The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

Day 37 of the Spanish–American War, May 27th 1898

Cuba, Santiago de Cuba

US Navy, under Admiral William Thompson Sampson and Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, formally blockaded the port of Santiago de Cuba.

Hong Kong

United States Revenue Cutter Service cutter USS McCulloch having being dispatched to the closest cable facility, that at Hong Kong, bearing the first dispatches of the great US naval victory of Manila Bay departs Hong Kong with Emilio Aguinaldo, the Philippine revolutionary onboard.

At Sea - Captain Caspar F. Goodrich To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U.S.S.St.LOUIS,

At Sea, Lat. 37°43N.Long.72°16W.

May 27, 1898.

Sir:-

I have the honor to report that on the morning of May 20t and outside the marine league off Mole St. Nicholas, I broke the French cable to Cuba. If, as I have reason to believe,the second Jamaica cable is seriously damaged, the island of Cuba is now isolated, telegraphically speaking.

Off Tortuga that afternoon I spoke the U.S.S.St.PAUL and gave her Commanding Officer important information concerning the batteries of Santiago de Cuba, which I trust has proved of benefit to Commodore Schley4 who, I was given to understand, was bound there.

On the morning of the 22d, at daylight, I commenced grappling for the cable to the westward of Ponce, Porto Rico. The bottom along the south shore of that island is very irregular and rocky, requiring special apparatus which I do not possess. After opening out my last two grapnels I abandoned the attempt for the present, in the expectation of obtaining more definite information as to favorable points at which to attack this cable and of providing myself with suitable appliances. The evidences of uncharted dangers to navigation were but too evident, and I felt that it would be unwise to risk this ship in such places.

I continue to hope that on my return, I may be given, the Mangrove with her grappling outfit and a cruiser to drive off the smaller vessels of the enemy which,armed with better guns than mine,are able to interrupt the work. I venture to remind you,also,that cable grappling is a very slow and tedious operation,often necessitating repeated drives over the same ground. The good fortune which has attended our efforts so far is I am told,quite exceptional in cable practice,and is due in my opinion to the unusual skill of Chief Officer Seagrave.

I reached St Thomas May 23d, where I found your dispatch of the 21st and immediately left for NEW YORK. Personally I should have preferred to go to Hampton Roads,but a careful study of the questions of coaling which can be far more quickly completed at NEW YORK; of laying in the supplies needed for the next cruise,and especially of obtaining certain indispensable appliances for cable grappling more likely to be found in NEW YORK than elsewhere, left me no choice. I beg your approval of my decision.

Before this reaches you I hope to have received your instructions by telegraph and to have sailed to execute them. I am,Sir,

Very respectfully

C.F.Goodrich

Captain, U.S.Navy,

Commanding.

United States- Commodore Winfield S. Schley, Commander, Flying Squadron, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Cipher dispatch for Navy Department.

Received despatch of May 25th delivered by HARVARD off Santiago de Cuba. MERRIMAC’S engine is disabled and she is helpless; am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely unablex to coal the TEXAS, MARBLEHEAD, VIXEN and BROOKLYN from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West. BROOKLYN is the only one in Squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago in present state of coal account of the Squadron. Not possible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer weather owing to southwest winds. HARVARD justs reports to me she has only coal enough to reach Jamaica and she will proceed to Port Royal; also reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole Haiti. MINNEAPOLIS has only coal enough to reach Key West and same of YALE which will tow MERRIMAC. It is to be regreted that the Department’s orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West <via Yucatan Passage> for coal<.> Can ascertain nothing certain concerning enemy. Was obliged to send EAGLE to Port Antonio, Jamaica, yesterday as she had only 27 tons coal on board. Will probably leave St PAUL here. Will require 9500 tons of coal, at Key West.

SCHLEY.

Day 38 of the Spanish–American War, May 28th 1898

United States

General William Rufus Shafter, US Army, receives orders to mobilize his forces in Tampa, Florida for the attack on Cuba.

Philippines: Battle of Alapan

In Alapan, Imus, Cavite fierce fighting erupted at 10:00 o'clock in the morning and lasted until 3:00 in the afternoon, Emilio Aguinaldo attacked a garrison of 270 or more Spanish troops under the command of General Leopoldo García Pena, who commanded 2,800 men loosely scattered across Cavite. Upon hearing of Aguinaldo's return, a column of 500 infantrymen from Manila had rushed to reinforce Peña, but they were stopped in Laguna by a force commanded by Paciano Rizal and Pío del Pilar.

Back in Cavite. a combined force of over 6,000 men under Artemio Ricarte, Luciano San Miguel, Mariano Noriel, and Juan Cailles pressured Peña's troops around Cavite. At Alapan, they fought at rather close range, armed with bamboo cannons and Mauser rifles and fought with full force despite heavy Spanish resistance. However, they had much more ammunition than the Spaniards, and after five hours, the Spaniards ran out of ammunition and surrendered.

United States - Commodore Winfield S. Schley, Commander, Flying Squadron, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Cipher telegram for Sampson and Navy Department.

Collier now having been temporarily repaired and able to make six knots or seven, will endeavor to coal TEXAS and MARBLEHEAD in open sea and hold position off Santiago until coal supply of larger ships is [raised?] to lowest safe limit. Will then go to Gonaives or coast near, or in vicinity of Port au Prince to coal. Good opportunity occurring yesterday took a good quantity of coal on board TEXAS and MARBELHEAD about 25 miles west of Santiago which enables me to hold that place till coal is reduced so much as to force us over to Haiti coast to replenish. Two more colliers well fitted to report at Gonaives urgently needed to hastily coal all vessels when chances occur. Need also another auxiliary for picket work and for communication. I send YALE and MINNEAPOLIS Key West. ST PAUL still off Santiago. Repairs to MERRIMAC’S machinery being completed on board Flagship. Sigsbee on 26th captured British collier bound in with coal undoubtedly for fleet; collier had touched previously at San Juan, and Curacao.

SCHLEY.

Will Captain Wise put the above in cipher and send one to Department and one to Sampson.

Sgd W.S. Schley

Commodore, U.S.N.

Commander-in-Chief Flying Squadron.

I suppose Nelson Miles was upset that he was not allowed to plan his grand campaign against Havana and the ~140,000 Spanish troops waiting for him, but one must be thankful that it was the USN directing this war and not Russell Alger's merry band of bozos. I have no doubt that the American Regular Army, all hard professionals every one of them could do a number on an equal number of Spanish Tercios, but the mob assembled at Camp Thomas at Chicamauga, was exactly that... a MOB. They had less than two months camp presence, most of them, and if any of them had more than the rudiments of squad or company parade ground drill, then I would be quite surprised.

As for Schafter, he was selected for several "political" reasons.
a. He could "handle" African American troops, who made up a surprisingly LARGE % of the professional Regular Army COMBAT units.
b. He was a Republican.
c. He was not politically ambitious as Merritt and Miles were.
d. He would do what Alger or McKinley told him and ignore Nelson Miles.
e. He was not Nelson Miles.
Did this mean he knew what he was doing? No.

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See map. 



One can see immediately what Aguinaldo was after. He wanted to neutralize Dewey by sizing the anchorage and Spanish naval establishment at Cavite. 

In summary, Schley had been advised that he was in hot water with Long. Who got this message to him is unknown but we know it was probably is probably transmitted through the USS Saint Paul' Captain. Historians still argue over it. One thing is most definite. Schley assessed his needs as being 'three colliers', which means two additional ones to add to the defective USS Merrimac. This piece of nautical fraud, foisted on Schley, had originally been claimed of 5,000 tons of coal capacity and capable of 12 knots sustained speed. Its current service failure is directly attributable to its engines having never been properly repaired after the fire and scuttle that should have seen it written off and scrapped. Howsoever the fraud was perpetrated, Schley's engineers aboard the USS Brooklyn attempted to repack blown out gaskets and to fix the pipe joints and collars that caused the steam plant to only deliver 1/3 of promised rated horsepower.. The repairs as reported would of course not hold. 

As for Captain Sigsbee, under whose lax sloppy command, the USS Maine blew up...
(Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, another officer of irresolute and incompetent discernment. And yet they censured Schley. M.)

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  Given what Schley knew and what condition his command was in, that is no coal, in half ballast, and no reinforcements, his decision to linger at Cienfuegos was kind of risky. There was every chance that Cervera might have been coaled and ammoed up by our 'three helpful British friends' at Curacao or Santiago, and then Schley would have been up the creek without an oar or a working collier if Cervera showed up to the dance.  It is likely Schley would have won, but it would have been expensive. M. 

(The thing about Teddy Roosevelt, that many observers at the time recognized, was that he was a shrewd and calculating kind of man. It is possible that Teddy could have commanded the unit from the 'giddy-up' with his innate ability, but the ever-practical TR knew that he needed time to learn how to absorb what the American army had as its cavalry doctrine. As it will turn out, he would have done better to learn the infantry officer's syllabus. M.)  

Translation: Schley is not happy and he is making it known to his bosses:
a. Found Cervera and there is more of him than me.  
b. Have half the coal I need for battle. Where is the rest of it?
c. The USS Merrimac, that piece of junk, is at present a barge. We took her engine apart and are attempting to fix it and are putting it back together. I have no confidence that it will work. Where are the two colliers we asked to receive? 
d. We have no coal scuttles and USS Merrimac's transfer hoists are not the right type for cross coaling at sea.  
e. Sampson should be here, so this squadron can fix its current condition. Sampson should be here anyway. Where is he? 
f. I sent our most useless captain to find Sampson and communicate my current situation to him.  
g. Please send additional 'avisos' and 'scouts'. I am blind here. 
      
Love and kisses;

Schley

How does that make George Dewey feel right now? 

Bearing in mind, strictly what Dewey knows on the 29 May 1898...

a. Aguinaldo has hold of the anchorage and the 'only' working warship maintenance facility in Manila Bay by his control of Cavite. 
b. Dewey by now has 'visitors'. At least from 6 May 1898, the SMS Irene has made herself a nuisance. The British, French and the Japanese are interlocutating and sniffing for an opportunity to gobble up goodies. Aguinaldo is playing off one nation against another. US sources already know the Filipino leader has talked to the Germans and the British in Hong Kong.      
c. For now, George has to smile, smile and smile and sweat until reinforcements arrive. That is in his unknown future.    

 

On this issue *I am an expert, Steve. Chichester had specific instructions. If not British secured dependence, a la Egypt, then he was to make sure that the Germans did not get the archipelago. Much like British shenanigans and designs on Hawaii, there was the stench of "Empire" involved in his activities, even of his supposed support of Dewey, when the crisis with Diederichs came.

As for Aguinaldo and the Germans...     Aguinaldo would eventually turn tyrant and then traitor to the Filipino people.  

You see, Steve, George Dewey was quickly disabused of any illusions concerning Emilio Aguinaldo. The man was as slippery and twisty as a greased electric eel.

Except that a million Filipinos died under Japanese misrule out of about 10 million, Steve. Aguinaldo's claim was utterly bogus. He was a Marcos before there was a Marcos.  The only traitor worse was Jose P. Laurel.