A grab-bag of alternate WWI set-ups (changing the timing of Balkan entrants)
Aug 23, 2022 0:52:58 GMT
stevep and American hist like this
Post by raharris1973 on Aug 23, 2022 0:52:58 GMT
Alternate WWI set-ups:
1. What if Germany and Austria-Hungary nailed down alliances with Bulgaria and Ottomans, in the summer of 1914 (July Crisis), and supplied arms, ensuring that that Bulgaria and the Ottomans declared war on the Entente, or at least parts of it, within a few days of the principal European belligerents starting the war. Therefore, Bulgaria declares war on Serbia, at a minimum, within a day of Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia. Or within a day or so of the actual A-H invasion, or within a day or so of Germany seconding the A-H DoW. And the Ottoman Empire declares war on Russia, at a minimum, within days of the German DoW on Russia and Russian attacks on A-H and Germany. Mutual DoWs between Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other, are likely soon to come.
How does the 1914 campaigning go differently when the two junior league CP allies are in the fight before August is out?
2. What if Romania joins the Entente side in 1914? This requires a PoD perhaps of the old pro-German King dying in late 1912 or early 1913, and Romania getting a chance to do exploratory planning and diplomacy with France and Russia prior to the July Crisis. When it comes, Romania assures Belgrade and St. Petersburg, and paradoxically, Vienna and Berlin, of its friendly attitude. After the first Austro-Hungarian defeats in Galicia and Serbia, Romania declares war and attacks Transylvania. Is Austria-Hungary capable of throwing the Romanians back over the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps in their already disastrous 1914 campaign? Can they go further and occupy any of Wallachia or Moldavia? Can the Austro-Hungarians maintain any forces advancing on Serbia while trying any of this? Or, does Romania participation in 1914, before the winter, alongside the Russian advances in Galicia, result in an Entente break-out on to the Hungarian plain and a Romanian and/or Russian foothold that the Austro-Hungarian cannot get rid of that year, or perhaps ever?
3. What if Greece joins the Entente side early, possibly in 1915 or 1916? This requires a PoD of perhaps pro-German (pro-neutralist) King Constantine dying in 1913, and the Venizelists having the political control to commit to participate. How soon could/would Venizelist Greece jump in, hoping for things to work out for the best, regardless of specific negotiated promises. The earlier Greek participation, the more helpful for the Serbian supply situation and in reinforcing them, and the more deterrence of Bulgaria, or distraction of its forces if Bulgaria sides with the CP. Perhaps, without any concrete promises from Britain and France regarding territories like Cyprus (British-held) or the Dodecanese (Italian-held, and thus dangerous to promise) or Albania, even the Venizelists can only be roused to enter the war once Bulgaria has declared war and its Thracian territory can be promised as a reward.
4. What if late Ottoman entry into the war? - the German dreadnoughts under Souchon make a successful dash to the Adriatic, and Austrian ports (instead of proceeding to the Ottoman Empire like OTL). Enver has to continue to debate joining the war on the German side against the CUP, instead of just pulling a fait accompli on the opposition. By October, November 1914, he still hasn't won that debate. In fact, with the Germans checked and pushed back a little in France and at the channel, and Austria-Hungary facing clear setbacks in Galicia and Serbia, his pro-argument starts looking worse for wear.
Without breaking ties with the Germans, or coming to a deal with the Entente, who persist in undervaluing them, the Ottomans continue to temporize and increase their readiness.
What are they doing with the straits? How open to transit of warships, munitions, or commercial cargoes to and from Black Sea states, neutral (like Romania & Bulgaria) or belligerent (like Russia)? Great question. I suppose the Ottomans continue whatever policy they actually pursued on the straits shipping rules they followed during OTL August, September, and October 1914.
With the Ottoman Empire neutral, Churchill at the Admiralty doesn't have the option of suggesting the Dardanelles-Gallipolli expedition as an alternative to simply reinforcing the BEF in France. Nor does he have the option of suggesting a landing in Alexandretta as a substitute. The British don't have Mesopotamia to send Indian troops to, and don't have defensive fighting to do in Sinai.
The only "clever maritime descents" the Admiralty could put forth are the Churchill-Fischer idea of a landing on the German Baltic or North Sea coast.
As 1915 starts and rolls on through January, Feb, March, and April, how is the war effected by no preps or execution for Gallipolli, no winter Ottoman disaster in the Caucasus, straits possibly open to commercial cargoes to Russia, and a possible disastrous spring descent on Germany's northern coast?
Assuming nothing too dramatic (like that last item happening and being a quick fail), I assume Italy would declare war on Austria in May 1915.
I don't know if Bulgaria would declare war on Serbia any sooner than OTL without Gallipolli, or on time, or theoretically, later/not at all.
The immediate military impact of Italy's entry will be underwhelming compared to expectations - the Italians won't make progress and the Austrians will defend themselves with gusto.
In fact, with stable lines in the west, and German reinforcements in the east, the CPs will have a fantastic May-June-July on the Russian front, serially defeating Russian armies and forcing them on the Great Retreat.
This beating of the Ottomans primary existential enemy should create circumstances highly favorable for the Ottoman leadership to declare war on the Entente and ally with the CP, and for their launching of a priority attack on the Russian Caucasus.
How badly would an Ottoman late summer offensive and DoW affect the already reeling Russians? This Ottomans should be at least a bit more organized than in their OTL winter 1914 offensive, and with better weather, it simply shouldn't be as disastrous, even if the Russians are the more tactically savvy of the two armies.
I would imagine that if German and Austrian summer successes haven't convinced the Ottomans to join by July-August. The approaching death of Serbia, and Bulgarian joining of the CPs in September 1915 would be the final straw convincing the Ottomans to declare war against the Entente, confident now in the land connection to Germany and Austria.
1. What if Germany and Austria-Hungary nailed down alliances with Bulgaria and Ottomans, in the summer of 1914 (July Crisis), and supplied arms, ensuring that that Bulgaria and the Ottomans declared war on the Entente, or at least parts of it, within a few days of the principal European belligerents starting the war. Therefore, Bulgaria declares war on Serbia, at a minimum, within a day of Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia. Or within a day or so of the actual A-H invasion, or within a day or so of Germany seconding the A-H DoW. And the Ottoman Empire declares war on Russia, at a minimum, within days of the German DoW on Russia and Russian attacks on A-H and Germany. Mutual DoWs between Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other, are likely soon to come.
How does the 1914 campaigning go differently when the two junior league CP allies are in the fight before August is out?
2. What if Romania joins the Entente side in 1914? This requires a PoD perhaps of the old pro-German King dying in late 1912 or early 1913, and Romania getting a chance to do exploratory planning and diplomacy with France and Russia prior to the July Crisis. When it comes, Romania assures Belgrade and St. Petersburg, and paradoxically, Vienna and Berlin, of its friendly attitude. After the first Austro-Hungarian defeats in Galicia and Serbia, Romania declares war and attacks Transylvania. Is Austria-Hungary capable of throwing the Romanians back over the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps in their already disastrous 1914 campaign? Can they go further and occupy any of Wallachia or Moldavia? Can the Austro-Hungarians maintain any forces advancing on Serbia while trying any of this? Or, does Romania participation in 1914, before the winter, alongside the Russian advances in Galicia, result in an Entente break-out on to the Hungarian plain and a Romanian and/or Russian foothold that the Austro-Hungarian cannot get rid of that year, or perhaps ever?
3. What if Greece joins the Entente side early, possibly in 1915 or 1916? This requires a PoD of perhaps pro-German (pro-neutralist) King Constantine dying in 1913, and the Venizelists having the political control to commit to participate. How soon could/would Venizelist Greece jump in, hoping for things to work out for the best, regardless of specific negotiated promises. The earlier Greek participation, the more helpful for the Serbian supply situation and in reinforcing them, and the more deterrence of Bulgaria, or distraction of its forces if Bulgaria sides with the CP. Perhaps, without any concrete promises from Britain and France regarding territories like Cyprus (British-held) or the Dodecanese (Italian-held, and thus dangerous to promise) or Albania, even the Venizelists can only be roused to enter the war once Bulgaria has declared war and its Thracian territory can be promised as a reward.
4. What if late Ottoman entry into the war? - the German dreadnoughts under Souchon make a successful dash to the Adriatic, and Austrian ports (instead of proceeding to the Ottoman Empire like OTL). Enver has to continue to debate joining the war on the German side against the CUP, instead of just pulling a fait accompli on the opposition. By October, November 1914, he still hasn't won that debate. In fact, with the Germans checked and pushed back a little in France and at the channel, and Austria-Hungary facing clear setbacks in Galicia and Serbia, his pro-argument starts looking worse for wear.
Without breaking ties with the Germans, or coming to a deal with the Entente, who persist in undervaluing them, the Ottomans continue to temporize and increase their readiness.
What are they doing with the straits? How open to transit of warships, munitions, or commercial cargoes to and from Black Sea states, neutral (like Romania & Bulgaria) or belligerent (like Russia)? Great question. I suppose the Ottomans continue whatever policy they actually pursued on the straits shipping rules they followed during OTL August, September, and October 1914.
With the Ottoman Empire neutral, Churchill at the Admiralty doesn't have the option of suggesting the Dardanelles-Gallipolli expedition as an alternative to simply reinforcing the BEF in France. Nor does he have the option of suggesting a landing in Alexandretta as a substitute. The British don't have Mesopotamia to send Indian troops to, and don't have defensive fighting to do in Sinai.
The only "clever maritime descents" the Admiralty could put forth are the Churchill-Fischer idea of a landing on the German Baltic or North Sea coast.
As 1915 starts and rolls on through January, Feb, March, and April, how is the war effected by no preps or execution for Gallipolli, no winter Ottoman disaster in the Caucasus, straits possibly open to commercial cargoes to Russia, and a possible disastrous spring descent on Germany's northern coast?
Assuming nothing too dramatic (like that last item happening and being a quick fail), I assume Italy would declare war on Austria in May 1915.
I don't know if Bulgaria would declare war on Serbia any sooner than OTL without Gallipolli, or on time, or theoretically, later/not at all.
The immediate military impact of Italy's entry will be underwhelming compared to expectations - the Italians won't make progress and the Austrians will defend themselves with gusto.
In fact, with stable lines in the west, and German reinforcements in the east, the CPs will have a fantastic May-June-July on the Russian front, serially defeating Russian armies and forcing them on the Great Retreat.
This beating of the Ottomans primary existential enemy should create circumstances highly favorable for the Ottoman leadership to declare war on the Entente and ally with the CP, and for their launching of a priority attack on the Russian Caucasus.
How badly would an Ottoman late summer offensive and DoW affect the already reeling Russians? This Ottomans should be at least a bit more organized than in their OTL winter 1914 offensive, and with better weather, it simply shouldn't be as disastrous, even if the Russians are the more tactically savvy of the two armies.
I would imagine that if German and Austrian summer successes haven't convinced the Ottomans to join by July-August. The approaching death of Serbia, and Bulgarian joining of the CPs in September 1915 would be the final straw convincing the Ottomans to declare war against the Entente, confident now in the land connection to Germany and Austria.
