miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Apr 12, 2022 18:58:23 GMT
April 13th 1898
United StatesThe US Congress agrees to President McKinley's request for intervention in Cuba, but without recognition of the Cuban Government. SpainThe Spanish government declares that the sovereignty of Spain is jeopardized by US policy and prepares a special budget for war expenses. United States - Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To The Commanding Officers Of Ships On The North Atlantic StationU.S.Flagship New York, 1st Rate, Key West, Florida, April 13th,1898 Sir:- 1. The following confidential Memoranda,received from the Office of Naval Intelligence is published for your information:- ------------------------------ NOTES ON SANTIAGO DE CUBA. The latest reports giving any information upon the defenses of Santiago come from our Consul. 1. From these we learn that the Spanish authorities are preparing to mount modern guns back of Morro Castle and on Cay Smith, for the protection of the entrance, and at Blanca battery for the protection of the town. 2. The information as to mines being planted in the bay is conflicting. It has been fairly well established that several mines with complete cable outfit were landed here in 1896, but the entire supply seems to be still in the storehouse probably as it was not required for use against the insurgents. One report, which came quite direct, as to the effect that mines had been laid near Cay Smith, about a year and a half ago. 3. Provision was made some years ago to close the mouth of the harbor by a chain or boom and some old guns planted to secure the end, but beyond this nothing is known to have been done. 4. Locations for two new batteries were lately selected close to town,but as late as March 5th no work had been done on them. 5. The roads generally, leading to town are poor. The “Camino Reale (highway)[”]is good and leads with 1 ½ to 2 ½ miles of the coast. the best transportation for a landing party is by rail, as the railroad leading to within a short distance of town runs close to the coast for some ten miles to the eastward, and offers several good landing points. 6. The forts are of stone and brick and were constructed in 1663, and unless much improved would offer but little resistance to modern ships. 7. It has been asserted that the insurgents can capture the place at any time, but have not done so, as they had no ships to hold it with and were not strong enough to stand a naval attack from the Spanish ships. Richardson Clover, April 13,1898. Chief Intelligence Officer. Comments: 1. The Spaniards dug gun pits for various Ordonez guns. At least one complete battery of 6 inch / 50s was mounted at the west bank harbor entrance (See photo)  2. The Morro may have received a pair of larger caliber Ordonez guns of a bore size I do not remember at the moment. Both sets of guns were mounted on bluffs. (See photo)  3. I have no idea if anyone, American, actually set eyes on the place, but what Sampson reposted to his captains in the ONI memorandum, above, has about as little relation to reality as a Tom and Jerry Moon is made of cheese cartoon has to a real Apollo Moon mission. One instantly notes that ship naval guns' line shots will find it impossible to reach or knock out Spanish land batteries at their superior elevations in height. The Spaniards have excellent fields of fire in return. There is a small island just beyond the bluffs that splits the passage (fjord, it is properly called a fjord) into two channels that are IMPOSSIBLE to navigate more than one ship at a time past and through. The tidal current makes mining "problematic" at the harbor mouth. Same problem exists for any chain and boom which was a sheer fantasy. The harbor defense guns will be onerous enough. Now, that is just the naval problem, circa 1898.  That is what the Americans actually knew as of 1 April 1898. Note the map date of 1872? Where is that railroad? Where is that coastal road? This thorny lack of information and set of wrong assumptions will be seen in results which will develop as the Army becomes involved in what has started as a complete misread of the situation as of 11 April 1898. Plus, remember that Sampson is suspected of being incompetent, and by now at least Captain Mahan is acutely aware of it. Crowninshield will take much longer to convince. Later I will write something about how many American officers went insane or were rendered mentally unfit during this war, but that will have to wait. William Ruftus Shafter is one humdinger of a whack-job. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Apr 14, 2022 2:54:19 GMT
April 14th 1898
Italy
Suspension of Italian negotiations with Spain to sell the armored cruiser Garibaldi.
United States - Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long
U.S.Flagship New York,1st Rate,
Key West,Florida,
April 14th, 1898.
Sir:-
1. In anticipation of the establishment of a blockade,I have decided to begin with the following ports,viz:--Mariel, Havana, Matanzas and Cardenas.
2. As soon as this shall be established I shall at once inform the Department.
3. I regard it as impossible on account of the limited coal capacity of many of our ships to begin the blockade of the southern ports until the colliers shall be on the ground ready to supply the blockading vessels with coal.
Very respectfully,
W.T. Sampson
Captain,Comdr.-in-Chief,
U.S.Naval Force on North Atlantic Station.
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Apr 14, 2022 6:02:47 GMT
April 14th 1898
ItalySuspension of Italian negotiations with Spain to sell the armored cruiser Garibaldi. United States - Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long
U.S.Flagship New York,1st Rate, Key West,Florida, April 14th, 1898. Sir:- 1. In anticipation of the establishment of a blockade,I have decided to begin with the following ports,viz:--Mariel, Havana, Matanzas and Cardenas. 2. As soon as this shall be established I shall at once inform the Department. 3. I regard it as impossible on account of the limited coal capacity of many of our ships to begin the blockade of the southern ports until the colliers shall be on the ground ready to supply the blockading vessels with coal. Very respectfully, W.T. Sampson Captain, Comdr.-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Force on North Atlantic Station. Comments: In two parts: a. After long protracted negotiations with the Italian government and with the shipbuilder Ansaldo, the ARS Cristobol Colon was delivered without her main armament. It is a common misconception that it was the Italians who failed to supply the main armament. The actual history is that the French firm of Schneider which built the original two 24 cm/42 (9.45") Guillen Model 1896 guns for the Cristobol Colon, completely screwed up the prototypes and when test fired before installation, those guns failed proof, having breech plug jams and lockups. This was to be expected of a new gun, one supposes, but the Schneider firm had not done good service as far as the Armada was concerned. The standard Armada rapid fire gun before the Cristobol Colon was delivered with her 6 / 50s (Elswick pattern which would be equally horrible in service as the USN was to find with its two Elswick cruisers) was supposed to be the 5.5 inch / 40 and 5.5 inch / 50 Schneider unit cartridge gun series designed by Schneider on the Canet pattern and evolved in service from 1888 to 1897. These guns were either imported or license built for the Infant Maria Teresa class cruisers. The United States Navy had seen these guns and examined them in FRENCH service. The guns used a four-position pivot elbow breech interrupted screw de Bang type breech plug, which had a curious design defect. The plug got hotter and expanded more rapidly than the breech collar. This was called a plug jam and was the same uniform problem with the whole family of Schneider Canet pattern designed guns. The other jam issue was that the poudre blanc which the Armada used was not a cool propellant powder. This was something the United States Navy did not know, but it is something of which the Armada, particularly Sigismundo Bermejo and Admiral Cervera who wrote letters back and forth about it, were well aware. It was not just that these 5.5 /40s and 50s blew up, which was horrific enough. It was that the brass shell cases expanded under the hot gas expansion and jammed in the breech. This was called a case or cartridge jam. Once the Spanish gun crews used their special issue pry tools to extract the deformed brass case from a Canet gun, they would find the case lip bulged out and the case out of round. Useless. Normal practice was to send the expended deformed brass cases to a munition arsenal or armory to "anneal the case back into round and to roll the bulge flat", so the case could be reused. Spain's naval administration and royal government had not purchased the milling and rolling machinery to do this work in their national arsenal at Caracca as the Japanese did at Sasebo. So, spent Spanish cases had to be sent to a foreign vendor for "annealing". Guess who that foreign vendor was? Ansaldo held that contract in Italy. Hence the problem with the bungled annealing contract led to further entangled negotiations about the second Garibaldi Class armored cruiser, which if Sigismundo Bermejo had not bungled the first negotiations, and if the Spanish crown government had not torqued off the United States, could have led to the purchase of another cruiser, the ARS Pedro de Aragorn (which was yet to be laid down), or perhaps a substitute emergency purchase of one of the Garibaldis then building for Italy. That covers the first point in background I think as of April 14, 1898. b. The second point concerns our favorite incompetent American naval officer, Wiliam Sampson, who had problems with his arithmetic and naval geography. See MAP.  Mariel, Havana, Matanzas and Cardenas stretch along the northwest coast of Cuba for about 200 nautical miles. Sampson at the moment, this date, has about a dozen ships to blockade those four ports which means he can only cover one port. Moreover, the General Board in Washington (Captain Mahan) has a good idea that the First Spanish Cruiser Squadron is not about to sail up to Havana to be sunk like floating target sleds. Only an idiot admiral would sail through the Bahama Banks and through the Straits of Florida to be so obliging to Sampson. The likely move, Cervera will make, is to put into a southern Cuban port if he is ordered west. The only Cuban port with a railroad to Havana and access to the Cuban stockpiled coal supply at Havana for Cervera's squadron is Cienfuegos. So... when Sampson writes: one can understand the mindset of the General Board members: Montgomery Sicard, Arent. S. Crowninshield, and Alfred T. Mahan who were clearly not happy that the "commodore" of the North Atlantic Squadron was not on the same sheet of music everyone else was on. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Apr 15, 2022 7:39:16 GMT
April 15th 1898
United Kingdom
The British government informs Jamaica that coal will be considered contraband in the event of war between Spain and the United States.
United States - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington,
April 15, 1898.
Sir:
On behalf of the War Board I have to report as follow:
The five deep-sea patrol vessels for the North Atlantic coast which have already been purchased have been assigned to the New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Maryland and New Jersey Naval Militia by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. The Nictheroy, if she comes up in time, or whatever the sixth patrol vessel may be, will probably be given to the Second Battalion of the New York Militia. The Connecticut and Rhode Island Militia are also efficient. The Pennsylvania Naval Militia is are much less efficient. Disturbances have broken out in the Georgia Militia, with the result that their best division has been disbanded. All of this emphasizes the wisdom of the Department of in enlisting the Naval Militia individually, and in preventing the recognition by the Department of all the different Naval Militia organizations as being on the same plane. It is the purpose of the Department to keep the Naval Militia together in their battalion and division organizations, and it will be very unwise to act otherwise; but the widest difference obtains between the different organizations. The five chosen to man the deep-sea patrol vessels are those for which we have the best reports from the regular officers during the past year. They are all five thoroughly efficient organizations. From these we created last year range down to organizations such as one in the Southern States which made its appearance aboard ship with the officers rowing the men, as they were the only ones who knew how to row. Of course we can only take tentative steps about the Naval Militia, assigning them their vessels, and giving them the information that they have thus been assigned. Until they are called out and we are able to pay them, they cannot be brought on.
The Topeka will come instantly to this side of the water. The Somers will then come if she can. The Board believe that we should close with the offer to deliver here for $12,000.
In reference to the letter from Mr. Emery the Board has to say that of course it cannot scatter cruisers around South American ports, and that it will probably be impossible to scatter some of them around the equator at the point mentioned by Mr. Emery to protect the trade. We have not a sufficiently large Navy.
In the event of war Congress should at once pass a law permitting our ships to be transferred to foreign flags with power to again be put back under the American flag at the close of the war if desired.
In connection with the accompanying report of Captain Clover the Board recommends that the small cable vessel therein mentioned by immediately hired and put under Captain Sampson’s control. The Buccaneer is the vessel recommended.
Commodore Dewey will be directed to operate against Manilla. Probably it will be advisable for him to blockade, but he should certainly pick up the Spanish vessels, and probably he should take the vessels off fort defending Manilla. The objection to trying ships against forts until the Spanish vessels are picked up destroyed which obtain on the North Atlantic coast do not obtain on the Asiatic coast.
The Board transmits herewith the offer from Mr. Flint about three torpedo cruisers now in Brazil. If these boats can be delivered at some naval station north of Hatteras within 30 days, it is our opinion that any price up to $1,000,000 apiece should be paid for them. We are paying very large prices for steamships, yachts and tugs which relatively are not nearly as valuable as these vessels; but we have no sailors who can take charge and deliver them for us, and that will have to be done at the risk of the man making the negotiations.
The Nictheroy should start at once. For some reason the report about her seem to hang fire. Minister Bryan should be telegraphed to that we need an immediate report.
Very respectfully,
Theodore Roosevelt
Assistant Secretary.
United States - Secretary Of State John Sherman To Ambassador Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary To The Court Of St. James John Hay
Translation of a cipher telegram received at the Embassy, April 15, 1898.
Hay, Ambassador, London
Notify seaport consuls through United States Consul General to keep sharp watch of any suspicious vessels destined to aid Spain as war ships or privateers and report to you. In event of hostilities, you will notify British government of any suspected ship and ask full observance of neutral obligations. Keep Department advised.
Sherman.
United States - ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington
April 15, 1898
Governors Island, New York:
With the approval of the Secretary of War, the following regiments of cavalry and light batteries of artillery are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to proceed to Chickamauga Park, Ga.: All the light batteries of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth regiments of artillery and the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regiments of cavalry. The following regiments of infantry are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to the following points: To New Orleans, La., the First, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth; to Mobile, Ala., Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and 'twenty-second; to Tampa, Fla., the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-first.
The commanding general Department of the Colorado will detail company of Fifteenth Infantry to proceed to Fort Wingate and take station at that post. At posts from which the whole garrison is withdrawn, one officer and a detail of two men from each company will be left in charge of the post. All transportation will accompany the troops. The necessities of the post from which all public transportation is withdrawn will be provided by hired transportation through the Quartermaster's Department. Troops will be provided with thirty days' field rations and necessary camp equipping. You will give the necessary orders for the execution of the movements of the troops in your department as indicated above.
Acknowledge.
By command of Major-General Miles:
H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-GeneraL
Same to commanding generalDepartment of the Gulf, Atlanta, Ga.
Department of Colorado, Denver, Colo.
Department of California, San Francisco, CaL
Department of Missouri, Omaha, Nebr.
Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Minn.
Department of the Lakes, Chicago, TIl
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Apr 15, 2022 18:20:33 GMT
April 15th 1898
United KingdomThe British government informs Jamaica that coal will be considered contraband in the event of war between Spain and the United States. 1. The USG and especially the USN is well aware of how the British operated during the Sino-Japanese War. At the time, one incident with the SS Kowshing had some influence with how the Americans intended to handle the British attempts to profit off the projected Spanish-American War. They, the Americans, expected that the British would allow the Spanish to charter some British ships, especially colliers, to try to supply the Armada with fuel and naval stores. Blasting such a chartered vessel into fish food would not be prudent, so careful procedures to "handle" such charters would be necessary. Considering that the waters in which the USN intended to operate were "traditionally British controlled" (Bahama Banks and Greater Antilles) (See Map) /Caribbean_general_map-56a38ec03df78cf7727df5b8.png) they could not just declare a blockade and sink on sight any smugglers in those waters like the Japanese did. Scrupulous prize law would have to be followed. United States - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. LongNAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 15, 1898. Sir: On behalf of the War Board I have to report as follow: The five deep-sea patrol vessels for the North Atlantic coast which have already been purchased have been assigned to the New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Maryland and New Jersey Naval Militia by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. The Nictheroy, if she comes up in time, or whatever the sixth patrol vessel may be, will probably be given to the Second Battalion of the New York Militia. The Connecticut and Rhode Island Militia are also efficient. The Pennsylvania Naval Militia is are much less efficient. Disturbances have broken out in the Georgia Militia, with the result that their best division has been disbanded. All of this emphasizes the wisdom of the Department of in enlisting the Naval Militia individually, and in preventing the recognition by the Department of all the different Naval Militia organizations as being on the same plane. It is the purpose of the Department to keep the Naval Militia together in their battalion and division organizations, and it will be very unwise to act otherwise; but the widest difference obtains between the different organizations. The five chosen to man the deep-sea patrol vessels are those for which we have the best reports from the regular officers during the past year. They are all five thoroughly efficient organizations. From these we created last year range down to organizations such as one in the Southern States which made its appearance aboard ship with the officers rowing the men, as they were the only ones who knew how to row. Of course we can only take tentative steps about the Naval Militia, assigning them their vessels, and giving them the information that they have thus been assigned. Until they are called out and we are able to pay them, they cannot be brought on. The Topeka will come instantly to this side of the water. The Somers will then come if she can. The Board believe that we should close with the offer to deliver here for $12,000. In reference to the letter from Mr. Emery the Board has to say that of course it cannot scatter cruisers around South American ports, and that it will probably be impossible to scatter some of them around the equator at the point mentioned by Mr. Emery to protect the trade. We have not a sufficiently large Navy. In the event of war Congress should at once pass a law permitting our ships to be transferred to foreign flags with power to again be put back under the American flag at the close of the war if desired. In connection with the accompanying report of Captain Clover the Board recommends that the small cable vessel therein mentioned by immediately hired and put under Captain Sampson’s control. The Buccaneer is the vessel recommended. Commodore Dewey will be directed to operate against Manilla. Probably it will be advisable for him to blockade, but he should certainly pick up the Spanish vessels, and probably he should take the vessels off fort defending Manilla. The objection to trying ships against forts until the Spanish vessels are picked up destroyed which obtain on the North Atlantic coast do not obtain on the Asiatic coast. The Board transmits herewith the offer from Mr. Flint about three torpedo cruisers now in Brazil. If these boats can be delivered at some naval station north of Hatteras within 30 days, it is our opinion that any price up to $1,000,000 apiece should be paid for them. We are paying very large prices for steamships, yachts and tugs which relatively are not nearly as valuable as these vessels; but we have no sailors who can take charge and deliver them for us, and that will have to be done at the risk of the man making the negotiations. The Nictheroy should start at once. For some reason the report about her seem to hang fire. Minister Bryan should be telegraphed to that we need an immediate report. Very respectfully, Theodore Roosevelt Assistant Secretary. 1. The fiasco of the "naval militias" is the reason the modern federal NAVY has no "naval national guard" but rather a "naval reserve" in permanent federal service. During the Gulf War, a Georgia national guard unit brigade, a round-out or war manning unit for a federal mechanized division was called up for its war mission and sent to Fort Irwin for some hurry up training to bring it up to war standard. After the training session, the umpires who graded its performance, found that unit thoroughly incompetent and unsuitable for any role whatsoever, which has led to serious reforms in the American national guard roles and missions assignments. Actually the state of Georgia, historically, has never been any good administratively or operationally with its "militia units". One can read the reason why in Sherman's accounts as he marched through the state. "All bombast and buffoonery" is how he described those units' performances. 2. The USS Topeka started out as a hull ordered by Peru from the Howaldtswerke, Kiel, Germany. She was a Socrates class gunboat of all things. The Peruvians intended her as a commerce raider, but the British kiboshed that somehow during outfitting in their yards and she was laid up. The USG at this time was on a shopping spree to buy anything that could mount a gun and perform blockade duty so they bought her and impressed her into USN service. The USS Somers was a German built torpedo boat refused by the Kaiser's navy, but purchased for the USN during the same shopping spree. This purchase proved ineffectual as the British contract crew hired to sail her across the Atlantic, refused the commission. It was not until after the war that she was delivered, a complete waste of time and money. She eventually wound up in Illinois of all places as a training boat around 1914. 3. There was a fight inside the USN about this time about how it should be deployed. It was not only a tactical argument, but a POLITICAL argument. The "Eastern Establishment" (banking interests and overseas commerce they supported.), was acutely aware of several dangers (As it was understood at the time.) that the Spanish Armada posed to the United States: a. Based on recent history in the South American naval wars, the Spanish Armada had shown a predilection for indiscriminate terrorist port bombardments and naval raids. b. The way the Spanish Armada was built and building, it looked "on paper" as it were a core-centered force built around some fairly powerful commerce raiding armored cruisers that were faster and much longer ranged than the USN's nascent coast defense battleship fleet. This was actually true, but the politicians had no way to know that the Spanish Marine administration was so incredibly corrupt and stupid as to mis-equip, mis-train and misuse the kind of force it had. c. This led to political calls to disperse the USN's few protected cruisers to "guard US trade with South America" and or to deploy a select squadron of cruisers to guard the US east coast against port raids by the First Spanish Cruiser Squadron. The "Flying Squadron" was so deployed against the War Board's (General Board's) professional advice and Roosevelt was the man who did it, "for political reasons". The dispersal of the limited cruiser forces for commerce protection, TR refused because indeed "the navy was too small". 4. In one of TR's biggest mistakes, he opens the door for US owned merchant vessels to operate under "Flags of Convenience" that allowed the actual rundown of the US merchant marine in the early 1900s and its pass out from under direct USG regulation and control. This ruined what at the time was arguably the most efficient and capable bulk trade carrier and commerce enabler in the world. Every attempt by the USG to fix this boneheaded blunder since, has made the situation worse. 5. The cable vessel was and is part of a scheme to build a rival undersea cable network independent of British control. This is a part of the Spanish American War, that few historians notice. The USG was using the war exercise to run its own cables to South America, to East Asia and to Europe, so it could break the British comms monopoly once and for all. 6. TR is plainly lying here to Secretary Long. He already told Dewey to surprise attack Montojo and wipe him out. 7. Nothing will come of Mister Flint's scheme for the Tamandare and two other protected cruisers and that for the same reason that nothing came of the NITCHEROY. The Brazilians were reluctant to part with the ships for the price (bribes) offered. |
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Apr 15, 2022 22:00:01 GMT
United States - Secretary Of State John Sherman To Ambassador Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary To The Court Of St. James John HayTranslation of a cipher telegram received at the Embassy, April 15, 1898. Hay, Ambassador, London Notify seaport consuls through United States Consul General to keep sharp watch of any suspicious vessels destined to aid Spain as war ships or privateers and report to you. In event of hostilities, you will notify British government of any suspected ship and ask full observance of neutral obligations. Keep Department advised. Sherman. Why that telegram would have to be translated is beyond me. It was a two stage cypher which the British cracked easily enough. United States - ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WashingtonApril 15, 1898 Governors Island, New York: With the approval of the Secretary of War, the following regiments of cavalry and light batteries of artillery are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to proceed to Chickamauga Park, Ga.: All the light batteries of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth regiments of artillery and the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regiments of cavalry. The following regiments of infantry are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to the following points: To New Orleans, La., the First, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth; to Mobile, Ala., Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and 'twenty-second; to Tampa, Fla., the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-first. The commanding general Department of the Colorado will detail company of Fifteenth Infantry to proceed to Fort Wingate and take station at that post. At posts from which the whole garrison is withdrawn, one officer and a detail of two men from each company will be left in charge of the post. All transportation will accompany the troops. The necessities of the post from which all public transportation is withdrawn will be provided by hired transportation through the Quartermaster's Department. Troops will be provided with thirty days' field rations and necessary camp equipping. You will give the necessary orders for the execution of the movements of the troops in your department as indicated above. Acknowledge. By command of Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-GeneraL Same to commanding general Department of the Gulf, Atlanta, Ga. Department of Colorado, Denver, Colo. Department of California, San Francisco, CaL Department of Missouri, Omaha, Nebr. Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. Department of the Lakes, Chicago, TIl This is the repositioning of the Regular Army for training duties, the intent being that the Regulars will train the militia force being martialed in the state of Georgia near Chattanooga, Tennessee. See previous remarks about how incompetent the state of Georgia was as regards administrative support and training of its own militia units. Multiply that by 100,000 men or about 100 regiments. We will see the results ... in the future. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Apr 15, 2022 23:18:27 GMT
United States - Secretary Of State John Sherman To Ambassador Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary To The Court Of St. James John HayTranslation of a cipher telegram received at the Embassy, April 15, 1898. Hay, Ambassador, London Notify seaport consuls through United States Consul General to keep sharp watch of any suspicious vessels destined to aid Spain as war ships or privateers and report to you. In event of hostilities, you will notify British government of any suspected ship and ask full observance of neutral obligations. Keep Department advised. Sherman. edit United States - ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WashingtonApril 15, 1898 Governors Island, New York: With the approval of the Secretary of War, the following regiments of cavalry and light batteries of artillery are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to proceed to Chickamauga Park, Ga.: All the light batteries of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth regiments of artillery and the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regiments of cavalry. The following regiments of infantry are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to the following points: To New Orleans, La., the First, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth; to Mobile, Ala., Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and 'twenty-second; to Tampa, Fla., the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-first. The commanding general Department of the Colorado will detail company of Fifteenth Infantry to proceed to Fort Wingate and take station at that post. At posts from which the whole garrison is withdrawn, one officer and a detail of two men from each company will be left in charge of the post. All transportation will accompany the troops. The necessities of the post from which all public transportation is withdrawn will be provided by hired transportation through the Quartermaster's Department. Troops will be provided with thirty days' field rations and necessary camp equipping. You will give the necessary orders for the execution of the movements of the troops in your department as indicated above. Acknowledge. By command of Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-GeneraL Same to commanding generalDepartment of the Gulf, Atlanta, Ga. Department of Colorado, Denver, Colo. Department of California, San Francisco, CaL Department of Missouri, Omaha, Nebr. Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. Department of the Lakes, Chicago, TIl United States - ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WashingtonApril 15, 1898 Governors Island, New York: With the approval of the Secretary of War, the following regiments of cavalry and light batteries of artillery are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to proceed to Chickamauga Park, Ga.: All the light batteries of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth regiments of artillery and the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regiments of cavalry. The following regiments of infantry are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to the following points: To New Orleans, La., the First, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth; to Mobile, Ala., Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and 'twenty-second; to Tampa, Fla., the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-first. The commanding general Department of the Colorado will detail company of Fifteenth Infantry to proceed to Fort Wingate and take station at that post. At posts from which the whole garrison is withdrawn, one officer and a detail of two men from each company will be left in charge of the post. All transportation will accompany the troops. The necessities of the post from which all public transportation is withdrawn will be provided by hired transportation through the Quartermaster's Department. Troops will be provided with thirty days' field rations and necessary camp equipping. You will give the necessary orders for the execution of the movements of the troops in your department as indicated above. Acknowledge. By command of Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-GeneraL Same to commanding generalDepartment of the Gulf, Atlanta, Ga. Department of Colorado, Denver, Colo. Department of California, San Francisco, CaL Department of Missouri, Omaha, Nebr. Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. Department of the Lakes, Chicago, TIl United States - ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WashingtonApril 15, 1898 Governors Island, New York: With the approval of the Secretary of War, the following regiments of cavalry and light batteries of artillery are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to proceed to Chickamauga Park, Ga.: All the light batteries of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth regiments of artillery and the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regiments of cavalry. The following regiments of infantry are relieved from duty at their present stations and will be ordered to the following points: To New Orleans, La., the First, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth; to Mobile, Ala., Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and 'twenty-second; to Tampa, Fla., the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-first. The commanding general Department of the Colorado will detail company of Fifteenth Infantry to proceed to Fort Wingate and take station at that post. At posts from which the whole garrison is withdrawn, one officer and a detail of two men from each company will be left in charge of the post. All transportation will accompany the troops. The necessities of the post from which all public transportation is withdrawn will be provided by hired transportation through the Quartermaster's Department. Troops will be provided with thirty days' field rations and necessary camp equipping. You will give the necessary orders for the execution of the movements of the troops in your department as indicated above. Acknowledge. By command of Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-GeneraL Same to commanding generalDepartment of the Gulf, Atlanta, Ga. Department of Colorado, Denver, Colo. Department of California, San Francisco, CaL Department of Missouri, Omaha, Nebr. Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Minn. Department of the Lakes, Chicago, TIl Question, a reason for this post is. |
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Apr 15, 2022 23:21:23 GMT
Question, a reason for this post is. Called away in mid-post by an emergency. Apparently someone could not solve a fire. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Apr 15, 2022 23:24:32 GMT
Question, a reason for this post is. Called away in mid-post by an emergency. Apparently someone could not solve a fire. Well we know one country who had the same problem recently. It happens. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Apr 16, 2022 6:06:38 GMT
April 16th 1898
Spain
The American naval attaché in Madrid, Lt. George Dyer, reports that the Spanish Navy has dispatched a small and ill-equipped fleet to Cuba while the bulk of its naval forces are frantically scrounging for equipment to allow it to leave port. Moreover, Spain’s straiten economy and sizable debt make it difficult for its leaders to find or borrow money to purchase what is necessary and to improve what is sub-standard. Finally, Spain is politically unstable, rife with rumors of an impending popular revolt, and many Spaniards, including its naval leaders, are gripped by defeatism.
Spain - Lieutenant George L. Dyer, United States Naval Attaché In Madrid, To Commander Richardson Clover, Chief, Officer Of Naval Intelligence
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Madrid, April 16, 1898.
Sir:
Yesterday the Spanish Government began to take extraordinary precautions to prevent the getting out of news relating to the movement of ships or anything pertaining to war preparations. It is quite probable therefore that definite information in regard to these subjects will be difficult, if not impossible, to get. My latest information, which I have telegraphed to date, is to the effect that the torpedo squadron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo boats and the converted cruiser “Ciudad de Cadiz” with the “Colon” and the “Maria Theresa,” (1) are at the Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions (2) It is said that the “Colon” and the “Theresa” left Cadiz in such a hurry that they were not properly provisioned. Provisions and coal have been sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have not a full supply of ammunition. The “Oquendo”(3) and “Vizcaya” from Puerto Rico should arrive at Cape de Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite information I believe the “Pelayo” arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena. It was intended that she should go after a few days’ necessary delay in Cartagena and it is reported that she was sighted in the straits of Gibraltar day before yesterday. The “Proserpina,” “Osada”, “Destructor,” “Barcelo,” “Retamosa,” “Habana,” “Halcon,”, torpedo boats and destroyers, and the “Vitoria” are now practically ready in Cadiz awaiting the arrival of the “Carlos V” and the “Pelao”(4). The “Alfonso Xlll” is also about ready in Cartagena (5) The installation for moving the guns by electricity in the “Carlos V” is not completed, and I am unable to get at any estimate of the date when she will be entirely ready for service. It is said on good authority, however, that in an emergency she could be used at once, working such parts as have not power applied by hand. Work is being pushed also as rapidly as possible on the Cisneros but she can hardly be ready for many weeks. The transatlantic steamers “Mexico”, “Panama,” “Santo Domingo,” “San Augustin” and “Villaverde,” now in Cuban waters, are being armed as auxiliary cruisers. Nine transatlantic steamers in Spanish ports at present are also being armed as cruisers. To this number should be added the “Colombia” and “Normania”, recently purchased in Germany, and the “Giralda” now being converted in Barcelona. This makes 21 auxiliary cruisers concerning which I have quite definite information. The two steamers bought in Germany were strengthened there and are in condition to receive their artillery and crew when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected today. I call your special attention to the newspaper slip which I enclose, entitled “Fe en la Armada.” It was published in the “Heraldo” of April 6th, the leading and most influential paper of Madrid. The Imparcial (6) of the following morning called attention to it and spoke in very severe terms of the impropriety of a former Secretary of the Navy speaking so unreservedly of such important matters at this very critical time. The following is a translation:
“We had an opportunity today to talk for a long time with General Beranger, the last Secretary of the Navy under the Conservative Cabinet (7) To the question which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending with the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces. The attack on our Island ports is not to be feared, he said, by an enemy taking advantage of the darkness of night. The reason of this is that Havana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and Santiago, are well defended by electrical and automobile torpedoes which can work at a great distance (Have a large radius of action). Senor Canovasdel Castillo (8), who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in agreement with me, the shipment to Cuba of 190 torpedos which are surely located in these ports at present. The transportation and installation of these war machines was in the charge of the distinguished torpedoist Senor Chacon I have already said that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am going to give you my reasons. The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our warships, and the second, as soon as fire is opened, the crews of the American ships will commence to desert, since we all know that among them there are people of all nationalities.10 Ship against ship, therefore a failure is not to be feared. I believe that the squadron detained at Cade de Verde and particularly the destroyers should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have nothing to fear from the American fleet. In this class of ships we are on a much higher level than the United States.”
“The Company ‘Bander a Espanola’ have been ordered to “suspend the voyages of its ships to Havana.” without definite information I presume the Government intends to take these ships into service. Also the “Compania Transatlantica” has ordered its ships not to touch at Coruna hereafter, presumably for the same reason as given above.
It is said quite openly here that the intention of the Government is to make some kind of an effort on our coasts. This comes to me from so many sources that I am inclined to believe that they have this plan in view, but I have been unable to verify the reports or to get at any details.
Just at this moment here in Madrid everything is very quiet. Considerable turbulence is reported from the provinces. How great this may be we are unable to judge, as the Government is keeping a sharp watch on the telegrams and does not permit any very exciting news to be disseminated. There was some excitement and, for two days, considerable danger of a mob here in Madrid after the announcement of the proclamation of the armistice in Cuba. That crisis is now apparently passed. Everybody here expects war, and the lower classes ardently desire it. The Government and more intelligent classes dread it, are willing to do anything they can to avoid it without revolution, but will accept it if, from their point of view, it is forced upon them. The press fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the superior bravery of the Spanish sailor, the superior discipline aboard the Spanish ships and the greater fighting power of the Navy. The belief in this superiority of the Spanish Navy over that of the United States accounts in a large measure, in my opinion, for the determination to fight us. This opinion is shared al by many intelligent persons, in fact I believe by all Spaniards. They say they have nothing to lose, they could not be any worse off with war that without it, as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can do incalculable damage to our commerce; seriously injure, if not destroy, our Navy and alshtough although they would probably be beaten in the end they will have taught us a salutary lesson in the meantime. One of the most intelligent, best informed Spaniards I have met here, a man who has travelled much and claims to have great admiration for the United States and who knows much about our history and resources, a senator from the Kingdom, told me yesterday that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period that hostilities would last. He was sure that three years would be the very least that the struggle would continue. It may be of interest to you to know that he said he could very well understand and appreciate the feelings and ambitions of a young and powerful nation like the United States for conquest. He could not help having a great deal of sympathy with an avowed proposition on our part to take the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Canaries, the Baleares, the Philippines, and even to come to Madrid itself; but what he could not understand was that while protesting a desire for peace, a decided disinclination to the annexation of any territory, the people of the United States had done everything in their power to foment rebellion in Cuba, and to make it impossible for Spain to overcome it either by peaceable of forcible means. I gave you this as a matter of interest solely but it represents the attitude, of the intelligent educated and travelled Spaniard.
Very respectfully,
G.L. Dyer,
Lt., U.S.N.,
Naval Attache.
Footnote 1: The armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa and Cristóbal Colón.
Footnote 2: The Spanish Squadron under RAdm. Pascual Cervera y Topete was poorly armed and undersupplied when it departed from Spain for the Cape Verde Islands and then to the Caribbean. He wrote to the Minister of Marine SegismundoBermejo y Merelo on 22 April from Cape Verde:
“How can it be said that I have been supplied with everything I asked for? The Colon does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there were no others. The 14-centimeter ammunition, with the exception of about 300 rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the Vizcaya and Oquendo have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the Colon can not be recharged. We do not have a single Bustamente torpedo. There is no plan or concert, which I so much desired and have suggested in vain. The servomotors of my vessels have only been made in the InfantaMaria Theresa after they had left Spain.”
RAdm. Cervera’s fleet not only faced a serious shortage of ammunition and functioning guns, it also lacked sufficient coal and food stores for a trip across the Atlantic. Trask, War With Spain, 111.
Footnote 3: The Spanish cruiser Almirante Oquendo.
Footnote 4: Pelayo, Carlos V, and Vittoria were unprepared to sail by the time RAdm. Cervera was ordered to go to the Caribbean on 29 April.
Footnote 5: RAdm. Cervera wrote of the Alfonso XIII: “We must discount the Alfonso XIII, so many years under trials that it appears we shall not have the pleasure to ever count it among our vessels of war.” As Cervera predicted, the Alfonso XIII did not join his fleet that sailed from Spain/
Footnote 6: El Imparcial (The Independent) was a Liberal Party newspaper in Madrid.
Footnote 7: José María Beránger y Ruiz Apodaca served as Conservative Spanish Minister of the Marine intermittently from 1870 to 1897.
Footnote 8: The Conservative Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo.
United States - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON,
April 16, 1898.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I wish you would lay this before the President. I hear from Captain Sampson corroborating what I hear from many other sources, that the Spaniards are now laying in three months provisions in Havana for their Army. A considerable quantity has been sent; more is on the way. Coal is also on the way. I again urge as strongly as I know how that we declare an embargo. If we had declared the embargo a fortnight ago, Havana would have been in shape to fall at once. Gen. Lee informed us that at that time it could not have held out for two weeks. Now it will hold out a month. If provisions and coal are allowed to go it may be able to hold out for three months. Again I wish most respectfully, but most urgently , to point out the great disadvantage that come to us from not striking quickly. Every consideration from a military point of view bids us to strike at once if we are to strike at all. Week by week, as well as month by month, the situation has steadily changed to our disadvantage since last December, and notably since February. If Havana is to be provisioned, the difficulty of reducing the city will be immensely increased, and it may mean an appalling death rate among the troops sent down there to besiege it who will have to be kept through the sickly season. What would otherwise be done in days may require weeks. It must be remembered that every week’s delay so far has undoubtedly meant <to our army and navy> serious loss of life <in the event of war,> and this is what delay in the future will mean. I earnestly <beseech> you to lay this matter immediately before the President.
Very respectfully
Theodore Roosevelt
Assistant Secretary
P. S. I am writing on behalf of the War Board.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Apr 16, 2022 18:15:48 GMT
Spain - Lieutenant George L. Dyer, United States Naval Attaché In Madrid, To Commander Richardson Clover, Chief, Officer Of Naval IntelligenceLEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Madrid, April 16, 1898. Sir: Yesterday the Spanish Government began to take extraordinary precautions to prevent the getting out of news relating to the movement of ships or anything pertaining to war preparations. It is quite probable therefore that definite information in regard to these subjects will be difficult, if not impossible, to get. My latest information, which I have telegraphed to date, is to the effect that the torpedo squadron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo boats and the converted cruiser “Ciudad de Cadiz” with the “Colon” and the “Maria Theresa,” (1) are at the Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions (2) It is said that the “Colon” and the “Theresa” left Cadiz in such a hurry that they were not properly provisioned. Provisions and coal have been sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have not a full supply of ammunition. The “Oquendo”(3) and “Vizcaya” from Puerto Rico should arrive at Cape de Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite information I believe the “Pelayo” arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena. It was intended that she should go after a few days’ necessary delay in Cartagena and it is reported that she was sighted in the straits of Gibraltar day before yesterday. The “Proserpina,” “Osada”, “Destructor,” “Barcelo,” “Retamosa,” “Habana,” “Halcon,”, torpedo boats and destroyers, and the “Vitoria” are now practically ready in Cadiz awaiting the arrival of the “Carlos V” and the “Pelao”(4). The “Alfonso Xlll” is also about ready in Cartagena (5) The installation for moving the guns by electricity in the “Carlos V” is not completed, and I am unable to get at any estimate of the date when she will be entirely ready for service. It is said on good authority, however, that in an emergency she could be used at once, working such parts as have not power applied by hand. Work is being pushed also as rapidly as possible on the Cisneros but she can hardly be ready for many weeks. The transatlantic steamers “Mexico”, “Panama,” “Santo Domingo,” “San Augustin” and “Villaverde,” now in Cuban waters, are being armed as auxiliary cruisers. Nine transatlantic steamers in Spanish ports at present are also being armed as cruisers. To this number should be added the “Colombia” and “Normania”, recently purchased in Germany, and the “Giralda” now being converted in Barcelona. This makes 21 auxiliary cruisers concerning which I have quite definite information. The two steamers bought in Germany were strengthened there and are in condition to receive their artillery and crew when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected today. I call your special attention to the newspaper slip which I enclose, entitled “Fe en la Armada.” It was published in the “Heraldo” of April 6th, the leading and most influential paper of Madrid. The Imparcial (6) of the following morning called attention to it and spoke in very severe terms of the impropriety of a former Secretary of the Navy speaking so unreservedly of such important matters at this very critical time. The following is a translation: “We had an opportunity today to talk for a long time with General Beranger, the last Secretary of the Navy under the Conservative Cabinet (7) To the question which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending with the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces. The attack on our Island ports is not to be feared, he said, by an enemy taking advantage of the darkness of night. The reason of this is that Havana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and Santiago, are well defended by electrical and automobile torpedoes which can work at a great distance (Have a large radius of action). Senor Canovasdel Castillo (8), who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in agreement with me, the shipment to Cuba of 190 torpedos which are surely located in these ports at present. The transportation and installation of these war machines was in the charge of the distinguished torpedoist Senor Chacon I have already said that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am going to give you my reasons. The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our warships, and the second, as soon as fire is opened, the crews of the American ships will commence to desert, since we all know that among them there are people of all nationalities.10 Ship against ship, therefore a failure is not to be feared. I believe that the squadron detained at Cade de Verde and particularly the destroyers should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have nothing to fear from the American fleet. In this class of ships we are on a much higher level than the United States.” “The Company ‘Bander a Espanola’ have been ordered to “suspend the voyages of its ships to Havana.” without definite information I presume the Government intends to take these ships into service. Also the “Compania Transatlantica” has ordered its ships not to touch at Coruna hereafter, presumably for the same reason as given above. It is said quite openly here that the intention of the Government is to make some kind of an effort on our coasts. This comes to me from so many sources that I am inclined to believe that they have this plan in view, but I have been unable to verify the reports or to get at any details. Just at this moment here in Madrid everything is very quiet. Considerable turbulence is reported from the provinces. How great this may be we are unable to judge, as the Government is keeping a sharp watch on the telegrams and does not permit any very exciting news to be disseminated. There was some excitement and, for two days, considerable danger of a mob here in Madrid after the announcement of the proclamation of the armistice in Cuba. That crisis is now apparently passed. Everybody here expects war, and the lower classes ardently desire it. The Government and more intelligent classes dread it, are willing to do anything they can to avoid it without revolution, but will accept it if, from their point of view, it is forced upon them. The press fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the superior bravery of the Spanish sailor, the superior discipline aboard the Spanish ships and the greater fighting power of the Navy. The belief in this superiority of the Spanish Navy over that of the United States accounts in a large measure, in my opinion, for the determination to fight us. This opinion is shared al by many intelligent persons, in fact I believe by all Spaniards. They say they have nothing to lose, they could not be any worse off with war that without it, as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can do incalculable damage to our commerce; seriously injure, if not destroy, our Navy and although they would probably be beaten in the end they will have taught us a salutary lesson in the meantime. One of the most intelligent, best informed Spaniards I have met here, a man who has travelled much and claims to have great admiration for the United States and who knows much about our history and resources, a senator from the Kingdom, told me yesterday that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period that hostilities would last. He was sure that three years would be the very least that the struggle would continue. It may be of interest to you to know that he said he could very well understand and appreciate the feelings and ambitions of a young and powerful nation like the United States for conquest. He could not help having a great deal of sympathy with an avowed proposition on our part to take the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Canaries, the Baleares, the Philippines, and even to come to Madrid itself; but what he could not understand was that while protesting a desire for peace, a decided disinclination to the annexation of any territory, the people of the United States had done everything in their power to foment rebellion in Cuba, and to make it impossible for Spain to overcome it either by peaceable of forcible means. I gave you this as a matter of interest solely but it represents the attitude, of the intelligent educated and travelled Spaniard. Very respectfully, G.L. Dyer, Lt., U.S.N., Naval Attache. Comments follow. 1. The First Spanish Cruiser Squadron, is as reported, of the 16 April 1898, in the process of assembling. The Ciudad de Cadiz was one of those hasty passenger liner conversions that would prove to be 100% useless to both navies. 2. The ARS Infanta Maria Teresa and the Cristobol Colon were panic-sortied to prevent them from being blockaded. About this time, as LT. Dyer should have reported, the Spanish government had called its reserves to the colors and was manning its coast defense forts with their version of the "national guard" as the Madrid government was afraid that the USN was about to descend upon the Spanish coast to blockade and bombard Spanish ports. 3. The ARS Vizcaya and ARS Oquendo movements are unknown and Dyer should not have speculated about these units. 4. ARS Pelayo, the one genuine Armada battleship, was laid up at La Seyne since 1897 with a full refit in progress and was still stuck there. If Dyer had read the Madrid Newspapers as he should have, he would have reported this known fact. 5. “Proserpina,” “Osada”, “Destructor,” “Barcelo,” “Retamosa,” “Habana,” “Halcon,”, torpedo boats and destroyers, and the “Vitoria” in Cadiz as listed as massing at Cadiz were in various stages of incomplete fit-out. The ARS Carlos V was a complete disaster, with her engines totally unfit for service, and with the British firm of Armstrong hired to look at her to see if they could fix her. Again this was reported in the Madrid newspapers as of this date. 6. ARS Alfonso XIII was unfit for blue water operations as she was as bollixed in hull form as the rest of the Reina Cristina class. 7. ARS Cisneros has not even been wetted down. She is still building on the weighs as reported in the Spanish papers. 8. The transatlantic steamers “Mexico”, “Panama,” “Santo Domingo,” “San Augustin” and “Villaverde,” armings are pure speculation as of this date. “Colombia” and “Normania”, and the “Giralda” were being converted as fast as possible, so this was independently verified and Dyer got that much of his reportage correct. 9. The newspaper article is interesting: As of that date, the over optimistic General Baranger, who was only exceeded in his ministerial incompetence and utter stupidity by his successor, Sigismundo Bermejo, was "whistling Dixie". The type of automobile torpedoes in service with the Armada were of the German Schwartzkopf variety. The USN had purchased examples of this Whitehead knockoff and found them inferior to the Howell as to accuracy and to its own license-built Whitehead torpedoes as to range and straight hot runs. No torpedo in service in 1898 was proofed for more than 500 to 1000 meters effective range. Guess of which range the Schwartzkopf had, as the Americans knew and so did Baranger? As for the Bustamente mines, well... if the inventor had not been killed by the Americans at the Battle of Kettle Hill he might have been court martialed for two reasons. a. His mines did not work. b. He drew up Admiral Cervera's battle plan for The Battle of the Bahia de Santiago de Cuba. Back to Baranger, it is such as of this date that we can safely assume that Captain Vilaamil, the great Spanish navy torpedo boat expert, had told him that torpedo boats were highly specialized ambush weapons for whom the tactics were still to be determined? The quotation from Global Security shows what kind of Armada Baranger left Sigismundo Bermejo. Not too good. 11. Back to Dyer: a.--There is the provisional warning about port raids to be expected from the Armada. b.--The undercurrent of revolution which will plague Spain for the next half century Dyer notes, along with the immediate Spanish sitting government remedy of inciting a popular foreign war to distract the dissatisfied polity. c.--I find it interesting that Dyer overestimates American avowed prowess and severely underestimates the Spanish Tercios' capacity. Similarly, the Spanish intellectual classes with whom he discusses the pending war make the same exact mistakes. Conclusions about either nation's navies appear to be of moonshine and cloud cuckoo lander elements. Example of a Spanish armed auxiliary. ARS Ciudad de Cadiz armed auxiliary.  after modifications...  Apparently armed with 4 or 5 each 4.7 inch guns and intended as a commerce raider, or second class gunboat. It was too slow for naval commerce warfare work, and not well protected to stand in a gunfight. United States - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. LongNAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 16, 1898. My dear Mr. Secretary: I wish you would lay this before the President. I hear from Captain Sampson corroborating what I hear from many other sources, that the Spaniards are now laying in three months provisions in Havana for their Army. A considerable quantity has been sent; more is on the way. Coal is also on the way. I again urge as strongly as I know how that we declare an embargo. If we had declared the embargo a fortnight ago, Havana would have been in shape to fall at once. Gen. Lee informed us that at that time it could not have held out for two weeks. Now it will hold out a month. If provisions and coal are allowed to go it may be able to hold out for three months. Again I wish most respectfully, but most urgently , to point out the great disadvantage that come to us from not striking quickly. Every consideration from a military point of view bids us to strike at once if we are to strike at all. Week by week, as well as month by month, the situation has steadily changed to our disadvantage since last December, and notably since February. If Havana is to be provisioned, the difficulty of reducing the city will be immensely increased, and it may mean an appalling death rate among the troops sent down there to besiege it who will have to be kept through the sickly season. What would otherwise be done in days may require weeks. It must be remembered that every week’s delay so far has undoubtedly meant <to our army and navy> serious loss of life <in the event of war,> and this is what delay in the future will mean. I earnestly <beseech> you to lay this matter immediately before the President. Very respectfully Theodore Roosevelt Assistant Secretary P. S. I am writing on behalf of the War Board. TR is quite the realist. His concerns are Yellow Fever and over 150,000 Spanish Tercios holed up in the Cubana fortress complexes between Havana and Cardenas. His main naval concern is that the Spaniards still are buying Pennsylvania and West Virginia coal, food and AMMUNITION and shipping it to Havana! Of course, to land in Cuba right now is impossible. The US Army has less than 20,000 trained and equipped combat ready soldiers as of this date. TR knows it. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Apr 17, 2022 6:34:46 GMT
April 17th 1898
Hong Kong
Revenue Cutter USRC McCulloch arrives in Hong Kong where it joins the US Navy's Asiatic Squadron. Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. LongNAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 17, 1898. Sir: The War Board does not wish to needlessly bore you by repeating advice, and of course it is ignorant of the larger proficiencies and purposes of the administration; but with the light we have we would again respectfully state that in our opinion the construction of torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers should be begun at once, and that all the battleships, and especially the KEARSARGE and KENTUCKY, should be hastened to completion, working night and day. Surely the KEARSARGE and KENTUCKY could be gotten ready by next fall if necessary. The board has agreed upon the armament for the four American Liners (1), following in this respect the suggestion of Captain O’Neil (2). We have also substantially adopted his suggestion with regard to the armament for the remaining cruisers. Some of the yachts we have taken have been overloaded with armor, so that their speed has been greatly reduced. The Board thinks that it would be well to take the CORSAIR (3) and put very light guns aboard her, so as to use her merely for a dispatch vessel. She is the best yacht, barring the MAYFLOWER and possibly the SOVEREIGN, that we have had up. The NEWARK is already being pushed to completion as rapidly as possible, and will soon be ready. I think the CHICAGO <and Atlanta> should be likewise pushed. Very respectfully, Theodore Roosevelt Assistant Secretary. Footnote 1: The four American Liner steamers taken into Naval service as auxiliaries are: St. Louis, St. Paul, Harvard and Yale. Footnote 2: RAdm. Charles O’Neil, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. Footnote 3: The Corsair was renamed Gloucester. The request that it be lightly armored was originally made by the man selected to command the Gloucester, Lt. Cmdr. Richard Wainwright. Wainwright received his wish that the ship be equipped with more guns instead of additional armor.
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on Apr 17, 2022 16:03:42 GMT
April 17th 1898
Hong Kong
Revenue Cutter USRC McCulloch arrives in Hong Kong where it joins the US Navy's Asiatic Squadron. Comments: The USS McCulloch was a bit slow and under-armed as a vessel to stand in line of battle. Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. LongNAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 17, 1898. Sir: The War Board does not wish to needlessly bore you by repeating advice, and of course it is ignorant of the larger proficiencies and purposes of the administration; but with the light we have we would again respectfully state that in our opinion the construction of torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers should be begun at once, and that all the battleships, and especially the KEARSARGE and KENTUCKY, should be hastened to completion, working night and day. Surely the KEARSARGE and KENTUCKY could be gotten ready by next fall if necessary. The board has agreed upon the armament for the four American Liners (1), following in this respect the suggestion of Captain O’Neil (2). We have also substantially adopted his suggestion with regard to the armament for the remaining cruisers. Some of the yachts we have taken have been overloaded with armor, so that their speed has been greatly reduced. The Board thinks that it would be well to take the CORSAIR (3) and put very light guns aboard her, so as to use her merely for a dispatch vessel. She is the best yacht, barring the MAYFLOWER and possibly the SOVEREIGN, that we have had up. The NEWARK is already being pushed to completion as rapidly as possible, and will soon be ready. I think the CHICAGO <and Atlanta> should be likewise pushed. Very respectfully, Theodore Roosevelt Assistant Secretary. The problem, as TR notes above, is that the United States Navy is short of torpedo armed small craft, and that it is badly outnumbered (on paper), by faster and longer ranged Spanish armored cruisers. The yachts were and are intended as scout and messenger ships to picket the approach routes to Cuba from the east and south specifically. The four each armed merchant cruisers were intended as additional scouts, by the war boards. |
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lordroel
Administrator
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Post by lordroel on Apr 18, 2022 6:46:58 GMT
April 18th 1898
United States
Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, commander of the North Atlantic Squadron, issue instructions for a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba. Included are detailed orders relating to ship placement and cruising. According to Sampson’s plan, the bulk of the squadron, including Sampson’s flagship New York, are to blockade Havana. Other urban centers on the northern coast: Mariel, Matanzas, and Cardenas, are to be blockaded by smaller flotillas, and Indiana, Marblehead, and Detroit are to form a special mobile “flying” flotilla. Ships off Havana and Mariel composed will be composed of the First Division and those off Matanzas and Cardenas were the Second Division. The fleet also includes six torpedo boats which are to deliver dispatches.
Philippines
More inspections involving Manila residents accused of suspected accomplices in plans to oust the Spanish government are conducted by the Spanish authorities, resulting into the arrests of Jose Albert, Salvador Vivencio del Rosario, and others.
Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long
United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station.
FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA,
HONGKONG,
APRIL 18, 1898.
Sir:
1. I have the honor to submit the following report of the squadron under my command from April 1st:-
2. The squadron, with the exception of the Monocacy, has remained at this port, keeping full of coal, provisions and stores.
3. The Monocacy has remained at Shanghai, and arrangements are being made by her Commanding Officer by which it is believed that he will be able to furnish coal and supplies to the purchased steamers at or near that port in case of hostilities.
4. On the 6th instant, in obedience to you orders, I purchased the British Steamer Nanshan of London, of 2200 gross and 1344 registered tons. She was built in 1896 and is in excellent condition. The purchase price was 32000 pounds sterling with the privilege of re-selling her within three months for 26000 pounds. She has on board 3000 tons of Cardiff coal which I had previously purchased.
5. On the 11th, the British Steamer Zafiro was bought for 18000 pounds sterling. She is 1062 gross and 675 registered tons, was built in 1884 and is in excellent condition. She has on board provisions for the squadron for two months and 660 tons of Cardiff coal. Both of these vessels have their bunkers full of Japanese coal for their own consumption.
6. On the 10th instant, Lieutenant B.W. Hodges, Ensign H.A. Pearson and Passed Assistant Engineer G. Kaemmerling with fifty men arrived having been transferred from the Monocacy by my offer. They are assigned as follows:
Lieutenant Hodges, with four men to the Nanshan.
Ensign Pearson, with four men, to the Zafiro.
Passed Assistant Engineer Kaemmerling to the OLYMPIA.
The rest of the men were distributed to fill vacancies temporarily in the vessels of the squadron.
7. The BALTIMORE arrived at Yokohama on the 11th instant. She was ordered to fill up with stores and best coal and proceed to Hong Kong immediately and sailed for this port on the 15th instant.
8. The revenue cutter McCULLOCH arrived on the 17th instant with orders for service with this squadron.6 She will be coaled and provisioned immediately.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
George Dewey
Commodore, U.S.Navy,
Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.
United States - Cruising Orders For The North Atlantic Squadron
U.S.F.S.NEW YORK,
Off Key West, Florida,
April 18, 1898.
CONFIDENTIAL.
1. The confidential “Memorandum for Commanding Officer”, containing instructions for blockade, is revoked and replaced by the following, and will be destroyed.
2. Until colliers are provided for the Squadron, only ports on the North coast of Cuba will be blockaded. The following distribution of the vessels of the Squadron is made for that purpose:
Off Havana. The New York, Iowa, Wilmington, Helena, Dolphin, Mayflower, Vesuvius, Ericsson, Porter, and such auxiliaries as may be designated.
Off Mariel. The Nashville, Castine, and auxiliaries to be designated.
Off Matanzas. The Amphitrite, Cincinnati, Dupont, Winslow, and auxiliaries to be designated.
Off Cardenas. The Newport, Machias, Foote, Cushing, and auxiliaries.
The Indiana, Marblehead, Detroit, and auxiliaries to be designated will form a division for special service.
The Terror, Mangrove, and Fern will remain at Key West.
Auxiliaries will be used as dispatch boats. A telegraph operator, with instruments, will accompany the fleet.
The ships detailed for Havana and Mariel will comprise the 1st Division.
The ships detailed for Matanzas and Cardenas will comprise the 2nd Division.
The ships intended for special service will form the 3d Division.
3. It will depend upon circumstances whether the torpedo boats, any or all of them, will accompany the Fleet upon its departure from Key West. They will, when attached to the Fleet, be attached to vessels for supplies, towing, etc., as follows:
Ericsson to the New York, Dupont to the Cincinnati,
Porter to the Iowa, Winslow to the Amphitrite,
Cushing to the Newport, Foote to the Machias.
During the day, and in rough weather at night, torpedo boats and other small vessels will seek shelter where available, under the approval of the Senior Officer Present, guarding with care against surprise or attack.
4. It is my intention to approach within sight of Havana with the entire force, and at that time or later to detach by signal the vessels designated to blockade Mariel, Matanzas, Cardenas, and for special service. The cruising order, upon leaving Key West, is appended.
5. When signal is made to get underway, the vessels inside of the reef will weigh and come out at [mob?], without regard [i.e., regard] to order, and as rapidly as the crowded state of the harbor and the safety of the navigation will permit. Upon getting clear of the reef they will steam to their approximate positions in the cruising formation while awaiting signal. The column of cruisers will form one mile to the Westward of the New York’s present berth, the Cincinnati leading, and heading S.S.E. S.S.W (1). The Cincinnati will not go further to the Southward than necessary to allow room for the formation.
6. All the cruisers, forming the starboard column, will reach their places by using starboard helm; i.e., after clearing the entrance buoy they will turn sharply to the Westward, will pass between the battleships and the reef, and will turn into column with starboard helm.
7. The scouts and torpedo boats will take convenient positions for following falling (2) into the stations assigned them when the formation is completed.
8. When the vessels are outside, the Flagship will make Signal 233, “Form in proscribed cruising order”, upon which the double column will be formed, and the scouts and torpedo boats will take their positions. The guide, distance, and interval of the ships in double column, and the speed and course of the fleet, will be signaled.
9. Upon arrival off Havana, or at a later time, the 2nd and 3rd Divisions will be detached by signal. The divisional distinguishing pennants, Plato VII (3), Tactical Signal Book, will be employed in making signals. When the 2nd Division is so signaled, the monitors will at once sheer out of column to the Eastward. The Cincinnati, followed by the Machias and Newport, will countermarch to the right, pass around the rear of the column of cruisers, and, increasing their speed, join the monitors. When the 3rd Division is detached, the Indiana will turn to the Eastward, and will be followed by the Detroit and Marblehead. When a division is detached it will be taken in charge of by its senior officers, to whom the vessels comprising it will look for signals. The senior officer will at once form his division in column, and will proceed to his station without further orders.
10. The Cincinnati and Nashville will repeat all signals, and will if not supplied with all distinguishing pennants, at once remedy that deficiency. The scouts will repeat signal which affect the torpedo boats.
11. On the blockade, during the day, the vessels assigned to each port will form a single line of patrol, and will patrol in front of, and on either side of the mouth of the port, for a distance sufficient to ensure the detection of any vessel attempting to run the blockade. The distances between the ships will be equalized, and the line of patrol will be established just beyond the range of the batteries.
At night, the vessels will close in around the mouth of the harbors. The torpedo boats will patrol as near the mouth as is safe; the cruisers will form a second line of patrol to seaward of the torpedo boats; and the armored ships will form a third line still farther to seaward, and will keep a bright lookout to avoid the attack of small vessels armed with torpedoes. When the weather and sea will permit, they will send out one or more picket boats on patrol duty.
When the port is not defended by heavy guns, the blockading ships will remain close inshore, observing the same general plan day and night.
During the night all lights will be screened. Every ship or boat will display the private signal when approaching another vessel.
12. Blockading stations off any port as indicated above, will be numbered consecutively from East to West, and will in number equal the number of vessels assigned to the blockade of that post, torpedo boats excepted, and will thereby vary from time to time, the entire line of blockade always being covered.
Vessels will be assigned to their stations by signal from the Senior Officer Present. Cruisers, which move in closer at night, will be considered as holding their stations on the same bearing from the blockaded port, but will somewhat extend their patrol for the purpose of better covering the heavy ships in the outside line.
13. The following new signals will be entered in the Tactical Signal Book:
253. Form in proscribed cruising order.
234. Take blockading stations as indicated by numeral signal.
14. Two Very’s red stars5 fired in rapid succession will indicate the discovery of an enemy’s or suspicious vessel. If the two red lights be immediately followed by a green one, it will indicate the discovery of torpedo boats. The same signal will be employed by all patrolling ships and boats. Paragraph 4, Circular Letter No. 5, of April 1st, 1898, is modified accordingly.
Very respectfully,
W.T. Sampson
Captain,U.S.N.,Com’d’r-in-Chief,
U.S.Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station.
Footnote 1: “S.S.E.” is crossed through and “S.S.W.,” meaning south southwest, is hand written in the margin.
Footnote 2: The word “following” is crossed through and “falling” is hand written as an interlineation.
Footnote 3: That is, Plate VII.
Footnote 4: A common type of flare gun. It was named for Edward Wilson Very, an American naval officer who developed and popularized this single-shot breech-loading snub-nosed pistol that fired flares.
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
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Post by oscssw on Apr 18, 2022 12:54:30 GMT
Later I will write something about how many American officers went insane or were rendered mentally unfit during this war, but that will have to wait. William Ruftus Shafter is one humdinger of a whack-job. miletus12, I can not speak authoritatively about the sanity of US Army officers of this period but I have read there were still a large % of senior ranks who were Civil War vets. Dementia might have played a part but more likely ,IMO, they were just too damn old for active wartime service and had nervous breakdowns.
I stand on firmer ground about the USN. The USN has always been known for the "Real characters (AKA Maniacs)" it produced, particularly in the "O" ranks. From Mad Jack Percival in 1799, to civil war hero Lt. Cushing, to Rear admiral Dan Gallery of WWII and let us not forget Vice Adm. Tim Giardinato.
I served under more than a "few" real "beauties". "Sundowner" martinets, really wild swings of temperament, lapses of judgement involving situations they had deal with many times before, vindictiveness carried to insane extremes. One who was carried ashore sedated after breaking down AFTER 70+ hours of conning his ship around the fringes a very bad typhoon Rose. Unlike Queeg, there was nothing wrong with his seamanship but his or nerves in the storm. Once he retired to his cabin he started to cry and it took a sedative from our doc to get him to stop temporarily. After that his paranoia was all to evident and became worse every day. He still made Rear admiral.
And then there was Captain USN John T. Stensrud III who stands out particularly clearly. 18 months aboard his "Mad House" of a DLG/CG matured/aged this mid 20's 2nd class RD, way beyond my years.  He was an absolute nut job who managed to totally terrorize his wardroom by persecuting a series of his officers and made the life of the enlisted crew a living hell because we never knew which "Stensrud" the martinet or the easy going skipper would be calling the shots this day. The only people he actually had liked were the Chiefs. They could do nothing wrong as far as he was concerned. While at sea, he actually spent much of his very limited free time in the Goat locker playing high stakes poker, drinking banned booze and generally just enjoying the comradeship of the Chiefs mess. Those Chiefs were very grateful and loyal to him. If any of his actions had come to the notice of the brass his career would have been over. The Chiefs made sure it didn't.
Long service, great responsibility and the hardships of the sea really do wear on a man (just look at the USN divorce rates) and those with relatively minor mental problems were, and probably still are, greatly stressed, which greatly enhances those flaws. It was, and probably still is a saying in the Nav, that "Sanity was NOT a requirement for promotion and in no way hampered a successful career in the USN ". You better "Fn" believe it.
If you want to read a very entertaining but quite realistic example of this I highly Recommend The Great Herman Wouk's "The Caine Mutiny". Wouk knew of what he wrote.
WOULD YOU LIKE TO KNOW MORE?
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Wouk joined the U.S. Naval Reserve in 1942 and served in the Pacific Theater during World War II, an experience he later characterized as educational: "I learned about machinery, I learned how men behaved under pressure, and I learned about Americans." Wouk served as an officer aboard two destroyer minesweepers (DMS), the USS Zane and USS Southard, becoming executive officer of the latter while holding the rank of lieutenant. He participated in around six invasions and won a number of battle stars. Wouk was in the New Georgia Campaign, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign, the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign, and the Battle of Okinawa.
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He was an absolute nut job who managed to totally terrorize his wardroom by persecuting a series of his officers and made the life of the enlisted crew a living hell because we never knew which "Stensrud" the martinet or the easy going skipper would be calling the shots this day. The only people he actually had liked were the Chiefs. They could do nothing wrong as far as he was concerned. While at sea, he actually spent much of his very limited free time in the Goat locker playing high stakes poker, drinking banned booze and generally just enjoying the comradeship of the Chiefs mess. Those Chiefs were very grateful and loyal to him. If any of his actions had come to the notice of the brass his career would have been over. The Chiefs made sure it didn't.