The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

Day 11 of the Spanish–American War, May 1st 1898

United States

The iron-hulled steamship SS City of Peking is chartered by the US government for service as a troop transport, at the rate of $1,500 a day.

Cuba

"The message to García". US Army Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan, through the assistance of the US government, the Cuban Delegation in New York, and the mambises in Cuba, made contact with General Calixto García in Bayamo to seek his cooperation and to obtain military and political assessment of Cuba. This contact benefited the Cuban Liberation Army and the Cuban Revolutionary Army and totally ignored the Government of the Republic in arms.

Philippines: Naval Battle of Manila Bay

On arriving off the Philippine Island of Luzon on April 30, Dewey ordered a reconnaissance of Subic Bay by the Boston and Concord. After there were reports of gunfire coming from the direction of Subic Bay, Baltimore was sent to determine if the other ships had made contact. The reports were found to be in error and Spanish forces were not found in Subic Bay. On hearing the news, Dewey' commented to Commander Lamberton, his chief of staff, that "Now we have them!" The Asiatic Squadron's course was set for Manila Bay. In the meantime, Spanish Admiral Montojo received a telegram that evening notifying him that the Americans had reconnoitered Subic Bay, and had left, heading toward Manila Bay.

Painting: the U.S. battle line turning while in action, with USS Olympia leading



Aboard the American vessels, last minute preparations continued. The ships' crews continued throwing anything made of wood overboard, since the danger from splintering and fire was very serious. On board the Hugh McCulloch, virtually all of the mess tables were tossed into the water, leaving the crew eating off the deck for a long time after the battle. The same was true of almost all of the ships except for the OLYMPIA. Dewey, wisely or unwisely, left much of the wood intact, simply covering it with canvas and splinter netting. Many of the items to which the Olympia crew had direct access, were, however, thrown overboard. Sand was sprinkled on the decks for traction in battle.

There were two major channels which led into Manila Bay - Boca Chica and Boca Grande. Boca Chica was the main shipping route, however it was narrower and more heavily defended by shore batteries than Boca Grande. Boca Grande which, according to recent reports (suspected to be part of a Spanish disinformation campaign), was said to be dangerously rocky. Dewey believed the water to be deep in this area. Reports were also heard that this entrance to Manila Bay was mined. Dewey also discounted the rumors of mines stating the the report was probably untrue, and if it was true, that the Spanish did not have the capability to mine in deep water. Also, the Commodore believed that the mines, if placed, would deteriorate rapidly in the trpoical waters. Later, based on captured Spanish officers and records, indications were that Dewey was wrong in that the channel was mined. The mines, however, must have deteriorated, as Dewey's vessels, as well as subsequent visitors, reported no damage from mines.

The Asiatic Squadron steamed into Boca Grande at about 11:00 P.M. The men were at their guns, and the situation was very tense. All lights were out, except for one veiled stern light on each ship, to enable the vessels to follow one another. The men knew of the rumors of mines, of the reported shoals, and of Spanish shore batteries. They expected to meet a squadron ready for battle. They also knew that they were low on ammunition and seven thousand miles from resupply. What they did not know was the Dewey had also underestimated the number of Spanish vessels present.

Painting: the Spanish squadron



The vessels, with Olympia in the lead and Nanshan and Zafiro bringing up the rear, steamed past the little island of El Fraile. The island had a battery of guns taken from the General Lezo. When almost all of the American vessels were past El Fraile, flames shot from the Hugh McCulloch's funnel as some soot caught fire briefly. She had been supplied with Australian coal which did not burn as cleanly as the Welsh coal provided for the other vessels in the Squadron. Hugh McCulloch had experienced periodic flare-ups as the coal soot burned in her funnel. The battery on the island saw the most recent flame and opened up, sending a shot between the Raleigh and the Petrel. The Boston, McCulloch, Raleigh and Concord returned fire, and the battery fell silent. It has never been explained why the El Fraile battery did not put up more of a fight or fire earlier. The American vessels were plainly visible in spite of the darkness. Some claimed that there were not enough men present to man the fort's guns.

The gunfire from the El Fraile skirmish was heard in Manila. Montojo knew what it meant. At 2:00 a.m., he received a telegram confirming that the Americans had passed El Fraile. He notified army commanders, ordered all artillery loaded, and sent all soldiers and sailors to their battle stations. The Spanish waited. They had already removed masts, yards and boats to avoid splintering from the projectiles of the American guns, a major source of injury.

The Asiatic Squadron set off across Manila Bay with a goal of arriving at Manila, where Dewey expected to find the Spanish Fleet, at dawn. To meet this schedule, the squadron slowed to four knots. The men were given a chance to catch some sleep at their guns, if the tension of the situation would allow it. The crews on board the vessel saw flares, beacons, rocket and fires dot the shoreline as their movements were tracked. The Commodore sent signals to his squadron using his ardois lights....secrecy was no longer a possibility.

At 4:00 A.M., Montojo signaled his forces to prepare for action. At this same moment, coffee was being served to the men of the American squadron. At 4:45 A.M., the crew of the Don Juan De Austria spotted the American Squadron. Sending the Nanshan, Zafiro under protection of the Hugh McCulloch to a safer location in the bay, the Americans headed directly for Manila, where they expected the Spanish warships to be. This was a logical location since the strong shore batteries would greatly augment the firepower of the Spanish vessels. Not seeing anything but merchant vessels in the anchorage, the American vessels turned toward Cavite. At 5:05 A.M., the guns of the three of the Manila batteries opened fire. Only the Boston and Concord replied, since the limited ammunition was to be used against the Spanish fleet and not the forts. Montojo had the Reina Christina slip its cables and begin to move. To clear his path, he ordered several mines, which could have been a hazard to his ships, blown. Their explosions were spotted by the American crewmen. Dewey misinterpreted the reason for the reason for the explosion of the mines, commenting "Evidently the Spaniards are already rattled." The Squadron moved ahead in battle order - Olympia , followed by Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord and Boston at two hundred yard intervals.

Firing one of the Olympia's 5 inch guns The Americans finally spotted the Spanish vessels in their Cavite anchorage between Sangley Point and Las Pinas. At 5:15 a.m. the guns of the Cavite fortifications and the Spanish fleet opened fire. Dewey had his ships hold their fire until 5:40 A.M. Then, standing on the vessel's open bridge, he quietly told the Olympia's captain, "You may fire when ready, Gridley." The Olympia's forward eight inch turret fired. The other ships of the column followed suit. The Americans kept the Spanish vessels off their port bow during their initial attack, since this allowed the maximum number of guns on each ship to fire.

Though it was not obvious to the Americans, who noted that the damage to the Spanish vessels must not have been too great since the fire from their vessels did not slacken, destruction came quickly to the Spanish fleet. Montojo commented that the first three ships seemed to direct their fire mainly on his flagship, Reina Christina. Soon a shot hit her forecastle, put the crews of four rapid fire guns out of action, shattering the mast, and injuring the helmsman, who had to be replaced. Another shell set flew into the vessel's orlop deck, starting a fire which was rapidly put under control.

The American ships came in as close as they thought the depth of the water would allow, first passing the Spanish position from west to east, and then countermarching east to west. Five passes were made along the two and a half mile course by the Asiatic Squadron at a speed of six to eight knots.

Suddenly, around 7:30 A.M., Commodore Dewey had a rude awakening. Captain Gridley relayed a report that the vessel was down to only fifteen rounds of ammunition for each five inch gun. The five inch guns were the OLYMPIA's most effective gun, since they could fire much more quickly than the 8" turret guns. Fifteen rounds of ammunition could, under rapid fire condition, be expended in two minutes! Realizing that running out of ammunition could spell the end of his squadron, and not being able to determine the extent of the damage to the Spanish vessels amidst the smoke of battle, Dewey decided to withdraw to redistribute ammunition and assess the entire situation. To avoid having the Spanish realize his plight and give them additional reason to hold out longer, the commodore had the signal sent to his squadron that the ships were breaking off to allow the men time for breakfast. The men greeted this with consternation. It was later noted in the American press as an example of the nonchalance the Americans exhibited in the battle by stopping in the middle for a bite to eat, while still within range of the enemy's guns in their fortifications.

Very quickly, though, it was found that the report was in error. Instead, only fifteen rounds per five inch gun had been expended. This indicated that the men were showing unusual restraint by firing only after taking time to aim, and trying to make every shot count. A call went out for the commanders of the ships of the squadron to report their damage, casualties and ammunition status. The men, somewhat confused by this turn of events, ate and rested. The engine room crewscame up on deck to get away from the stifling heat below decks and survey the carnage which was becoming evident from the direction of the Spanish fleet.

During the morning's battle, twice the Olympia believed it was under attack from small torpedo boats. One of these it sunk, the other was run aground. Torpedoes were greatly feared weapons, because, with them a small vessel could conceivably sink a large vessel. However, the Spanish reports make no report of these attacks, and it now appears that these vessels, military or civilian, were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and were not torpedo boats.

Twice, near the end of the battle's morning phase, Spanish men-of-war had made attempts to close on the American squadron. First, the Don Juan De Austria attempted to charge the Olympia. The heavy gunfire of the fleet had forced her to abandon the effort. Shortly after this action, the Spanish Flagship, Reina Christina also tried to close on the Olympia, possibly to try to ram her. While making this attempt that the Reina Christina's steering gear was destroyed as she again became the focus of the galling fire of the American squadron.

Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Spanish fleet was already defeated when Dewey "broke for breakfast." Very close to the end of the morning's phase of the battle, the Reina Christina was hit by a number of projectiles. In addition to the shot that destroyed her steering gear, another shot, sadly, hit her in the area that was being used as a hospital, killing many already wounded men. One shot fatally hit a stern ammunition handling room, hampering further steering attempts, and resulting in the flooding of the nearby magazines. Fire broke out elsewhere while the broadside guns continued firing, though only one gunner and one seaman remained unhurt and able to work the guns. Half of her crew was out of action, and seven officers were lost. Montojo ordered the vessel scuttled, and tried to save his men.

The Spanish admiral transferred his flag to the Isla De Cuba. Now, in the lull of the American "breakfast break" he could survey the damage. The Don Antonio De Ulloa had been sunk, and half of her crew and her commander were put out of action. Some of her remaining crew may have stayed aboard refusing to abandon her. The Castilla had been set afire in the action and riddled with shot. She was abandoned and sunk, with a loss of 23 men killed and 80 wounded. The Iisla De Luzon had three guns dismounted, while the Marques Del Duero was "sadly cut up."

Montojo ordered the remainder of the fleet, those that could still maneuver, to retreat back into Bacoor Bay, fight on as long as possible, and then scuttle the ships before surrendering.

Dewey's guncrews had found their marks, in spite of actually hitting their targets only about one to two percent of the time. This hit rate was low, but not unusual in the period. . In fact, it was higher than the American hit rate at the later naval Battle of Santiago, a fact attributable to the Spanish vessels being generally stationary targets the Spanish, of course, hit their targets much less than the Americans.

Meanwhile, the reports from Dewey's subordinates began to arrive aboard the Olympia. The information was shocking. In spite of what seemed to be a strong Spanish barrage, there were no lives lost aboard the American vessels. Two officers and seven men were injured, most only slightly. Eight of the injuries were from a single hit on the Baltimore, with the remaining injury occurring aboard the Boston.

By 11:16 A.M., the lull was over. The Asiatic Squadron went back on the attack. It was now evident to the Americans that the Spanish fleet was ablaze and sinking. The Baltimore led the attack the second time, switching places in line with the flagship. She had been sent to intercept a vessel which turned out to be a merchant vessel, and was closer in to the enemy. As the remainder of the fleet was considerably behind her, the Baltimore requested and obtained permission to shell the Canacao Battery and Fort Sangley. The spirited exchange went on for ten minutes, with the Canacao and then Fort Sangley being silenced.

As the American ships got within range, some reports indicate that the crew that remained aboard the Don Antonio De Ulloa, already a wreck, may have opened fire. Whether this was indeed fire or merely the "cooking off" of ammunition is not clear. However, she was answered by the fleet, and savagely raked. The Spanish crew, if they were still on board, won the respect of the Americans for their bravery, and must have finally decided to abandon ship.

The Asiatic Squadron received orders from the flagship to break ranks. The Concord was ordered to destroy the beached Isla De Mindanao, mail steamer thought by the Americans to be a transport. The Petrel, because of her shallow draft, was ordered to perform the risky duty of proceeding into the shallow waters of Cavite to capture or fire any vessels there. After a few shots from her six inch guns, the forces on Cavite itself surrendered. The Petrel also captured the transport Manila and several smaller vessels.

The American losses were minor, consisting of nine men injured. In addition, Captain Gridley of the Olympia, already gravely ill, would pass away about a month after the battle, his condition worsened by his hours spent in the hot conning tower aboard Olympia that morning. Chief Engineer Randall of the Hugh McCulloch had passed away from a heart attack as the squadron entered Manila Bay, but may be considered a casualty of the battle also, since his condition may have been the result of the tension of the moment and the heat of the engine rooms.

The Spanish losses were much higher. Admiral Montojo reported a loss of 381 men killed and wounded as a result of the battle.

However, the battle was over. The Spanish vessels had been destroyed. Though the guns of the fortifications around Manila still had the power to sink the American squadron, the threat of a return bombardment of the city kept the guns silent. That evening, the USS Olympia Brass Band serenaded the crowds of people teeming along the Manila waterfront with a selection of music including many Spanish numbers, punctuated by continued explosions of ammunition aboard the still-burning Spanish vessels. It was an strange end to a strange day.

At sea - Commander Bowman H. McCalla To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U.S.S. MARBLEHEAD, 3rd. Rate,

At sea, Lat. 21° 42’ N.,

Long. 85° 08’ W., (1)

May 1st, 1898.

S i r:

I. I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your orders, the MARBLEHEAD in company with the Eagle sailed from the vicinity of Habana about ten A. M. of the 25th. ultimo, delivering the mail to the different vessels to the Westward of that city. I instructed Commander Maynard (2) of the Nashville that you had directed him to accompany the MARBLEHEAD and Eagle on the special duty of intercepting the Spanish transports Montserrat and Alicante which had left St. Pierre, Martinique, on the 23rd. ultimo for Cuba.

2. In consequence of an undiscovered deflection of the standard compass of about half a point (3), I had the misfortune to strand both the MARBLEHEAD and Eagle at 3:46 on the morning of the 26th., a special report of which I have submitted (4).

The Division was delayed twelve hours in consequence of the grounding above mentioned.

3. On the morning of the 27th. the Russian Barque Verandi of Wasa (5) was boarded and given a copy of the President’s Proclamation (6) concerning the blockade of Cuban ports, and the necessary entries were made on the Ships Register and Log Book (7).

On the afternoon of the same day the Norwegian Steamer Condor, of Bergen, from Cienfuegos to New York, laden with molasses and carrying Cuban refugees, was boarded and the necessary entries were also made on her Register and Log Book.

4. About 11 A. M. of the 28th. ultimo, arriving in the vicinity of the bank discovered by the Cable Steamer Silvertown, it occurred to me that the cable might possible have been laid on that bank, although it is usual to avoid shoal water for ocean lines.

I accordingly slowed down until the noon observations were in and the steamed slowly about the locality for an hour, expecting to find the shoal; but either the position of this shoal is not correctly laid down on the chart or else the strong currents in the vicinity effected our position, for it could not be located.

5. Not wishing to appear off Cienfuegos until the following morning, the Division steamed to the North East near to Munos Point, with the town of Trinidad in sight, perhaps fifteen miles away; and during the night of the 28th. to the Southward and Westward to clear Xagua Bank, standing in toward Trinidad at 2 A. M. of the 29th., thence steaming along the coast to the entrance to Cienfuegos.

6. Shortly after the arrival of the ships off the entrance, beyond the range of the shore batteries, a torpedo gunboat believed to be the Gallicia, came out from the inner harbor to a point abreast Punta de la Cocos.

Believing the movement of the torpedo gunboat might be an attempt to escape to the Eastward, the ships were placed so as to cover the entrance to the harbor, after which she steamed back into the harbor and disappeared behind Punta de Pasacaballos.

7. At 10:55, the Nashville having signalled that a steamer was in sight to the Westward, Commander Maynard was signalled to stop or chase the steamer.

This steamer proved to be the Spanish Steamer Argonauta of Cienfuegos, running along the coast between Batabano and Santiago de Cuba. On board were eight Spanish Officers and eight Spanish soldiers of the Army, and several men, four women and three children as passengers.

She was laden with provisions, Mouser rifles and ammunition and a general cargo, but a portion of which was entered in the Manifest of the steamer; Government Officials having at the last moment taken space for cargo which was not entered on the Manifest.

There were also twelve bags of mail which were transferred to the Nashville.

Ensign Kuensli (8) and a prize crew from the Nashville were sent on board and the civilian passengers, including the stewardess, with their baggage were sent into the harbor in two of the Argonauta’s boats. The Officers and men of the Spanish Army were sent on board the Nashville; the Officers and men of the steamer being retained on board to work her into port.

All those on the Argonauta were treated with the greatest courtesy, and nothing unusual occurred.

8. At about 12:10 P.M., wishing to obtain information with regard to the prize, the Commanding Officer of the Eagle (9) was directed to take his position off the mouth of the river while the MARBLEHEAD steamed towards the Argonauta about two miles away. The MARBLEHEAD had hardly reached the Nashville and prize before the Eagle signalled that the enemy’s torpedo boat was coming out of the harbor.

The MARBLEHEAD at once steamed towards the Eagle which shortly began to fire into the entrance, the Commanding Officer of the torpedo boat having placed himself close in to the Punta de la Cocos directly in front of a suburb, apparently, of Cienfuegos, which has been built about the castle shown above Placido Cove and on the heights to the Northward and Eastward of the old fort, first fired on the Eagle. When the MARBLEHEAD arrived in the vicinity of the Eagle, fire was opened on the Torpedo Gunboat which shortly afterward steamed in behind Punta de Pasacaballos. In finding the range of the Torpedo Gunboat some of the shell from this ship passed over her, two being seen to fall in the suburban town which I have mentioned. A short time after, the torpedo boat again came out from the inner harbor and lay close to the land, behind the point, next inside Punta de la Cocos. Two five inch shell were then fired in the direction from which the smoke from his funnel could be seen above the low land.

9. A battery on shore, supposed to be field guns, near Punta de la Cocos also opened fire on the ships, together with a guard of infantry at the light-house who fired their rifles at the Eagle.

10. I am pleased to report that there were no casualties, all of the shots from the enemy’s guns with the exception of two falling short, the two referred to passing over the MARBLEHEAD.

The Spaniards did good line shooting.

11. At 5 P. M. of the 29th. the Division left the vicinity of Cienfuegos for the fleet off Habana, the MARBLEHEAD having but sufficient coal to reach Tortugas or Key West without taking unnecessary risk under the circumstances, and the prize having only two days coal supply.

12. On the 30th. ultimo, believing that valuable information might be found in the official mail captured in the Argonauta, I directed Commander Maynard to steam at full speed to the flagship, in order that you might be in possession of this mail as soon as possible.

13. I need scarcely point out that Tortugas and Key West are far from Cienfuegos and that a blockading force will require coal nearer at hand, unless that force be sufficiently large to enable the ships to steam in succession to the distant base to refill their bunkers.

14. I have been informed that but one line of mines has been laid across the river between the extremities of the broken line on the Harbor chart showing the road from Habana to Trinidad; and that there are some six and eight inch modern guns at hand, but not yet mounted. It is also said that it was not the intention to put anther line of mines further out, but I give this information for what it is worth.

new battery could be seen on the high land North-North West of the castle previously mentioned, and with glasses two large guns seemed to have been mounted in embrasures.

15. In addition to the Gallicia it is reported that there are two old gunboats and elevan armed steam launches in the harbor of Cienfuegoes.

16. I regret to add that the Montserrat is reported to have arrived, and I believe with truth, in Cienfuegos Wednesday morning, the 27th. ultimo. If so, she must have steamed the distance from St. Pierre at fourteen knots, the speed assigned to her; and it would have thus been impossible for the MARBLEHEAD, Nashville and Eagle to have arrived in time to intercept that transport even had two ships not been stranded on the Colorado Reef causing a delay of twelve hours.

Very respectfully,

BH McCalla

Commander, U. S. Navy,

Commanding.

Footnote 1: With the exception of “At sea,” these two lines are handwritten.

Footnote 2: Cmdr. Washburn Maynard.

Footnote 3: An “undiscovered deflection” refers to the influence of local magnetic interferences that alter the compass from magnetic north.

Footnote 4: This report has not been found.

Footnote 5: The Swedish royal House of Vasa ruled Poland-Lithuania from 1587 to 1668. The name “Verandi” could not be located, however, in 1898 Poland and Lithuania were parts of the Russian Empire, hence the ship’s registry.

Footnote 6: See: President McKinley’s Proclamation of 23 April 1898.

Footnote 7: During the proclaimed Cuban blockade, vessels registered with in neutral countries were subject to search and U.S. naval officers made entries in Ship’s Register and Log Books regarding the disposition of the ship and its cargo. For more information see, Benton, International Law, 194-200.

Footnote 8: En. Henry C. Kuenzli.

Footnote 9: Lt. William H.H. Southerland.

Cuba - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Squadron, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S.Flagship New York,1st Rate,

Off Havana,Cuba,

May 1st,1898.

Sir:-

1. I have the honor to make the following report on the distribution and employment of ships for the month of April,1898:--

NEWYORK: Left Key West for Havana,Cuba,April 22nd,arriving off that port on the same day,and started blockade of the same. On April 27 ran down to Matanzas and shelled batteries,returning the same day to station off Havana. On the 29th steamed up the coast as far as Mariel and returned to station.

IOWA : April 22nd left Key West for Havana,Cuba,arriving off that port the same day. Was stationed in blockading Squadron off Havana.

INDIANA : April 20 went to Tortugas for coal,returning to Key West April 22nd,and on the same day left Key West for Havana,Cuba,arriving the same day. April 26th went to Tortugas for coal and rejoined Flag off Havana April 29th.

TERROR : April 1st was en route from Charleston to Key West arriving at the latter port on the 2nd. Joined Flag off Havana Cuba,April 23rd,and proceeded to blockading station off Cardenas.1

MONTGOMERY : Was at Norfolk until April 25th when she left that place for Key West, convoying the transport Panther.2

MARBLEHEAD : Was at Key West until April 23rd,when she joined the Flag off Havana, April 25th was sent to Cienfuegos to intercept transports.3

CINCINNATI : April 22nd left Key West for Havana,Cuba,and arrived there the same day. Proceeded to her blockading station off Matanzas on April 23rd.4

CASTINE : April 22nd left Key West for Havana,Cuba,arriving off that port on the same day. April 23rd assumed blockading station off Mariel.

WILMINGTON : At Jacksonville April 1st. April 9th left for Key West,arriving at that place on the 11th.

MACHIAS : Left Boston April 7th for Key West,arriving there the 15th. April 22nd left Key West for Havana,arriving off that port on the same day. April 23rd took blockading station off Cardenas.

HELENA : April 1st en route to Key West,arriving there the 6th. April 23rd left Key West for Yucatan Channel to intercept Spanish steamers.

SAMOSET : At Key West.

LEYDEN : En route to Key West arriving there on the 3rd with the barge EDITH HOWE.

DOLPHIN : April 16th arrived Key West. April 25th joined flag off Havana and was assigned to blockading station of Bahia Honda.

AMPHITRITE : April 8th arrived off Key West. April 22nd left Key West for Havana,arriving there the same day. Was assigned to blockading station off Matanzas April 23rd. April 26th went to Key West for coal,arriving there the following day. April 30th resumed station off Matanzas.

MANGROVE : April 23rd joined flag off Havana. Returned to Key West April 25th with the Spanish steamer PANAMA and for coal. April 29th rejoined Flag off Havana.

MC LANE : April 13th ordered to patrol duty from Key West to Sanibal Islands. April 14th arrived Punta Gorda and station.

NEZINSCOT : April 13th arrived Key West.

ALGONQUIN : April 13th arrived Key West.

MAYFLOWER : April 14th left Newport for Key West,where she arrived April 19th. April 22nd left Key West for Havana,arriving off that port on the same day. Was assigned to Havana blockading division.

HORNET : April 24th reported to Flag off Havana and was assigned to Havana blockading division.

EAGLE : April 25th reported to Flag off Havana Cuba,and was sent to Cienfeugos to intercept transports.

HAWK : April 25th reported to Flag off Havana,Cuba. April 26th was sent to patrol Yucatan Channel.

TECUMSEH : Reported to Flag off Havana, April 26th. Assigned to Havana division.

WOMPATUCK : Reported to Flag off Havana, Cuba. Very respectfully,

W.T. Sampson

Rear Admiral, Comdr.-in-Chief,

U.S.Naval Force on North Atlantic Station.