oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
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Post by oscssw on May 19, 2022 19:32:00 GMT
Lordroel my friend, I also think Ramillies would not last long but just might do some material damage to Bismarck or the Prince. I want those two in pretty good shape when BB-55 catches up with them.
I also have something really nasty for them, compliments AMC HMS Derbyshire. Got to work out the details.
I would agree. It would definitely put up as much of a fight as it could, especially given the number of merchants who are threatened. Could get lucky and do some damage given her 15" guns if she can get into range and has a bit of luck. However the Bismarck is a lot larger and more modern, especially in terms of fire control and elevation of guns. Plus it has the Prince Eugen although that would probably be dashing off after the scattering colony.
Take it that instead that HMS Derbyshire is going to be doing a Jervis Bay  but manage to get a hit or something that while not significant in most ways has some influence?  |
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
Posts: 967
Likes: 1,575
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Post by oscssw on May 23, 2022 19:22:27 GMT
This is a minor adjustment to the timing of U-105 (former U-43 the type 9B better fits this ATL)/Cambletown action, Ramillies CASREP and & 23 APRIL log entry. It is easier for a lazy writer to just edit the 23 May update. Lines changed, mostly just dates and hours, are in GREEN.
Next update will be far more material, I hope. 
THE SHOWBOAT engages THE IRON CHANCELLOR 23 MAY UPDATEMost of this is new. Some are corrections or alterations to previous updates. Hope this is entertaining.
22 APR 1941 0115 German 10,000 tons, 18 kt Oiler Weissenburg makes her break for the North Atlantic under cover of a fierce spring storm. She is commanded by Kapitan zur See Helmuth von Ruckteschell, a very successful Raider captain; after a successful raiding voyage he brought his ship and crew home safely.
Ruckteschell as CO Hilfskreuzer 3, (the raider Widder) he sailed on 6 May 1940. On 13 May the Widder fought submarine HMS Clyde in an inconclusive hour long surface action. On 14 May he sailed to the open sea, crossing the Arctic Circle the next day. On 21 August 1940, 800 miles west of the Canary Islands, he sank the SS Anglo Saxon. After refuelling from the auxiliary ship Nordmark, he slipped through the Denmark Strait. Over a 5½ month period she captured and sank ten ships, totalling 58,644 GRT. Having completed his mission, he returned to occupied France on 31 October 1940.
23 APR 1941 0900 “Ching” Lee was holding Captain’s mast (a necessary waste of his time) on GM2
Ermes Effron Borgnino for fighting in the mess line on the 21st. “Ernie” was the ship’s very competent armorer, who kept Lee’s “Match star class” personal weapns in superb condition must not sway his judgement. The fact Lee considered Ernie” a very valuable PO whose superior work as ship’s armorer was vital to the ship’s fighting ability also had to be considered. That GM2 Ermes Effron Borgnino had never been before Lee at mast was a far more important point in his favor .
The Chief Master At Arms investigation, approved by his XO Cmdr Stryker, made it clear Madrick started the fight and threw the first punch. Madrick was in Sick Bay with 2 cracked ribs, a sprained wrist and a “rebroken” nose. When released, by order of Madrick’s Mast, he would be a two week guest of the Marines, in the brig, a second home to Kevin. No use busting Madrick but he would do three months of restriction and extra duty. Lee would not order loss of his pay, a Seaman Second made little enough and that would really be cruel if not unusual punishment.
The CMAA’s report “Chit” also made clear it took three strong PO’s to pull Ernie off Madrick. These three PO’s also sported bruises and cuts inflicted on them by “Ernie” as they did their duty. Ernie’s, Chief, Divo and the Gunnery Officer all spoke highly of the GM2’s technical abilities and considered him an outsanding PO. Lee was convinced Ernie was provoked but no one who assaulted HIS PO’s in the performance of their duty gets off easy. He’d give him 3 days bread and water in the brig, restriction and extra duty for 30 days. The man was far too valuable to keep locked up any longer.
(one day GM1 Borgnino USN would be known as Ernest Borgnine and he would play a LTCDR)
18 MAY 1941 Convoy HX 123 Commodore H. Rogers in Cornerbrook, Vice Commodore was the Master of Cairnesk. The convoy had 41 ships, 34 of which were still present at local the rendezvous according to the Commodore's report. Amberton returned to Halifax on the night of 15 MAY . Welsh Prince returned to Halifax to repair steering gear 6 AM 15 May. Winona County disappeared on the night of 16 MAY - believed broken down. Wellpark dropped out during gale on 17 MAY. COPELAND was convoy Rescue Ship. Empire Burton is our CAM Ship carrying weet flower. She is Crewed by 46 Merchant Navy men & officers, 12 RAF personnel, four DEMS gunners carries 1 Hawker Sea Hurricane for her single aircraft catapult. Her one aviator was Sergeant Pilot “Reaper” Simon Darkshade.
18 MAY 1941 1825 Town Class destroyer Cambeltown Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham RN, detached to make best speed to position 27 miles north West, on HX-123 PIM based on Lordroel’s information. Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders CHENG to put ALL boilers on the line. GQ piped aboard Cambeltown.
18 MAY 1941 1832 All stations report Manned and ready to the bridge.
18 MAY 1941 1845 Cambeltown picks up small contact dead ahead, range 7 miles on course 290 speed 8 kts. Contact appears to be a U-boat charging batteries. No radio transmissions. Teynham orders flank speed. Down in Main control CHENG looks at his Chief ERA and an unspoken agreement takes place. No way this old gal’s spavine engines will hold up under max speed. Instead, Chief ERA opens throttles just enough to give the skipper 31 kts, her design speed is 35 and she made 39 on trials. Even at 31 he was doubtful the old Wick’s class USN bucket’s steam plant will last very long.
18 MAY 1941 1850 U-105 lookout spots Cambeltown and makes an urgent sighting report to OOD. OOD imediately yells “Alarm” down to Zentrale (U-boat control room) , followed by “Emergency Dive”. He knows, at 1 minutes 30 seconds his Type 9 does not crash dive as quickly as the type VIICs and just prays it is good enough. Second thought, why didn’t the “Biskaya-Kreuz” Nick name for FuMB 1 radar detector give us a warning? What has the fucking RN come up with now?
18 MAY 1941 1855 U-105 ’s “Kaleu” is in the Zentrale looking at the OOD. “Erster Wachoffizier, report.”
“Looks like an escort closing at 30 kts.”
“Kaleu” “To all hands set up for bow shot on that Pig. She is running deaf right to us. Make all tubes ready. We’ll use two Aals from the bow tubes, go deep and make a radical course change. Then we listen and if things sound good we come up and admire our kill or make another run at the at him.”
18 MAY 1941 1857 Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders Cambletown speed reduction to 1/3rd and commences a sweeping with his Type 141 Asdic, actually a USN QCJ/QCL domeless, system that came with his Lend-Lease Town-class DD, modified with British range and bearing recorders. In his opinion it was an adequate ASDIC in the hands veteran very skilled operators but hardly up to the standard of the newer RN systems. Fortunately, he had a couple of these outstanding matelots, one of which AB Miletus was his best.
Under orders from the Watch Officer ASDIC operator Miletus began to search through an arc of roughly 45 degrees each side of the base course of the vessel. Miletus had to stop at regular intervals on this arc long enough to allow the relatively slow underwater sound waves to return should they locate a submerged target. Normally the head would be stopped on a bearing and a sound pulse would be transmitted, which would be heard as a "ping" noise. If no echo was received after several seconds the head would be rotated a few degrees (usually 5) and the process repeated throughout the watch.
18 MAY 1941 1924 ASDIC operator Miletus’ outgoing impulses stuck a submerged target the echo sounded like a distinct "beep". Miletus’ notified the Watch Officer and bridge the range and of the bearing and then immediately start left and right cuts to try to determine the width of the target and trying to see if it was moving from one side to another. Miletus’ determined the target was closing the range.
Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham, the Watch Officer and especially Miletus knew the return echo could bounce back from many things besides the U-boats such as whales, schools of fish, vertical sea currents and ship's wakes. This caused many false alarms, especially with the inexperienced operators. The veteran operator, Miletus was much better at figuring out these bad signals and hunting down the intended target. The commanding officers quickly learned which operators were reliable.
All three also painfully had learned that often a real U-boat could not be detected due to water conditions. ASDIC was not very reliable in rough water but just now conditions were a little better than marginal, pretty good for the North Atlantic and he was certain Metilus could read through this. What he knew his 141 set nor his excellent ASDIC opetrator could not read through were layers of different temperature that deflected the sound waves. U-boats could dive beneath such layers to avoid detection.
18 MAY 1941 1926 Cambeltown’s CO ordered his depth charges be set for a shallow pattern.
18 MAY 1941 1936 ASDIC OPERATOR Metilus reports range down to 7,000 yards constant bearing and it is a positive submarine contact. Watch Officer reports contact speed 5 kts. Teynham, recognizes this as indicating the U-boat is going to try to make him swallow a mouldy and he is already within maximum range of the Nazi 21 inch G7a T1 8,750 yards 40 knots. He orders OOD to inform Lookouts to keep eyes peeled for torpedo wakes from forward of the beam. He also makes to decision to keep his 141 set on active and not go to passive listening to hear screw sounds. It’s a risk but he wants to kill that sub on his first pass and he needs to know precise range and when Metilus reports instantaneous echo so he can drop and maneuver for a second attack. He also knows one sub has the advantage against a single escort. The Pig Boat can’t RUN but she can hide under a layer, she can turn a lot tighter than an old Wick’s class DD and her G7a T1’s are now reliable.
18 MAY 1941 1943 U-105's “Kaleu” orders Eals fired from tubes 1 and 2, Speed 44 kts, deflection 1 degree, depth 6 ft. It’s a bow shot but he wanted this destroyer dead and then he would figure out where she came from. Intel from agents in Halifax, shared with him before sailing, was that quite a few convoys could be expected to sail in the next month. That agent would be spilling his guts out to RCN and US Intel folks before the remains of HX-123 reached Liverpool thanks to Unit 387’s ace civilian Code Breaker…... Elizabeth Smith Feldman. That was why his long range Type 9 was where she is. Give the shorter legged Type VIIcs comprising the Wolf Packs time to get into position and do the real killing.
18 MAY 1941 1944 U-105 captain orders an immediate hard right rudder and a dive to 50 meters.
18 MAY 1941 1945 Starboard lookout report two torpedo wakes dead ahead. In a loud but firm voice Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders Cambletown’s rudder hard over to port counts to slow counts 20 and then orders it back to base course paralleling the torpedoes by about 75 yds?
18 MAY 1941 1947 both eals pass down starboard side at 40 and 20 yds respectively. Lord Teynham’s snap calculation was not as accurate as he would have hoped but he’d take it as a win. A miss was as good as a mile.
Over the tanoy speaker he announces that Cambletown was going in for the kill. “The Hun had his try and now it is our time.”
18 MAY 1941 1949 Cambletown drops a pattern of 6 depth charges 2 from rails and 4 from MK.1 DCTs. Teynham orders hard right rudder at flank speed. Runs a track that takes him back to the vicinity of the sub in three minutes, slows to 10 kts and waits for Miletus to conduct listen for signs of breakup or anything else for 2 minutes. Nothing .
18 MAY 1941 1951 CO orders Watch officer and ASDIC Operator to begin lost contact search using active sonar. Gives helmsman first course for the search.
18 MAY 1941 1955 The Convoy Comodore orders a course change to the South by 15 % hoping this is a good compromise that should elude whatever Wolf Pack is waiting for them and still give him a good shot at making Liverpool in a reasonable time.
18 MAY 1941 2015 The course change being made without collisions (Thank God) and the convoy pretty much settled down for the night. He expects no problem from the weather for the rest of the night. Visibility is clear, moderate E. wind 15t Kts gusting to 21, making 7 knots in sea state 5.
18 MAY 1941 2100 Commodore R-Adm Rogers finishes his journal entry with the following comments on “HIS convoy”
AT 1500 high wing monoplane flying N.E. Presume American clipper. This air contact was not picked up by the lookouts until it was within a mile or so of “MY convoy”. Why didn’t the escorts radar pick it up at all? Going to shoot a signal flare up senior escort officer’s Ass and demand they do better before we are in Condor Range.
Station keeping - "Began badly, improved to very good. Kinross, Barbro, Helgøy, Kolsnaren, Empire Oryx were all inclined to drop back at night and in spite of signals made little improvements.
Signalling - Generally very good. British Power signaling was oscillating badly. Barbro (1st trip) and Helgøy were slow. Kolsnaren was slow and slack. Master of Tiba did useful work by intelligent use of D/F in connection with W/T watch on 850 meters. U-boat was attacked by HMS Cambeltown based on Roel’s information.
Captain Roel Hendrikx deserves official thanks.
What the comodore and CO of Cambeltown did not know was type 9 U-105 although suffering shock damage to her long range radio had already signaled her sighting report to BDU. 19 MAY 1941 0130 CO orders crew stand easy on station and for the cooks to issue tea hard tack to all hands at their stations. 19 MAY1941 0245 Convoy HX 123 950 miles NORTH EAST of Halifax.
BB HMS Ramillies, has a catastrophic casualty to a high pressure turbine. The internal explosion fractures the casing sending shrapnel through the engine room that cuts down the Chief ERA and many of the engineers. Much of the piping requires patching and replacement. Serious damage is done the engine room’s other high pressure turbine. On inspection, it is determined the 2nd turbine requires shipyard repair.
19 MAY 1941 0300 CO orders the “off” watch below but to keep all Depth charge throwers, torpedo tubes and Depth charged rail crews fully manned. Orders Watch Officer and Miletus relieved.
19 MAY 1941 0330 Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham Celebrates his 26th birthday with a single Pink Gin and thinks about what he could do if that U-boat surfaced with fight in it. His three 4"/50 Mk.9 singles;1 - 3"/40 Mk.V AA single; two 20mm Oerlikon AA; three 21" torpedo tubes; should be more than enough but you never knew what was going to happen at sea. In his short life he had seen things happen at sea that no sane man would ever credit.
19 MAY 1941 0347 Sleep deprived “ASDIC Operator Benny” Hill misses three return echoes over 12 minutes. Watch Officer Sub Lieutent Hugh Laurie RNVR, with all of 4 months “In the Andrew” has been out cold for 25 minutes and will sleep through until his relief arrives at 0615. Benny will continue to report “No Contact reports”, throughout the watch. The bridge crew, zombies on their feet, accepts the reports and desperately tries to stay awake.
19 MAY1941 0400 Convoy HX 123 960 miles NORTH EAST of Halifax.
Ramillies is detached and ordered back to Halifax with a W class DD and ASW sloop as escort.
19 MAY 1941 0530 CO Cambletown calls off the search and orders his navigator for a two boiler run (Every CO of a Town Class DD, with it’s small bunkerage, has to keep in mind his fuel level) back to HX-123 current posit.
19 MAY 1941 1025 HMS Cambeltown rejoins HX-123. CO notices Ramillies is missing. Guesses a break down and a welcome return a to Halifax, some well deserved dockyard time for her crew.
HX 123 Commodore H. Rogers orders Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham to lay on board his ship by flag hoist with his reports of his “Wild Goose Hunt”. CO Cambeltown senses no matter what he says he is about to relieve his Commodore's frustrations. Oh well. Should not have joined if I could not take a joke!
21 May 1941 0630 USS Brooklyn CL-40 made her number and reported to admiral Hewitt.
21 May 1941 1200 USS Tuscaloosa detached from TG39.1. Hewitt considered this a mixed blessing . He just lost 9 MK-9 eight inch guns firing 260-pound projectiles with a maximum effective range of 15 miles and ROF of 5 - 6 rounds per minute. He gained fifteen 6-in/47 caliber Mark 16 guns in 5 turrets firing 130-pound AP shell capable of a 13 miles maximum effective range. Even the outstanding ten rounds per minute sustained rate of fire, a full salvo of 150 rounds a minute, would not compensate against, capital ships, for the MK-9 eight inch 260-pound projectiles. But Brooklyn did have something that made her more valuable to Hewitt; she had CXAM radar. That is why he called in some valuable IOUs to get her assaigned to TG39.1 The thought struck him that with a radar equipped Cruiser it might be better if he shifted his flag to Brooklyn? He’d have to think about that.
21 May 1941 1300 Hewitt ordered CO CL-40 and his Navigator to report to the flag.
21 May 1941 1400 CO CL-40 and his Navigator arrive at BB-55 by Captain’s Barge and imediately escorted to TG39.1 cabin. RADM Hewitt, his Chief of Staff and CO BB-55 greet new members of “The Team”. Ching had served with CO CL-40 in the Pennsylvania in 1931. CO CL-40 was one of Hewitt’s more competent skippers as “Comodore” Des Div 12 in the mid 30’s. All four were members of the Gun Club and got on well.
C of Staff handed out a copy of TG39.1 Standard Operating Doctrine and then informed CL-40 Navigator his staff wanted to go over some things with him in the staff officers. Taking the hint he looked at CO CL-40 who nodded and the left.
Now Kent went over his views of the current ops and his expectations from Brooklyn. He then asked CO CL40 if he had any questions and was there anything about his ship Kent should know? He also asked what the “Flag facilities” in Brooklyn were like. CO CL40’s answers was they were adaquate for a small staff. Kent looked at his C of Staff and back to CO CL40 “Would it be OK if my C of Staff hitched a ride with you back to Brooklyn? I’d like him to do a quick eval and determine if Brooklyn was suitable as my flag.” No skipper in his right mind wanted to be saddled with an Admirals’ Staff so there was good reason for C of Staff’s boat ride.
21 May 1941 1600 TG39.1 C of Staff reported back to BB-55 and informed his boss the CO of CL40 spoke the truth. His ship could handle the TG39.1 staff. It would be tight for the ship and staff Junior Officers who had to share the same “state Rooms” more like dog kennels really. Serves them right anyway he said with a smile. Plenty of extra berthing for CPOs and enlisted, Communications more than adaquate, admirals cabin smaller than he had now but not bad at all. Flag bridge was adaqutae with it’s own chart room. In his opinion the move, if made, should be made in port.
Kent said “Seas a little rough for boating right now?”
C of Staff replied “Not for old shellbacks like us Admiral but it’s a might rough for new kids and old hands who have put in too much time in the BIG ships of late.” Both had a good chuckle. After C of Staff left Kent decided to sleep on shifting his flag. He wanted to take another look at “Ching’s” Tracking Compartment at work. He thought every sea going staff should be provided with one. He would have to draft a very concise report to Ernie King about the advanatges of “Tracking Compartments” with his recomendation they should be adopted as soon as possible. Probably get them in time for the next war, if we are lucky, his all too realistic Navy mind thought.[/b][/font] |
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lordroel
Administrator
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Post by lordroel on May 23, 2022 19:26:06 GMT
Most of this is new. Some are corrections or alterations to previous updates. Hope this is entertaining. Senior Chief, I like these kind of TLs where the author does his best, keep up the good work. |
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lordroel
Administrator
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Post by lordroel on May 24, 2022 3:50:54 GMT
Captain Maarten Lordroel deserves official thanks.
If you want to use my real name, use Roel Hendrikx. Captain Maarten Lordroel seems a bit off, and do not worry, this is not my first cameo in a TL, got to be a general in the TLW. |
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on May 24, 2022 5:21:27 GMT
THE SHOWBOAT engages THE IRON CHANCELLOR
23 MAY UPDATEMost of this is new. Some are corrections or alterations to previous updates. Hope this is entertaining.
22 APR 1941 0115 German 10,000 tons, 18 kt Oiler Weissenburg makes her break for the North Atlantic under cover of a fierce spring storm. She is commanded by Kapitan zur See Helmuth von Ruckteschell, a very successful Raider captain; after a successful raiding voyage he brought his ship and crew home safely.
Ruckteschell as CO Hilfskreuzer 3, (the raider Widder) he sailed on 6 May 1940. On 13 May the Widder fought submarine HMS Clyde in an inconclusive hour long surface action. On 14 May he sailed to the open sea, crossing the Arctic Circle the next day. On 21 August 1940, 800 miles west of the Canary Islands, he sank the SS Anglo Saxon. After refuelling from the auxiliary ship Nordmark, he slipped through the Denmark Strait. Over a 5½ month period she captured and sank ten ships, totalling 58,644 GRT. Having completed his mission, he returned to occupied France on 31 October 1940.
23 APR 1941 0900 “Ching” Lee was holding Captain’s mast (a necessary waste of his time) on GM2
Ermes Effron Borgnino for fighting in the mess line on the 21st. The fact “Ernie’s” face was not familiar to Lee was an important point in his favor. The other sailor in the fight, Seaman 2nd Kevin Madrick, was all to familiar to Lee as he was a constant “guest of honor” at mast was another point in Ernie’s favor. The Chief Master At Arms investigation, approved by his XO Cmdr Stryker, made it clear Madrick started the fight and threw the first punch. Madrick was in Sick Bay with 2 cracked ribs, a sprained wrist and a “rebroken” nose. When released, by order of Madrick’s Mast, he would be a two week guest of the Marines, in the brig, a second home to Kevin. No use busting Madrick but he would do three months of restriction and extra duty. Lee would not order loss of his pay, a Seaman Second made little enough and that would really be cruel if not unusual punishment.
The CMAA’s report “Chit” also made clear it took three strong PO’s to pull Ernie off Madrick. These three PO’s also sported bruises and cuts inflicted on them by “Ernie” as they did their duty. Ernie’s, Chief, Divo and the Gunnery Officer all spoke highly of the GM2’s technical abilities and considered him an outsanding PO. Lee was convinced Ernie was provoked but no one who assaulted HIS PO’s in the performance of their duty gets off easy. He’d give him 3 days bread and water in the brig, restriction and extra duty for 30 days. The man was far too valuable to keep locked up any longer.
(one day GM1 Borgnino USN would be known as Ernest Borgnine and he would play a LTCDR)
18 MAY 1941 Convoy HX 123 Commodore H. Rogers in Cornerbrook, Vice Commodore was the Master of Cairnesk. The convoy had 41 ships, 34 of which were still present at local the rendezvous according to the Commodore's report. Amberton returned to Halifax on the night of 15 MAY . Welsh Prince returned to Halifax to repair steering gear 6 AM 15 May. Winona County disappeared on the night of 16 MAY - believed broken down. Wellpark dropped out during gale on 17 MAY. COPELAND was convoy Rescue Ship. Empire Burton is our CAM Ship carrying weet flower. She is Crewed by 46 Merchant Navy men & officers, 12 RAF personnel, four DEMS gunners carries 1 Hawker Sea Hurricane for her single aircraft catapult. Her one aviator was Sergeant Pilot “Reaper” Simon Darkshade.
18 MAY 1941 1815 Town Class destroyer Cambeltown Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham RN, detached to make best speed to position 27 miles north West, on HX-123 PIM based on Lordroel’s information. Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders CHENG to put ALL boilers on the line.
18 MAY 1941 1845 GQ piped aboard Cambeltown.
18 MAY 1941 1853 All stations report Manned and ready to the bridge.
18 MAY 1941 2005 Cambeltown picks up small contact dead ahead, range 7 miles on course 290 speed 8 kts. Contact appears to be a U-boat charging batteries. No radio transmissions. Teynham orders flank speed. Down in Main control CHENG looks at his Chief ERA and an unspoken agreement takes place. No way this old gal’s spavine engines will hold up under max speed. Instead, Chief ERA opens throttles just enough to give the skipper 31 kts, her design speed is 35 and she made 39 on trials. Even at 31 he was doubtful the old Wick’s class USN bucket’s steam plant will last very long.
18 MAY 1941 2012 U-43 lookout spots Cambeltown and makes an urgent sighting report to OOD. OOD imediately yells “Alarm” down to Zentrale (U-boat control room) , followed by “Emergency Dive”. He knows, at 1 minutes 30 seconds his Type 9 does not crash dive as quickly as the type VIICs and just prays it is good enough. Second thought, why didn’t the “Biskaya-Kreuz” Nick name for FuMB 1 radar detector give us a warning? What has the fucking RN come up with now?
18 MAY 1941 2014 U-43’s “Kaleu” is in the Zentrale looking at the OOD. “Erster Wachoffizier, report.”
“Looks like an escort closing at 30 kts.”
“Kaleu” “To all hands set up for bow shot on that Pig. She is running deaf right to us. Make all tubes ready. We’ll use two Aals from the bow tubes, go deep and make a radical course change. Then we listen and if things sound good we come up and admire our kill or make another run at the at him.”
18 MAY 1941 2020 Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders Cambletown speed reduction to 1/3rd and commences a sweeping with his Type 141 Asdic, actually a USN QCJ/QCL domeless, system that came with his Lend-Lease Town-class DD, modified with British range and bearing recorders. In his opinion it was an adequate ASDIC in the hands veteran very skilled operators but hardly up to the standard of the newer RN systems. Fortunately, he had a couple of these outstanding matelots, one of which AB Miletus was his best.
Under orders from the Watch Officer ASDIC operator Miletus began to search through an arc of roughly 45 degrees each side of the base course of the vessel. Miletus had to stop at regular intervals on this arc long enough to allow the relatively slow underwater sound waves to return should they locate a submerged target. Normally the head would be stopped on a bearing and a sound pulse would be transmitted, which would be heard as a "ping" noise. If no echo was received after several seconds the head would be rotated a few degrees (usually 5) and the process repeated throughout the watch.
18 MAY 1941 2035 ASDIC operator Miletus’ outgoing impulses stuck a submerged target the echo sounded like a distinct "beep". Miletus’ notified the Watch Officer and bridge the range and of the bearing and then immediately start left and right cuts to try to determine the width of the target and trying to see if it was moving from one side to another. Miletus’ determined the target was closing the range.
Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham, the Watch Officer and especially Miletus knew the return echo could bounce back from many things besides the U-boats such as whales, schools of fish, vertical sea currents and ship's wakes. This caused many false alarms, especially with the inexperienced operators. The veteran operator, Miletus was much better at figuring out these bad signals and hunting down the intended target. The commanding officers quickly learned which operators were reliable.
All three also painfully had learned that often a real U-boat could not be detected due to water conditions. ASDIC was not very reliable in rough water but just now conditions were a little better than marginal, pretty good for the North Atlantic and he was certain Metilus could read through this. What he knew his 141 set nor his excellent ASDIC opetrator could not read through were layers of different temperature that deflected the sound waves. U-boats could dive beneath such layers to avoid detection.
18 MAY 1941 2036 Cambeltown’s CO ordered his depth charges be set for a shallow pattern.
18 MAY 1941 2038 ASDIC OPERATOR Metilus reports range down to 7,000 yards constant bearing and it is a positive submarine contact. Watch Officer reports contact speed 5 kts. Teynham, recognizes this as indicating the U-boat is going to try to make him swallow a mouldy and he is already within maximum range of the Nazi 21 inch G7a T1 8,750 yards 40 knots. He orders OOD to inform Lookouts to keep eyes peeled for torpedo wakes from forward of the beam. He also makes to decision to keep his 141 set on active and not go to passive listening to hear screw sounds. It’s a risk but he wants to kill that sub on his first pass and he needs to know precise range and when Metilus reports instantaneous echo so he can drop and maneuver for a second attack. He also knows one sub has the advantage against a single escort. The Pig Boat can’t RUN but she can hide under a layer, she can turn a lot tighter than an old Wick’s class DD and her G7a T1’s are now reliable.
18 MAY 1941 2041 U-43’s “Kaleu” orders Eals fired from tubes 1 and 2, Speed 44 kts, deflection 1 degree, depth 6 ft. It’s a bow shot but he wanted this destroyer dead and then he would figure out where she came from. Intel from agents in Halifax, shared with him before sailing, was that quite a few convoys could be expected to sail in the next month. That agent would be spilling his guts out to RCN and US Intel folks before the remains of HX-123 reached Liverpool thanks to Unit 387’s ace civilian Code Breaker…... Elizabeth Smith Feldman. That was why his long range Type 9 was where she is. Give the shorter legged Type VIIcs comprising the Wolf Packs time to get into position and do the real killing.
18 MAY 1941 2042 U-43’s captain orders an immediate hard right rudder and a dive to 50 meters.
18 MAY 1941 2044 Starboard lookout report two torpedo wakes dead ahead. In a loud but firm voice Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders Cambletown’s rudder hard over to port counts to slow counts 20 and then orders it back to base course paralleling the torpedoes by about 75 yds?
18 MAY 1941 2047 both eals pass down starboard side at 40 and 20 yds respectively. Lord Teynham’s snap calculation was not as accurate as he would have hoped but he’d take it as a win. A miss was as good as a mile.
Over the tanoy speaker he announces that Cambletown was going in for the kill. “The Hun had his try and now it is our time.”
18 MAY 1941 2049 Cambletown drops a pattern of 6 depth charges 2 from rails and 4 from MK.1 DCTs. Teynham orders hard right rudder at flank speed. Runs a track that takes him back to the vicinity of the sub in three minutes, slows to 10 kts and waits for Miletus to conduct listen for signs of breakup or anything else for 2 minutes. Nothing .
18 MAY 1941 2051 CO orders Watch officer and ASDIC Operator to begin lost contact search using active sonar. Gives helmsman first course for the search.
18 MAY 1941 2300 The Convoy Comodore orders a course change to the South by 15 % hoping this is a good compromise that should elude whatever Wolf Pack is waiting for them and still give him a good shot at making Liverpool in a reasonable time.
18 MAY 1941 2345 The course change being made without collisions (Thank God) and the convoy pretty much settled down for the night. He expects no problem from the weather for the rest of the night. Visibility is clear, moderate E. wind 15t Kts gusting to 21, making 7 knots in sea state 5.
18 MAY 1941 2355 Commodore R-Adm Rogers finishes his journal entry with the following comments on “HIS convoy”
AT 1500 high wing monoplane flying N.E. Presume American clipper. This air contact was not picked up by the lookouts until it was within a mile or so of “MY convoy”. Why didn’t the escorts radar pick it up at all? Going to shoot a signal flare up senior escort officer’s Ass and demand they do better before we are in Condor Range.
Station keeping - "Began badly, improved to very good. Kinross, Barbro, Helgøy, Kolsnaren, Empire Oryx were all inclined to drop back at night and in spite of signals made little improvements.
Signalling - Generally very good. British Power signaling was oscillating badly. Barbro (1st trip) and Helgøy were slow. Kolsnaren was slow and slack. Master of Tiba did useful work by intelligent use of D/F in connection with W/T watch on 850 meters. U-boat was attacked by HMS Cambeltown based on Maarten’s information.
Captain Maarten Lordroel deserves official thanks.
What the commodore and CO of Cambeltown did not know was type 9 U-43 suffered severe shock damage to her long range radio and was unable to provide sighting report to BADU.
19 MAY 1941 0100 CO orders crew stand easy on station and for the cooks to issue tea hard tack to all hands at their stations.
19 MAY 1941 0300 CO orders the “off” watch below but to keep all Depth charge throwers, torpedo tubes and Depth charged rail crews fully manned. Orders Watch Officer and Miletus relieved.
19 MAY 1941 0330 Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham Celebrates his 26th birthday with a single Pink Gin and thinks about what he could do if that U-boat surfaced with fight in it. His three 4"/50 Mk.9 singles;1 - 3"/40 Mk.V AA single; two 20mm Oerlikon AA; three 21" torpedo tubes; should be more than enough but you never knew what was going to happen at sea. In his short life he had seen things happen at sea that no sane man would ever credit.
19 MAY 1941 0347 Sleep deprived “ASDIC Operator Benny” Hill misses three return echoes over 12 minutes. Watch Officer Sub Lieutent Hugh Laurie RNVR, with all of 4 months “In the Andrew” has been out cold for 25 minutes and will sleep through until his relief arrives at 0615. Benny will continue to report “No Contact reports”, throughout the watch. The bridge crew, zombies on their feet, accepts the reports and desperately tries to stay awake.
19 MAY 1941 0530 CO Cambletown calls off the search and orders his navigator for a two boiler run (Every CO of a Town Class DD, with it’s small bunkerage, has to keep in mind his fuel level) back to HX-123 current posit.
19 MAY 1941 1025 HMS Cambeltown rejoins HX-123. CO notices Ramillies is missing. Guesses a break down and a welcome return a to Halifax, some well deserved dockyard time for her crew.
HX 123 Commodore H. Rogers orders Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham to lay on board his ship by flag hoist with his reports of his “Wild Goose Hunt”. CO Cambeltown senses no matter what he says he is about to relieve his Commodore's frustrations. Oh well. Should not have joined if I could not take a joke!
21 May 1941 0630 USS Brooklyn CL-40 made her number and reported to admiral Hewitt.
21 May 1941 1200 USS Tuscaloosa detached from TG39.1. Hewitt considered this a mixed blessing . He just lost 9 MK-9 eight inch guns firing 260-pound projectiles with a maximum effective range of 15 miles and ROF of 5 - 6 rounds per minute. He gained fifteen 6-in/47 caliber Mark 16 guns in 5 turrets firing 130-pound AP shell capable of a 13 miles maximum effective range. Even the outstanding ten rounds per minute sustained rate of fire, a full salvo of 150 rounds a minute, would not compensate against, capital ships, for the MK-9 eight inch 260-pound projectiles. But Brooklyn did have something that made her more valuable to Hewitt; she had CXAM radar. That is why he called in some valuable IOUs to get her assaigned to TG39.1 The thought struck him that with a radar equipped Cruiser it might be better if he shifted his flag to Brooklyn? He’d have to think about that.
21 May 1941 1300 Hewitt ordered CO CL-40 and his Navigator to report to the flag.
21 May 1941 1400 CO CL-40 and his Navigator arrive at BB-55 by Captain’s Barge and imediately escorted to TG39.1 cabin. RADM Hewitt, his Chief of Staff and CO BB-55 greet new members of “The Team”. Ching had served with CO CL-40 in the Pennsylvania in 1931. CO CL-40 was one of Hewitt’s more competent skippers as “Comodore” Des Div 12 in the mid 30’s. All four were members of the Gun Club and got on well.
C of Staff handed out a copy of TG39.1 Standard Operating Doctrine and then informed CL-40 Navigator his staff wanted to go over some things with him in the staff officers. Taking the hint he looked at CO CL-40 who nodded and the left.
Now Kent went over his views of the current ops and his expectations from Brooklyn. He then asked CO CL40 if he had any questions and was there anything about his ship Kent should know? He also asked what the “Flag facilities” in Brooklyn were like. CO CL40’s answers was they were adaquate for a small staff. Kent looked at his C of Staff and back to CO CL40 “Would it be OK if my C of Staff hitched a ride with you back to Brooklyn? I’d like him to do a quick eval and determine if Brooklyn was suitable as my flag.” No skipper in his right mind wanted to be saddled with an Admirals’ Staff so there was good reason for C of Staff’s boat ride.
21 May 1941 1600 TG39.1 C of Staff reported back to BB-55 and informed his boss the CO of CL40 spoke the truth. His ship could handle the TG39.1 staff. It would be tight for the ship and staff Junior Officers who had to share the same “state Rooms” more like dog kennels really. Serves them right anyway he said with a smile. Plenty of extra berthing for CPOs and enlisted, Communications more than adaquate, admirals cabin smaller than he had now but not bad at all. Flag bridge was adaqutae with it’s own chart room. In his opinion the move, if made, should be made in port.
Kent said “Seas a little rough for boating right now?”
C of Staff replied “Not for old shellbacks like us Admiral but it’s a might rough for new kids and old hands who have put in too much time in the BIG ships of late.” Both had a good chuckle. After C of Staff left Kent decided to sleep on shifting his flag. He wanted to take another look at “Ching’s” Tracking Compartment at work. He thought every sea going staff should be provided with one. He would have to draft a very concise report to Ernie King about the advanatges of “Tracking Compartments” with his recomendation they should be adopted as soon as possible. Probably get them in time for the next war, if we are lucky, his all too realistic Navy mind thought. Another PM about this installment is on the way. M. |
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
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Post by oscssw on May 24, 2022 9:57:37 GMT
Captain Maarten Lordroel deserves official thanks.
If you want to use my real name, use Roel Hendrikx. Captain Maarten Lordroel seems a bit off, and do not worry, this is not my first cameo in a TL, got to be a general in the TLW.  |
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
Posts: 967
Likes: 1,575
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Post by oscssw on May 24, 2022 10:03:37 GMT
THE SHOWBOAT engages THE IRON CHANCELLOR
23 MAY UPDATEMost of this is new. Some are corrections or alterations to previous updates. Hope this is entertaining.
22 APR 1941 0115 German 10,000 tons, 18 kt Oiler Weissenburg makes her break for the North Atlantic under cover of a fierce spring storm. She is commanded by Kapitan zur See Helmuth von Ruckteschell, a very successful Raider captain; after a successful raiding voyage he brought his ship and crew home safely.
Ruckteschell as CO Hilfskreuzer 3, (the raider Widder) he sailed on 6 May 1940. On 13 May the Widder fought submarine HMS Clyde in an inconclusive hour long surface action. On 14 May he sailed to the open sea, crossing the Arctic Circle the next day. On 21 August 1940, 800 miles west of the Canary Islands, he sank the SS Anglo Saxon. After refuelling from the auxiliary ship Nordmark, he slipped through the Denmark Strait. Over a 5½ month period she captured and sank ten ships, totalling 58,644 GRT. Having completed his mission, he returned to occupied France on 31 October 1940.
23 APR 1941 0900 “Ching” Lee was holding Captain’s mast (a necessary waste of his time) on GM2
Ermes Effron Borgnino for fighting in the mess line on the 21st. The fact “Ernie’s” face was not familiar to Lee was an important point in his favor. The other sailor in the fight, Seaman 2nd Kevin Madrick, was all to familiar to Lee as he was a constant “guest of honor” at mast was another point in Ernie’s favor. The Chief Master At Arms investigation, approved by his XO Cmdr Stryker, made it clear Madrick started the fight and threw the first punch. Madrick was in Sick Bay with 2 cracked ribs, a sprained wrist and a “rebroken” nose. When released, by order of Madrick’s Mast, he would be a two week guest of the Marines, in the brig, a second home to Kevin. No use busting Madrick but he would do three months of restriction and extra duty. Lee would not order loss of his pay, a Seaman Second made little enough and that would really be cruel if not unusual punishment.
The CMAA’s report “Chit” also made clear it took three strong PO’s to pull Ernie off Madrick. These three PO’s also sported bruises and cuts inflicted on them by “Ernie” as they did their duty. Ernie’s, Chief, Divo and the Gunnery Officer all spoke highly of the GM2’s technical abilities and considered him an outsanding PO. Lee was convinced Ernie was provoked but no one who assaulted HIS PO’s in the performance of their duty gets off easy. He’d give him 3 days bread and water in the brig, restriction and extra duty for 30 days. The man was far too valuable to keep locked up any longer.
(one day GM1 Borgnino USN would be known as Ernest Borgnine and he would play a LTCDR)
18 MAY 1941 Convoy HX 123 Commodore H. Rogers in Cornerbrook, Vice Commodore was the Master of Cairnesk. The convoy had 41 ships, 34 of which were still present at local the rendezvous according to the Commodore's report. Amberton returned to Halifax on the night of 15 MAY . Welsh Prince returned to Halifax to repair steering gear 6 AM 15 May. Winona County disappeared on the night of 16 MAY - believed broken down. Wellpark dropped out during gale on 17 MAY. COPELAND was convoy Rescue Ship. Empire Burton is our CAM Ship carrying weet flower. She is Crewed by 46 Merchant Navy men & officers, 12 RAF personnel, four DEMS gunners carries 1 Hawker Sea Hurricane for her single aircraft catapult. Her one aviator was Sergeant Pilot “Reaper” Simon Darkshade.
18 MAY 1941 1815 Town Class destroyer Cambeltown Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham RN, detached to make best speed to position 27 miles north West, on HX-123 PIM based on Lordroel’s information. Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders CHENG to put ALL boilers on the line.
18 MAY 1941 1845 GQ piped aboard Cambeltown.
18 MAY 1941 1853 All stations report Manned and ready to the bridge.
18 MAY 1941 2005 Cambeltown picks up small contact dead ahead, range 7 miles on course 290 speed 8 kts. Contact appears to be a U-boat charging batteries. No radio transmissions. Teynham orders flank speed. Down in Main control CHENG looks at his Chief ERA and an unspoken agreement takes place. No way this old gal’s spavine engines will hold up under max speed. Instead, Chief ERA opens throttles just enough to give the skipper 31 kts, her design speed is 35 and she made 39 on trials. Even at 31 he was doubtful the old Wick’s class USN bucket’s steam plant will last very long.
18 MAY 1941 2012 U-43 lookout spots Cambeltown and makes an urgent sighting report to OOD. OOD imediately yells “Alarm” down to Zentrale (U-boat control room) , followed by “Emergency Dive”. He knows, at 1 minutes 30 seconds his Type 9 does not crash dive as quickly as the type VIICs and just prays it is good enough. Second thought, why didn’t the “Biskaya-Kreuz” Nick name for FuMB 1 radar detector give us a warning? What has the fucking RN come up with now?
18 MAY 1941 2014 U-43’s “Kaleu” is in the Zentrale looking at the OOD. “Erster Wachoffizier, report.”
“Looks like an escort closing at 30 kts.”
“Kaleu” “To all hands set up for bow shot on that Pig. She is running deaf right to us. Make all tubes ready. We’ll use two Aals from the bow tubes, go deep and make a radical course change. Then we listen and if things sound good we come up and admire our kill or make another run at the at him.”
18 MAY 1941 2020 Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders Cambletown speed reduction to 1/3rd and commences a sweeping with his Type 141 Asdic, actually a USN QCJ/QCL domeless, system that came with his Lend-Lease Town-class DD, modified with British range and bearing recorders. In his opinion it was an adequate ASDIC in the hands veteran very skilled operators but hardly up to the standard of the newer RN systems. Fortunately, he had a couple of these outstanding matelots, one of which AB Miletus was his best.
Under orders from the Watch Officer ASDIC operator Miletus began to search through an arc of roughly 45 degrees each side of the base course of the vessel. Miletus had to stop at regular intervals on this arc long enough to allow the relatively slow underwater sound waves to return should they locate a submerged target. Normally the head would be stopped on a bearing and a sound pulse would be transmitted, which would be heard as a "ping" noise. If no echo was received after several seconds the head would be rotated a few degrees (usually 5) and the process repeated throughout the watch.
18 MAY 1941 2035 ASDIC operator Miletus’ outgoing impulses stuck a submerged target the echo sounded like a distinct "beep". Miletus’ notified the Watch Officer and bridge the range and of the bearing and then immediately start left and right cuts to try to determine the width of the target and trying to see if it was moving from one side to another. Miletus’ determined the target was closing the range.
Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham, the Watch Officer and especially Miletus knew the return echo could bounce back from many things besides the U-boats such as whales, schools of fish, vertical sea currents and ship's wakes. This caused many false alarms, especially with the inexperienced operators. The veteran operator, Miletus was much better at figuring out these bad signals and hunting down the intended target. The commanding officers quickly learned which operators were reliable.
All three also painfully had learned that often a real U-boat could not be detected due to water conditions. ASDIC was not very reliable in rough water but just now conditions were a little better than marginal, pretty good for the North Atlantic and he was certain Metilus could read through this. What he knew his 141 set nor his excellent ASDIC opetrator could not read through were layers of different temperature that deflected the sound waves. U-boats could dive beneath such layers to avoid detection.
18 MAY 1941 2036 Cambeltown’s CO ordered his depth charges be set for a shallow pattern.
18 MAY 1941 2038 ASDIC OPERATOR Metilus reports range down to 7,000 yards constant bearing and it is a positive submarine contact. Watch Officer reports contact speed 5 kts. Teynham, recognizes this as indicating the U-boat is going to try to make him swallow a mouldy and he is already within maximum range of the Nazi 21 inch G7a T1 8,750 yards 40 knots. He orders OOD to inform Lookouts to keep eyes peeled for torpedo wakes from forward of the beam. He also makes to decision to keep his 141 set on active and not go to passive listening to hear screw sounds. It’s a risk but he wants to kill that sub on his first pass and he needs to know precise range and when Metilus reports instantaneous echo so he can drop and maneuver for a second attack. He also knows one sub has the advantage against a single escort. The Pig Boat can’t RUN but she can hide under a layer, she can turn a lot tighter than an old Wick’s class DD and her G7a T1’s are now reliable.
18 MAY 1941 2041 U-43’s “Kaleu” orders Eals fired from tubes 1 and 2, Speed 44 kts, deflection 1 degree, depth 6 ft. It’s a bow shot but he wanted this destroyer dead and then he would figure out where she came from. Intel from agents in Halifax, shared with him before sailing, was that quite a few convoys could be expected to sail in the next month. That agent would be spilling his guts out to RCN and US Intel folks before the remains of HX-123 reached Liverpool thanks to Unit 387’s ace civilian Code Breaker…... Elizabeth Smith Feldman. That was why his long range Type 9 was where she is. Give the shorter legged Type VIIcs comprising the Wolf Packs time to get into position and do the real killing.
18 MAY 1941 2042 U-43’s captain orders an immediate hard right rudder and a dive to 50 meters.
18 MAY 1941 2044 Starboard lookout report two torpedo wakes dead ahead. In a loud but firm voice Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders Cambletown’s rudder hard over to port counts to slow counts 20 and then orders it back to base course paralleling the torpedoes by about 75 yds?
18 MAY 1941 2047 both eals pass down starboard side at 40 and 20 yds respectively. Lord Teynham’s snap calculation was not as accurate as he would have hoped but he’d take it as a win. A miss was as good as a mile.
Over the tanoy speaker he announces that Cambletown was going in for the kill. “The Hun had his try and now it is our time.”
18 MAY 1941 2049 Cambletown drops a pattern of 6 depth charges 2 from rails and 4 from MK.1 DCTs. Teynham orders hard right rudder at flank speed. Runs a track that takes him back to the vicinity of the sub in three minutes, slows to 10 kts and waits for Miletus to conduct listen for signs of breakup or anything else for 2 minutes. Nothing .
18 MAY 1941 2051 CO orders Watch officer and ASDIC Operator to begin lost contact search using active sonar. Gives helmsman first course for the search.
18 MAY 1941 2300 The Convoy Comodore orders a course change to the South by 15 % hoping this is a good compromise that should elude whatever Wolf Pack is waiting for them and still give him a good shot at making Liverpool in a reasonable time.
18 MAY 1941 2345 The course change being made without collisions (Thank God) and the convoy pretty much settled down for the night. He expects no problem from the weather for the rest of the night. Visibility is clear, moderate E. wind 15t Kts gusting to 21, making 7 knots in sea state 5.
18 MAY 1941 2355 Commodore R-Adm Rogers finishes his journal entry with the following comments on “HIS convoy”
AT 1500 high wing monoplane flying N.E. Presume American clipper. This air contact was not picked up by the lookouts until it was within a mile or so of “MY convoy”. Why didn’t the escorts radar pick it up at all? Going to shoot a signal flare up senior escort officer’s Ass and demand they do better before we are in Condor Range.
Station keeping - "Began badly, improved to very good. Kinross, Barbro, Helgøy, Kolsnaren, Empire Oryx were all inclined to drop back at night and in spite of signals made little improvements.
Signalling - Generally very good. British Power signaling was oscillating badly. Barbro (1st trip) and Helgøy were slow. Kolsnaren was slow and slack. Master of Tiba did useful work by intelligent use of D/F in connection with W/T watch on 850 meters. U-boat was attacked by HMS Cambeltown based on Maarten’s information.
Captain Maarten Lordroel deserves official thanks.
What the commodore and CO of Cambeltown did not know was type 9 U-43 suffered severe shock damage to her long range radio and was unable to provide sighting report to BADU.
19 MAY 1941 0100 CO orders crew stand easy on station and for the cooks to issue tea hard tack to all hands at their stations.
19 MAY 1941 0300 CO orders the “off” watch below but to keep all Depth charge throwers, torpedo tubes and Depth charged rail crews fully manned. Orders Watch Officer and Miletus relieved.
19 MAY 1941 0330 Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham Celebrates his 26th birthday with a single Pink Gin and thinks about what he could do if that U-boat surfaced with fight in it. His three 4"/50 Mk.9 singles;1 - 3"/40 Mk.V AA single; two 20mm Oerlikon AA; three 21" torpedo tubes; should be more than enough but you never knew what was going to happen at sea. In his short life he had seen things happen at sea that no sane man would ever credit.
19 MAY 1941 0347 Sleep deprived “ASDIC Operator Benny” Hill misses three return echoes over 12 minutes. Watch Officer Sub Lieutent Hugh Laurie RNVR, with all of 4 months “In the Andrew” has been out cold for 25 minutes and will sleep through until his relief arrives at 0615. Benny will continue to report “No Contact reports”, throughout the watch. The bridge crew, zombies on their feet, accepts the reports and desperately tries to stay awake.
19 MAY 1941 0530 CO Cambletown calls off the search and orders his navigator for a two boiler run (Every CO of a Town Class DD, with it’s small bunkerage, has to keep in mind his fuel level) back to HX-123 current posit.
19 MAY 1941 1025 HMS Cambeltown rejoins HX-123. CO notices Ramillies is missing. Guesses a break down and a welcome return a to Halifax, some well deserved dockyard time for her crew.
HX 123 Commodore H. Rogers orders Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham to lay on board his ship by flag hoist with his reports of his “Wild Goose Hunt”. CO Cambeltown senses no matter what he says he is about to relieve his Commodore's frustrations. Oh well. Should not have joined if I could not take a joke!
21 May 1941 0630 USS Brooklyn CL-40 made her number and reported to admiral Hewitt.
21 May 1941 1200 USS Tuscaloosa detached from TG39.1. Hewitt considered this a mixed blessing . He just lost 9 MK-9 eight inch guns firing 260-pound projectiles with a maximum effective range of 15 miles and ROF of 5 - 6 rounds per minute. He gained fifteen 6-in/47 caliber Mark 16 guns in 5 turrets firing 130-pound AP shell capable of a 13 miles maximum effective range. Even the outstanding ten rounds per minute sustained rate of fire, a full salvo of 150 rounds a minute, would not compensate against, capital ships, for the MK-9 eight inch 260-pound projectiles. But Brooklyn did have something that made her more valuable to Hewitt; she had CXAM radar. That is why he called in some valuable IOUs to get her assaigned to TG39.1 The thought struck him that with a radar equipped Cruiser it might be better if he shifted his flag to Brooklyn? He’d have to think about that.
21 May 1941 1300 Hewitt ordered CO CL-40 and his Navigator to report to the flag.
21 May 1941 1400 CO CL-40 and his Navigator arrive at BB-55 by Captain’s Barge and imediately escorted to TG39.1 cabin. RADM Hewitt, his Chief of Staff and CO BB-55 greet new members of “The Team”. Ching had served with CO CL-40 in the Pennsylvania in 1931. CO CL-40 was one of Hewitt’s more competent skippers as “Comodore” Des Div 12 in the mid 30’s. All four were members of the Gun Club and got on well.
C of Staff handed out a copy of TG39.1 Standard Operating Doctrine and then informed CL-40 Navigator his staff wanted to go over some things with him in the staff officers. Taking the hint he looked at CO CL-40 who nodded and the left.
Now Kent went over his views of the current ops and his expectations from Brooklyn. He then asked CO CL40 if he had any questions and was there anything about his ship Kent should know? He also asked what the “Flag facilities” in Brooklyn were like. CO CL40’s answers was they were adaquate for a small staff. Kent looked at his C of Staff and back to CO CL40 “Would it be OK if my C of Staff hitched a ride with you back to Brooklyn? I’d like him to do a quick eval and determine if Brooklyn was suitable as my flag.” No skipper in his right mind wanted to be saddled with an Admirals’ Staff so there was good reason for C of Staff’s boat ride.
21 May 1941 1600 TG39.1 C of Staff reported back to BB-55 and informed his boss the CO of CL40 spoke the truth. His ship could handle the TG39.1 staff. It would be tight for the ship and staff Junior Officers who had to share the same “state Rooms” more like dog kennels really. Serves them right anyway he said with a smile. Plenty of extra berthing for CPOs and enlisted, Communications more than adaquate, admirals cabin smaller than he had now but not bad at all. Flag bridge was adaqutae with it’s own chart room. In his opinion the move, if made, should be made in port.
Kent said “Seas a little rough for boating right now?”
C of Staff replied “Not for old shellbacks like us Admiral but it’s a might rough for new kids and old hands who have put in too much time in the BIG ships of late.” Both had a good chuckle. After C of Staff left Kent decided to sleep on shifting his flag. He wanted to take another look at “Ching’s” Tracking Compartment at work. He thought every sea going staff should be provided with one. He would have to draft a very concise report to Ernie King about the advanatges of “Tracking Compartments” with his recomendation they should be adopted as soon as possible. Probably get them in time for the next war, if we are lucky, his all too realistic Navy mind thought. Another PM about this installment is on the way. M.  |
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
Posts: 967
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Post by oscssw on May 24, 2022 10:13:09 GMT
Senior Chief, I must join in the chorus of laud and BZs for what you’ve crafted so far. The logbook style lends itself very well to the scenario and allows that fine balance of narrative and technical detail. I am reminded of a couple of the stories that used to live on the old Warships1 splash page back in 2001 or so about the Philippine Sea and an Anglo-American 20s tussle. You’ve got a good yarn on the go and the format suits it well. Good stuff. .  |
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Post by simon darkshade on May 24, 2022 10:19:34 GMT
I don’t mind at all. Thank you kindly.
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lordroel
Administrator
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Post by lordroel on May 24, 2022 12:20:49 GMT
If you want to use my real name, use Roel Hendrikx. Captain Maarten Lordroel seems a bit off, and do not worry, this is not my first cameo in a TL, got to be a general in the TLW. Wel the Joe, keep up the TL. |
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
Posts: 967
Likes: 1,575
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Post by oscssw on May 24, 2022 12:47:07 GMT
You got it. See edited post above. Glad to meet you Roel my name is Joe.  Wel the Joe, keep up the TL. Will do Roel. Looked up your first name; seems like we have something in common. When I was a youngster my older sister often complained I was "bright as a rock" with the feelings of a stone. 
Be advised very good chance HX 123 takes a beating from a wolf pack. Lutgens unreps in a Kangerluarsunnguaq Fjord with some local help.
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lordroel
Administrator
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Post by lordroel on May 24, 2022 13:16:24 GMT
Wel the Joe, keep up the TL. Will do Roel. Looked up your first name; seems like we have something in common. When I was a youngster my older sister often complained I was "bright as a rock" with the feelings of a stone.
Be advised very good chance HX 123 takes a beating from a wolf pack. Lutgens unreps in a Kangerluarsunnguaq Fjord with some local help.
Where Wolfpacks already a thing in 1940. |
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on May 24, 2022 15:24:33 GMT
THE SHOWBOAT engages THE IRON CHANCELLOR
23 MAY UPDATEMost of this is new. Some are corrections or alterations to previous updates. Hope this is entertaining.
22 APR 1941 0115 German 10,000 tons, 18 kt Oiler Weissenburg makes her break for the North Atlantic under cover of a fierce spring storm. She is commanded by Kapitan zur See Helmuth von Ruckteschell, a very successful Raider captain; after a successful raiding voyage he brought his ship and crew home safely.
Ruckteschell as CO Hilfskreuzer 3, (the raider Widder) he sailed on 6 May 1940. On 13 May the Widder fought submarine HMS Clyde in an inconclusive hour long surface action. On 14 May he sailed to the open sea, crossing the Arctic Circle the next day. On 21 August 1940, 800 miles west of the Canary Islands, he sank the SS Anglo Saxon. After refuelling from the auxiliary ship Nordmark, he slipped through the Denmark Strait. Over a 5½ month period she captured and sank ten ships, totalling 58,644 GRT. Having completed his mission, he returned to occupied France on 31 October 1940.
23 APR 1941 0900 “Ching” Lee was holding Captain’s mast (a necessary waste of his time) on GM2
Ermes Effron Borgnino for fighting in the mess line on the 21st. The fact “Ernie’s” face was not familiar to Lee was an important point in his favor. The other sailor in the fight, Seaman 2nd Kevin Madrick, was all to familiar to Lee as he was a constant “guest of honor” at mast was another point in Ernie’s favor. The Chief Master At Arms investigation, approved by his XO Cmdr Stryker, made it clear Madrick started the fight and threw the first punch. Madrick was in Sick Bay with 2 cracked ribs, a sprained wrist and a “rebroken” nose. When released, by order of Madrick’s Mast, he would be a two week guest of the Marines, in the brig, a second home to Kevin. No use busting Madrick but he would do three months of restriction and extra duty. Lee would not order loss of his pay, a Seaman Second made little enough and that would really be cruel if not unusual punishment.
The CMAA’s report “Chit” also made clear it took three strong PO’s to pull Ernie off Madrick. These three PO’s also sported bruises and cuts inflicted on them by “Ernie” as they did their duty. Ernie’s, Chief, Divo and the Gunnery Officer all spoke highly of the GM2’s technical abilities and considered him an outsanding PO. Lee was convinced Ernie was provoked but no one who assaulted HIS PO’s in the performance of their duty gets off easy. He’d give him 3 days bread and water in the brig, restriction and extra duty for 30 days. The man was far too valuable to keep locked up any longer.
(one day GM1 Borgnino USN would be known as Ernest Borgnine and he would play a LTCDR)
18 MAY 1941 Convoy HX 123 Commodore H. Rogers in Cornerbrook, Vice Commodore was the Master of Cairnesk. The convoy had 41 ships, 34 of which were still present at local the rendezvous according to the Commodore's report. Amberton returned to Halifax on the night of 15 MAY . Welsh Prince returned to Halifax to repair steering gear 6 AM 15 May. Winona County disappeared on the night of 16 MAY - believed broken down. Wellpark dropped out during gale on 17 MAY. COPELAND was convoy Rescue Ship. Empire Burton is our CAM Ship carrying weet flower. She is Crewed by 46 Merchant Navy men & officers, 12 RAF personnel, four DEMS gunners carries 1 Hawker Sea Hurricane for her single aircraft catapult. Her one aviator was Sergeant Pilot “Reaper” Simon Darkshade.
18 MAY 1941 1815 Town Class destroyer Cambeltown Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham RN, detached to make best speed to position 27 miles north West, on HX-123 PIM based on Lordroel’s information. Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders CHENG to put ALL boilers on the line.
18 MAY 1941 1845 GQ piped aboard Cambeltown.
18 MAY 1941 1853 All stations report Manned and ready to the bridge.
18 MAY 1941 2005 Cambeltown picks up small contact dead ahead, range 7 miles on course 290 speed 8 kts. Contact appears to be a U-boat charging batteries. No radio transmissions. Teynham orders flank speed. Down in Main control CHENG looks at his Chief ERA and an unspoken agreement takes place. No way this old gal’s spavine engines will hold up under max speed. Instead, Chief ERA opens throttles just enough to give the skipper 31 kts, her design speed is 35 and she made 39 on trials. Even at 31 he was doubtful the old Wick’s class USN bucket’s steam plant will last very long.
18 MAY 1941 2012 U-43 lookout spots Cambeltown and makes an urgent sighting report to OOD. OOD imediately yells “Alarm” down to Zentrale (U-boat control room) , followed by “Emergency Dive”. He knows, at 1 minutes 30 seconds his Type 9 does not crash dive as quickly as the type VIICs and just prays it is good enough. Second thought, why didn’t the “Biskaya-Kreuz” Nick name for FuMB 1 radar detector give us a warning? What has the fucking RN come up with now?
18 MAY 1941 2014 U-43’s “Kaleu” is in the Zentrale looking at the OOD. “Erster Wachoffizier, report.”
“Looks like an escort closing at 30 kts.”
“Kaleu” “To all hands set up for bow shot on that Pig. She is running deaf right to us. Make all tubes ready. We’ll use two Aals from the bow tubes, go deep and make a radical course change. Then we listen and if things sound good we come up and admire our kill or make another run at the at him.”
18 MAY 1941 2020 Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders Cambletown speed reduction to 1/3rd and commences a sweeping with his Type 141 Asdic, actually a USN QCJ/QCL domeless, system that came with his Lend-Lease Town-class DD, modified with British range and bearing recorders. In his opinion it was an adequate ASDIC in the hands veteran very skilled operators but hardly up to the standard of the newer RN systems. Fortunately, he had a couple of these outstanding matelots, one of which AB Miletus was his best.
Under orders from the Watch Officer ASDIC operator Miletus began to search through an arc of roughly 45 degrees each side of the base course of the vessel. Miletus had to stop at regular intervals on this arc long enough to allow the relatively slow underwater sound waves to return should they locate a submerged target. Normally the head would be stopped on a bearing and a sound pulse would be transmitted, which would be heard as a "ping" noise. If no echo was received after several seconds the head would be rotated a few degrees (usually 5) and the process repeated throughout the watch.
18 MAY 1941 2035 ASDIC operator Miletus’ outgoing impulses stuck a submerged target the echo sounded like a distinct "beep". Miletus’ notified the Watch Officer and bridge the range and of the bearing and then immediately start left and right cuts to try to determine the width of the target and trying to see if it was moving from one side to another. Miletus’ determined the target was closing the range.
Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham, the Watch Officer and especially Miletus knew the return echo could bounce back from many things besides the U-boats such as whales, schools of fish, vertical sea currents and ship's wakes. This caused many false alarms, especially with the inexperienced operators. The veteran operator, Miletus was much better at figuring out these bad signals and hunting down the intended target. The commanding officers quickly learned which operators were reliable.
All three also painfully had learned that often a real U-boat could not be detected due to water conditions. ASDIC was not very reliable in rough water but just now conditions were a little better than marginal, pretty good for the North Atlantic and he was certain Metilus could read through this. What he knew his 141 set nor his excellent ASDIC opetrator could not read through were layers of different temperature that deflected the sound waves. U-boats could dive beneath such layers to avoid detection.
18 MAY 1941 2036 Cambeltown’s CO ordered his depth charges be set for a shallow pattern.
18 MAY 1941 2038 ASDIC OPERATOR Metilus reports range down to 7,000 yards constant bearing and it is a positive submarine contact. Watch Officer reports contact speed 5 kts. Teynham, recognizes this as indicating the U-boat is going to try to make him swallow a mouldy and he is already within maximum range of the Nazi 21 inch G7a T1 8,750 yards 40 knots. He orders OOD to inform Lookouts to keep eyes peeled for torpedo wakes from forward of the beam. He also makes to decision to keep his 141 set on active and not go to passive listening to hear screw sounds. It’s a risk but he wants to kill that sub on his first pass and he needs to know precise range and when Metilus reports instantaneous echo so he can drop and maneuver for a second attack. He also knows one sub has the advantage against a single escort. The Pig Boat can’t RUN but she can hide under a layer, she can turn a lot tighter than an old Wick’s class DD and her G7a T1’s are now reliable.
18 MAY 1941 2041 U-43’s “Kaleu” orders Eals fired from tubes 1 and 2, Speed 44 kts, deflection 1 degree, depth 6 ft. It’s a bow shot but he wanted this destroyer dead and then he would figure out where she came from. Intel from agents in Halifax, shared with him before sailing, was that quite a few convoys could be expected to sail in the next month. That agent would be spilling his guts out to RCN and US Intel folks before the remains of HX-123 reached Liverpool thanks to Unit 387’s ace civilian Code Breaker…... Elizabeth Smith Feldman. That was why his long range Type 9 was where she is. Give the shorter legged Type VIIcs comprising the Wolf Packs time to get into position and do the real killing.
18 MAY 1941 2042 U-43’s captain orders an immediate hard right rudder and a dive to 50 meters.
18 MAY 1941 2044 Starboard lookout report two torpedo wakes dead ahead. In a loud but firm voice Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham orders Cambletown’s rudder hard over to port counts to slow counts 20 and then orders it back to base course paralleling the torpedoes by about 75 yds?
18 MAY 1941 2047 both eals pass down starboard side at 40 and 20 yds respectively. Lord Teynham’s snap calculation was not as accurate as he would have hoped but he’d take it as a win. A miss was as good as a mile.
Over the tanoy speaker he announces that Cambletown was going in for the kill. “The Hun had his try and now it is our time.”
18 MAY 1941 2049 Cambletown drops a pattern of 6 depth charges 2 from rails and 4 from MK.1 DCTs. Teynham orders hard right rudder at flank speed. Runs a track that takes him back to the vicinity of the sub in three minutes, slows to 10 kts and waits for Miletus to conduct listen for signs of breakup or anything else for 2 minutes. Nothing .
18 MAY 1941 2051 CO orders Watch officer and ASDIC Operator to begin lost contact search using active sonar. Gives helmsman first course for the search.
18 MAY 1941 2300 The Convoy Comodore orders a course change to the South by 15 % hoping this is a good compromise that should elude whatever Wolf Pack is waiting for them and still give him a good shot at making Liverpool in a reasonable time.
18 MAY 1941 2345 The course change being made without collisions (Thank God) and the convoy pretty much settled down for the night. He expects no problem from the weather for the rest of the night. Visibility is clear, moderate E. wind 15t Kts gusting to 21, making 7 knots in sea state 5.
18 MAY 1941 2355 Commodore R-Adm Rogers finishes his journal entry with the following comments on “HIS convoy”
AT 1500 high wing monoplane flying N.E. Presume American clipper. This air contact was not picked up by the lookouts until it was within a mile or so of “MY convoy”. Why didn’t the escorts radar pick it up at all? Going to shoot a signal flare up senior escort officer’s Ass and demand they do better before we are in Condor Range.
Station keeping - "Began badly, improved to very good. Kinross, Barbro, Helgøy, Kolsnaren, Empire Oryx were all inclined to drop back at night and in spite of signals made little improvements.
Signalling - Generally very good. British Power signaling was oscillating badly. Barbro (1st trip) and Helgøy were slow. Kolsnaren was slow and slack. Master of Tiba did useful work by intelligent use of D/F in connection with W/T watch on 850 meters. U-boat was attacked by HMS Cambeltown based on Roel’s information.
Captain Roel Hendrikx deserves official thanks.
What the commodore and CO of Cambeltown did not know was type 9 U-43 suffered severe shock damage to her long range radio and was unable to provide sighting report to BADU.
19 MAY 1941 0100 CO orders crew stand easy on station and for the cooks to issue tea hard tack to all hands at their stations.
19 MAY 1941 0300 CO orders the “off” watch below but to keep all Depth charge throwers, torpedo tubes and Depth charged rail crews fully manned. Orders Watch Officer and Miletus relieved.
19 MAY 1941 0330 Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham Celebrates his 26th birthday with a single Pink Gin and thinks about what he could do if that U-boat surfaced with fight in it. His three 4"/50 Mk.9 singles;1 - 3"/40 Mk.V AA single; two 20mm Oerlikon AA; three 21" torpedo tubes; should be more than enough but you never knew what was going to happen at sea. In his short life he had seen things happen at sea that no sane man would ever credit.
19 MAY 1941 0347 Sleep deprived “ASDIC Operator Benny” Hill misses three return echoes over 12 minutes. Watch Officer Sub Lieutent Hugh Laurie RNVR, with all of 4 months “In the Andrew” has been out cold for 25 minutes and will sleep through until his relief arrives at 0615. Benny will continue to report “No Contact reports”, throughout the watch. The bridge crew, zombies on their feet, accepts the reports and desperately tries to stay awake.
19 MAY 1941 0530 CO Cambletown calls off the search and orders his navigator for a two boiler run (Every CO of a Town Class DD, with it’s small bunkerage, has to keep in mind his fuel level) back to HX-123 current posit.
19 MAY 1941 1025 HMS Cambeltown rejoins HX-123. CO notices Ramillies is missing. Guesses a break down and a welcome return a to Halifax, some well deserved dockyard time for her crew.
HX 123 Commodore H. Rogers orders Lt.Cdr. Lord Teynham to lay on board his ship by flag hoist with his reports of his “Wild Goose Hunt”. CO Cambeltown senses no matter what he says he is about to relieve his Commodore's frustrations. Oh well. Should not have joined if I could not take a joke!
21 May 1941 0630 USS Brooklyn CL-40 made her number and reported to admiral Hewitt.
21 May 1941 1200 USS Tuscaloosa detached from TG39.1. Hewitt considered this a mixed blessing . He just lost 9 MK-9 eight inch guns firing 260-pound projectiles with a maximum effective range of 15 miles and ROF of 5 - 6 rounds per minute. He gained fifteen 6-in/47 caliber Mark 16 guns in 5 turrets firing 130-pound AP shell capable of a 13 miles maximum effective range. Even the outstanding ten rounds per minute sustained rate of fire, a full salvo of 150 rounds a minute, would not compensate against, capital ships, for the MK-9 eight inch 260-pound projectiles. But Brooklyn did have something that made her more valuable to Hewitt; she had CXAM radar. That is why he called in some valuable IOUs to get her assaigned to TG39.1 The thought struck him that with a radar equipped Cruiser it might be better if he shifted his flag to Brooklyn? He’d have to think about that.
21 May 1941 1300 Hewitt ordered CO CL-40 and his Navigator to report to the flag.
21 May 1941 1400 CO CL-40 and his Navigator arrive at BB-55 by Captain’s Barge and imediately escorted to TG39.1 cabin. RADM Hewitt, his Chief of Staff and CO BB-55 greet new members of “The Team”. Ching had served with CO CL-40 in the Pennsylvania in 1931. CO CL-40 was one of Hewitt’s more competent skippers as “Comodore” Des Div 12 in the mid 30’s. All four were members of the Gun Club and got on well.
C of Staff handed out a copy of TG39.1 Standard Operating Doctrine and then informed CL-40 Navigator his staff wanted to go over some things with him in the staff officers. Taking the hint he looked at CO CL-40 who nodded and the left.
Now Kent went over his views of the current ops and his expectations from Brooklyn. He then asked CO CL40 if he had any questions and was there anything about his ship Kent should know? He also asked what the “Flag facilities” in Brooklyn were like. CO CL40’s answers was they were adaquate for a small staff. Kent looked at his C of Staff and back to CO CL40 “Would it be OK if my C of Staff hitched a ride with you back to Brooklyn? I’d like him to do a quick eval and determine if Brooklyn was suitable as my flag.” No skipper in his right mind wanted to be saddled with an Admirals’ Staff so there was good reason for C of Staff’s boat ride.
21 May 1941 1600 TG39.1 C of Staff reported back to BB-55 and informed his boss the CO of CL40 spoke the truth. His ship could handle the TG39.1 staff. It would be tight for the ship and staff Junior Officers who had to share the same “state Rooms” more like dog kennels really. Serves them right anyway he said with a smile. Plenty of extra berthing for CPOs and enlisted, Communications more than adaquate, admirals cabin smaller than he had now but not bad at all. Flag bridge was adaqutae with it’s own chart room. In his opinion the move, if made, should be made in port.
Kent said “Seas a little rough for boating right now?”
C of Staff replied “Not for old shellbacks like us Admiral but it’s a might rough for new kids and old hands who have put in too much time in the BIG ships of late.” Both had a good chuckle. After C of Staff left Kent decided to sleep on shifting his flag. He wanted to take another look at “Ching’s” Tracking Compartment at work. He thought every sea going staff should be provided with one. He would have to draft a very concise report to Ernie King about the advanatges of “Tracking Compartments” with his recomendation they should be adopted as soon as possible. Probably get them in time for the next war, if we are lucky, his all too realistic Navy mind thought. [/b][/font][/quote][/div]
Interesting developments and sounds bloody accurate of life at sea in those times from what I've read. Some interesting names there, can't quite think why they ring a bell or two. 
I get the feeling that the convoy is going to see a lot worse than a wolf pack in the days ahead,  albeit that those were bad enough in this period. Looking forward to seeing future chapters. |
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575
Captain
There is no Purgatory for warcriminals - they go directly to Hell!
Posts: 2,732
Likes: 4,109
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Post by 575 on May 24, 2022 15:44:57 GMT
Wel the Joe, keep up the TL. Will do Roel. Looked up your first name; seems like we have something in common. When I was a youngster my older sister often complained I was "bright as a rock" with the feelings of a stone.
Be advised very good chance HX 123 takes a beating from a wolf pack. Lutgens unreps in a Kangerluarsunnguaq Fjord with some local help.
Too early for a recce plane out of Bluie West 1 or 8 at this time though US warships in area. The local Danish admin were quite divided on loyalty to Government at Copenhagen or Minister Kaufmann in Washington so some local help may happen.
Good read.
That U-43 is going to shadow HX 123 it seems..
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
Posts: 7,470
Likes: 4,295
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Post by miletus12 on May 24, 2022 15:54:52 GMT
Another PM about this installment is on the way. M. Sonar operator? Sure, why not. I will have a chart for you later today, I hope. |
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but manage to get a hit or something that while not significant in most ways has some influence? 
albeit that those were bad enough in this period. Looking forward to seeing future chapters.