Post by stevep on Jan 16, 2016 0:01:06 GMT
Guys
I have been thinking for a while about a fairly nasty path that WWII might have taken. The ongoing discussion on on the otherhistory.proboards.com/thread/446/lead-role-cage-comments-thread thread about different paths that might develop and especially the idea of when the allies might return to N France nudged me into looking at it again and have brushed up my earlier thoughts into this thread. Be interested to see what people think. Thinking this is basically the latest date at which a single non-ASB decision might preserve the Nazi empire in both existence and control of much of Europe.
POD
Working on the assumption that the 2nd Washington Conference, 20-25th June 1942 sees the US take a harder line over a quick invasion of northern Europe. Britain is still able to shoot down the rash Operation Sledgehammer, especially since that would be an overwhelmingly British operation that they viewed as suicidal. However instead of Churchill winning acceptance for a landing in NW Africa to help clear out the Axis from that Continent Roosevelt insists on a landing in N France in 1943.
The initial plan for this was Operation Roundup, which involved 48 divisions [18 British, presumably involving dominion and imperial forces] landing on a broad front between Boulogne and Le Havre. This was however quickly realises as impractical given the inability to produce and ship those forces to Britain by summer 43 let alone carrying them over the Channel. Also as the Germans started to strengthen their coastal defences during the autumn and winter other doubts were raised.
It was politically impossible to delay the invasion until 44 so details plans were made for a smaller landing in Normandy with elaborate deception plans to make the Germans expect a landing in the Calais region. [Plus for reasons of simplicity it makes it easier to look at a landing if I have the OTL Normandy one as a benchmark.]
N African Impact
The 1st casualty of the decision was the pursuit of the Germans after their defeat at 2nd El Alamein. The battle still occurred as the British didn't want the Germans so close to the Nile valley and canal and pushing them back and retaking Cyrenaica would be essential to making the resupply of Malta necessary. Which would be more important given that plans to clear N Africa were abandon. Also since at least some of the Desert Rats, the only western force with recent experience of fighting German forces, albeit in a different climate, would be recalled to spearhead the British part of the landings. As such it was decided not to push beyond El Agheila.
Winter 42-43 in the east
Allied morale was raised however by the stunning Soviet successes in the east, especially the encirclement and capture of 6th Army and related forces in the Stalingrad pocket, aided by Hitler's refusal to allow a breakout effort. This was followed up by advances all along the front but especially in the south with much of the eastern Ukraine retaken by the Red Army along with associated parts of the Russian SSR. The important Donbas region was quickly regained and later, to Hitler's fury SS forces withdraw from Kharkov which was also liberated. Soviet units got within striking distance of the Dnieper. Further south Army Group A was forced out of virtually all of the Ciscaucasus region with 18thA isolated in a bridgehead around Novorossiysk.
However by February 43 the swings was tilting backwards. The Germans had been reinforced in terms of both air and ground units and the Soviets had suffered heavy losses themselves and overstretched their supply lines, as well as losing some of their cohesion. Equally dangerously their attacking forces had also become somewhat separated. The result was a series of counter offensives, chiefly spearhead by Manstein, the commander of the reformed AGS which destroyed the SW Front and badly mauled the Voronezh Front. Kharkov was reconquered by the Germans as was Kursk shortly before mutual exhaustion and the spring thaw brought mobile action to a end.
The winter campaign had seen severe losses on both sides. The Soviet losses had been greater but between their considerable manpower, the greater degree of Soviet mobilisation for war and the aid arriving in increasing amounts from the US especially meant they could take them damage more than the Germans who had lost both a lot of experienced troops and a large measure of their previous sense of invincibility.
Plans for 43
All three blocs had plans for the coming year but all three also faced problems.
For the western allies the determination to invade France in spring or early summer, further pushed by Stalin's continued demands and hints of looking at a separate peace. However getting together enough troops, training them, shipping them and their supplies across the Atlantic and organising the forces to smash into occupied Europe made the allies realise how big a task they had taken on. This was compounded by the fact this massive build-up in Britain was being done before the battle of the Atlantic had been won, piling yet more stress on Britain's economy and supplies. It was helped by the US having admitted the importance of convoying and committing greater resources to the task, although this took time to build ships, train men and gain real experience. By the spring of 43 the Atlantic campaign was being won but whether it was quickly enough to secure the massive amount of supplies needed both to sustain Britain and maintain an invasion was uncertain to many. This was not helped by the continued closing of the Med to traffic which made the transfer of men and equipment between Britain and the eastern theatres markedly more difficult. [Although at this stage this is a false loss as OTL markedly more resources would have been tied up in operations in support of the N African and Sicily and later the Italian campaigns. It is probably only from about Sept 43 onwards that the clearing of the Med becomes useful. However for TTL the supply problem is compounded by the fact the invasion is being launched a year earlier, with much fewer resources.]
At the same time plans for the invasion were to a degree in flux. The Americans, on changing to a Normandy target had initially suggested a 3 division landing front but the British feared this was too narrow. After some discussion this was widened to 5 divisions but this again increased the burdens for mounting such an invasion. [This occurred OTL]. However because of the US confidence in their own forces and lingering British doubts over the operations it was decided that the US forces would land on the 2 eastern beaches, which were seen as more important and vulnerable, the Canadians on the central one and the British on the two western bridgeheads. [This is a reversal of the OTL circumstances.]
The British were also concerned about how reliable the Americans would be in combat as they were virtually totally lacking in experience while they were also aware of their own limitations in amphibious warfare, as highlighted by the Dieppe raid. This lead to much work on ways to help support the landings, especially in fire-power support and the famous Hobart's funnies. There were also plans for artificial harbours but it turned out to be too big a task in the limited time available.
For the Soviets Stalin has satisfaction at the huge casualties inflicted on the Germans and their allies and the vast amounts of land the Red Army had retaken. However even the victories had been costly while the defeat of the overstretched Soviet forces had cause heavy losses and also punctured Stalin's growing over-confidence. He knew that even the manpower available to him was limited while there was a lot of destroyed equipment to replace. Furthermore he was fearful that the western powers were leaving him to fight the Germans alone, letting the Red Army do the vast majority of the blood-letting as they wear down the German army. Coupled with this was the continued resilience of the German army, supported by intelligence reports that although not completely the Germans were replacing losses and bringing in more equipment. Furthermore the Germans had been on the offensive in both previous summers and he was uncertain the they were weakened enough for the Soviets to take the offensive that summer. Hence he decided to wait for a German attack and seek to block and hold that, bleeding the Germans until they were weakened and then counter-attacking. The longer the delay the more troops and equipment he could assemble as he knew that even without L-L from the west the Soviets were producing far more equipment that the Germans.
One complication was that he wasn't sure where the Germans would attack as there was no certainty about this, in part because the Germans themselves seemed undecided. He couldn't even rule out a new attack on Moscow from the Orel area, although this was viewed as unlikely. Equally unlikely was a new strike towards Stalingrad or the Baku oilfields as it was thought even the Germans realised they were comparatively markedly weaker than the previous year. As such extensive fortifications would be needed pretty much along the southern half of the eastern front. Only in the north was a major German offensive thought unlikely. [This was due to the lack of a Kursk sailent as the obvious target].
For the Germans there were also problems and uncertainty. Some of this came from Hitler's growing instability and the incompetence of the Nazi system. Also the demands for massive increases of military production, although being achieved with some considerable success was taking time and a lot of organisational effort. Guderian was drastically rebuilding the battered and depleted panzer forces but this was taking time, as was replacing at least some of the manpower losses. This was further complicated by attempts to introduce new weapons, most noticeably the Panzer V and VI and the Elephant tank destroyer. There were repeated problems with introducing them quickly and then getting most of the bugs out of them. This was to be crucial in the coming campaign in the east as Hitler wanted to see them in service for a relatively small scale offensive to maul Soviet forces. As such plans were repeatedly delayed and by early June Manstein, who had argued for an early attack as soon as the mud dried was now supporting the idea of allowing the Soviets to attack and then counter-attacking them.
The other complication was that the Germans knew an attack was coming in the west. This was strongly hinted at by the lack of western activity in the Med, especially since the British hadn't continued their pursuit of the battered Axis forces in Libya. Also there were plenty of reports of American forces arriving in Britain in large numbers, by a few photo-reconnaissance flights over Britain, reports from subs of the number of troopships sighted in the Atlantic and interception of radio messages. Even British wartime security couldn't hide the massive build-up and the reactions it caused in public opinion.
Another clear marker was the allied bombing campaign. It might have been that the Americans were restricting their own heavy bombers to operations over northern France while they gained experience and, from spring 43 reluctantly accepted the need for escort fighters. However the British strategic bombers, which had been pounding, albeit often ineffectively, German cities had also joined in the attack on targets in N France. Furthermore both forces were primarily attacking transport targets, especially railways. Which many saw as an inevitable step before any invasion, to prevent Germany supporting the coastal defensive forces.
As a result of course, despite the demands in the east the Germans were also boosting their defences in the west. Both some forces being sent west and a lot of effort to build defences, especially on the coastal sections thought most likely to be the target of attack.
[Here the Germans have a number of advantages compared to OTL. The lack of a series of campaigns in N Africa, Sicily and Italy freed up a lot of manpower and resources. Both in terms of avoiding the German losses in N Africa and the commitments to garrisoning and defending Italy. Also in terms of no need to garrison Vichy France, which remains in existence and being able to call on resources in Italy that would have been lost. Furthermore the fact that the sizeable demand for air and ground units to fight in N Africa didn't occur at the same time as a similar demand for attempts to withstand the Soviet deluge from Stalingrad onwards. Most especially the large number of a/c lost during the N African campaign was saved and a lot available to reinforce the eastern front, which reduced German and increased Soviet losses.]
Actions during the invasion of Normandy
The allies fight with determination and do a lot of damage to German forces in Normandy and early reinforcements. Especially with heavy naval gunfire support. However there are limits to how long this could be sustained and possible losses to German guided bombs. Also simply the heavy combat losses, especially to the American forces fighting the main German armoured units in the east. Their early seizure of Caen is quickly repelled by a counter-attack and savage losses occur amongst the inexperienced American units despite the massive air and naval gunfire support.
In the following weeks bitter fighting occurs with several times Utah [OTL Sword] beach being nearly overrun. The Americans fought bravely, often making repeated attacks, but occasionally, especially when badly led, proved brittle. Reckless attacks failed to dislodge the Germans and often suffered huge losses. Such actions were to lead to the removal of two army commanders, Patton, for his disregard of losses and Fredendall for his failure of nerve. The inexperienced American units had their 1st very bloody experience of warfare with German units and although a number of valuable lessons were learnt the costs were very very heavy.
To the west, despite early problems on Sword [OTL Ohama] beach due to the terrain Hobart's funnies and very heavy naval gunfire support means the British are able to fight their way ashore and by the 4th day they have linked up with the British on Gold [Utah] and the Canadians on Juno [Gold] beaches. However losses have been heavy and the bocage greatly delayed advances. Also while the vigorous American attacks in the east tied up the majority of the German forces, especially their armour, the huge losses the Americans suffered meant they took the vast majority of the available shipping to remove casualties and bring in supplies, reinforcements and new equipment. Furthermore some sources suggested the British forces were to cautious and they were unable to break out of the defences despite the capture of St Lo on the 29th day of the campaign, before it became clear the invasion had failed.
While the allies made a massive effort their lack of experience and the problems they faced meant they couldn't reinforce and resupply as fast as the Germans, despite the losses the latter suffered, especially from allied air power in some massive attacks. Simply the sheer number of losses, especially on the American sector, meant that the pressure couldn't be maintained. By mid-July its becoming clear that the invasion has failed. A big storm in the last week of July which drastically disrupts resupply makes this even more certain. It might even have saved allied lives in a way, as it made clear that the position was unsustainable. The resulting evacuation sees heavy losses but about a third of the forces still on the beaches are successfully withdrawn, although the vast majority of their equipment and many wounded had to be left behind.
Also the German air force, although it suffered heavily in trying to support its forces got in some valuable hits. Three successful strikes in the 1st week of the invasion by glide-bombs badly damaged the BBs Warspite and Texas and sank the cruiser Quincy. The allies quickly found counters to the weapons but it meant continued CAPs being flown over the supporting fleets, a further drain on allied a/c and the early losses restricted the availability of the naval gunfire support.
Primarily reasons why the landing fails:
a) Allied troops are far less well prepared without experience gained in N Africa and Italy, especially for their commanders. This is especially dangerous for the American forces in the eastern landing beaches. British troops also suffer on Sword [OTL Ohama] beach but are helped by more experience, Hobart's funnies and very heavy fire support.
b) Due to smaller and less experienced forces the bombing campaigns were less effective in damaging the transport links in N W Europe. Hence the Germans have far less problems in reinforcing the defences. Also those same strategic forces are less capable in support of the actual invasion forces in the fight.
c) Rommel is still in N Africa. Hence, without his experience of overwhelming allied tactical air power there is not the same debate about the deployment of available armoured units. Instead of being split into three separate elements they are kept as a centralised reserve in N France. While they do suffer losses and delay due to allied air attack the relatively greater balance between the air forces on both sides mean this is less and against stronger German panzer units. As such, although delayed a little compared to OTL German armoured forces are stronger and concentrated into a single force.
d) Again without the fighting in the Med the allies have less experience of supplying rapid ground support while the earlier offensive and lack of wear on the Luftwaffe from both the Med campaign and the fact there has been no prolonged USAAF operation deep into Germany with the resultant decimation of Luftwaffe fighter strength. This is badly depleted in the Normandy campaign but not quickly enough to effect the conflict.
e) Without the Mulberries it is far more difficult to land supplies rapidly and also remove wounded which means that the beachheads, which are smaller than OTL are very crowded, increasing confused and casualties are often stuck on the beaches longer. This latter not only caused higher casualties but had a bad impact on moral.
Aftermath
A period of investigation follows although complicated by some infighting and blame-casting. The fact the less experienced Americans took markedly heavier losses caused resentment on both sides while the performance of some US commanders, especially Fredendall and Patton caused internal clashes inside the US army. Montgomery was criticised for being too conservative in his command of the British forces and some Americans argued that he missed chances to breakout to the west, which might have prevented a failure of the wider campaign.
Despite the disputes the two powers still have to work together and do something to regain the initiative. It will take some time to put together a force capable of challenging the Germans on a major front again. Both because of the large number of casualties and also the shattering of morale of a lot of the survivors and elements in the civilian population in both countries. Britain is facing manpower shortages and after nearly 4 years of war looks a long way from winning while American optimism is badly battered.
In September there are landings in N Africa as plans for the clearing of N Africa have been revived to give a relatively easy and secure victory. The Vichy French are angry and put up some resistance but are too weak. Also after the bitter fighting in Normandy and with the ongoing crisis in the east the Germans haven't major forces to reinforce the Italians or French.
Eastern Front
The fact the western allies had struck 1st meant that there was no real chance of a German attack in the east. Therefore Stalin quickly decided the Red Army must go on the offensive itself. This sees a wave of attacks starting in late June pretty much along the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea but with major thrusts by the Bryansk Front towards Orel, the rebuilt Voronezh Front towards Kursk and the Southern Front towards Stalino.
Three months of confused fighting followed. Sheer weight of numbers, coupled with the growing experience of many Red Army units meant that the Germans were forced back in numerous places. Their armoured units struck back in strength and mauled several Russian spearheads. However each such clash wore down both the panzer units and also the infantry forces that were seeking to hold a line in between such actions. Also with the battle in Normandy absorbing most reserves, especially of air units the situation became increasingly desperate for the Germans.
By the middle of August exhausted German units were starting to crumble and 8th army and part of 1st Panzer Army were cut off around Kharkov and destroyed by the end of the month. Large parts of 9th army were also destroyed between Orel and Bryansk.
The saving grace for the Germans was the ending of the allied campaign in the west. While many of the German units there were too badly battered to be moved elsewhere it did enable some air units and the final reserves in Germany itself to be sent east. It also meant Hitler was even more determined that no retreat would be allowed in the east but generals were increasingly ignoring such orders.
Even so, by the time an exhausted Red army called off its offensives towards the end of October they had made substantial gains. The Dnieper was reached along much of its lower length although an attempt to reach the Crimean had seen South Front cut off and largely destroyed by a last German counter-strike, encircling much of it in the Melitopol pocket. Also an attempt to cross the river either side of Kiev had been defeated as had another attack near Dnepropetrovsk. Further north Smolensk had been retaken but the Germans still held the Vitebsk/Orsha region.
The costs on both sides had been huge and while the Germans had no strength left to try and counter-attack the Soviets were also shattered. Also Stalin was angry at the early ending of the western offensive, which with his paranoia meant he was increasing certain it had been a deliberate ploy to lure the Soviets into their own offensive and then leave them to fight alone. Relations with both western powers deteriorated despite the growing numbers of supplies from them.
Elsewhere in 43
The US had started driving back the Japanese with the defeat of the latter's attempt to secure the Solomon's and threaten links with Australia. This was followed up with an advance through New Guinea and neighbouring islands. Also in the Pacific the USN towards the end of the year started its own advance across the central Pacific. [Basically as OTL but with slightly less resources as the decision to make the landing in France had forced a greater allocation, especially of landing craft and supporting air and naval units, to the European/Atlantic theatre. Britain hadn't made the OTL offensive into Burma because it had committed units to both Normandy and then later the N African campaign.]
Winter 43/44
In the east Stalin tried attacking again in Dec43/Mar 44 before the Germans could rebuild their forces. They were however able to call upon the 1st rebuilt units from the western front, along with their increasing production to gain valuable reinforcements and the Soviets only made minor gains, for heavy losses. No strategic positions were lost by the Germans and although they suffered heavy losses themselves there was hope in some elements of the German military that the line could be held at least for the next few months.
In N Africa the Axis forces were steadily driven back despite some reinforcements and Hitler, worried by the losses in the east, was persuaded to accept a withdrawal of the remaining forces from Tunisia to Sicily in Jan/Feb 44. With this the allies finally cleared N Africa and enabled limited use of the Med for shipping.
One down side of the two campaigns by the western powers was the Treaty of Dijon. In this Hitler formally ended the armistice with Vichy France and the latter became a formal ally of Nazi Germany. This was partly due to continued French confidence in German ability to win the war and also anger at the attack on Vichy N Africa and high French casualties from the bombing during the campaign in Normandy and its run up. Furthermore the ending of the armistice meant that the Germans started releasing the French POWs they had held since 1940 and also handed back most of Northern France to French political control, although German military forces continued to occupy many areas. The US broke off relations with France, the Laval government having moved the capital back to Paris.
Behind the scenes there is manoeuvring going on. The western powers are building up for a new offensive in France in 44 but many are concerned about another defeat, especially since while German military forces haven't increased they are building more powerful fixed defences. Also some, especially in Britain are arguing for following on the N African campaign by attacks into Italy and the Balkans. Stalin is aware of this through his spies and given his paranoia is disbelieving that the allies will actually carry out an attack on France and carry it through to a long term advance into France and western Germany. The Germans accept that victory in the east is no longer realistic and are concerned about their continued losses, both from the huge battles in the east and the growing strength of allied bombing in the west. Also they are aware of large forces being rebuilt in Britain and the probability of another attack in France in the coming summer which is likely to be larger and better organised and supported than the 43 one. At the same time allied operations in N Africa means they are uncertain about the reliability of the Italians as allies.
Political decisions
As such even Hitler is willing to listen to approaches made by the Soviets for a peace agreement. Between mutual mistrust and contempt and the nature of both regimes it is a long path to an agreement especially since Hitler is bitterly hostile to giving up any land in the east. The huge losses both sides suffered during the winter fight are probably important in deciding both leaders to compromise. As such the final agreement is made in April 44 and sees the Treaty of Helsinki signed. The Germans reluctantly gave up the areas they still held east of the Dnieper along with a section of land from around Smolensk north to the Pskov region. Germany kept most of the western Ukraine, including the important resource centre of Krivoy Rog along with a strip of Belorussia and control of the three Baltic states, as well as all of the former Polish state. Also there would be an exchange of prisoners and tentative discussion of economic exchanges.
The news was a bombshell to the western powers. They had had some reports of such negotiations in part due to intelligence sources inside Nazi Germany but Stalin had violently denied western questions about them. This further deepened mistrust between the western and Soviet powers, as did the rapid ending of Lend-Lease and the following seizure of allied resources in the Soviet Union. The L-L cut-off caused serious problems for the Soviets, although the extent of this was not realised at the time in either the west or Nazi Germany.
It also cast serious doubts on the future western plans for the war. Despite the widely expected fact this was seen as little more than a truce between the two dictatorships and a new war would be likely sooner or later Germany would release a lot of resources from the ending of the conflict. This meant that any allied landings, whether in northern France or the Med would be far more costly and difficult and could well fail. Especially since the French government is clear it would oppose any such invasion.
There are promising signs. US daytime raids seem to be having success against German targets, although markedly less than they think, and are completing the destruction of much of the Luftwaffe. British night raids are also doing a lot of damage, but still at high costs and again far less than BC thinks. Also with Germany able to allocate a lot more resources to the air war some are doubtful that bomber campaigns can win the war on their own. Especially since reports of new German jet and rocket weapons have some fearing a drastic reversal in the campaign.
Furthermore the German counter-attacks with the V1 weapon and intelligence reports about the V2 are raising doubts about how much damage Britain will take and whether it can be a reliable staging post for a new invasion of France. The Atlantic campaign is virtually over by now with convoy losses drastically reduced and crippling U boat losses but this is a defensive victory rather than anything which weakens the German control of Europe.
Some have hopes for the Manhattan Project but very few know about this and most of the decision makers have little understanding of the science and technology involved. With relevant materials [U235 and Pu239] only just starting to be produced in literally microscopic amounts and many doubts about whether a weapon is practical leaders are uncertain whether they can gamble on another long year or two of bitter fighting, probably with heavy losses on the chance that the project might produce a war winning weapon.
Anyway, do the western powers fight on or make their own peace with Hitler?
Steve
I posted this on the Other History site but didn't get any response. Any interest in possibilities here please?
I have been thinking for a while about a fairly nasty path that WWII might have taken. The ongoing discussion on on the otherhistory.proboards.com/thread/446/lead-role-cage-comments-thread thread about different paths that might develop and especially the idea of when the allies might return to N France nudged me into looking at it again and have brushed up my earlier thoughts into this thread. Be interested to see what people think. Thinking this is basically the latest date at which a single non-ASB decision might preserve the Nazi empire in both existence and control of much of Europe.
POD
Working on the assumption that the 2nd Washington Conference, 20-25th June 1942 sees the US take a harder line over a quick invasion of northern Europe. Britain is still able to shoot down the rash Operation Sledgehammer, especially since that would be an overwhelmingly British operation that they viewed as suicidal. However instead of Churchill winning acceptance for a landing in NW Africa to help clear out the Axis from that Continent Roosevelt insists on a landing in N France in 1943.
The initial plan for this was Operation Roundup, which involved 48 divisions [18 British, presumably involving dominion and imperial forces] landing on a broad front between Boulogne and Le Havre. This was however quickly realises as impractical given the inability to produce and ship those forces to Britain by summer 43 let alone carrying them over the Channel. Also as the Germans started to strengthen their coastal defences during the autumn and winter other doubts were raised.
It was politically impossible to delay the invasion until 44 so details plans were made for a smaller landing in Normandy with elaborate deception plans to make the Germans expect a landing in the Calais region. [Plus for reasons of simplicity it makes it easier to look at a landing if I have the OTL Normandy one as a benchmark.]
N African Impact
The 1st casualty of the decision was the pursuit of the Germans after their defeat at 2nd El Alamein. The battle still occurred as the British didn't want the Germans so close to the Nile valley and canal and pushing them back and retaking Cyrenaica would be essential to making the resupply of Malta necessary. Which would be more important given that plans to clear N Africa were abandon. Also since at least some of the Desert Rats, the only western force with recent experience of fighting German forces, albeit in a different climate, would be recalled to spearhead the British part of the landings. As such it was decided not to push beyond El Agheila.
Winter 42-43 in the east
Allied morale was raised however by the stunning Soviet successes in the east, especially the encirclement and capture of 6th Army and related forces in the Stalingrad pocket, aided by Hitler's refusal to allow a breakout effort. This was followed up by advances all along the front but especially in the south with much of the eastern Ukraine retaken by the Red Army along with associated parts of the Russian SSR. The important Donbas region was quickly regained and later, to Hitler's fury SS forces withdraw from Kharkov which was also liberated. Soviet units got within striking distance of the Dnieper. Further south Army Group A was forced out of virtually all of the Ciscaucasus region with 18thA isolated in a bridgehead around Novorossiysk.
However by February 43 the swings was tilting backwards. The Germans had been reinforced in terms of both air and ground units and the Soviets had suffered heavy losses themselves and overstretched their supply lines, as well as losing some of their cohesion. Equally dangerously their attacking forces had also become somewhat separated. The result was a series of counter offensives, chiefly spearhead by Manstein, the commander of the reformed AGS which destroyed the SW Front and badly mauled the Voronezh Front. Kharkov was reconquered by the Germans as was Kursk shortly before mutual exhaustion and the spring thaw brought mobile action to a end.
The winter campaign had seen severe losses on both sides. The Soviet losses had been greater but between their considerable manpower, the greater degree of Soviet mobilisation for war and the aid arriving in increasing amounts from the US especially meant they could take them damage more than the Germans who had lost both a lot of experienced troops and a large measure of their previous sense of invincibility.
Plans for 43
All three blocs had plans for the coming year but all three also faced problems.
For the western allies the determination to invade France in spring or early summer, further pushed by Stalin's continued demands and hints of looking at a separate peace. However getting together enough troops, training them, shipping them and their supplies across the Atlantic and organising the forces to smash into occupied Europe made the allies realise how big a task they had taken on. This was compounded by the fact this massive build-up in Britain was being done before the battle of the Atlantic had been won, piling yet more stress on Britain's economy and supplies. It was helped by the US having admitted the importance of convoying and committing greater resources to the task, although this took time to build ships, train men and gain real experience. By the spring of 43 the Atlantic campaign was being won but whether it was quickly enough to secure the massive amount of supplies needed both to sustain Britain and maintain an invasion was uncertain to many. This was not helped by the continued closing of the Med to traffic which made the transfer of men and equipment between Britain and the eastern theatres markedly more difficult. [Although at this stage this is a false loss as OTL markedly more resources would have been tied up in operations in support of the N African and Sicily and later the Italian campaigns. It is probably only from about Sept 43 onwards that the clearing of the Med becomes useful. However for TTL the supply problem is compounded by the fact the invasion is being launched a year earlier, with much fewer resources.]
At the same time plans for the invasion were to a degree in flux. The Americans, on changing to a Normandy target had initially suggested a 3 division landing front but the British feared this was too narrow. After some discussion this was widened to 5 divisions but this again increased the burdens for mounting such an invasion. [This occurred OTL]. However because of the US confidence in their own forces and lingering British doubts over the operations it was decided that the US forces would land on the 2 eastern beaches, which were seen as more important and vulnerable, the Canadians on the central one and the British on the two western bridgeheads. [This is a reversal of the OTL circumstances.]
The British were also concerned about how reliable the Americans would be in combat as they were virtually totally lacking in experience while they were also aware of their own limitations in amphibious warfare, as highlighted by the Dieppe raid. This lead to much work on ways to help support the landings, especially in fire-power support and the famous Hobart's funnies. There were also plans for artificial harbours but it turned out to be too big a task in the limited time available.
For the Soviets Stalin has satisfaction at the huge casualties inflicted on the Germans and their allies and the vast amounts of land the Red Army had retaken. However even the victories had been costly while the defeat of the overstretched Soviet forces had cause heavy losses and also punctured Stalin's growing over-confidence. He knew that even the manpower available to him was limited while there was a lot of destroyed equipment to replace. Furthermore he was fearful that the western powers were leaving him to fight the Germans alone, letting the Red Army do the vast majority of the blood-letting as they wear down the German army. Coupled with this was the continued resilience of the German army, supported by intelligence reports that although not completely the Germans were replacing losses and bringing in more equipment. Furthermore the Germans had been on the offensive in both previous summers and he was uncertain the they were weakened enough for the Soviets to take the offensive that summer. Hence he decided to wait for a German attack and seek to block and hold that, bleeding the Germans until they were weakened and then counter-attacking. The longer the delay the more troops and equipment he could assemble as he knew that even without L-L from the west the Soviets were producing far more equipment that the Germans.
One complication was that he wasn't sure where the Germans would attack as there was no certainty about this, in part because the Germans themselves seemed undecided. He couldn't even rule out a new attack on Moscow from the Orel area, although this was viewed as unlikely. Equally unlikely was a new strike towards Stalingrad or the Baku oilfields as it was thought even the Germans realised they were comparatively markedly weaker than the previous year. As such extensive fortifications would be needed pretty much along the southern half of the eastern front. Only in the north was a major German offensive thought unlikely. [This was due to the lack of a Kursk sailent as the obvious target].
For the Germans there were also problems and uncertainty. Some of this came from Hitler's growing instability and the incompetence of the Nazi system. Also the demands for massive increases of military production, although being achieved with some considerable success was taking time and a lot of organisational effort. Guderian was drastically rebuilding the battered and depleted panzer forces but this was taking time, as was replacing at least some of the manpower losses. This was further complicated by attempts to introduce new weapons, most noticeably the Panzer V and VI and the Elephant tank destroyer. There were repeated problems with introducing them quickly and then getting most of the bugs out of them. This was to be crucial in the coming campaign in the east as Hitler wanted to see them in service for a relatively small scale offensive to maul Soviet forces. As such plans were repeatedly delayed and by early June Manstein, who had argued for an early attack as soon as the mud dried was now supporting the idea of allowing the Soviets to attack and then counter-attacking them.
The other complication was that the Germans knew an attack was coming in the west. This was strongly hinted at by the lack of western activity in the Med, especially since the British hadn't continued their pursuit of the battered Axis forces in Libya. Also there were plenty of reports of American forces arriving in Britain in large numbers, by a few photo-reconnaissance flights over Britain, reports from subs of the number of troopships sighted in the Atlantic and interception of radio messages. Even British wartime security couldn't hide the massive build-up and the reactions it caused in public opinion.
Another clear marker was the allied bombing campaign. It might have been that the Americans were restricting their own heavy bombers to operations over northern France while they gained experience and, from spring 43 reluctantly accepted the need for escort fighters. However the British strategic bombers, which had been pounding, albeit often ineffectively, German cities had also joined in the attack on targets in N France. Furthermore both forces were primarily attacking transport targets, especially railways. Which many saw as an inevitable step before any invasion, to prevent Germany supporting the coastal defensive forces.
As a result of course, despite the demands in the east the Germans were also boosting their defences in the west. Both some forces being sent west and a lot of effort to build defences, especially on the coastal sections thought most likely to be the target of attack.
[Here the Germans have a number of advantages compared to OTL. The lack of a series of campaigns in N Africa, Sicily and Italy freed up a lot of manpower and resources. Both in terms of avoiding the German losses in N Africa and the commitments to garrisoning and defending Italy. Also in terms of no need to garrison Vichy France, which remains in existence and being able to call on resources in Italy that would have been lost. Furthermore the fact that the sizeable demand for air and ground units to fight in N Africa didn't occur at the same time as a similar demand for attempts to withstand the Soviet deluge from Stalingrad onwards. Most especially the large number of a/c lost during the N African campaign was saved and a lot available to reinforce the eastern front, which reduced German and increased Soviet losses.]
Actions during the invasion of Normandy
The allies fight with determination and do a lot of damage to German forces in Normandy and early reinforcements. Especially with heavy naval gunfire support. However there are limits to how long this could be sustained and possible losses to German guided bombs. Also simply the heavy combat losses, especially to the American forces fighting the main German armoured units in the east. Their early seizure of Caen is quickly repelled by a counter-attack and savage losses occur amongst the inexperienced American units despite the massive air and naval gunfire support.
In the following weeks bitter fighting occurs with several times Utah [OTL Sword] beach being nearly overrun. The Americans fought bravely, often making repeated attacks, but occasionally, especially when badly led, proved brittle. Reckless attacks failed to dislodge the Germans and often suffered huge losses. Such actions were to lead to the removal of two army commanders, Patton, for his disregard of losses and Fredendall for his failure of nerve. The inexperienced American units had their 1st very bloody experience of warfare with German units and although a number of valuable lessons were learnt the costs were very very heavy.
To the west, despite early problems on Sword [OTL Ohama] beach due to the terrain Hobart's funnies and very heavy naval gunfire support means the British are able to fight their way ashore and by the 4th day they have linked up with the British on Gold [Utah] and the Canadians on Juno [Gold] beaches. However losses have been heavy and the bocage greatly delayed advances. Also while the vigorous American attacks in the east tied up the majority of the German forces, especially their armour, the huge losses the Americans suffered meant they took the vast majority of the available shipping to remove casualties and bring in supplies, reinforcements and new equipment. Furthermore some sources suggested the British forces were to cautious and they were unable to break out of the defences despite the capture of St Lo on the 29th day of the campaign, before it became clear the invasion had failed.
While the allies made a massive effort their lack of experience and the problems they faced meant they couldn't reinforce and resupply as fast as the Germans, despite the losses the latter suffered, especially from allied air power in some massive attacks. Simply the sheer number of losses, especially on the American sector, meant that the pressure couldn't be maintained. By mid-July its becoming clear that the invasion has failed. A big storm in the last week of July which drastically disrupts resupply makes this even more certain. It might even have saved allied lives in a way, as it made clear that the position was unsustainable. The resulting evacuation sees heavy losses but about a third of the forces still on the beaches are successfully withdrawn, although the vast majority of their equipment and many wounded had to be left behind.
Also the German air force, although it suffered heavily in trying to support its forces got in some valuable hits. Three successful strikes in the 1st week of the invasion by glide-bombs badly damaged the BBs Warspite and Texas and sank the cruiser Quincy. The allies quickly found counters to the weapons but it meant continued CAPs being flown over the supporting fleets, a further drain on allied a/c and the early losses restricted the availability of the naval gunfire support.
Primarily reasons why the landing fails:
a) Allied troops are far less well prepared without experience gained in N Africa and Italy, especially for their commanders. This is especially dangerous for the American forces in the eastern landing beaches. British troops also suffer on Sword [OTL Ohama] beach but are helped by more experience, Hobart's funnies and very heavy fire support.
b) Due to smaller and less experienced forces the bombing campaigns were less effective in damaging the transport links in N W Europe. Hence the Germans have far less problems in reinforcing the defences. Also those same strategic forces are less capable in support of the actual invasion forces in the fight.
c) Rommel is still in N Africa. Hence, without his experience of overwhelming allied tactical air power there is not the same debate about the deployment of available armoured units. Instead of being split into three separate elements they are kept as a centralised reserve in N France. While they do suffer losses and delay due to allied air attack the relatively greater balance between the air forces on both sides mean this is less and against stronger German panzer units. As such, although delayed a little compared to OTL German armoured forces are stronger and concentrated into a single force.
d) Again without the fighting in the Med the allies have less experience of supplying rapid ground support while the earlier offensive and lack of wear on the Luftwaffe from both the Med campaign and the fact there has been no prolonged USAAF operation deep into Germany with the resultant decimation of Luftwaffe fighter strength. This is badly depleted in the Normandy campaign but not quickly enough to effect the conflict.
e) Without the Mulberries it is far more difficult to land supplies rapidly and also remove wounded which means that the beachheads, which are smaller than OTL are very crowded, increasing confused and casualties are often stuck on the beaches longer. This latter not only caused higher casualties but had a bad impact on moral.
Aftermath
A period of investigation follows although complicated by some infighting and blame-casting. The fact the less experienced Americans took markedly heavier losses caused resentment on both sides while the performance of some US commanders, especially Fredendall and Patton caused internal clashes inside the US army. Montgomery was criticised for being too conservative in his command of the British forces and some Americans argued that he missed chances to breakout to the west, which might have prevented a failure of the wider campaign.
Despite the disputes the two powers still have to work together and do something to regain the initiative. It will take some time to put together a force capable of challenging the Germans on a major front again. Both because of the large number of casualties and also the shattering of morale of a lot of the survivors and elements in the civilian population in both countries. Britain is facing manpower shortages and after nearly 4 years of war looks a long way from winning while American optimism is badly battered.
In September there are landings in N Africa as plans for the clearing of N Africa have been revived to give a relatively easy and secure victory. The Vichy French are angry and put up some resistance but are too weak. Also after the bitter fighting in Normandy and with the ongoing crisis in the east the Germans haven't major forces to reinforce the Italians or French.
Eastern Front
The fact the western allies had struck 1st meant that there was no real chance of a German attack in the east. Therefore Stalin quickly decided the Red Army must go on the offensive itself. This sees a wave of attacks starting in late June pretty much along the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea but with major thrusts by the Bryansk Front towards Orel, the rebuilt Voronezh Front towards Kursk and the Southern Front towards Stalino.
Three months of confused fighting followed. Sheer weight of numbers, coupled with the growing experience of many Red Army units meant that the Germans were forced back in numerous places. Their armoured units struck back in strength and mauled several Russian spearheads. However each such clash wore down both the panzer units and also the infantry forces that were seeking to hold a line in between such actions. Also with the battle in Normandy absorbing most reserves, especially of air units the situation became increasingly desperate for the Germans.
By the middle of August exhausted German units were starting to crumble and 8th army and part of 1st Panzer Army were cut off around Kharkov and destroyed by the end of the month. Large parts of 9th army were also destroyed between Orel and Bryansk.
The saving grace for the Germans was the ending of the allied campaign in the west. While many of the German units there were too badly battered to be moved elsewhere it did enable some air units and the final reserves in Germany itself to be sent east. It also meant Hitler was even more determined that no retreat would be allowed in the east but generals were increasingly ignoring such orders.
Even so, by the time an exhausted Red army called off its offensives towards the end of October they had made substantial gains. The Dnieper was reached along much of its lower length although an attempt to reach the Crimean had seen South Front cut off and largely destroyed by a last German counter-strike, encircling much of it in the Melitopol pocket. Also an attempt to cross the river either side of Kiev had been defeated as had another attack near Dnepropetrovsk. Further north Smolensk had been retaken but the Germans still held the Vitebsk/Orsha region.
The costs on both sides had been huge and while the Germans had no strength left to try and counter-attack the Soviets were also shattered. Also Stalin was angry at the early ending of the western offensive, which with his paranoia meant he was increasing certain it had been a deliberate ploy to lure the Soviets into their own offensive and then leave them to fight alone. Relations with both western powers deteriorated despite the growing numbers of supplies from them.
Elsewhere in 43
The US had started driving back the Japanese with the defeat of the latter's attempt to secure the Solomon's and threaten links with Australia. This was followed up with an advance through New Guinea and neighbouring islands. Also in the Pacific the USN towards the end of the year started its own advance across the central Pacific. [Basically as OTL but with slightly less resources as the decision to make the landing in France had forced a greater allocation, especially of landing craft and supporting air and naval units, to the European/Atlantic theatre. Britain hadn't made the OTL offensive into Burma because it had committed units to both Normandy and then later the N African campaign.]
Winter 43/44
In the east Stalin tried attacking again in Dec43/Mar 44 before the Germans could rebuild their forces. They were however able to call upon the 1st rebuilt units from the western front, along with their increasing production to gain valuable reinforcements and the Soviets only made minor gains, for heavy losses. No strategic positions were lost by the Germans and although they suffered heavy losses themselves there was hope in some elements of the German military that the line could be held at least for the next few months.
In N Africa the Axis forces were steadily driven back despite some reinforcements and Hitler, worried by the losses in the east, was persuaded to accept a withdrawal of the remaining forces from Tunisia to Sicily in Jan/Feb 44. With this the allies finally cleared N Africa and enabled limited use of the Med for shipping.
One down side of the two campaigns by the western powers was the Treaty of Dijon. In this Hitler formally ended the armistice with Vichy France and the latter became a formal ally of Nazi Germany. This was partly due to continued French confidence in German ability to win the war and also anger at the attack on Vichy N Africa and high French casualties from the bombing during the campaign in Normandy and its run up. Furthermore the ending of the armistice meant that the Germans started releasing the French POWs they had held since 1940 and also handed back most of Northern France to French political control, although German military forces continued to occupy many areas. The US broke off relations with France, the Laval government having moved the capital back to Paris.
Behind the scenes there is manoeuvring going on. The western powers are building up for a new offensive in France in 44 but many are concerned about another defeat, especially since while German military forces haven't increased they are building more powerful fixed defences. Also some, especially in Britain are arguing for following on the N African campaign by attacks into Italy and the Balkans. Stalin is aware of this through his spies and given his paranoia is disbelieving that the allies will actually carry out an attack on France and carry it through to a long term advance into France and western Germany. The Germans accept that victory in the east is no longer realistic and are concerned about their continued losses, both from the huge battles in the east and the growing strength of allied bombing in the west. Also they are aware of large forces being rebuilt in Britain and the probability of another attack in France in the coming summer which is likely to be larger and better organised and supported than the 43 one. At the same time allied operations in N Africa means they are uncertain about the reliability of the Italians as allies.
Political decisions
As such even Hitler is willing to listen to approaches made by the Soviets for a peace agreement. Between mutual mistrust and contempt and the nature of both regimes it is a long path to an agreement especially since Hitler is bitterly hostile to giving up any land in the east. The huge losses both sides suffered during the winter fight are probably important in deciding both leaders to compromise. As such the final agreement is made in April 44 and sees the Treaty of Helsinki signed. The Germans reluctantly gave up the areas they still held east of the Dnieper along with a section of land from around Smolensk north to the Pskov region. Germany kept most of the western Ukraine, including the important resource centre of Krivoy Rog along with a strip of Belorussia and control of the three Baltic states, as well as all of the former Polish state. Also there would be an exchange of prisoners and tentative discussion of economic exchanges.
The news was a bombshell to the western powers. They had had some reports of such negotiations in part due to intelligence sources inside Nazi Germany but Stalin had violently denied western questions about them. This further deepened mistrust between the western and Soviet powers, as did the rapid ending of Lend-Lease and the following seizure of allied resources in the Soviet Union. The L-L cut-off caused serious problems for the Soviets, although the extent of this was not realised at the time in either the west or Nazi Germany.
It also cast serious doubts on the future western plans for the war. Despite the widely expected fact this was seen as little more than a truce between the two dictatorships and a new war would be likely sooner or later Germany would release a lot of resources from the ending of the conflict. This meant that any allied landings, whether in northern France or the Med would be far more costly and difficult and could well fail. Especially since the French government is clear it would oppose any such invasion.
There are promising signs. US daytime raids seem to be having success against German targets, although markedly less than they think, and are completing the destruction of much of the Luftwaffe. British night raids are also doing a lot of damage, but still at high costs and again far less than BC thinks. Also with Germany able to allocate a lot more resources to the air war some are doubtful that bomber campaigns can win the war on their own. Especially since reports of new German jet and rocket weapons have some fearing a drastic reversal in the campaign.
Furthermore the German counter-attacks with the V1 weapon and intelligence reports about the V2 are raising doubts about how much damage Britain will take and whether it can be a reliable staging post for a new invasion of France. The Atlantic campaign is virtually over by now with convoy losses drastically reduced and crippling U boat losses but this is a defensive victory rather than anything which weakens the German control of Europe.
Some have hopes for the Manhattan Project but very few know about this and most of the decision makers have little understanding of the science and technology involved. With relevant materials [U235 and Pu239] only just starting to be produced in literally microscopic amounts and many doubts about whether a weapon is practical leaders are uncertain whether they can gamble on another long year or two of bitter fighting, probably with heavy losses on the chance that the project might produce a war winning weapon.
Anyway, do the western powers fight on or make their own peace with Hitler?
Steve
I posted this on the Other History site but didn't get any response. Any interest in possibilities here please?
