Operation Rädda Norge ("Save Norway") in 1945
Oct 14, 2021 14:55:51 GMT
stevep, ukron, and 1 more like this
Post by lordroel on Oct 14, 2021 14:55:51 GMT
So we know about Operation Rädda Danmark" (Operation Save Denmark) in 1945 but there was another oparation Seden planned, that was Operation Rädda Norge ("Save Norway"), a planned but never carried out Swedish military operation during the latter half of World War II.
Background
At the outbreak of World War II in 1939, there was no planning in Sweden to meet an attack from Norway. After Nazi Germany's invasion of Norway on April 9th 1940, such was hastily improvised. During 1941, it was projected from a military point of view that a German attack on Sweden would best be met with a counter-attack into Norway. However, this did not win the approval of the Defense Staff.
From the autumn of 1942, Germany was forced to withdraw some units from Norway to deploy them elsewhere. In order to be able to deploy the Swedish army in Norway in favorable cases, for example in connection with a possible allied landing in Norway, a new plan was drawn up. This was presented to the Minister of Defense Per Edvin Sköld on November 30th 1942 and was intended to apply from January 1st 1943.
The plan
The plan required the deployment of the main part of the Swedish army, whereby power would be gathered from Värmland and Dalsland in the direction of Oslo. Secondary attacks were also planned against Trondheim and Mo i Rana. The operation was planned to include the Norwegian Police Troops, which from the beginning of 1943 were trained in Sweden.
From a Reddit post called: Did Sweden facilitate/help the Germans in the German invasion of Denmark during WWII? And did the swedish government actively collaborate with the Germans, rather than bowing to superior force?
The Swedish legation (embassy in modern terms - before 1946, only grand powers had embassies led by ambassadors to each other, while smaller countries to each others and grand powers to smaller countries had legations or missions headed by envoys, ministers or chargé de affaires) in Germany reported in late Autumn 1944, especially the Military Attaché Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt, that Hitler was in such bad health that he could only focus for about 15 minutes in a stretch and that Göring was less and less interested in military matters and that Himmler now seemed like the strong man in Germany. Himmmler's masseur Kersten was a Swede, and he reported to the Swedish foreign ministry on the inner workings of Himmler and his closest associates when he visited Sweden, reinforcing these ideas. Himmler seemed like a man that would fight to the last rather than surrender, and the Swedish society and military would have to act in accordance with that.
Sweden had since mid-1943 trained roughly 17 000 Norwegian refugees as "Rikspoliti" ("Realm Police") and "Reservpoliti" ("Reserve Police"), in reality these so-called "police" formations were fully trained and equipped as regular Swedish infantry, including mortars, light AA guns, AT-gunsm machine-guns, submachine-guns and other small arms. By 1945, there were 8 "Rikspoliti" companies (motorised infantry heavily equipped with automatic arms along the line of Swedish military police) and 9 (with 1 more being set up) "Reservpoliti" battalions (regular infantry), plus support elements, 1 engineer company and 1 artillery battery (equipped with the 10,5cm guns the Norwegian 1. Division had brougth with them when they crossed the border to be interned in April 1940). In one sense the Norwegians were even better equipped than their Swedish counterparts - they had access to British PIAT infantry AT weapons, brought by the British (perhaps aptly names) Gay Viking class gun motorboats that crossed the North Sea Winter 1944-45 to bring back high-quality ball bearings from Swedish firm SKF.
Some of the Norwegian "Reservpoliti" battalions had already gone into action, as the Germans retreated away from Finns and Soviets in Finnmark in northern Norway. Fearing for the civilians and perhaps a possible Soviet occupation of the territory, the Norwegian government-in-exile requested that Sweden allow the usage of the "police" troops. Sweden accepted, and two "Rikspoliti" companies and two "Reservpoliti" battalions headed into Finnmark to restore order, protect the civilians and make sure both Germans and Soviets kept out. They were supplied by mostly American C-47 Dakotas from Luleå - using a depot that had ironically been used by the Germans to store horse fooder and food for their troops in Finland before.
With that as a background, let me get on to the actual operation.
Swedish military intelligence, C-byrån (the C-bureau) led by Colonel Carlos Adlercreutz had extensive contacts with the Norwegian resistance and civilian officials in Norway such as police men, administrators, toll officials, harbour pilots and clearers, railway officials and so on and had a very good idea on the strength of the German forces in Norway - it was estimated at 100 000 frontline troops and roughly 80 000 third line or rear area men, mostly Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe rear area personell. The real numbers were around 102 000 frontline troops and 206 000 third line or rear area men, for a total of 308 000. It seems like in what counts, the frontline soldiers, the Swedish intelligence was accurate.
Sweden also acquired information on the placement of German troops and the activity in the staff of the German commander in Norway Böhmer. As an example, when the German 25. Panzer-division in June 1943 moved from the Oslo area to the Trondheim area (before leaving Norway in August 1943), its new position shows up in Swedish staff reports 2 days after the movement finished. Böhmer seem to have held a kriegsspiel (war game) on a Swedish attack which turned up negative results for the Germans in NOrway on the 2nd of May 1945 - something which figures in the Swedish documentation on a possible invasion.
The Swedish miliary planning for a conflict with the Germans in Norway was initially extremely defensive, intending to use the sparse roads and dense forests to use Finnish Motti tactics against invading German forces. However, from early 1942 and onwards the planning also included an attack towards Mo-i-Rana, a port in northern Norway between Narvik and Trondheim, where Norway is at its narrowest, as it was both a decent port, connected by road to Sweden and close to impossible to reinforce by land for the Germans due to lack of infrastructure. The intention then was to open a port through which Western Allied support for Sweden could come through.
Churchill let Sweden know through the Swedish minister in Finland, Beck-Friis that an Western Allied action against the Germans in Norway was not possible due to the lack of tonnage for shipment in February 1945. If Sweden wanted to attack the Germans in Norway, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) was all for it, but could not promise any substantial support.
The Swedish plan included a 3-pronged attack against Oslo by III. MILO (Militärområdet, the Military Area) and 1. Armékåren (1. Army Corps) while II. MILO would launch an attack from Härjedalen towards the area south of Trondheim and VI. MILO attacked across the border to take Mo-i-Rana.
From north to south, the Swedish forces would be:
VI. MILO (attacking Mo-i-Rana).
1 infantry division (XV. Fördelningen), 1 infantry regiment (I19), 1 infantry battalion (II/I31), 1 Jäger/Special forces battalion (XIX. Kårjägarbataljonen), 1 corps artillery battalion (XII. Kårartilleridivisionen), 1 AA battalion (IX. Kårluftvärnsdivisionen) plus various support units, including 2 infantry companies, 1 AT company, 1 motorised military police company, 2 engineer companies, 3 road construction companies and 8 independend jäger/special forces platoons.
II. MILO (attacking south of Trondheim).
1 infantry division (II. Fördelningen), 1 infantry battalion (II/I44), 1 jäger/special forces battalion (V. Kårjägarbataljonen) plus support elements including 1 engineer company and 7 indpendent jäger/special forces platoons.
Armékåren (attacking towards Oslo from the east).
5 infantry divisions (Iv., XII., XIII., XIV. and XV. Fördelningen), 2 armoured brigades (each had 185 tanks), 1 assault gun battalion (18 assault guns), 5 corps artillery battalions (III., IV., VI., VII. and VIII. Kårartilleridivisionen), 3 AA battalions (Kårluftvärnsdivisionen Lv 1, II. and VIII. Kårluftvärnsdivisionen), 2 infantry battalions (I and III/I10), 1 jäger/special forces battalion (II. Kårjägarbataljonen) plus support elements including 5 motorised military police companies, 6 engineer companies, 14 construction/road building companies, 2 field replacement battalions, 12 field replacement companies and 6 independent jäger/special forces platoons.
III. MILO (attacking towards Oslo from the southeast).
1 infantry division (III. Fördelningen), 1 infantry battalion (I/I46), 1 corps artillery battalion (II. Kårartilleridivisionen), 1 AA battalion (VI. Kårluftvärnsdivisionen) plus support elements including 2 engineer companies, 3 construction/road building companies, 3 motorised military police companies, 6 field replacement companies and 5 independent jäger/special forces platoons.
Reserves
2 infantry divisions, 1 armoured brigade (with 185 tanks), 1 motorised brigade, 1 bicycle brigade, plus 6 motorised infantry companies and 7 infantry battalions from the Norwegian police troops.
This is roughly 250 000 men and 370 tanks, that was to be supported by the whole of the Swedish airforce, roughly 440 planes at this time. One should note that the Swedish forces while untested in real battle are well supplied, fresh, have a high morale and consists of the best recruits and with extensive tactical, operational and strategic mobility.
Background
At the outbreak of World War II in 1939, there was no planning in Sweden to meet an attack from Norway. After Nazi Germany's invasion of Norway on April 9th 1940, such was hastily improvised. During 1941, it was projected from a military point of view that a German attack on Sweden would best be met with a counter-attack into Norway. However, this did not win the approval of the Defense Staff.
From the autumn of 1942, Germany was forced to withdraw some units from Norway to deploy them elsewhere. In order to be able to deploy the Swedish army in Norway in favorable cases, for example in connection with a possible allied landing in Norway, a new plan was drawn up. This was presented to the Minister of Defense Per Edvin Sköld on November 30th 1942 and was intended to apply from January 1st 1943.
The plan
The plan required the deployment of the main part of the Swedish army, whereby power would be gathered from Värmland and Dalsland in the direction of Oslo. Secondary attacks were also planned against Trondheim and Mo i Rana. The operation was planned to include the Norwegian Police Troops, which from the beginning of 1943 were trained in Sweden.
From a Reddit post called: Did Sweden facilitate/help the Germans in the German invasion of Denmark during WWII? And did the swedish government actively collaborate with the Germans, rather than bowing to superior force?
The Swedish legation (embassy in modern terms - before 1946, only grand powers had embassies led by ambassadors to each other, while smaller countries to each others and grand powers to smaller countries had legations or missions headed by envoys, ministers or chargé de affaires) in Germany reported in late Autumn 1944, especially the Military Attaché Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt, that Hitler was in such bad health that he could only focus for about 15 minutes in a stretch and that Göring was less and less interested in military matters and that Himmler now seemed like the strong man in Germany. Himmmler's masseur Kersten was a Swede, and he reported to the Swedish foreign ministry on the inner workings of Himmler and his closest associates when he visited Sweden, reinforcing these ideas. Himmler seemed like a man that would fight to the last rather than surrender, and the Swedish society and military would have to act in accordance with that.
Sweden had since mid-1943 trained roughly 17 000 Norwegian refugees as "Rikspoliti" ("Realm Police") and "Reservpoliti" ("Reserve Police"), in reality these so-called "police" formations were fully trained and equipped as regular Swedish infantry, including mortars, light AA guns, AT-gunsm machine-guns, submachine-guns and other small arms. By 1945, there were 8 "Rikspoliti" companies (motorised infantry heavily equipped with automatic arms along the line of Swedish military police) and 9 (with 1 more being set up) "Reservpoliti" battalions (regular infantry), plus support elements, 1 engineer company and 1 artillery battery (equipped with the 10,5cm guns the Norwegian 1. Division had brougth with them when they crossed the border to be interned in April 1940). In one sense the Norwegians were even better equipped than their Swedish counterparts - they had access to British PIAT infantry AT weapons, brought by the British (perhaps aptly names) Gay Viking class gun motorboats that crossed the North Sea Winter 1944-45 to bring back high-quality ball bearings from Swedish firm SKF.
Some of the Norwegian "Reservpoliti" battalions had already gone into action, as the Germans retreated away from Finns and Soviets in Finnmark in northern Norway. Fearing for the civilians and perhaps a possible Soviet occupation of the territory, the Norwegian government-in-exile requested that Sweden allow the usage of the "police" troops. Sweden accepted, and two "Rikspoliti" companies and two "Reservpoliti" battalions headed into Finnmark to restore order, protect the civilians and make sure both Germans and Soviets kept out. They were supplied by mostly American C-47 Dakotas from Luleå - using a depot that had ironically been used by the Germans to store horse fooder and food for their troops in Finland before.
With that as a background, let me get on to the actual operation.
Swedish military intelligence, C-byrån (the C-bureau) led by Colonel Carlos Adlercreutz had extensive contacts with the Norwegian resistance and civilian officials in Norway such as police men, administrators, toll officials, harbour pilots and clearers, railway officials and so on and had a very good idea on the strength of the German forces in Norway - it was estimated at 100 000 frontline troops and roughly 80 000 third line or rear area men, mostly Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe rear area personell. The real numbers were around 102 000 frontline troops and 206 000 third line or rear area men, for a total of 308 000. It seems like in what counts, the frontline soldiers, the Swedish intelligence was accurate.
Sweden also acquired information on the placement of German troops and the activity in the staff of the German commander in Norway Böhmer. As an example, when the German 25. Panzer-division in June 1943 moved from the Oslo area to the Trondheim area (before leaving Norway in August 1943), its new position shows up in Swedish staff reports 2 days after the movement finished. Böhmer seem to have held a kriegsspiel (war game) on a Swedish attack which turned up negative results for the Germans in NOrway on the 2nd of May 1945 - something which figures in the Swedish documentation on a possible invasion.
The Swedish miliary planning for a conflict with the Germans in Norway was initially extremely defensive, intending to use the sparse roads and dense forests to use Finnish Motti tactics against invading German forces. However, from early 1942 and onwards the planning also included an attack towards Mo-i-Rana, a port in northern Norway between Narvik and Trondheim, where Norway is at its narrowest, as it was both a decent port, connected by road to Sweden and close to impossible to reinforce by land for the Germans due to lack of infrastructure. The intention then was to open a port through which Western Allied support for Sweden could come through.
Churchill let Sweden know through the Swedish minister in Finland, Beck-Friis that an Western Allied action against the Germans in Norway was not possible due to the lack of tonnage for shipment in February 1945. If Sweden wanted to attack the Germans in Norway, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) was all for it, but could not promise any substantial support.
The Swedish plan included a 3-pronged attack against Oslo by III. MILO (Militärområdet, the Military Area) and 1. Armékåren (1. Army Corps) while II. MILO would launch an attack from Härjedalen towards the area south of Trondheim and VI. MILO attacked across the border to take Mo-i-Rana.
From north to south, the Swedish forces would be:
VI. MILO (attacking Mo-i-Rana).
1 infantry division (XV. Fördelningen), 1 infantry regiment (I19), 1 infantry battalion (II/I31), 1 Jäger/Special forces battalion (XIX. Kårjägarbataljonen), 1 corps artillery battalion (XII. Kårartilleridivisionen), 1 AA battalion (IX. Kårluftvärnsdivisionen) plus various support units, including 2 infantry companies, 1 AT company, 1 motorised military police company, 2 engineer companies, 3 road construction companies and 8 independend jäger/special forces platoons.
II. MILO (attacking south of Trondheim).
1 infantry division (II. Fördelningen), 1 infantry battalion (II/I44), 1 jäger/special forces battalion (V. Kårjägarbataljonen) plus support elements including 1 engineer company and 7 indpendent jäger/special forces platoons.
Armékåren (attacking towards Oslo from the east).
5 infantry divisions (Iv., XII., XIII., XIV. and XV. Fördelningen), 2 armoured brigades (each had 185 tanks), 1 assault gun battalion (18 assault guns), 5 corps artillery battalions (III., IV., VI., VII. and VIII. Kårartilleridivisionen), 3 AA battalions (Kårluftvärnsdivisionen Lv 1, II. and VIII. Kårluftvärnsdivisionen), 2 infantry battalions (I and III/I10), 1 jäger/special forces battalion (II. Kårjägarbataljonen) plus support elements including 5 motorised military police companies, 6 engineer companies, 14 construction/road building companies, 2 field replacement battalions, 12 field replacement companies and 6 independent jäger/special forces platoons.
III. MILO (attacking towards Oslo from the southeast).
1 infantry division (III. Fördelningen), 1 infantry battalion (I/I46), 1 corps artillery battalion (II. Kårartilleridivisionen), 1 AA battalion (VI. Kårluftvärnsdivisionen) plus support elements including 2 engineer companies, 3 construction/road building companies, 3 motorised military police companies, 6 field replacement companies and 5 independent jäger/special forces platoons.
Reserves
2 infantry divisions, 1 armoured brigade (with 185 tanks), 1 motorised brigade, 1 bicycle brigade, plus 6 motorised infantry companies and 7 infantry battalions from the Norwegian police troops.
This is roughly 250 000 men and 370 tanks, that was to be supported by the whole of the Swedish airforce, roughly 440 planes at this time. One should note that the Swedish forces while untested in real battle are well supplied, fresh, have a high morale and consists of the best recruits and with extensive tactical, operational and strategic mobility.
