unless you have advanced inerts which we dod not have in WWII. The British are still using cordite as a propellant for example. An aero engine of the WWII Pratt or Rolls variety needs a swap-out, tear down and rebuild about every 30 hours or 4 missions. These engines can be recycled about 4 times before they are scrap metal. That means the engines on hand can be predicted to last 2 months. Have I missed anything? I probably did. No it doesn't. I explicitly stated that 45 Britain replaced 39 Britain but that the British forces and equipment outside Britain in 39 was unaffected. I also stated that the US and other non-British forces disappeared but that overseas 45 units and their equipment, spares, supplies etc were returned in replacement. [Possibly misreading that is why you made your other error in understanding]?
Nothing there: changes what I wrote. You need to clarify what you mean by "returned in replacement". Does that mean the US stuff is replaced by British equivalents from overseas? Because if that is the case, then you mean Continental Europe and the CBI foprces and THAT has zero effect on the RAF strategic bombers aside from European tactical air forces. You have introed veteran ground troops galore and no sea lift. The stocks for air warfare remain as I wrote. I read where you wrote: At midnight something changes. Many people suddenly disappear, causing concern and consternation. All foreign military personal in the UK, including Commonwealth, Imperial and allied forces along with German and Italian POWs suddenly disappear, along with in the case of foreign forces in their own units all their equipment. However some appear to replace them. The mainly US bases across the country are not left empty but suddenly filled with British air and ground forces from overseas, along with their equipment. Medical facilities are filled not only with their previous patients but also thousands of emaciated men who when their own confuse passes explain they were in Japanese prisoner of war or labour camps across the latter's empire. Off Scapa Flow very confused radio messages are heard as RN forces overseas, including the British Pacific fleet similarly find themselves within a few miles of the prime British fleet base. Especially confusing for those who were in daylight and tropic waters only seconds before. Similarly men and women in naval shore facilities around the world find themselves back in British fleet bases. You did write that, did you not?
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Post by simon darkshade on Sept 20, 2022 14:56:07 GMT
Miletus, as Steve says, you've got the wrong end of the stick.
The only possibly doubling up is in the case of the 1939 RN and 1945 RN, as the former did have a large number of ships out at sea as of 1/9/1939. They are now joined by all of the 1945 fleet, which I outlined above. Coming back are also the Far Eastern forces, all the troops on occupation in Italy, garrison forces from the Middle East, the British Army of the Rhine et al, appearing in the 1945 UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, replacing the 1939 landmass, men etc.
So, you are wrong on Dowding, but that matters little. The speculative numbers are, dare I suggest, superceded by those in the link I supplied of ~1360 Lancasters, 269 Mosquito bombers and ~300 Halifaxes. Even that is enough to completely stuff up the 1939 Luftwaffe, which as you say, lacks the Kammhuber Line, more advanced radar, the sheer numbers of AA guns and half a hundred other components of a functioning air defence system.
The leftover US supplies are a constraint, but not a fatal one. If fighting continues for longer than that period, then they will necessarily be constrained, but not paralysed.
1. Bomber Command in 1945 has the capacity to knock out a German city every week with the main bomber force, operate with impunity around the clock with the Mosquito and knock out precision targets with No. 617 Squadron. 2. We know that Jerry has 1100 fighters, not all of which are Bf-109s, 290 Stukas and ~1100 bombers. We also know that their production rates in 1939 were nothing to write home about. 3. The RAF has more and better fighters than the Luftwaffe, even before jets are included in calculations, and is building at a rate that the Germans cannot match nor interrupt. 4. The carrier forces of the RN have sufficient numbers and weight that they could overwhelm German defences on a localised level if used in concert. 5. The British also have that crucial weapon of knowledge of the future.
Taking those five issues into combination, there is not a suggestion of a long term air war. I don't think that it will be won by bombing alone, but that will be the first means of attack, followed by movement of the fighter and tactical planes to France and a 10 division 3rd BEF going into the Saar alongside the French.
Sealift is an issue, but there isn't an absolute 'need it this 24 hours' urgency, nor a dearth of 1945 ships in port in Britain. The 1939 Merchant Navy will be at sea and can do service quite shortly and cross Channel administrative landings aren't the most difficult thing under the sun.
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Post by simon darkshade on Sept 20, 2022 15:41:03 GMT
Actually, the balance gets better: www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-3908-01RNships.htm31/8/1939: "Home Fleet - departed Scapa Flow at 1800 with battleships NELSON, RODNEY, ROYAL OAK, ROYAL SOVEREIGN, aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL, light cruisers CALYPSO, CALEDON, DIOMEDE, DRAGON of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, EFFINGHAM, CARDIFF, DUNEDIN, EMERALD of the 12th Cruiser Squadron, AURORA, BELFAST, SHEFFIELD of the 18th Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers FAULKNOR, FAME, FEARLESS, FIREDRAKE, FORESTER, FORTUNE, FOXHOUND, FURY of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. The Fleet deployed in the North Sea between the Orkneys and Norway. Battlecruisers HOOD, REPULSE and Tribal-class destroyers SOMALI, ASHANTI, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, MASHONA, MATABELE, PUNJABI, TARTAR of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla departed Scapa Flow for patrol off the Skagerrak. BEDOUIN had mechanical defects and returned to Scapa Flow for repairs. Home Fleet returned to Scapa Flow on 6 September. British Home waters - light cruiser EDINBURGH departed Glasgow after docking and arrived at Scapa Flow on 1 September." So that increases the available force for the Home Fleet to 4 KGVs, 4 Nelsons, Hood, Repulse, Renown, QE, Warspite, Malaya, Barham, Ramilies, Royal Oak and Royal Sovereign, whilst the 1945 Warspite, Revenge (disarmed), Resolution (disarmed), Valiant and Malaya are in various states of damage. What it amounts to is only missing HMS Prince of Wales, from one way of thinking. Given that this is literally ASB, I don't think that we need to be bound too tightly to the quantum mechanics of our universe; something bigger and weirder is going on. The main weapon against Germany that is relatively ready to go is Bomber Command. There is less of the compunction of 1939, so they will go to Berlin and the Ruhr from the outset. - Whilst the rest of the world is stumbling about with 1939 tanks, the British have the Centurion in production and, with the need, can ramp that up - They have jets in good numbers, plus advanced aircraft projects across the board - 1939 Britain had a GDP of $300 billion 1990 US, whereas 1945 has one of $347 billion. The postwar recession would be temporarily halted due to increased war spending - They have knowledge of the atom bomb and roughly how it was to be made. They know which Nazi rocket scientists to go for. They know which Middle Eastern leaders turned coat during @ WW2. They know who backed the Japanese from among the ranks of the Indian independence movement. - The Merchant Navy is diminished slightly in overall numbers, but has some more modern ships and decent designs building - The prewar national debt was £8,163,000,000 - a large sum for the prewar world. Net Public Debt 1945 was £21,360 million, a large part of which was owed overseas. This was the real killer for a lot of starry eyed postwar plans, ranging from housing to the welfare state 'New Jerusalem' to being able to afford a defence budget for a robust military. The overseas debts are now gone, with only whatever domestic bonds et al necessarily payable - British assets in South America and the USA are back, after being hocked off during the Lend Lease discussions and implementation - Without the desperation of 1940, I can't see the big secrets of the Tizard Mission being given to the Americans freely. Many of the technical advances will therefore earn good hard cash Whatever wars happen with Germany, Italy and Japan will be short, decisive and victorious. There won't be the economic damage to the wider world, which helps the reestablishment and advantages of British trade in the new 1940s, nor the tremendous losses of civilian life. There will be no Holocaust this time around. The winding down of Empire will be greatly slowed without the dual necessities of being broke and being kicked into a distant third place behind two decidedly anti-imperialist superpowers. The moral damage of the loss of Singapore etc has disappeared in the ISOT.
I did notice while looking at the Hood wiki entry yesterday for another matter that it was away on 1-9-39 but that is a hell of a lot of other ships.
Agree that the main weapon for immediate deployment would be BC which for all its many faults is a well experienced weapon in 45. It will do a great deal of damage both materially and in shock while OTL the autumn/winter of 39/40 was a bad time for Germany due to the Nazis neglect of their railway system. Here its likely to be much worse.
Britain's technological and economic position is a lot better now although it could have issues claiming some of those US based assets if Washington plays hard ball as it tended to do. Also some of the reliance built up during the war will be a problem.
The bomb will be a priority and doubly so given that unfortunately the Soviet spies will enable Stalin to get a bomb, probably earlier than OTL. Whether Attlee decides to work with the French or Americans I don't know. [He doesn't know about the US back-stab on nuclear development as IIRC it hasn't occurred yet.]
War against Germany will be relatively short and decisive. Japan could be a bigger problem because of the distances but a lot could be done indirectly with aid to China and attacks on their trade and supply lines if a major war occurs there. [Think its likely but the possibility of a multi-national embargo might just force a withdrawal from China without it - although that would require quite an extensive purge of the fanatics in the military]. The other issue here would be if with his western borders secure - with Nazi Germany going down - Stalin makes an intervention against Japan. Italy is probably not going to be something Britain would push on as Mussolini, with Germany being defeated will be keeping a profile so low it could be subterranean.
Agree that a lot of the necessary social and economic changes that were started OTL will be a lot easier here and hopefully markedly more effective.
the withdrawal from empire may be delayed a bit but I think Attlee's government will realise its on its way out and in most cases is a burden rather than an asset. India will definitely become independent, possibly earlier this time around although hopefully the sectarian bloodshed can be avoided and possibly it might end up as a dominion, at least for a time as that would set a useful precedent for other areas and make the movement easier.
Steve, 1.) It is the second best potential situation, with the best being the very unfair 1945 ISOT + all 1939 RN + war losses. That would be a tad too providential, methinks. 2.) Yes on BC 3.) The USA is in less of a position to play hardball than in 1940, particularly given France is still intact, but you make a point that Britain is more geared towards US supply and there will be dislocation pains. 4.) I think Attlee would reinstate a National Government of unity and that the opinions will be mixed. Bevin’s belief about the Union Jack on the Bomb will not disappate into the realm of the neverwere, as he did have consistent beliefs like that beforehand. 5.) I disagree that Japan is a comparable threat. They’re a one trick pony and that pony is the IJN. The RN is well equipped to do very bad things to the 1939 IJN, particularly with submarines and 1945 aircraft, if it comes to shooting. Italy will need to be settled at some point to remove any threat, but as you say, is unlikely to kick off solo. 6.) On Empire: The policies and record of Attlee’s government were not suggestive of an end of Empire. Indeed, there was the notion of investment in Africa and even an African army to substitute for the Indian one. Getting a Union of India as an independent Dominion with more effective ties, particularly if Japan is still about, is what they would aim for. Above all else, there is a sense of knowledge of errors, not just military and strategic, but political. This British Empire has the capacity to be a bona fide superpower by the time 1950 rolls around here, some 10 years and 4 months after their arrival.
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Sept 20, 2022 17:01:07 GMT
Miletus, as Steve says, you've got the wrong end of the stick. The only possibly doubling up is in the case of the 1939 RN and 1945 RN, as the former did have a large number of ships out at sea as of 1/9/1939. They are now joined by all of the 1945 fleet, which I outlined above. Coming back are also the Far Eastern forces, all the troops on occupation in Italy, garrison forces from the Middle East, the British Army of the Rhine et al, appearing in the 1945 UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, replacing the 1939 landmass, men etc. So, you are wrong on Dowding, but that matters little. The speculative numbers are, dare I suggest, superceded by those in the link I supplied of ~1360 Lancasters, 269 Mosquito bombers and ~300 Halifaxes. Even that is enough to completely stuff up the 1939 Luftwaffe, which as you say, lacks the Kammhuber Line, more advanced radar, the sheer numbers of AA guns and half a hundred other components of a functioning air defence system. The leftover US supplies are a constraint, but not a fatal one. If fighting continues for longer than that period, then they will necessarily be constrained, but not paralysed. 1. Bomber Command in 1945 has the capacity to knock out a German city every week with the main bomber force, operate with impunity around the clock with the Mosquito and knock out precision targets with No. 617 Squadron. 2. We know that Jerry has 1100 fighters, not all of which are Bf-109s, 290 Stukas and ~1100 bombers. We also know that their production rates in 1939 were nothing to write home about. 3. The RAF has more and better fighters than the Luftwaffe, even before jets are included in calculations, and is building at a rate that the Germans cannot match nor interrupt. 4. The carrier forces of the RN have sufficient numbers and weight that they could overwhelm German defences on a localised level if used in concert. 5. The British also have that crucial weapon of knowledge of the future. Taking those five issues into combination, there is not a suggestion of a long term air war. I don't think that it will be won by bombing alone, but that will be the first means of attack, followed by movement of the fighter and tactical planes to France and a 10 division 3rd BEF going into the Saar alongside the French. Sealift is an issue, but there isn't an absolute 'need it this 24 hours' urgency, nor a dearth of 1945 ships in port in Britain. The 1939 Merchant Navy will be at sea and can do service quite shortly and cross Channel administrative landings aren't the most difficult thing under the sun. Just so we can keep the numbers straight. 1. Once you postulate a 1939 KGV with a PCU crew as she is still building and fitting out and you introduce that same KGV with a BPF crew who contain some of the same people... 1939 and 1945 means human collocation. Now aside from the very real Kaboom involved as the that sombrero hat of potential energy flattens out, we have the problem of that striker meeting his petty officer self; six years later. But put the physics and Dowding 1939/1945 aside. ================================================================= We have the CBI medical casualties from Japanese prisoner of war camps and construction slave worker farms introduced into hospital on 1 September 1939. Since Allied prisoner recovery and receivership programs were going on into 1946 in the CBI, I find this interesting. But put that one aside and let us deal with the RAF. No 617 Squadron was the RAF equivalent of the 509th Composite Group USAAF. It was a specialist unit that scored spectacular strikes in Holland to neutralize a security issue when it bombed a Gestapo compound. Its other claim was the Roer (not the Ruhr) dams, hence the name "Dambusters". They attacked three target sets and only damaged in any significant degree two of them. The third was scratched at the cost of a lot of bombers and crews. The raids were conducted in May of 1943, and the Germans were back in business 90 days later. The 3 months lost production and flood out was valuable indeed, but hardly war winning or war crippling as hoped. I read that RAF forces available list above as May 1945. I accept it as given. 270 more Lancasters is not going to matter all that much to me as to available effects. What I will point out... Destroy one German city a week is the claim with this 1945 force in 1939. I submit not without American help and I mean the kind the 8th Air Force supplied in 1945. Exzample? BERLIN. Other examples are Cologne, Munich, Hamburg, DRESDEN. This is 1945 when German defenses are flat. Some of those targets are at the limit of Lancaster range which means light as in half or less full rated bomb loads which is true for the Americans as well. Also remember that RAF bombing is by stream method where bombs are dumped at night into a fire beaconed target by single bombers in a file series one after another. The targets are not phalanx bombed in mass release as the Americans do in daylight. That makes a difference on how damage is distributed. Believe me, that matters as ARCLIGHT demonstrated. The RAF fighters universally due to a defensible at the time technical decision are severely restricted in range. The exception is the Mosquito in its fighter variant and look how few of them there are? About 400? The FAA is equipped with 70% American aircraft in 1945. Mainly Corsairs, Martlets *(Wildcats) and Avengers. If the RAF spares are "tight", then imagine what the BPF stocks are like. After Pedestal which happened 2 months after Midway, I argue that the British probably knew a bit more about how to fight an aircraft carrier battle than the Americans did. Yet when the British showed up off Java to work over the Japanese held oil fields in 1945, the Japanese handed them their rumps. It was as if the RN had forgotten everything that they learned and taught US in early 1943. Okinawa was worse. Armored flight decks were needed because British fleet air defense was non-existent. Knowledge of the future is useless without refreshed perishable skillsets. Even so... Get the Meuse bridges when the Germans come through the Ardennes, bomb the traffic jams on the roads all the way back to the Rhine, especially around Aachen and arrange for Huntziger to be run over by a Cromwell by accident. The French will thank you for it later.
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Post by simon darkshade on Sept 20, 2022 17:59:39 GMT
Yes, that is the table and the numbers discussed.
There weren’t any KGVs with PCU crews in 1939, but it wouldn’t matter as they aren’t there. You keep on harping about physics when it has been explained several times that there are no double ups nor does someone else’s scenario necessarily need to follow your interpretation of the effects of quantum mechanics. It is just a waste of space.
Now, with regard to older and younger selves, you are into something and a very interesting psychological, spiritual and legal array of questions as to what happens when they meet, or are married, or have property, etc. By phrasing your point in a more open fashion, you don’t come across as imposing conditions on an ISOT, but rather raising an interesting issue and letting other posters think on it.
The POWs are going to take a long time recovering, but at least they are at home. That could be both a blessing and a problem.
Underselling the wartime record of No. 617 Squadron by focusing only on the circumstances of their debut op against the Dams, whilst not mentioning Tirpitz, Bielefeld Viaduct, the Dortmund-Ems Canal and many other precision operations is bordering on the inaccurate.
Your presumptions are based on the RAF being confined to night ops and facing a modern German air defence net, albeit one that by 1945 had been blown open. A case of comparing apples with orange squash. If BC goes at night, the 1939 Germans have bugger all night fighters or guns up against 1945 level electronic navigation and radar, as well as Window. Operation Gomorrah in 1943 had quite small USAAF participation - 120 and 50. Knocking out Hamburg, Kiel, Wilhelmshaven and the Ruhr isn’t a death blow, but it is a good start. As you say, less can be carried to Berlin, but they aren’t going up against 1943 defences again.
By 1945, BC was operating in daylight again, mainly due to the destruction of the Luftwaffe. That won’t be too far away in 1939 once the RAF’s Mustangs, Thunderbolts, Tempests, Spitfires, Mosquitoes and Meteors start operating from France. I again refer you to the low numbers of total German fighters in 1939, their technological inferiority to 1945 RAF aircraft, their inferior production capacity, their concentration on the Eastern Front against Poland and the 1945 British advantages in radar and AAA if they do venture over the Rhine. The combination of these factors make the 1939 Luftwaffe a limited and diminishing asset.
The FAA may have a large majority of US aircraft, but it has a lot of them, counting the spares, replacement squadrons, CVEs and the main carriers. They have more planes than the Luftwaffe has fighters. They have also had a master class in carrier warfare from the USN and had improved since the ops against Sumatra on their way to the Pacific. They had operated alongside the best carrier navy in the world against the former second best, but now find themselves back in 1939, going up against a much less advanced Germany.
I would suggest to you that expecting that the best a 1945 Britain could do against 1939 Germany is to simply wait around for May 1940 is being a bit silly and not really appraising things on their merits.
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Post by raharris1973 on Sept 21, 2022 1:24:06 GMT
The other issue here would be if with his western borders secure - with Nazi Germany going down - Stalin makes an intervention against Japan. The British may just want to take a hands off, laissez-faire attitude while these two delightful regimes take swings at each other for awhile, Britain ensures Nazi Germany is dead, dead, dead, transitions itself and its empire to a good peacetime footing, and organizes postwar Europe to its liking. Might as well let the Red Menace shred the Yellow Peril in a blender and wait till Northeast Asia is "orange juice" that is easier to mop up at a lower cost.
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Post by simon darkshade on Sept 21, 2022 1:47:06 GMT
That was Steve, not I.
The September 1945 attitude towards Stalin from Labour was, alas, not as realist as it would later become; and Japan had just caused a world of trouble and horror.
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Sept 21, 2022 9:44:16 GMT
Underselling the wartime record of No. 617 Squadron by focusing only on the circumstances of their debut op against the Dams, whilst not mentioning Tirpitz, Bielefeld Viaduct, the Dortmund-Ems Canal and many other precision operations is bordering on the inaccurate. Most pf these raids were also incidentalist and "temporary" in effect. The Tirpitz raid was the one instance where I think a permanent effect was achieved. Example... Note that by March of 1945, the Anglo-American armies were cruising through the North German Plain and that the raids were therefore "pointless" and a waste of bombs? The point of an air campaign or even a raid is to dislocate and interrupt an enemy war effort to an immediate and catastrophic degree that shapes their overall war options and direction and decision making. Pearl Harbor and Ploesti fits this criterion. The 617 targets aside from KMS Tirpitz do not. ============================================================================================== Your presumptions are based on the RAF being confined to night ops and facing a modern German air defence net, albeit one that by 1945 had been blown open. A case of comparing apples with orange squash. If BC goes at night, the 1939 Germans have bugger all night fighters or guns up against 1945 level electronic navigation and radar, as well as Window. Operation Gomorrah in 1943 had quite small USAAF participation - 120 and 50. Knocking out Hamburg, Kiel, Wilhelmshaven and the Ruhr isn’t a death blow, but it is a good start. As you say, less can be carried to Berlin, but they aren’t going up against 1943 defences again. The fighter pilots of the USAAF thank you for that compliment. It is actually based on 2020 hindsight, what I write hereafter, and how even a minimalist 1945 air defense forced another quite capable air force to adopt night intrusion and day fighter escort to defeat such an enemy. When it comes to air tacticians, nobody holds a 1945 candle to Curtis Lemay. His tactics over Japan were based on RAF tactics over 1945 Germany. With regards to specific European conditions as the RAF found them... the RAF was unable to mount deep range escort or tactical strike into central Germany because of their decisions to create the kind of fighter park they created with their Hawker and Supermarine lines of fighters mid-war. Because of wind-shear and sideslip drift in bomber streams the RAF was forced to bomb LOW to mid altitude to put bombs inside the optical target markers or radio markers that preset their bomb release points. Because of JET FIGHTERS the RAF continued to fly mostly at night in 1945. Now, no jet fighters in 1939? Do not need them, the Germans do not. Their 1939 Luftwaffe actually has a flight line of sufficient "bomber destroyers" in numbers to make unescorted daylight Lancaster raids suicide. And their 1939 radar network is not suppressed yet. And worse... it is as good as the 1945 British air defense setup as to coverage, though not yet in command and control. Kannhuber does not have Holland yet. I think if I were the 1945 RAF with a full strength 1939 LW, I would remember Regensburg and Schwinefurt if I were Bomber Command and not be eager to try day-lighters until Fighter Command has killed off those German pilot cadres. The FAA may have a large majority of US aircraft, but it has a lot of them, counting the spares, replacement squadrons, CVEs and the main carriers. They have more planes than the Luftwaffe has fighters. They have also had a master class in carrier warfare from the USN and had improved since the ops against Sumatra on their way to the Pacific. They had operated alongside the best carrier navy in the world against the former second best, but now find themselves back in 1939, going up against a much less advanced Germany. Hmmm. USS RobinThe exchange between HMS Victorious and USS Saratoga was in vectoring CAP patrols (British experience and 4 channel radio positive ground control) and deck park handling movement and aircraft fuel-rearm cycles (American experience against the Japanese.). If it was a master class, neither navy really learned enough to handle the Japanese who still outperformed them at such things as night deck landings, speed of rearm and refuel and landing circuit traffic management for multi-aircraft carrier task groups. Even in 1944 when Spruance saw off Ozawa, the Americans were not the plane handlers the Japanese were. That only happens by Korea. Why? Well... the Japanese had a primitive mechanical land-on system that did not require a landing signal officer. We know it today as the MEATBALL, but back then it was a set of lights that changed colors if you were above or below the proper glide slope for land-on as you trapped. In its 1944 version, it was unhooded and only three rows instead of what we use now, but the Japanese aviators were drilled on it until it was muscle memory-flying. That was why it took them so long to carrier qualify decent aircraft carrier pilots. Off Okinawa. The BPF operated a mixed aviation force of 6 medium and 4 light aircraft carriers. Altogether these operated about 330 fighters, a mix of about 220 Corsairs and 70 Seafires with a skein of 36-40 Hellcats. They handled about 400 count kamikaze intruders who broke through their CAP and hit six of the British aircraft carriers. If claims are accurate, the FAA fighter force splashed 50% of the intruders in air-to-air action. 200 leakers got through and scored 70 impacts on various ships. The American force had about 11 heavy carriers and 6 light carriers. The fighter line was 1,000 aircraft that was mixed 60% Hellcat and 40% Corsair. They took on between 3,600 to 4,000 intruders. From claims and observed reports about 1,000 intruders broke through the CAP and 168-204 impacts (accounts vary) occurred, damaging 6 aircraft carriers enough to force retirement for repairs. This is the record. The observation is that this showed that neither the Americans nor the British had developed a good low-low-low intruder defense. Further, that without the British armored flight deck, a hanger event occurred which caused a loss of mission and aircraft carrier temporary withdrawal for repairs. Further that the enemy attacker profile of side impact could be effective in permanently deforming and crippling through shock to the point of uselessness a through hull up to strength deck / flight deck framed aircraft carrier. This happened to 2 British flattops making them post battle complete write-offs. All in all, different experiences and different results. Teaboys and Ameri-boos take note: each navy chose its methods to fit the environment it was going to face and adopted methods and procedures that worked for it at the time these forces were built. What worked during the Club Runs and in the North Atlantic was less effective off Okinawa. What worked at Philippine Sea was also found to be lacking at Okinawa. That is war. The enemy learns. I am not sure the 1945 FAA fighter line was designed to handle a 1939 Luftwaffe. You see the FAA fighter line was tuned to fight best at medium altitude, same as the USNAS at the time. This was combat between 1500 and 3000 meters or between 5,000 and 10,000 feet. They expected to attack land targets from the sea or fight enemy naval aviation. Combat was rare at 10,000 meters. or 33,000 feet at sea. The 1939 LW fighter line was designed to fight around 5000 to 7,000 meters. It was a land-based army cooperation and battlefield interdiction force which needed its intruder fighters to fly top cover for a force of medium bombers and dive bombers, like the early USN Wildcats which were expected to perform the same mission. High altitude meant high dive speeds and vertical fighting. Aside from the Corsair by 1944 that was not the way naval fighters worked. Their role was to swarm an intrusion at the intruders' altitude bands, which was mostly around or below 3,000 meters UNTIL Okinawa. Then the Japanese became smart and used anti-radar tactics.
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miletus12
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To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Sept 21, 2022 11:02:36 GMT
I would suggest to you that expecting that the best a 1945 Britain could do against 1939 Germany is to simply wait around for May 1940 is being a bit silly and not really appraising things on their merits. You are going to need the 1939 FRENCH. If you do not adjust accordingly, you will find your options geographically and operationally severely limited. They have by far the bigger army and are the bigger risk. Also: geography dictates access and options. That is Mahan. *(Dennis not Alfred.) The issue has to be settled on the ground. If the BEF is going to have that option, then Huntziger and even Gamelin has to be "neutralized" as to deleterious commander effects. The British cannot go charging in alone with those ninnies on their right leaking Germans through in a German left hook.
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Post by simon darkshade on Sept 21, 2022 14:21:56 GMT
There you go again. 1.) You are taking the wrong point out of the circumstance. 617 Squadron is a 1945 level precision unit ready to be applied against an unsuspecting enemy. 2.) Not quite. The September 1939 Luftwaffe has this: www.ww2-weapons.com/luftwaffe-orders-of-battle-september-2-1939/Equipment of Luftwaffe First Line Units on September 1, 1939: Aircraft type strength He 111 bombers 780 Do 17 bombers 470 Do17 recon 280 Ju 88 bombers 20 Ju 87 dive-bombers 335 Me 109 D fighters 235 Me 109 E fighters 850 Me 110 heavy fighters 195 Ar66 fighters 5 Ar68 fighters 35 Hs126 tactical recon 195 He46 tactical recon 100 Coastal aircrafts 205 Miscellaneous 65 Total 3,960 195 Messerschmitt 110s, prior to any losses over Poland or elsewhere. That does not suggest a formidable or indomitable force up against the numbers of British heavy bombers, Mosquitoes and thousands and day fighters that the RAF has available. They won't be static after the shock of arrival You keep on making reference to the RAF not having long range fighters, but they don't need them when they have French airfields. You expound in great detail on about tangential matters; I enjoy reading your stuff, learning new things and considering thought-provoking points, but it is also good to focus on the real question 3.) We aren't talking about Okinawa, so that entire section is not relevant. I made reference to the entire FAA having more aircraft than the Luftwaffe has fighters, based on the 1085 single engine early Me-109s and the 185 Me-110s and the FAA's 3700 aircraft. Now, plenty of those are trainers of no use for comparison, but there is still more aircraft back in Britain or on carriers off Scapa than were fielded on the BPF on ops in the Pacific. Here's the bottom line: - The RAF has over 8000 operational planes at this point, down from its peak of 9200 although many will have lost their pilots and ground crew with the non-transfer of Dominion and Allied personnel, if I understand Steve correctly. The Fleet Air Arm adds more as outlined above. - They have thousands upon thousands more aircraft in storage, laid up or in second, third (and fourth!) line roles that have made the journey - This gives a quite substantial numerical superiority - The frontline types of both are overwhelmingly superior to the best German bombers and fighters of 1939 - Britain of 1945 had wound down from the aircraft production peaks of 1944, but has the capacity to ramp back up again. Even on 1945 numbers, they are to Germany as a 6'6" bully over a toddler www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=116:british-production-of-aircraft-by-year-during-the-second-world-war&catid=48:production-statistics&Itemid=61- They have the Avro Lincoln and Hawker Tempest in production, plus the de Havilland Hornet and Vampire, as well as the Bristol Brigand on the cusp of the same. Better than Jerry - Britain of 1945 knows how to break German codes and also knows what ze Germans will do if they act historically - The news of an entire country transferring through time will leak pretty quickly, providing ammunition to the German high command who were worried about Hilter dropping them in it - The French will welcome thousands of British planes coming over to improve their defences and, dare I say it, the French body politic will have a bit of a think about the news that they have been given about what happened to them. They have been delivered and given a heaven sent chance - British land forces, when they arrive, have better tanks, better mobility, better comms, better artillery and better close air support than Jerry I would postulate that there would be a continued Saar Offensive which, in combination with RAF bombing by day and night. You don't need to kill off French generals, simply retire and replace them. About the only fellows in real trouble Frogside are Laval and his chums, who won't have a long or pleasant time of it. As Steve says, I don't see the circumstances for a long war, nor for a cautious, stolid approach.
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miletus12
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To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Sept 22, 2022 2:43:49 GMT
Yes; I do. Here's why. 617 was not as precise as claimed. I think 14% on target is optimistic. Good but not as popularly imagined. Plus: they took heavy losses per mission. They could not do continuous hammering as some of their target sets required. About the RAF in general... --I happen to know in air flight minutes of these 1945 aircraft cited. They were war built to survive no more than 25-50 missions before replacement. That is about 500 hours aloft max. Compare with the typical 6,000 hours required of modern military aircraft with complete airframe inspections and rebuilds every 1000 hours or so. If you work that out at 1944 op-tempo that is 6 months. Also refer to my spare engines comments. There are not that many for more than 3 months. --I have a good idea of available fuel stocks though not bomb filler on hand. 10 missions maybe or 30 days op-tempo. --Hardstand space in northern France is about 1,500 aircraft; NONE of it is rated for heavy bombers. --Check your 1939 French runway lengths? Most of the northern French aerodromes are designed for FRENCH fighters. Those runways are short for a Tempest. --AVRO Lincoln was an extended range Lancaster, just as suicidally vulnerable to day fighters as the Lancaster. 600 built (includes postwar production) with an IOC of second quarter 1945. --de Havilland Hornet does not see service until 1946. It is still having development problems until 1947. --Ditto the Dehavilland Vampire which was a pilot killer with flameout issues. --Code-breaking is time dependent. If you do not get it out to the operational forces or if you bungle it, as was true for the Germans, the Russians, the British, the Japanese and unfortunately for those poor guys working for MacArthur, especially the Americans, it has little immediate tactical impact. We have a thread on KMS Bismarck where Bletchley was less important than good traditional recon and spying and radio traffic analysis, also which the British bungled in that op. I would argue that traditional signals analysis did more to win the war than reading the other guy's coded traffic. The Japanese never broke SIGABA but they were always there waiting for us when we tried to surprise them. Why? We transmitted and they RDFed us and plotted us on a master plot. Stay off the radio and fake your radio traffic. Guess what the 1939 Wehrmacht Germans were good at doing? Not so the LW and KM. Those idiots yakked like Americans. --The French will welcome 1,000s of British planes. Where will they park them? How will they FUEL them? You keep on making reference to the RAF not having long range fighters, but they don't need them when they have French airfields. You expound in great detail on about tangential matters; I enjoy reading your stuff, learning new things and considering thought-provoking points, but it is also good to focus on the real question --See my previous points? If your fighter line is stuck in England, then they are effectively limited to ENGLAND. Range limits for existent fighters come into play. 3.) We aren't talking about Okinawa, so that entire section is not relevant. I made reference to the entire FAA having more aircraft than the Luftwaffe has fighters, based on the 1085 single engine early Me-109s and the 185 Me-110s and the FAA's 3700 aircraft. Now, plenty of those are trainers of no use for comparison, but there is still more aircraft back in Britain or on carriers off Scapa than were fielded on the BPF on ops in the Pacific. --You miss the point about Okinawa. This is the best that both navies have to offer and a bunch of 1939-1941 era Japanese land-based aircraft flown by pilots with less than 30 hours in air instruction per individual scored 15% operational mission kills. The other point is that the 1939 LW fighter line has the altitude advantage over the bulk of the global 1945 FAA fighter line, especially the Seafires which are garbage aircraft little better than the 1939 BF109s which are the German mainstays. Corsairs will definitely eat the Germans for lunch; but Hellcats are a slight problem in the climb and turn fight departments. The British are not trained for the vertical fight either which is the Hellcat attribute and advantage. This is why they got themselves badly handled at Balikpapan. Those obsolete Oscars flown by Japanese army aviation pilots were quite happy to get into turning fights with the British FAA. You do not do that with a plane with better cornering than what you fly. You either roll and scissor at high speed and lock him up or get him into the vertical and kill him when he stalls at the top. ================================================================================ Where the British will really surprise and shock the Germans will be with their land army. I think British 1945 combined arms tactics was a bit "basic", but compared to the 1939 Germans, who are still feeling out a thing called "fast maneuver warfare" as translated from the German, quite good enough. The appearance of British 1945 home grown tanks will come as an added "shock". Plus; Montgomery will be there to lead, and there will not be an Omar Bradley or a Louis Brereton to muck things up. Pity about Patton. You could use him instead of the job lot of French chasseurs turned tankers you will get. René Prioux, Gabriel Bougrain, and Jean-Léon-Albert Langlois did alright at Hannut, but you want someone who thinks like a Joe Wilson or Joe Wheeler on your right. ================================================================================ One last point... 1300 Lancasters versus 200 BF110s? Night defense, it is enough. Look at the German night fighter force. It rarely exceeded 400 machines of all types, just as the actual Lancaster force until the last 2 months of the war barely exceeded 1,000 aircraft.
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Post by simon darkshade on Sept 22, 2022 4:04:43 GMT
The heavies would stay in England and operate from there. Tactical aircraft would go to France. The RAF fighter line are not stuck in England ad infinitum, as they would go to French airfields and build new ones from the beginning. It won't happen overnight, but it will happen. There are Hurricanes 'returning' from the Far East and Med that are able to operate from grass fields, in addition to Spits forum.12oclockhigh.net/archive/index.php?t-15234.html Extending French runways to take Tempests would be an urgent priority. In the meantime, with drop tanks, the Tempests can get a pretty decent range from Kent. As said below on the FAA point, there are also several hundred each of RAF Mustangs and Thunderbolts, plus the Mosquito fighters It is important to remember that this is an ISOT into a war. Previous considerations and peacetime production and development rates go out the window. The Hornet, Lincoln and more will be building and entering service at a wartime rate. ---------------------------------- The British aren't up against an Okinawa situation, but one of almost complete surprise. The Germans will have next to no knowledge about the 1945 RN's aircraft and capabilities and that will stay until they have protracted engagements and real intelligence. Total deliveries to the RN were 1892 Corsairs and 252 Hellcats; the amount fielded by the Fleet was a much smaller fraction of that, as you say, and accidents/combat attrition will also have cut into it. However, there is still likely to be hundreds of Corsairs and a good number of Hellcats now back in Britain. The FAA strikes hitting the North Sea ports of Kiel, Hamburg, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven etc will be larger than any that the Germans have ever trained for or contemplated. They will outnumber the ~150 German fighters in the areas perhaps 5 to 1 in fighters alone, not counting any RAF long range fighters (400-500 Mustangs and 400-500 Thunderbolts come to mind) Notably, the Germans aren't going to be the ones flying out to find and hit any carriers 370km off the German coast, as the only aircraft they have that can go out on that range are busy over Poland (He-111 and Do-17s; Me-110s were not adapted to anti-ship operations at this point). Then, at night, Hamburg gets bombed by the Halifax force, whilst the Mosquitos and Lancasters hit the Ruhr. ------------------------------- The British artillery doctrine and response time will give the 1939 Germans conniptions, as it did in 1944 when there was Teutonic scuttlebutt about 'automatic 25pdrs'. Throw in most of the lessons of WW2 in @, and it is a formidable force. There will be more than a handful of Centurions, depending on timing, and the Comet alone will be trouble. --------------------------------------------------- Is Jerry going to be able to miraculously concentrate the entire 110 force, handwaving losses over Poland and every other mission, into specific night fighter operations over a particular part of Germany. Are all of those 110s and their pilots trained in night fighting operations? As of 1/9/1939, I would suggest not. The British numbers are also not going to be static, but increased by production of Lancasters, Halifaxes and Lincolns, as well as Mosquito night fighters and light bombers. ----------------------------------------------------- Germany isn't just going to turn around and start fighting like it is 1942, where they have experience, intelligence, detailed planning and strategy. Everything they have on fighting Britain has gone out the window with a literally miraculous appearance of a superior future equivalent, loaded to the gills with forces and equipment. Hitler thought that the Allies would not fight over Poland, yet now will be facing a much hardened equivalent that will not hold back from Day 1. I apologise as this is Wiki, but I'm not going to spend too much more time on this on my day off: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II1939's numbers refer to September, October, November and December. In that time, they produced 449 109s and 156 110s, which gives an average monthly rate of 112.5 and 39 respectively. The RAF alone is averaging 290 Spitfires a month in 1945 weaponsandwarfare.com/2019/05/04/luftwaffe-air-war-poland-1939/~579 losses of all kinds doesn't give us details of how many were fighters and types, but it can be presumed that some of both were among that number. That is the beginning of the attritional trap that the Luftwaffe finds itself in. - Losing aircraft over Poland - Losing aircraft in engagements against the RAF and RN over Northwest and Western Germany in daytime - Losing aircraft from night operations - Having airfields across the western part of the country hit by tactical bombers and intruders - Struggling to increase production, but doing so above historical levels when facing a new threat - Facing a much, much larger RAF that has better aircraft across the board - Lancaster production is over 200 a month and that will now continue, rather than halting with both VE Day and the wind down in the Pacific The Luftwaffe fighter force will be split up between the North Sea, Poland, Western Germany and Berlin/Saxony/Silesia, further cutting its capacity and effectiveness. Now, the US supplies and aircraft are going to be running out soon if used up at a high intensity of combat. You're right there. But that won't bring things to a complete stop, but rather alter their tempo. The damage, though, will be done to Germany in the initial blows and will be beyond their capacity to recover. By Spring 1940, the British Army will be in France, airfields and supply dumps will be built, production rates will be ramped back up and hundreds of new tanks and aircraft will be available well beyond the capacity of Germany to cope with. It might well be that, by that time, the nervous German generals will have tried something. Japan is in even more trouble, as the British have a fully modern fleet and submarine force ready to go out to Singapore, plus more aircraft than they can cope with in Malaya and French Indochina.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Sept 22, 2022 18:18:45 GMT
Everybody - apologies but under the weather yesterday so never got around to looking at posts yesterday and just catching up today. To summary.
a) British 1945 forces overseas, land, sea and air - along with military POWs in Japanese custody - are returned to the 45 UK which is brought back in time and they replace all non-British military forces in 45 UK. [Non-military people from other countries are also brought back]. As I said in the OP the people lost from 45 UK include Axis POWs. This also includes all equipment, spares, munitions etc.
b) British people, including military from 39 outside Britain - which as Simon points out will be a lot more than I was initially thinking as a lot was sent to sea the day before.
c) There will be people that will be duplicated, in that there will be 39 and 45 versions of them existing at the same time. This will cause personal, social and possible legal issues as the 39 version - largely I assume men in the forces or at sea/overseas for some reason on 1-9-39 - return to home's and families that are suddenly 6 years older than they knew, often with 6 years older versions of themselves. Alternatively they might find their wives have re-married because their younger version has died in the war - or the wife or children might have died which would be even more bitter for them - or possibly split up. This will not cause any massive explosions as the Paulian Exclusion Principle has never been applied in an ISOT before so I see no reason why it should do here.
d) As such Britain will have markedly more powerful air forces which can attack Germany fairly quickly and tactical forces along with a powerful army can move to France to operate from there against western Germany. A more powerful and far more experienced RN, helped also by information now known should have no problem hunting down the two 'pocket-battleships' and any other surface raiders at sea at the start of the war. I can't see there being time to stop Germany overrunning Poland unless the bombing prompts a coup against Hitler but that would be unlikely to end the war. However the big question might be whether it prompts Stalin not to invade eastern Poland - although he might still seek to annex the Baltic states.
e) What happens with Japan depends on circumstances. The Japanese empire is going to go down, or just possibly be radically changed without another war but whether its destroyed by the Soviets, the Americans having heard about Pearl Harbour and the Bataan death march, or possibly by a joint western embargo leading to war. Ditto with what happens to China as too many variables.
f) Britain will research nuclear weapons and will have an advantage in their knowledge of the processes involved although the US and the USSR - aided by their spies will also be in the race. Hopefully the UK will have the sense to pick up some of the scientists who OTL fled the Nazis.
g) Not sure what the UK reaction will be to the Soviets. They know them as necessary allies against the Nazis OTL and too much propaganda was used in both the UK and US during the war to make them seen as such but back in 39 a lot more people will be warily of them and when they get reports from Britain will point out that Stalin was a de-facto ally of Germany until Hitler's attack while if he occupies either the Baltic states or eastern Poland or even has a go at Finland that will cool relations.
h) I'm not sure about Italy. True its a fascist state but then so is Franco's Spain. If Italy is cowered by 45 UK and the news it brings then - apart from possibly some coup displacing Mussolini - a weary Britain could decide that its not worth a war to replace him, or at least not before the issue with Japan is resolved.
i) In terms of the empire the bulk of it will go, although parts of it in Africa and elsewhere could last longer than OTL. There were plans for developments in Africa although that was partly to boost the economy and living standards in the UK. They may not happen here but if they do you still have the change in the view of the world by the 45's having been through WWII and now another battle with Germany. Many will not want to fight a war to deny democracy on others after that or spend blood and money when there is so much needed in Britain. The great danger is that they will be pulled into battles in places with small white minorities seeking to maintain their monopoly of power. Thinking chiefly here western Africa from Kenya to Rhodesia. However there is a difference in terms of suppressing brutal terrorist groups like the Mau Mau or the Chinese communist if they still occur in Kenya and Malaya. India is definitely going and while reactions like Churchill will moan its too big to hold against the will of the population. Hopefully a stronger Britain will be able to manage its affairs better and have a tidier withdrawal from the bulk of the empire. Holding strategic locations will be another matter and a more developed Britain could maintain itself as a significant power longer.
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