Tanks, tanks, tanks! Bovington Tank Museum, the Chieftain and others.

I will have some rather UNPLEASANT comments about the British view of tank firepower.



First of all. "armor, mobility, firepower", the "iron triangle" of the tank lies at the heart of the amateur's view of what a tank was and what it did. Not even the British who never got it right in operations and usage were that stupid.  They put RADIOS into their tank because they knew it was "move, shoot, communicate under armor".     

From their WWI experience, the British stuck with the "male" (cavalry) and "female" (infantry) split, metastasizing it into "cruiser" and "infantry" tanks, per their branch confusion and "tank" doctrine.      
  
This led to more mistakes, such as "machine guns kill infantry" and "main guns kill tanks", mindset; and "tanks fight tanks" mindset that was to constantly lead them to an unending series of debacles clear through GOODWOOD and even later. Not even quite famous armored forces victories, such as first and second El Alamein saw the British use their armor properly.     

And then there is the myth of the Sherman Firefly. 

Part 1.
Part 2.
Part 3.

The short version is that the Americans tested that abortion. They were not stupid. By the time they looked at that British "bodge" they had enough owned experience in tank warfare themselves to know what worked.

a. Most tank shooting was against INFANTRY who were their main enemy and deadliest threat to them. Those pests could work in close, dug into the earth like gophers and were very hard to see. You had to have cannon fired explosive anti-personnel rounds to deal with them whenm they were dug in. That meant the main gun had to be a primary anti-infantry weapon as well as punch holes in armor. That was the rationale behind the 75mm / 40 gun-howitzer on the Sherman. machine guns were not enough for blockhouses and dug in antitank guns.

b. You usually saw the enemy tank about the same time he saw you and that was about 5 futbol fields away (500 meters in france and Italy and the SAME in North Africa, so the gun ranges were murderously SHORT and the differences in optics mattered not that much as they did in RUSSIA where the ranges were about 1,000 meters). You had to get off your shot first and fast, and hopefully the second BEFORE he shot you. This last feat was almost IMPOSSIBLE in the Sherman Firefly because the turret was so crowded and mislaid out by the big gun that a gun crew had a good time of it if they got off 2 shots a minute. This made the Firefly an AMBUSH tank or overwatch tank that reacted to the sudden appearance of a Panther or Tiger. It was USELESS in melee combat.

c. Why was it useless? The 17 pounder with discarding sabot shot or darts was not able to hit a Panther-sized target, except by dumb luck at more than 300 meters. Drift and tumble of projectile was the reason.

d. The British tried to pressure the Americans to underwrite or develop the 17 pounder Firefly to defray costs. The Americans told them to go pound coconuts. They had their own 76mm / 50 gun armed Sherman with the T-23 turret adapted from the T2X program in hand. This gun was not too dissimilar from the truncated 76mm / 52 the British developed to fit the Cromwell from the bored out 57mm / 60 gun from which it originated. The Sherman 76mm/50 could face punch a Panther at 400 meters, which was NOT ideal, with armor piercing composite rigid shot. It was good enough though, and good enough is much better than useless in melee tank combat, expecially when the 76mm / 50 could be relied to HIT a German tank out to 1,000 meters. It also came with an (Inferior to the 75mm / 40 shell because of a smaller filler bursting chaerge.) explosive shell for anti-infantry and anti-tank gun work and could indirect fire.

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In short, the British tankers like to present a false history of how tanks fought in WWII and what was important. Tank on tank combat was RARE. What you saw, was tanks working in cooperation with infantry in the West, with small platoon and company (troop) actions as part of combined armed teams at close rifle shot range. At those ranges, the tankers (Even American tankers) screamed for more armor and a bigger gun to overmatch the Germans. The British postwar went down that route to overmatch the postwar Russians and promptly screwed up, when they found their behemoths could not lay in first round shots fast, or move across ground at speed, or TALK to each other.

The Americans went first shot first kill, talk to the infantry and artillery and be able to cross MUD. American tanks (After the Korea tank panic.) had smaller guns and thinner armor than the British monsters, and did not BOG in place and could hit the Russians at speed rapidly at good engagement ranges and kill them.

The American tankers did not like it one bit, but the math worked out for the commanders who had to fight with those tanks. 3 to 1 exchange kill ratios favored that approach in a run and gun maneuver battle.

Over time Russian tank guns improved and American tanks grew thicker hides, but that first shot first kill and run and gun and TALK to each other emphasis was still found to be the valid method for the main battle tank. The logic is simple. Tanks are attrition units. They are going to die. The secret to winning with them is to remember that they mostly kill infantry, are meant to survive enough to overrun artillery and should be good enough to offer a favorable exchange ratio of tanks killed IN OFFENSE against a swarming Zerg enemy.

Challenger fails at that. Abrams succeeds.

The T-34 was a piece of junk. The T-62 was a piece of junk. The T-72, and the myriad of modified hulks based on it that the Russians claimed were new tanks, was a piece of junk.  How about the T-14, now?

How a tank is used is more important than what is gizmo-ducked. I do agree about the thermal imager. Look UP and shoot it.

Welcome aboard, you have good taste, the Centurion and Leopard are in my top 10, and not only becuase they also where used in the royal Netherlands Army.

Yes, I managed to have a few drinks with our allies during Canadian Army Trophy competitions!
Always got along with the Danes and the Dutch.
Not least of which was the Dutch messes in Bergen Hohne that had cheap and plentiful beer!
I can't remember what the horrible tasting liquor the Danes had was called, but it was used as a chaser for the pickled herring.

Hungarian WW2 War Armor Part 1 - Armored Cars and The First Tanks

After World War One, from the shattered remains of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a new Kingdom of Hungary was created. Being on the losing side of the war, the new Kingdom of Hungary lost many of its territories which had a significant percentage of Hungarian population, among which were. In addition, the size of its armed forces (Honved) was limited by the Trianon Treaty signed on the 4th June 1920. Hungary was also in a perilous situation, as it was surrounded by countries with which it had no friendly relationships. Between late 1918 and mid-1919, Hungary was invaded by the newly formed Czechoslovakia and Romania. Whilst the war with Czechoslovakia was a Hungarian military victory and was low in casualties, Romanian troops entered Budapest in August 1919, putting an end to hostilities which had left over 3,000 dead on either side. Furthermore, in March 1919, the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic was founded under the de facto control of Béla Kun, and politically, the country was volatile. The Hungarian Soviet Republic would fall on August 1st 1919, to be replaced by the Hungarian Republic and then in 1920, the Kingdom of Hungary.



Hungarian WW2 War Armour part 2 - Trial By Fire

Hungary got its first chance to get back some of the lost territories with the support of its Axis allies during the Vienna Arbitral Award in 1938. The Hungarians used this document to take parts of southern Slovakia and southern Ruthenia. Hungary would acquire Czechoslovakian territories thanks to the secessionist movement that arose in Ruthenia (eastern Czechoslovakia). By the end of September 1939, this region was declared as an Ukrainian autonomous region. This short-lived and unrecognised Carpatho-Ukraine state had, from the start, complicated political relations with Hungary due to previous lost Hungarian territories. It managed to form a 2,000 man strong Carpathian Guard which attacked the Hungarian-held town of Munkacs in early 1939. By 18th March, the Hungarians officially annexed Carpatho-Ukraine territories.