Post by justinian on Jul 16, 2022 2:29:08 GMT
Preamble:
The world in which we live today has been nearly completely and totally shaped by two transient events that occurred both in the 20th century, the first obviously being the period of the world wars and the second being the collapse of the Soviet Union. The world wars importance to the direction of modern history is obvious to anyone, not only would they dictate the fates of nations and of millions of people, but the ideological and philosophical direction said nations and individuals would take, it would be nearly impossible to ruminate over the thousands of possible different directions we could have been pulled in or on. In one of those directions, one series of events took nearly everyone by surprise. (Due to the nature of western academia and culture to look for simplified narratives, rather than complicated explanations, I'd recommend the documentary hypernormalization for anyone interested in this notion.) The collapse of the Soviet Union did not result in the same scale of death or destruction (Although certainly millions did die or have their life quality considerably altered, for better or generally more for worse by it) but it ultimately cleared the way for a world in which capitalism and to a lesser extent (a far lesser extent than what western intellectuals in the 1990s thought) liberal democracy as well as human rights could be the only legitimate ideologies, Fukuyama's claims etc. It would be the end of history, at least as they knew it. However, it is very clear this notion was born of some kind of hubristic naivety created from a feeling of victory from watching the wall get knocked down and rockstars parade around in Moscow. This of course raised a question in me, what if the Soviets didn't collapse? That global capitalism and liberalism did not receive its ultimate catharsis in 1989 and 1991? Always challenged by an intellectual and philosophical competitor, as well as military, political and economic and scientific. How would history progress in the midst of an unending cold war? This then of course led me to consider what exactly went wrong in the Soviet Union, that had led to its collapse in the first place. Having already studied the history of the Soviet Union and then consulting several other texts, it is very obvious to me, especially with the real life comparison of the People’s Republic of China, that Gorbachev's naive idealism, cowardly style of leadership and overall incompetence in his attempt to create an open political system combined with market reforms at a time of political, ideological and economic crisis created by economic stagnation essentially provided the tinder, to kerosine that would be the conditions necessary for the collapse.
However clearly there were other systemic issues at play, sapping away the Soviet Union's economic capabilities, these being runaway military spending, some of the inherent inefficiencies of planned economics and serious endemic corruption. Obviously, I cannot account for the actions of someone who did not actually take power, but Grigory Romanov was Gorbachev's rival to take power, he was a hardliner and very much styled himself after Andropov. For the purposes of this timeline I essentially continue a Soviet Union ran under Andropov esque policy and figure, but taken to its logical ends. Anti-corruption purges, pseudo-technocratic imposition of an intranet necessary to create a cross referencing checking system for the economy; of course the subsequent technological development which would result from concentration in that sector. Our departure from the our timeline posits a slightly healthier Andropov hands off control of the Soviet Union to a competent hardliner, retiring like the Emperor Diocletian and skipping Chernenko entirely. The latter accepts due to his health taking a turn for the worse earlier. All of these emmiently realistic events. Romanov and Gorbachev's fight for Politburo support is a historical fact.
Chapter One:
The End of the Beginning or Romanov's Acescent
Moscow, 1985
By the early and mid 1980's a realization within the Politburo that its leadership was incapable of keeping up with NATO and the Americans and the West's dynamic, powerful, innovative economy and aggressive foreign policy. Particularly spurred on by the The Star Wars project was believed by some in the Aerospace and Air Forces that the delicate equilibrium of MAD was being threatened, and a counter program would be massively expensive or require them to cross the threshold of placing weapons (especially nuclear) in space. There were many proponents of the latter policy as a direct response. Recently it had been revealed that a massive intelligence leak on Soviet aircraft and radars had been released, allowing for the severe advantages the west had found in air engagements in the mid to late 1970s. No one in the military bureaucracy wanted to take responsibility, but the CIA was pounding the table. With the news of Andropov's retirement only days away, the reformers knew that they were coming to their only chance was to block the reformers forcing in candidate who would obviously not be fit to lead the Soviet Union nor the revolution through this trying time. Through backhanded Politburo politics, Romanov the new favorite of both the military, industry and especially the KGB had already kissed the ring.
Within the circles of its elite, it was felt that the Soviet Union was stagnating, this was overwelmingly clear to both the Soviet economists and think tanks, who in many large institutions filled with intellectuals warned of serious institutional problems. On the ground, there existed what was almost entirely and perpetually a shortage economy, of both labour and goods. After the death of Brezhnev, former leader of the KGB Andropov was elevated and proved to be effective during his tenure. He demonstrated that strong authoritarian leadership could in fact deal with corruption at least to some extent, and counterbalance the west. But his tenure was a short one, his kidney failed and worsened several of his other health conditions, and he died at the age of 71. Before this, it had become clear that a successor would be needed soon. Andropov intended to retire from his post (the first Soviet leader to do this) and hand off power to his chosen successor, that man being Grigory Romanov. Romanov had previously fought in the second world war, managed the military industrial complex in the Leningrad region and had been awarded and recognized for his dutiful work for the party and his deft hand at management and administration. At his core he was a conservative and a patriot, he was very much hated by the refromers like Gorbachev, for they saw in him (the younger conservatives) the worst elements of the Soviet system, pragmatic careerists who cared nothing about human rights, adapting the authoritarian elements of the revolution to the 21st century. Within the confines of the marbled Kremlin Politburo meeting room, contention between the hardliners and reformers increased. With no words, and only the glares of men who burned with unknown and sheer hatred for each other. When word came in that Andropov had formerly resigned his position as the head of the General Secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, the reformers immediately acted first. In what had been the first of its kind, a leadership struggle ignited within the Politburo, with Gorbachev backed by senior figures like Andrei Gromyko and other reformists. They had aligned with economists recommending liberalization, in the vein of Dengism or Lenin’s NEP. Men openly argued their opinions, pointing fingers, using terms like reactionary, counter revolutionary, bitch, bastard and western prostitute in an orgy of vulgarity never before seen in these chambers. Grigory Romanov was the 2nd youngest member of the Politburo, he was very close to Andropov and who became something of a mentor and a friend, they would often play chess while Andropov underwent dialysis.
Romanov also aligned himself with others who scoffed at the idea of transitioning to state capitalism, especially the old guard and Marxist-Leninist hardliners. As Andropov began to die, he committed his unwavering support to Romanov allowing him to court Viktor Grishin and the conservatives. At the March 1985 meeting of the Central Committee, Grishin nominated Romanov. Gromyko's nomination of Gorbachev began to lose steam as the regional delegates and lesser important Politburo members who supported it clearly saw that the KGB did not bulge, neither did the Army or party heavy weights. The first situation of its kind to occur in Soviet history, but the tension folded in the Politburo’s Kremlin meeting room when Gorbachev’s lurch for power failed. Each man looked at each other, Gorbachev sweating, Gromyko and Grishin confused. Andropov proved stout and confident as it the minutes beat down on the clock and it became obvious as to how this would proceed. It had almost felt like an invisible force was about to break the stalemate. But at that critical moment, an aide arrived with Andropov’s vote, who had not dismissed himself from the Politburo for this exact reason. Gromyko withdrew his bid in disgrace and very quickly did Gorbachev's base of support fall apart. Romanov was elected unanimously. Gromyko subsequently "retired" and Gorbachev was later removed and given a regional committee position in the Kuril Islands and then later in Murmansk. Andropov later died soon after and was given a massive stately funeral. His death was not hidden, but instead he was saluted as a great leader and Marxist Leninist. One of General Secretary Romanov’s first public appearances was delivering the eulogy for this comrade.
Romanov by acclimation by first the Politburo, Central Committee and finally the Supreme Soviet, as 6th General Secretary of the Communist Party. It wasn't long until Romanov had embarked an ambitious campaign of reform, something that he had formulated in his mind for years prior and had refined in his bedside discussions with Andropov. Andropov saw in Romanov a vehicle to continue his attempts to save the party, revolution and state from failure and collapse. Romanov’s (relative) youth gave him the dynamism and energy to see it through, despite the difficulty of dealing with the immense byzantine soviet bureaucracy. Romanov, acting with the legitimacy and totality of his mandate, made a move that would later be recounted by historians as having changed the direction of Soviet history. It was generally felt in the party that something had to change, that the Brezhnev era had become one of stagnation. The Soviets were at this point importing grain from the west, ostensibly for use as animal feed. Despite having easily the agricultural capacity to support themselves. Advised to do this by Andropov, as Romanov did not have the benefit of having risen or spent years leading or in the KGB. Andropov had managed to increase efficiency in nearly all economic sectors by a simple reminder of the power that the CPSU/KGB had, what pain and brutality it could commit on a whim still in the memories buried deep in the roots of whispered family stories. That twinge could move mountains, imagine what it could do if that dog was actually let off its leash? It is the theory of some philosophers that power, at least in the hearts of some men, is the ultimate drive. Having this unchecked power over human life, handed to you? Could definitely affect the way someone thinks.
His first serious decisive action was “reforming” the party oversight of the KGB. In reality removing the barriers and oversight and leaving it almost completely and directly accountable to its own leadership and the General Secretaryship. In plainer terms, this essentially gave him the power to not only control the upper echelons of the KGB himself, but to investigate those who had previously held "immunity". He had almost in a sense created a Marxist-Leninist Proletarian Guard, ideologically justifiable, as the KGB was meant to serve as the vanguard of the Revolution. This move was created panic in the middle bureaucracy and in some of the population who was aware, at this point almost half of the population made their income from illegal enterprise. Stalin had only died almost thirty years prior. Romanov was denounced in the Supreme Soviet by delegates who were almost immediately arrested or dealt with either retirement or if less graceful resettlement. Brezhnev would have never considered such borderline “Stalinist politics” (at least within his own borders).
Romanov spared no thoughts or mercy on systematically destroying the "counter revolutionary forces" in the party, they were not individuals, but the lethargy of the guard dogs of revolution to prevention reaction from infiltrating the world's foremost socialist experiment. To him, the move was hardly political, and was completely necessary to continue Andropov’s campaign of 'labour discipline' and to maintain the economy and prevent collapse. The KGB brought him into their offices to see videotapes of interrogations and surveillance of what the country was actually up to, the CRT televisions started to play an interview. An older great war veteran, who returned home and became an engineer said it pained him to see only half of his factory full every day, and when he wanted to fire the ‘social parasites’ only to be told no by his own party committee. He had been a party member for twenty years, but the committee did not want to increase the number of "social parasites" or run into issues with their parents about their unemployed kids, he would receive lies that firing wouldn’t fit into the five-year plan. It was becoming clear to Romanov, his academics and his KGB entourage that there was a serious problem in the country. Under guarantee of anonymity (that is to speak to the literal leader of the nation and the highest officers of the KGB), one whistleblower described one of the networks of apparatchiks that assisted in this endemic corruption, when one or two names were mentioned, some men asked to be excused from the room. Instead, Romanov produced a pen and paper from his suit coat, an action very recognizable to the KGB officers, to the older men in the room, it produced a chill down their backs. In one of his second acts, he ordered what some would later call a “purge” of the corrupt apparatchiks; who if anyone was to ask anyone in the street who the problem was in the country, was the number one answer.
The Soviet Technocrat
To see even the elite publicly fall victim to the KGB scared the general population to such an extent that within a few months, efficiency improved a few percent. Andropov’s campaign had managed to get the drunk workers back into the factories, but didn’t deal with the corrupt managers or administration, he intended to but did not have a chance before his health failed. To give a direct (historical) example, it was often possible in the Soviet Union for factory X to have outdated equipment and less efficient production capabilities than factory Y, but through simple seniority, backroom dealing or a general soviet policy not to close factories allowed for this, despite serious labour shortages. That’s right, despite the fact that the Soviet Union had one of the lowest unemployment rates in the world (which was not propaganda), there were massive shortages of labour. It was very uncommon for people to be unemployed for more than six months or a year. Romanov created an ‘auditing’ department called the ‘accountant directorate’ derisively by those of which became its target. Imagine being the bookish kind of man who was a soviet accountant or engineer, often bullied through life or military service. Suddenly the burly or suited men from the KGB arrive at your doors, offers you (enhanced if already a member) party and KGB membership to help clean up the economy that you have grumbled about for years. These ‘auditors’ would become a major asset in the fight to enforce the Andropov ‘discipline’ policy.
The reformists in the party reacted with argument and spread dissent in the party. Previously, the KGB was accountable to the party in the spirit of 'collective leadership' to prevent the tyranny of Stalin from ever rearing its ugly head again. This however had the effect of allowing the lower and middle party ranks to become more corrupt, as they could use their political connections or influence to enrich themselves. Andropov, having spent many years in the only organization that had not become corrupt, the KGB, had imparted in Romanov his hatred of corruption and his fervent belief in the importance of the KGB in safeguarding Lenin's revolution and more importantly the state. The members of the Committee of State Security (KGB) had always saw themselves as superior to the civilians (or Plebeians?), they were the party vanguard. There was no problem transferring their loyalty for Andropov to Romanov, especially with their increased authority, pay and stature in society. He used them increasingly to eliminate those enemies wherever they stood, cleaning house on the basis of what was called the "revolutionary anti corruption campaign" with propagandistically aligned very well with the “labour discipline campaign”. Communist student groups, called Komsomols, roamed the streets naming old apparatchiks and Brezhnev appointees, aided by workers. As news of this spread, many western leaders denounced the move, highlighted by several defectors. There was very little information now coming from the Soviet Union, and very little about Romanov in general. This left the West and Americans to speculate feverishly. Was he the next Stalin? Was he a madman?
The Soviet Foreign Ministry simply responded "Do you not punish criminals in your own country, comrade ambassador? These men we are prosecuting steal without regard. We recall that you send your corrupt politicians out of office at least (or promote them), or imprison your gangsters for decades or your black people for nothing.” The 'Anti Corruption Campaign' became a massive propaganda stunt that helped Romanov mobilize the younger student elements of the party and the more radical elements. Under the cover and fervor of the public trials, he cleared out many his own opponents in the party or general society, but the biggest victims were in fact corrupt officials. With the KGB untethered, acting with what they felt was righteous indignation, they managed to seriously damage, destroy or roll back the largest and most overt corruption and black market efforts or organizations. Many with ties to the Russian/Ukrainian organized crime factions were shot, as was anyone with prison credentials. Of course, they grappled with human nature and the tendency or even basic need to try to gain for oneself and family. But capitalist economists have always forgot about that one more base need, the need for safety and life. Romanov’s coercion and intimidation seemed to get results. With the students and Komsomols motivated and activated, he also continued the policy within the auspices of the “Labour discipline” program, eager communist students were recruited (and promised easier party membership) to force workers to actually go back to their jobs, rather than being absent from work and getting drunk, which had become common during the Brezhnev years. They were then sent to be shame, beat, or publicly expose corrupt bosses. It was a much more tailored and controlled version of the cultural revolution in some respects, but highly regimented and controlled subtlety. At points it would naturally spiral out of the scope and control of those who masterminded these efforts, but typically would then be exploited by an ambitious type eager to throw another apparatchik out of office, often the one in his way of promotion.
The Beginnings of EKAP: 1988
A thinktank of both economists and computer scientists had increasingly recommended a system, not unlike that of Cybersyn in Chile, Allende’s dream, to fix the internal contradictions of a planned economy. General Secretary Romanov was on a personal scale understood in broader terms what computers did, but knew that they were behind and did not really understand them in more particular terms. Young professionals, academics and party members convinced him that this was the future. Romanov already saw that he could improve the economy by numbers ranging from 3-5% from his harsher, more authoritarian policies and crack down on the corrupt officials. But he needed something radical, a new change not only to fix the system but to announce to the world and ideologically cement the relevancy of Marxist Leninism to the 21st century, simple violence and coercion would never present a real opponent to capitalism because it was just autocracy and base socialism, it was philosophically impotent. Technology, and all of its future promises were far more powerful. The Academy of Sciences' prestigious Central Economics-Mathematical Institute presented two solutions, one that included self management and computerization. The others were adherents to a complete move to the imposition of a semi capitalist structure and recommended calling “Perestroika”, even the word annoyed Romanov and the hardliners, because why was ‘restructuring’ needed when the system itself had flaws and perhaps contradictions but simply needed to have the harmful elements removed and the excess cut.
Romanov suggested the term ‘Uprochneniye’ instead, as ‘consolidation’ or 'agreement' to describe his propagandized program of reform. It sounded masculine, more like the language of revolution, rather than defeatism at a critical point. He would also not accept capitalism or anything like the NEP, considering that he felt that if they adopted anything like that, it would be a major concession to the west and make them vulnerable in the world of trade. The beginnings of the Soviet ‘Elektronnaya Kompyuternaya Aistema Planirovaniya’ or EKAP system was born in 1985 and 1986. Romanov ordered a massive KGB operation of stealing the best computer technology from the west, and bringing it back for replication, reverse engineering and use in the new monolithic system that they had begun building.
While his previous efforts had resulted in the improvement of consumer goods production in factories, as well as increased levels of innovation (it was now possible to go above the bosses head to the ‘real bosses’ head who was motivated by bringing good ideas to his boss), another economic reform in the form of self-management in agriculture proved to be a massive boom. Collective farms had become increasingly half state, half private ventures. Owned by their farmers, but allowed to pick their suppliers and allowed to choose who they sold to, with some regional restrictions. Some quotas were introduced to ensure that rural or regional cities were fed, but overall this allowed for the serious reduction of western food imports, that still however continued to a lesser degree. The new agricultural policy was not announced to the world or to Soviet newspapers. They even allowed superior collective/self-managed farms to absorb others which were failing. Imports also increasingly shifted to luxuries, or goods that couldn’t be found in the eastern bloc, such as western sodas (although a Soviet Pepsi was licensed and bottled), cigarettes, alcohol and other foods that were often given in reward boxes for productivity or as general ‘pats on the back’.
Despite this, there were still serious problems, the Soviets had managed to deal with a lot of the issues in their own internal economy by authoritarianism, this method did not necessarily work in the other states of the Warsaw Pact or Comecon. The economic problems there led to a crackdown on solidarity in Poland and in other states, but a solution could not be devised other than transfers of hard currency to pay their debt down. However, a new KGB effort was introduced. A massive operation of counterfeiting US dollars, British pounds and later Euros was devised, to help patch the holes. Overall, there was little to be done to reverse the increasing dissent from liberal factions in the satellite states, especially in Eastern Germany and Poland, no matter how much money was thrown at the problem. The Soviets instead assured the leaders of both country’s that they had the military support and backing of their various deployed army units in Eastern Europe to crush any popular uprising or protest. In 1989 an attempt to breach the Berlin Wall resulted in riots in both East Germany and Poland. Martial law was declared, and the Soviet Army supported the East German forces in cracking down. Some of these events were televised by the west from the safety of West Berlin, where the Soviets were criticized for their open brutality. Grain sanctions were threatened, but the US president was already entering rough waters in many of the farm states, that were also swing states. The Soviets were less dependent on the grain shipments, and if the Americans cut them off, they could cost themselves politically.
The world in which we live today has been nearly completely and totally shaped by two transient events that occurred both in the 20th century, the first obviously being the period of the world wars and the second being the collapse of the Soviet Union. The world wars importance to the direction of modern history is obvious to anyone, not only would they dictate the fates of nations and of millions of people, but the ideological and philosophical direction said nations and individuals would take, it would be nearly impossible to ruminate over the thousands of possible different directions we could have been pulled in or on. In one of those directions, one series of events took nearly everyone by surprise. (Due to the nature of western academia and culture to look for simplified narratives, rather than complicated explanations, I'd recommend the documentary hypernormalization for anyone interested in this notion.) The collapse of the Soviet Union did not result in the same scale of death or destruction (Although certainly millions did die or have their life quality considerably altered, for better or generally more for worse by it) but it ultimately cleared the way for a world in which capitalism and to a lesser extent (a far lesser extent than what western intellectuals in the 1990s thought) liberal democracy as well as human rights could be the only legitimate ideologies, Fukuyama's claims etc. It would be the end of history, at least as they knew it. However, it is very clear this notion was born of some kind of hubristic naivety created from a feeling of victory from watching the wall get knocked down and rockstars parade around in Moscow. This of course raised a question in me, what if the Soviets didn't collapse? That global capitalism and liberalism did not receive its ultimate catharsis in 1989 and 1991? Always challenged by an intellectual and philosophical competitor, as well as military, political and economic and scientific. How would history progress in the midst of an unending cold war? This then of course led me to consider what exactly went wrong in the Soviet Union, that had led to its collapse in the first place. Having already studied the history of the Soviet Union and then consulting several other texts, it is very obvious to me, especially with the real life comparison of the People’s Republic of China, that Gorbachev's naive idealism, cowardly style of leadership and overall incompetence in his attempt to create an open political system combined with market reforms at a time of political, ideological and economic crisis created by economic stagnation essentially provided the tinder, to kerosine that would be the conditions necessary for the collapse.
However clearly there were other systemic issues at play, sapping away the Soviet Union's economic capabilities, these being runaway military spending, some of the inherent inefficiencies of planned economics and serious endemic corruption. Obviously, I cannot account for the actions of someone who did not actually take power, but Grigory Romanov was Gorbachev's rival to take power, he was a hardliner and very much styled himself after Andropov. For the purposes of this timeline I essentially continue a Soviet Union ran under Andropov esque policy and figure, but taken to its logical ends. Anti-corruption purges, pseudo-technocratic imposition of an intranet necessary to create a cross referencing checking system for the economy; of course the subsequent technological development which would result from concentration in that sector. Our departure from the our timeline posits a slightly healthier Andropov hands off control of the Soviet Union to a competent hardliner, retiring like the Emperor Diocletian and skipping Chernenko entirely. The latter accepts due to his health taking a turn for the worse earlier. All of these emmiently realistic events. Romanov and Gorbachev's fight for Politburo support is a historical fact.
Chapter One:
The End of the Beginning or Romanov's Acescent
Moscow, 1985
By the early and mid 1980's a realization within the Politburo that its leadership was incapable of keeping up with NATO and the Americans and the West's dynamic, powerful, innovative economy and aggressive foreign policy. Particularly spurred on by the The Star Wars project was believed by some in the Aerospace and Air Forces that the delicate equilibrium of MAD was being threatened, and a counter program would be massively expensive or require them to cross the threshold of placing weapons (especially nuclear) in space. There were many proponents of the latter policy as a direct response. Recently it had been revealed that a massive intelligence leak on Soviet aircraft and radars had been released, allowing for the severe advantages the west had found in air engagements in the mid to late 1970s. No one in the military bureaucracy wanted to take responsibility, but the CIA was pounding the table. With the news of Andropov's retirement only days away, the reformers knew that they were coming to their only chance was to block the reformers forcing in candidate who would obviously not be fit to lead the Soviet Union nor the revolution through this trying time. Through backhanded Politburo politics, Romanov the new favorite of both the military, industry and especially the KGB had already kissed the ring.
Within the circles of its elite, it was felt that the Soviet Union was stagnating, this was overwelmingly clear to both the Soviet economists and think tanks, who in many large institutions filled with intellectuals warned of serious institutional problems. On the ground, there existed what was almost entirely and perpetually a shortage economy, of both labour and goods. After the death of Brezhnev, former leader of the KGB Andropov was elevated and proved to be effective during his tenure. He demonstrated that strong authoritarian leadership could in fact deal with corruption at least to some extent, and counterbalance the west. But his tenure was a short one, his kidney failed and worsened several of his other health conditions, and he died at the age of 71. Before this, it had become clear that a successor would be needed soon. Andropov intended to retire from his post (the first Soviet leader to do this) and hand off power to his chosen successor, that man being Grigory Romanov. Romanov had previously fought in the second world war, managed the military industrial complex in the Leningrad region and had been awarded and recognized for his dutiful work for the party and his deft hand at management and administration. At his core he was a conservative and a patriot, he was very much hated by the refromers like Gorbachev, for they saw in him (the younger conservatives) the worst elements of the Soviet system, pragmatic careerists who cared nothing about human rights, adapting the authoritarian elements of the revolution to the 21st century. Within the confines of the marbled Kremlin Politburo meeting room, contention between the hardliners and reformers increased. With no words, and only the glares of men who burned with unknown and sheer hatred for each other. When word came in that Andropov had formerly resigned his position as the head of the General Secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, the reformers immediately acted first. In what had been the first of its kind, a leadership struggle ignited within the Politburo, with Gorbachev backed by senior figures like Andrei Gromyko and other reformists. They had aligned with economists recommending liberalization, in the vein of Dengism or Lenin’s NEP. Men openly argued their opinions, pointing fingers, using terms like reactionary, counter revolutionary, bitch, bastard and western prostitute in an orgy of vulgarity never before seen in these chambers. Grigory Romanov was the 2nd youngest member of the Politburo, he was very close to Andropov and who became something of a mentor and a friend, they would often play chess while Andropov underwent dialysis.
Romanov also aligned himself with others who scoffed at the idea of transitioning to state capitalism, especially the old guard and Marxist-Leninist hardliners. As Andropov began to die, he committed his unwavering support to Romanov allowing him to court Viktor Grishin and the conservatives. At the March 1985 meeting of the Central Committee, Grishin nominated Romanov. Gromyko's nomination of Gorbachev began to lose steam as the regional delegates and lesser important Politburo members who supported it clearly saw that the KGB did not bulge, neither did the Army or party heavy weights. The first situation of its kind to occur in Soviet history, but the tension folded in the Politburo’s Kremlin meeting room when Gorbachev’s lurch for power failed. Each man looked at each other, Gorbachev sweating, Gromyko and Grishin confused. Andropov proved stout and confident as it the minutes beat down on the clock and it became obvious as to how this would proceed. It had almost felt like an invisible force was about to break the stalemate. But at that critical moment, an aide arrived with Andropov’s vote, who had not dismissed himself from the Politburo for this exact reason. Gromyko withdrew his bid in disgrace and very quickly did Gorbachev's base of support fall apart. Romanov was elected unanimously. Gromyko subsequently "retired" and Gorbachev was later removed and given a regional committee position in the Kuril Islands and then later in Murmansk. Andropov later died soon after and was given a massive stately funeral. His death was not hidden, but instead he was saluted as a great leader and Marxist Leninist. One of General Secretary Romanov’s first public appearances was delivering the eulogy for this comrade.
Romanov by acclimation by first the Politburo, Central Committee and finally the Supreme Soviet, as 6th General Secretary of the Communist Party. It wasn't long until Romanov had embarked an ambitious campaign of reform, something that he had formulated in his mind for years prior and had refined in his bedside discussions with Andropov. Andropov saw in Romanov a vehicle to continue his attempts to save the party, revolution and state from failure and collapse. Romanov’s (relative) youth gave him the dynamism and energy to see it through, despite the difficulty of dealing with the immense byzantine soviet bureaucracy. Romanov, acting with the legitimacy and totality of his mandate, made a move that would later be recounted by historians as having changed the direction of Soviet history. It was generally felt in the party that something had to change, that the Brezhnev era had become one of stagnation. The Soviets were at this point importing grain from the west, ostensibly for use as animal feed. Despite having easily the agricultural capacity to support themselves. Advised to do this by Andropov, as Romanov did not have the benefit of having risen or spent years leading or in the KGB. Andropov had managed to increase efficiency in nearly all economic sectors by a simple reminder of the power that the CPSU/KGB had, what pain and brutality it could commit on a whim still in the memories buried deep in the roots of whispered family stories. That twinge could move mountains, imagine what it could do if that dog was actually let off its leash? It is the theory of some philosophers that power, at least in the hearts of some men, is the ultimate drive. Having this unchecked power over human life, handed to you? Could definitely affect the way someone thinks.
His first serious decisive action was “reforming” the party oversight of the KGB. In reality removing the barriers and oversight and leaving it almost completely and directly accountable to its own leadership and the General Secretaryship. In plainer terms, this essentially gave him the power to not only control the upper echelons of the KGB himself, but to investigate those who had previously held "immunity". He had almost in a sense created a Marxist-Leninist Proletarian Guard, ideologically justifiable, as the KGB was meant to serve as the vanguard of the Revolution. This move was created panic in the middle bureaucracy and in some of the population who was aware, at this point almost half of the population made their income from illegal enterprise. Stalin had only died almost thirty years prior. Romanov was denounced in the Supreme Soviet by delegates who were almost immediately arrested or dealt with either retirement or if less graceful resettlement. Brezhnev would have never considered such borderline “Stalinist politics” (at least within his own borders).
Romanov spared no thoughts or mercy on systematically destroying the "counter revolutionary forces" in the party, they were not individuals, but the lethargy of the guard dogs of revolution to prevention reaction from infiltrating the world's foremost socialist experiment. To him, the move was hardly political, and was completely necessary to continue Andropov’s campaign of 'labour discipline' and to maintain the economy and prevent collapse. The KGB brought him into their offices to see videotapes of interrogations and surveillance of what the country was actually up to, the CRT televisions started to play an interview. An older great war veteran, who returned home and became an engineer said it pained him to see only half of his factory full every day, and when he wanted to fire the ‘social parasites’ only to be told no by his own party committee. He had been a party member for twenty years, but the committee did not want to increase the number of "social parasites" or run into issues with their parents about their unemployed kids, he would receive lies that firing wouldn’t fit into the five-year plan. It was becoming clear to Romanov, his academics and his KGB entourage that there was a serious problem in the country. Under guarantee of anonymity (that is to speak to the literal leader of the nation and the highest officers of the KGB), one whistleblower described one of the networks of apparatchiks that assisted in this endemic corruption, when one or two names were mentioned, some men asked to be excused from the room. Instead, Romanov produced a pen and paper from his suit coat, an action very recognizable to the KGB officers, to the older men in the room, it produced a chill down their backs. In one of his second acts, he ordered what some would later call a “purge” of the corrupt apparatchiks; who if anyone was to ask anyone in the street who the problem was in the country, was the number one answer.
The Soviet Technocrat
To see even the elite publicly fall victim to the KGB scared the general population to such an extent that within a few months, efficiency improved a few percent. Andropov’s campaign had managed to get the drunk workers back into the factories, but didn’t deal with the corrupt managers or administration, he intended to but did not have a chance before his health failed. To give a direct (historical) example, it was often possible in the Soviet Union for factory X to have outdated equipment and less efficient production capabilities than factory Y, but through simple seniority, backroom dealing or a general soviet policy not to close factories allowed for this, despite serious labour shortages. That’s right, despite the fact that the Soviet Union had one of the lowest unemployment rates in the world (which was not propaganda), there were massive shortages of labour. It was very uncommon for people to be unemployed for more than six months or a year. Romanov created an ‘auditing’ department called the ‘accountant directorate’ derisively by those of which became its target. Imagine being the bookish kind of man who was a soviet accountant or engineer, often bullied through life or military service. Suddenly the burly or suited men from the KGB arrive at your doors, offers you (enhanced if already a member) party and KGB membership to help clean up the economy that you have grumbled about for years. These ‘auditors’ would become a major asset in the fight to enforce the Andropov ‘discipline’ policy.
The reformists in the party reacted with argument and spread dissent in the party. Previously, the KGB was accountable to the party in the spirit of 'collective leadership' to prevent the tyranny of Stalin from ever rearing its ugly head again. This however had the effect of allowing the lower and middle party ranks to become more corrupt, as they could use their political connections or influence to enrich themselves. Andropov, having spent many years in the only organization that had not become corrupt, the KGB, had imparted in Romanov his hatred of corruption and his fervent belief in the importance of the KGB in safeguarding Lenin's revolution and more importantly the state. The members of the Committee of State Security (KGB) had always saw themselves as superior to the civilians (or Plebeians?), they were the party vanguard. There was no problem transferring their loyalty for Andropov to Romanov, especially with their increased authority, pay and stature in society. He used them increasingly to eliminate those enemies wherever they stood, cleaning house on the basis of what was called the "revolutionary anti corruption campaign" with propagandistically aligned very well with the “labour discipline campaign”. Communist student groups, called Komsomols, roamed the streets naming old apparatchiks and Brezhnev appointees, aided by workers. As news of this spread, many western leaders denounced the move, highlighted by several defectors. There was very little information now coming from the Soviet Union, and very little about Romanov in general. This left the West and Americans to speculate feverishly. Was he the next Stalin? Was he a madman?
The Soviet Foreign Ministry simply responded "Do you not punish criminals in your own country, comrade ambassador? These men we are prosecuting steal without regard. We recall that you send your corrupt politicians out of office at least (or promote them), or imprison your gangsters for decades or your black people for nothing.” The 'Anti Corruption Campaign' became a massive propaganda stunt that helped Romanov mobilize the younger student elements of the party and the more radical elements. Under the cover and fervor of the public trials, he cleared out many his own opponents in the party or general society, but the biggest victims were in fact corrupt officials. With the KGB untethered, acting with what they felt was righteous indignation, they managed to seriously damage, destroy or roll back the largest and most overt corruption and black market efforts or organizations. Many with ties to the Russian/Ukrainian organized crime factions were shot, as was anyone with prison credentials. Of course, they grappled with human nature and the tendency or even basic need to try to gain for oneself and family. But capitalist economists have always forgot about that one more base need, the need for safety and life. Romanov’s coercion and intimidation seemed to get results. With the students and Komsomols motivated and activated, he also continued the policy within the auspices of the “Labour discipline” program, eager communist students were recruited (and promised easier party membership) to force workers to actually go back to their jobs, rather than being absent from work and getting drunk, which had become common during the Brezhnev years. They were then sent to be shame, beat, or publicly expose corrupt bosses. It was a much more tailored and controlled version of the cultural revolution in some respects, but highly regimented and controlled subtlety. At points it would naturally spiral out of the scope and control of those who masterminded these efforts, but typically would then be exploited by an ambitious type eager to throw another apparatchik out of office, often the one in his way of promotion.
The Beginnings of EKAP: 1988
A thinktank of both economists and computer scientists had increasingly recommended a system, not unlike that of Cybersyn in Chile, Allende’s dream, to fix the internal contradictions of a planned economy. General Secretary Romanov was on a personal scale understood in broader terms what computers did, but knew that they were behind and did not really understand them in more particular terms. Young professionals, academics and party members convinced him that this was the future. Romanov already saw that he could improve the economy by numbers ranging from 3-5% from his harsher, more authoritarian policies and crack down on the corrupt officials. But he needed something radical, a new change not only to fix the system but to announce to the world and ideologically cement the relevancy of Marxist Leninism to the 21st century, simple violence and coercion would never present a real opponent to capitalism because it was just autocracy and base socialism, it was philosophically impotent. Technology, and all of its future promises were far more powerful. The Academy of Sciences' prestigious Central Economics-Mathematical Institute presented two solutions, one that included self management and computerization. The others were adherents to a complete move to the imposition of a semi capitalist structure and recommended calling “Perestroika”, even the word annoyed Romanov and the hardliners, because why was ‘restructuring’ needed when the system itself had flaws and perhaps contradictions but simply needed to have the harmful elements removed and the excess cut.
Romanov suggested the term ‘Uprochneniye’ instead, as ‘consolidation’ or 'agreement' to describe his propagandized program of reform. It sounded masculine, more like the language of revolution, rather than defeatism at a critical point. He would also not accept capitalism or anything like the NEP, considering that he felt that if they adopted anything like that, it would be a major concession to the west and make them vulnerable in the world of trade. The beginnings of the Soviet ‘Elektronnaya Kompyuternaya Aistema Planirovaniya’ or EKAP system was born in 1985 and 1986. Romanov ordered a massive KGB operation of stealing the best computer technology from the west, and bringing it back for replication, reverse engineering and use in the new monolithic system that they had begun building.
While his previous efforts had resulted in the improvement of consumer goods production in factories, as well as increased levels of innovation (it was now possible to go above the bosses head to the ‘real bosses’ head who was motivated by bringing good ideas to his boss), another economic reform in the form of self-management in agriculture proved to be a massive boom. Collective farms had become increasingly half state, half private ventures. Owned by their farmers, but allowed to pick their suppliers and allowed to choose who they sold to, with some regional restrictions. Some quotas were introduced to ensure that rural or regional cities were fed, but overall this allowed for the serious reduction of western food imports, that still however continued to a lesser degree. The new agricultural policy was not announced to the world or to Soviet newspapers. They even allowed superior collective/self-managed farms to absorb others which were failing. Imports also increasingly shifted to luxuries, or goods that couldn’t be found in the eastern bloc, such as western sodas (although a Soviet Pepsi was licensed and bottled), cigarettes, alcohol and other foods that were often given in reward boxes for productivity or as general ‘pats on the back’.
Despite this, there were still serious problems, the Soviets had managed to deal with a lot of the issues in their own internal economy by authoritarianism, this method did not necessarily work in the other states of the Warsaw Pact or Comecon. The economic problems there led to a crackdown on solidarity in Poland and in other states, but a solution could not be devised other than transfers of hard currency to pay their debt down. However, a new KGB effort was introduced. A massive operation of counterfeiting US dollars, British pounds and later Euros was devised, to help patch the holes. Overall, there was little to be done to reverse the increasing dissent from liberal factions in the satellite states, especially in Eastern Germany and Poland, no matter how much money was thrown at the problem. The Soviets instead assured the leaders of both country’s that they had the military support and backing of their various deployed army units in Eastern Europe to crush any popular uprising or protest. In 1989 an attempt to breach the Berlin Wall resulted in riots in both East Germany and Poland. Martial law was declared, and the Soviet Army supported the East German forces in cracking down. Some of these events were televised by the west from the safety of West Berlin, where the Soviets were criticized for their open brutality. Grain sanctions were threatened, but the US president was already entering rough waters in many of the farm states, that were also swing states. The Soviets were less dependent on the grain shipments, and if the Americans cut them off, they could cost themselves politically.
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