Post by simon darkshade on Jul 29, 2021 6:11:06 GMT
This is the original text of the quite influential Sandys White Paper which lead to quite a lot of aircraft project cancellation; it is interesting to note that such matters do not take up a large amount of the original paper.
1. Introduction
Britain's defence policy must be radically revised. This has become
necessary on economic, international and military grounds.
2. Effect on Economy
(a) Britain's position and influence in the world depend first and foremost
upon the health of her internal economy and the success of her export trade.
Without these, military power is of no avail and in any case cannot in the
long run be supported. It is therefore as much in the interests of defence
as of prosperity that the country's financial and commercial position should
be consolidated.
(b) At present about a quarter of the nation's graduate scientists and
engineers, and about 7 per cent, of the working population, are engaged on
defence. The release of some proportion of these would clearly benefit the
national economy.
(c) The level of exports is still too low to provide the reserves necessary
to assure the stability of sterling. Moreover, unless more capital can be
spared for the modernisation and re-equipment of industry, British
manufacturers will have increasing difficulty in competing in overseas markets.
If the country's productive capacity is to be expanded, it is an inescapable
necessity that defence expenditure, along with Government expenditure of all
kinds, should be reduced to a level which does not place an excessive burden
on the economy.
3. Scientific Advances
(a) In recent years, military technology has been making dramatic strides.
New and increasingly formidable weapons have been succeeding one another
at an ever-increasing pace.
(b) Within a decade the atom bomb dropped at Hiroshima has been
superseded by a hydrogen or megaton bomb hundreds of times more
powerful.
(c) Parallel with this, the evolution of rocket weapons has been forging
ahead. It is now only a matter of a few years before there will be missiles
steered by electronic brains capable of delivering megaton warheads over a
range of 5,000 miles or more.
(d) These sensational scientific advances in methods of waging war have
fundamentally altered the whole basis of world strategy.
4. Military Alliances
(a) The defence problem has also been materially altered by the
progressive consolidation of NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and
by the recent announcement of a more positive American policy in the
Middle East.
(b) The effect of these international developments is to make it most
unlikely that Britain could become involved in a major war except in
association with allies, including the United States of America. In
determining the size and character of the armed forces, full account must be
taken of this fact.
5. Long-Term Planning
(a) Frequent changes in defence policy are wasteful and disturbing and
must as far as possible be avoided.
(b) Experience has shown that the rapid advance of scientific development
and the continual fluctuations in the international situation make it difficult
to forecast future military requirements with any certainty. Nevertheless, an
attempt must be made to establish a broad but flexible framework, within
which long-term planning can proceed.
(c) This long-term plan should provide for the armed forces being
equipped with the most modern weapons. This means that they must be
small enough for the cost of these weapons to be within our means.
6. Tasks of Armed Forces
(a) Any new defence plan, if it is to be effective and economical, must
be based on a clear definition of the military tasks to be discharged. This
cannot be founded exclusively on considerations of purely national security
or interest, since the safety and well-being of this country are indissolubly
linked with those of other nations.
(b) Britain's armed forces have two principal roles to perform:
(i) to play their part with the forces of allied countries in preventing war
and in resisting aggression; and
(ii) to defend, and preserve order in, British colonies and protected
territories.
(c) Since the first and more exacting of these tasks is part of a joint effort,
Britain need not necessarily contribute forces which are self-sufficient and
balanced in all respects.
7. Nuclear Deterrent
(a) Though the Hunters and Javelins of the Royal Air Force would, in
the event of war with Russia, be able to take a substantial toll of Soviet
bombers, a proportion would inevitably get through. Even if it were only a
dozen, they could, with hydrogen bombs, inflict widespread devastation and
might well blot out a large part of the population of the big cities. It must
be frankly recognised that fighters cannot give the country as a whole any
effective protection against the catastrophic consequences of nuclear attack.
(b) Clearly therefore the central aim of military policy must be to prevent
war rather than to prepare for it. In present circumstances the only way to
deter nuclear aggression is to possess the means of retaliating in time.
(c) Now and in the foreseeable future, the free world is almost wholly
dependent for its protection upon the nuclear power of the United States.
While Britain cannot by comparison make more than a modest contribution,
she must possess an element of nuclear deterrent of her own.
id) British atomic bombs are in steady production and the Royal Air
Force holds a substantial stock of them. A British megaton weapon has now
been developed. This will shortly be tested and will thereafter be put into
production.
(e) The means of delivering these weapons is provided by medium
bombers of the V-class. These will in due course be supplemented and
later replaced by ballistic rockets.
[(f) Her Majesty's Government have accepted an offer from the United
States Government to provide Britain with a substantial number of medium range
ballistic rockets of the THOR type, which is now in an advanced
stage of development.]
8. Defence of Deterrent
(a) Since peace depends upon the effectiveness of the deterrent, it is
essential that any would-be aggressor should not imagine he could readily
knock out the bomber or rocket bases. Though great cities cannot at
present be protected against nuclear attack, the defence of the very much
smaller target presented by an airfield is an altogether more manageable
task. There is every reason to believe that fighters would be able to interfere
sufficiently with enemy bombers for the short time needed to enable the
retaliatory force to take off.
(b) The Government have accordingly decided that air defence must be
provided for the nuclear deterrent. A manned fighter force of adequate
size for this purpose will be maintained. This will later be replaced by a
ground-to-air guided missile system. In order to gain experience it is
proposed to deploy a small number of guided missile units, equipped with
the first British weapons of this kind, starting in 1958.
(c) There are grounds for hoping that it may ultimately prove possible
to devise missile defences even against attack by ballistic rockets. Research
on this problem, in collaboration with the United States Government, is
being intensified.
9. Forces in Germany
(a) The power of nuclear retaliation is not enough by itself to prevent
war. The frontiers of the free world, and particularly the vital land frontier
in Europe, must be guarded.
(b) The defences must be strong enough to show that any aggression
would be met at once by the combined forces of the Western Alliance, backed
by their ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons.
(c) Britain must provide her fair share of the armed forces needed for this
purpose. However, she cannot any longer continue to make a
disproportionately large contribution. The defence expenditure of this
country has been higher, in relation to national, income, than that of any
other member of NATO, except the United States, and nearly twice as high
as the average of the other countries in Europe.
id) Her Majesty's Government have, therefore after due consultation with
the Allied Governments in the North Atlantic Council and in the Council of
the Western European Union, decided to make reductions in the British land
and air forces on the Continent. The strength of the British Army of the
Rhine will be reduced from about 77,000 to about 50,000. The organiisation
of this force will be streamlined in such a way as to increase the
proportion of fighting units, the total strength of which will be reduced
by not more than 10,000. At the same time, they will shortly be equipped
with atomic rocket artillery, which will gready augment their fire-power.
In addition, two Infantry Brigades in Britain will be earmarked for despatch
to the Continent by air, if needed; and vehicles and equipment for them will
be kept in Germany. This redeployment will be carried out gradually over
the next 1 years, during which time the German military contribution to
NATO will be progressively building up.
(e) The strength of the Second Tactical Air Force in Germany will be
reduced to about half its present size by the end of March, 1958. This
reduction in numbers will be counter-balanced by the fact that some of the
squadrons will in due course be provided with atomic bombs. A similar
reduction will be made in the light bomber force in England, which is
assigned to NATO.
10. Reinforcements for SACEUR
(a) In a nuclear war, it can be expected that fighting on land and in the
air would reach its climax within a few days. Consequently, reinforcements
which could not be rapidly put into the battle would be of little military
value.
(6) Under present plans, Britain is due to provide two Territorial Army
Divisions as reinforcements for NATO. Since these certainly could not be
ready for action on the Continent in less than three months, the Government
consider that it would be more appropriate to assign them to home defence
duties and to train and equip them for that purpose alone.
(c) Before any decision is taken the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
and the North Atlantic Council will of course be consulted.
11. Middle East
(a) Outside the area covered by the North Atlantic alliance, Britain has
vital interests in two other theatres, the Middle East and South-East Asia.
Apart from the importance of the Middle East itself, it is the key to the right
flank of NATO and is the gateway to the African continent.
(6) In the Middle East, she has two major commitments. The first is
in the Arabian Peninsula, where British forces must at all times be ready to
defend Aden Colony and Protectorates and the territories on the Persian
Gulf for whose defence Britain is responsible. For this task land, air and
sea forces have to be maintained in that area, including East Africa.
(c) Britain's other major commitment in the Middle East arises from her
membership of the Baghdad Pact. Under this treaty she has an obligation
to co-operate with the other signatory states, in defending their territories and
in preventing Communist encroachment and infiltration. In the event of
emergency, all British forces in that area would be made available to support
the Baghdad Alliance. They would consist of the forces in the Arabian
Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, referred to above, and of bomber squadrons
operating from Cyprus. The latter would be capable of delivering a heavy
counter-blow with nuclear weapons.
(d) Apart from local garrisons, it is not proposed in the long term to
maintain land forces in the Mediterranean area. Should it be necessary to
provide further support for the Baghdad Alliance it will be found from the
Central Reserve.
(e) Following upon the termination of the Treaty with Jordan, British
forces will be withdrawn from that country, and Britain will be relieved of
the responsibility of defending Jordan in the event of attack.
(f) The British forces in Libya will be progressively reduced.
12. South-East Asia
(a) In South-East Asia, apart from her responsibility for defending her
colonies and protectorates, Britain has agreed to assist in the protection of
Malaya after she attains independence.
ib) In addition, Britain has an international commitment, as a member
of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, to help maintain stability and
resist the extension of Communist power in that area.
(c) The land forces that are being maintained in this theatre include a
mixed British-Gurkha division and a United Kingdom contribution of about
two battalions to the Commonwealth Reserve Brigade. Small naval and air
forces will also be maintained there.
id) The remainder of the brigade is provided jointly by Australia and
New Zealand. With the steady growth in their population and economic
strength, it is reasonable to expect that, as time goes on, they will wish to
assume an increasing share of responsibility for the defence of this area
which is so vital to them.
13. Overseas Garrisons
(c) Britain has the responsibility for providing numerous garrisons for
her colonies and protected territories. This is making large demands on
military manpower. [There are. in fact, nearly 150,000 men of the Army
and the R.A.F. serving overseas in countries other than Germany.]
(b) The Government have come to the conclusion that these forces could
be reduced. Responsibility for assisting the civil power in the maintenance
of internal security is being increasingly assumed by colonial forces. With
the ability to reinforce rapidly in an emergency, the garrisons can be reduced
to those immediately necessary for purely local defence where a threat exists
requiring their presence.
14. Central Reserve
(a) With the reduction in size of garrisons and other British forces
overseas, it will be more than ever essential to maintain in Britain an
effective Central Reserve, from which reinforcements can be despatched at
short notice.
(b) To be effective the Central Reserve must possess the means of rapid
mobility. For this purpose, a substantial fleet of transport aircraft is being
built up in R.A.F. Transport Command. It will be composed mainly of
Comet IPs, Britannias and Beverley freighters. These Service transport
resources would be supplemented, when necessary, by suitable civil aircraft.
Naval resources would also be used for this purpose.
(c) Should an overseas emergency develop which calls for larger
reinforcements than can be provided from the Central Reserve in Britain,
the additional troops needed might have to be transferred from Germany.
The right to do this is specifically provided for in the Paris Agreements of
October 1954.
15. Naval Power
(a) On account of its mobility, the Royal Navy provides an effective means
of bringing power, in particular air power and Royal Marine units, rapidly to
bear in peacetime emergencies or limited hostilities. As the number of
Britain's overseas bases is reduced, the role of the aircraft carrier, which is
in effect a mobile air station, becomes increasingly significant.
(b) With this consideration in mind, it is proposed to base the main
elements of the Royal Navy upon a small number of carrier groups. Each
of these will be composed of one aircraft carrier and a number of supporting
ships.
(c) Apart from the aircraft carriers, the number of large ships will be
restricted to the minimum. The number of cruisers in the active fleet will
be reduced and replaced by ships of the Tiger Class and guided weapon
vessels. The four older battleships now in reserve will be scrapped. The
future of H.M.S. Vanguard will be discussed with NATO. Reductions will
also be made in the various classes of smaller vessels.
(d) It is the Government^ intention to maintain British naval strength
East of Suez at about its present level. One carrier group will normally be
stationed in the Indian Ocean and a small force at Singapore. Thus the
proposed reductions will primarily affect the forces in peacetime in Home
Waters and in the Mediterranean.
(e) While there can be no doubt about the value of sea power in localised
emergencies, the role of naval forces in total war is uncertain. It may well
bs that the initial nuclear bombardment and counter-bombardment by aircraft
or rockets would be so crippling as to bring the war to an end within a few
weeks or even days, in which case naval operations would not play any
significant part. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the nuclear
battle of the opening phase might noi prove immediately decisive. In that
event, Russia's large fleet of ocean-going submarines would constitute a
formidable threat.
(/) So long as this uncertainty remains, Britain must continue to be
vitally concerned in keeping open her Atlantic life-line; and it is, therefore,
right that she should make her contribution to the maritime forces of NATO.
What that contribution should be is a matter which will have to be discussed
with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance.
16. Headquarters and Rearward Services
(A) The more the overall strength of the forces is reduced, the more
important it is to prune to the utmost the elements which do not directly
contribute to fighting capacity.
(Jb) The Service Departments and Ministry of Supply are engaged in a
further intensive drive to reduce administrative overheads of all kinds, and
in particular to cut down the numbers of headquarters and the size of staffs,
both military and civilian.
(c) Economies will also be sought by eliminating duplication between the
Services on common tasks such as signal communications, and by reducing
the number of men serving in depots and base installations.
(d) To make this possible, it will be necessary to concentrate work in a
smaller number of establishments and to curtail greatly the holdings of
stores.
(e) Consideration will also have to be given to the larger problems of
integration which will emerge as the size of the forces comes down.
(f) These examinations will be carried out under the direction of the
Ministry of Defence.
17. " Civilianisation "
(a) It is generally accepted that it is more efficient and economical to
employ civilians to perform civilian tasks; and every endeavour will be made
to extend the application of this principle.
(b) The Service Departments are reviewing their establishments, with the
object, wherever possible, of reducing uniformed personnel on duties such as
store-keeping, accounting, repair and maintenance of equipment, policing and
catering, by increased use of directly employed civilians or civilian contractors.
(c) By these methods it should be possible to reduce substantially the
number of uniformed staff required.
18. National Service Training
(d) The measure which by itself would produce the largest saving in
overheads would be the abolition of National Service.
(b) National Service is an efficient method of producing large numbers
of trained reserves against a possible emergency and was originally designed
mainly for this purpose. It is, however, an expensive and inefficient, but
hitherto unavoidable, method of manning active forces.
(c) The shorter the period of service, the more men are occupied in
training or being trained. There are at present no less than 75,000 men in
the Army alone in training establishments in the United Kingdom.
19. Reduction in Size of Forces
(a) The reshaping and redistribution of the armed forces, on the general
lines indicated above, will greatly reduce the military manpower required.
(b) The total strength of the three Services to-day is about 700,000*.
The revised plan aims to reduce the forces to not much more than half their
present size over the next few years. Provided that commitments are
curtailed in the manner indicated above, the Government believe that Britain
should be able to discharge her essential defence responsibilities with
reduced forces of this size.
(c) That assumes that they could be recruited on an all-regular basis and
that the heavy overheads of National Service would be eliminated.
20. Regular Enlistment
(a) So long as it was felt necessary to maintain the strength of the Services
at anything approaching their present level, it would have been unrealistic
to imagine that such large numbers of men could be obtained wholly by
voluntary enlistment. However, the big reduction in the demands on
manpower, which will result from the revised defence plan, now makes it
reasonable to contemplate the possibility of putting the armed forces on to
an all-regular footing.
(Jb) The Government accordingly propose to take positive action to
encourage recruiting. In particular, they will endeavour to make Service
conditions more agreeable; and, despite the general need for economy, they
will press ahead with further measures tp secure this end. Barrack accommodation
will be modernised. Better recreational facilities will be provided.
The number of married quarters will be increased. The standard of Service
rations will be raised with effect from April 1st next. Methods of improving
the Serviceman's prospect of good employment on his return to civilian life
are also being considered. In these and other ways, it is hoped to make
a career in the Services more attractive for all ranks.
(c) In order to waste no time in building up the Regular element in the
forces, the recruiting campaign will be intensified and more money will be
provided in the coming year for this purpose.
21. National Service
(a) There is undoubtedly a general desire in the country to see National
Service abolished as soon as this is practicable, consistent with the needs of
defence; and that is the Governments declared aim.
(b) Even with the reductions in manpower requirements resulting from
the new plan, it is not going to be easy to go over to all-regular forces. The
task of bridging the gap between the present long-service regular element and
the minimum strength required is a formidable one.
(c) There are less than 260,000 long-service regular other ranks in the
forces to-day; and the number of these in the Army is only about 80,000.
It is true that there are in addition over 100,000 men on three-year
engagements. But it must be recognised that a large number of these would
* This figure relates to adult male uniformed United Kingdom personnel.
not have enlisted had it not been for their liability to National Service and
that, with the abolition of National Service, the three-year engagement would
lose much of its appeal.
(d) There are so many uncertain factors that it is impossible to predict
with confidence the future level of recruitment. However, with sufficient
improvement in conditions of service, the Government believe there is a
reasonable prospect of increasing the rate of regular enlistment sufficiently to
make it unnecessary to call up any further National Servicemen after 1960;
and they have accordingly decided to plan on this basis.
(e) It must be, however, emphasised that, should there be any serious
shortfall below the much reduced numbers now planned, the Services would
be unable to discharge their essential defence tasks, and the position would
clearly have to be reconsidered.
(f) While regular recruitment is building up and the size of the forces
is being run down, the men becoming available for National Service will,
to a growing extent, exceed the numbers required. It will therefore be
necessary during the period of transition to reduce progressively the size of
the intake. Every effort will be made to ensure that this is done in as fair
and reasonable a manner as possible.
22. Civil Defence
(a) Passive preparations for nuclear war must take second place to active
measures to prevent it; and expenditure on civil defence must as far as
possible be curtailed. Nevertheless, plans must be made to enable organised
society to survive.
(b) The civil defence services will be maintained, and will be supplied
with adequate equipment for training. The work of strengthening essential
communications will continue. Research and planning will go forward.
23. Expenditure
(a) The Defence Estimates for the year 1956/57 amounted to about £1,600
million, before deducting receipts from the United States and Germany. Had
the programme as planned a year ago been allowed to continue unchanged,
the figure for 1957/58 would have risen to about £1,700 million.
(b) However, as a result of strenuous efforts to effect economy, it has been
found possible to keep the defence estimates for the coming year down to a
total of £1,484 million. From this must be deducted receipts from Germany
and the United States, which are expected to amount to about £50 million and
£10 million respectively. Thus the net estimate of total defence expenditure
for the year 1957/58 will amount to about £1,424 million.
(c) This large saving has been secured by various measures, including in
particular a substantial reduction in the overall strength of the forces, the
cutting down of production orders and purchases of stores and some pruning
of the research and development programme.
(d) It is not as yet possible to forecast the level of expenditure in later
years. It should not however be expected that it will show a decline in any
way comparable with that in the manpower strengths of the forces. This
is primarily due to the ever-increasing complication of modern weapons and
equipment, the higher cost per man of regular forces and the fact that
proportionately more civilians will be employed. Nevertheless, it can safely
be assumed that the new plan, when it is fully implemented, will further
appreciably reduce the burden on the economy. Above all, it will release for
productive employment in industry several hundred thousand men, including
many badly needed scientists and technicians.
24. Effects of Contraction of Forces
(a) Any large change—and this will be the largest change in defence policy
ever carried through in normal times—must mean some temporary
dislocation. It will not be possible for the level of work in all factories,
dockyards, depots and establishments to be maintained; and some will have
to be closed. Where this happens the Government will do everything possible
to help those displaced to find other employment [and to see that the resources
set free are put to productive use.]
(b) The new plan will mean many changes in the Services, but the
fundamental traditions will be maintained.
(c) With so large a contraction of the forces some units will have to be
disbanded, and the services of some regular officers and N.C.O.'s will have
to be terminated. Those whose Service careers have to be terminated will
receive fair compensation and will be helped in every possible way to find
suitable employment in civil life.
(d) Plans are being prepared for the different ranks and branches of each
Service, which will be designed to provide good long-term careers for all who
join the new all-regular forces.
25. Conclusion
(a) The Government have adopted this new defence plan in the confident
belief that it will not only give relief to the country's sorely strained economy,
but will produce compact military forces of the highest quality.
(b) All three Services will be provided with the newest weapons. The
reduced Fleet will be composed of the most modern vessels; the Army will be
equipped with atomic artillery and given a high degree of strategic mobility;
the Air Force will be supplied with a British megaton bomb; a missile system
of air defence will be developed; and ballistic rockets will be introduced to
supplement the V-bombers.
(c) Standards of training and efficiency will be attained such as are
possible only in an all-regular force. The aim will be to produce long-service
professional forces of the highest quality and standing.
1. Introduction
Britain's defence policy must be radically revised. This has become
necessary on economic, international and military grounds.
2. Effect on Economy
(a) Britain's position and influence in the world depend first and foremost
upon the health of her internal economy and the success of her export trade.
Without these, military power is of no avail and in any case cannot in the
long run be supported. It is therefore as much in the interests of defence
as of prosperity that the country's financial and commercial position should
be consolidated.
(b) At present about a quarter of the nation's graduate scientists and
engineers, and about 7 per cent, of the working population, are engaged on
defence. The release of some proportion of these would clearly benefit the
national economy.
(c) The level of exports is still too low to provide the reserves necessary
to assure the stability of sterling. Moreover, unless more capital can be
spared for the modernisation and re-equipment of industry, British
manufacturers will have increasing difficulty in competing in overseas markets.
If the country's productive capacity is to be expanded, it is an inescapable
necessity that defence expenditure, along with Government expenditure of all
kinds, should be reduced to a level which does not place an excessive burden
on the economy.
3. Scientific Advances
(a) In recent years, military technology has been making dramatic strides.
New and increasingly formidable weapons have been succeeding one another
at an ever-increasing pace.
(b) Within a decade the atom bomb dropped at Hiroshima has been
superseded by a hydrogen or megaton bomb hundreds of times more
powerful.
(c) Parallel with this, the evolution of rocket weapons has been forging
ahead. It is now only a matter of a few years before there will be missiles
steered by electronic brains capable of delivering megaton warheads over a
range of 5,000 miles or more.
(d) These sensational scientific advances in methods of waging war have
fundamentally altered the whole basis of world strategy.
4. Military Alliances
(a) The defence problem has also been materially altered by the
progressive consolidation of NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and
by the recent announcement of a more positive American policy in the
Middle East.
(b) The effect of these international developments is to make it most
unlikely that Britain could become involved in a major war except in
association with allies, including the United States of America. In
determining the size and character of the armed forces, full account must be
taken of this fact.
5. Long-Term Planning
(a) Frequent changes in defence policy are wasteful and disturbing and
must as far as possible be avoided.
(b) Experience has shown that the rapid advance of scientific development
and the continual fluctuations in the international situation make it difficult
to forecast future military requirements with any certainty. Nevertheless, an
attempt must be made to establish a broad but flexible framework, within
which long-term planning can proceed.
(c) This long-term plan should provide for the armed forces being
equipped with the most modern weapons. This means that they must be
small enough for the cost of these weapons to be within our means.
6. Tasks of Armed Forces
(a) Any new defence plan, if it is to be effective and economical, must
be based on a clear definition of the military tasks to be discharged. This
cannot be founded exclusively on considerations of purely national security
or interest, since the safety and well-being of this country are indissolubly
linked with those of other nations.
(b) Britain's armed forces have two principal roles to perform:
(i) to play their part with the forces of allied countries in preventing war
and in resisting aggression; and
(ii) to defend, and preserve order in, British colonies and protected
territories.
(c) Since the first and more exacting of these tasks is part of a joint effort,
Britain need not necessarily contribute forces which are self-sufficient and
balanced in all respects.
7. Nuclear Deterrent
(a) Though the Hunters and Javelins of the Royal Air Force would, in
the event of war with Russia, be able to take a substantial toll of Soviet
bombers, a proportion would inevitably get through. Even if it were only a
dozen, they could, with hydrogen bombs, inflict widespread devastation and
might well blot out a large part of the population of the big cities. It must
be frankly recognised that fighters cannot give the country as a whole any
effective protection against the catastrophic consequences of nuclear attack.
(b) Clearly therefore the central aim of military policy must be to prevent
war rather than to prepare for it. In present circumstances the only way to
deter nuclear aggression is to possess the means of retaliating in time.
(c) Now and in the foreseeable future, the free world is almost wholly
dependent for its protection upon the nuclear power of the United States.
While Britain cannot by comparison make more than a modest contribution,
she must possess an element of nuclear deterrent of her own.
id) British atomic bombs are in steady production and the Royal Air
Force holds a substantial stock of them. A British megaton weapon has now
been developed. This will shortly be tested and will thereafter be put into
production.
(e) The means of delivering these weapons is provided by medium
bombers of the V-class. These will in due course be supplemented and
later replaced by ballistic rockets.
[(f) Her Majesty's Government have accepted an offer from the United
States Government to provide Britain with a substantial number of medium range
ballistic rockets of the THOR type, which is now in an advanced
stage of development.]
8. Defence of Deterrent
(a) Since peace depends upon the effectiveness of the deterrent, it is
essential that any would-be aggressor should not imagine he could readily
knock out the bomber or rocket bases. Though great cities cannot at
present be protected against nuclear attack, the defence of the very much
smaller target presented by an airfield is an altogether more manageable
task. There is every reason to believe that fighters would be able to interfere
sufficiently with enemy bombers for the short time needed to enable the
retaliatory force to take off.
(b) The Government have accordingly decided that air defence must be
provided for the nuclear deterrent. A manned fighter force of adequate
size for this purpose will be maintained. This will later be replaced by a
ground-to-air guided missile system. In order to gain experience it is
proposed to deploy a small number of guided missile units, equipped with
the first British weapons of this kind, starting in 1958.
(c) There are grounds for hoping that it may ultimately prove possible
to devise missile defences even against attack by ballistic rockets. Research
on this problem, in collaboration with the United States Government, is
being intensified.
9. Forces in Germany
(a) The power of nuclear retaliation is not enough by itself to prevent
war. The frontiers of the free world, and particularly the vital land frontier
in Europe, must be guarded.
(b) The defences must be strong enough to show that any aggression
would be met at once by the combined forces of the Western Alliance, backed
by their ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons.
(c) Britain must provide her fair share of the armed forces needed for this
purpose. However, she cannot any longer continue to make a
disproportionately large contribution. The defence expenditure of this
country has been higher, in relation to national, income, than that of any
other member of NATO, except the United States, and nearly twice as high
as the average of the other countries in Europe.
id) Her Majesty's Government have, therefore after due consultation with
the Allied Governments in the North Atlantic Council and in the Council of
the Western European Union, decided to make reductions in the British land
and air forces on the Continent. The strength of the British Army of the
Rhine will be reduced from about 77,000 to about 50,000. The organiisation
of this force will be streamlined in such a way as to increase the
proportion of fighting units, the total strength of which will be reduced
by not more than 10,000. At the same time, they will shortly be equipped
with atomic rocket artillery, which will gready augment their fire-power.
In addition, two Infantry Brigades in Britain will be earmarked for despatch
to the Continent by air, if needed; and vehicles and equipment for them will
be kept in Germany. This redeployment will be carried out gradually over
the next 1 years, during which time the German military contribution to
NATO will be progressively building up.
(e) The strength of the Second Tactical Air Force in Germany will be
reduced to about half its present size by the end of March, 1958. This
reduction in numbers will be counter-balanced by the fact that some of the
squadrons will in due course be provided with atomic bombs. A similar
reduction will be made in the light bomber force in England, which is
assigned to NATO.
10. Reinforcements for SACEUR
(a) In a nuclear war, it can be expected that fighting on land and in the
air would reach its climax within a few days. Consequently, reinforcements
which could not be rapidly put into the battle would be of little military
value.
(6) Under present plans, Britain is due to provide two Territorial Army
Divisions as reinforcements for NATO. Since these certainly could not be
ready for action on the Continent in less than three months, the Government
consider that it would be more appropriate to assign them to home defence
duties and to train and equip them for that purpose alone.
(c) Before any decision is taken the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
and the North Atlantic Council will of course be consulted.
11. Middle East
(a) Outside the area covered by the North Atlantic alliance, Britain has
vital interests in two other theatres, the Middle East and South-East Asia.
Apart from the importance of the Middle East itself, it is the key to the right
flank of NATO and is the gateway to the African continent.
(6) In the Middle East, she has two major commitments. The first is
in the Arabian Peninsula, where British forces must at all times be ready to
defend Aden Colony and Protectorates and the territories on the Persian
Gulf for whose defence Britain is responsible. For this task land, air and
sea forces have to be maintained in that area, including East Africa.
(c) Britain's other major commitment in the Middle East arises from her
membership of the Baghdad Pact. Under this treaty she has an obligation
to co-operate with the other signatory states, in defending their territories and
in preventing Communist encroachment and infiltration. In the event of
emergency, all British forces in that area would be made available to support
the Baghdad Alliance. They would consist of the forces in the Arabian
Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, referred to above, and of bomber squadrons
operating from Cyprus. The latter would be capable of delivering a heavy
counter-blow with nuclear weapons.
(d) Apart from local garrisons, it is not proposed in the long term to
maintain land forces in the Mediterranean area. Should it be necessary to
provide further support for the Baghdad Alliance it will be found from the
Central Reserve.
(e) Following upon the termination of the Treaty with Jordan, British
forces will be withdrawn from that country, and Britain will be relieved of
the responsibility of defending Jordan in the event of attack.
(f) The British forces in Libya will be progressively reduced.
12. South-East Asia
(a) In South-East Asia, apart from her responsibility for defending her
colonies and protectorates, Britain has agreed to assist in the protection of
Malaya after she attains independence.
ib) In addition, Britain has an international commitment, as a member
of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, to help maintain stability and
resist the extension of Communist power in that area.
(c) The land forces that are being maintained in this theatre include a
mixed British-Gurkha division and a United Kingdom contribution of about
two battalions to the Commonwealth Reserve Brigade. Small naval and air
forces will also be maintained there.
id) The remainder of the brigade is provided jointly by Australia and
New Zealand. With the steady growth in their population and economic
strength, it is reasonable to expect that, as time goes on, they will wish to
assume an increasing share of responsibility for the defence of this area
which is so vital to them.
13. Overseas Garrisons
(c) Britain has the responsibility for providing numerous garrisons for
her colonies and protected territories. This is making large demands on
military manpower. [There are. in fact, nearly 150,000 men of the Army
and the R.A.F. serving overseas in countries other than Germany.]
(b) The Government have come to the conclusion that these forces could
be reduced. Responsibility for assisting the civil power in the maintenance
of internal security is being increasingly assumed by colonial forces. With
the ability to reinforce rapidly in an emergency, the garrisons can be reduced
to those immediately necessary for purely local defence where a threat exists
requiring their presence.
14. Central Reserve
(a) With the reduction in size of garrisons and other British forces
overseas, it will be more than ever essential to maintain in Britain an
effective Central Reserve, from which reinforcements can be despatched at
short notice.
(b) To be effective the Central Reserve must possess the means of rapid
mobility. For this purpose, a substantial fleet of transport aircraft is being
built up in R.A.F. Transport Command. It will be composed mainly of
Comet IPs, Britannias and Beverley freighters. These Service transport
resources would be supplemented, when necessary, by suitable civil aircraft.
Naval resources would also be used for this purpose.
(c) Should an overseas emergency develop which calls for larger
reinforcements than can be provided from the Central Reserve in Britain,
the additional troops needed might have to be transferred from Germany.
The right to do this is specifically provided for in the Paris Agreements of
October 1954.
15. Naval Power
(a) On account of its mobility, the Royal Navy provides an effective means
of bringing power, in particular air power and Royal Marine units, rapidly to
bear in peacetime emergencies or limited hostilities. As the number of
Britain's overseas bases is reduced, the role of the aircraft carrier, which is
in effect a mobile air station, becomes increasingly significant.
(b) With this consideration in mind, it is proposed to base the main
elements of the Royal Navy upon a small number of carrier groups. Each
of these will be composed of one aircraft carrier and a number of supporting
ships.
(c) Apart from the aircraft carriers, the number of large ships will be
restricted to the minimum. The number of cruisers in the active fleet will
be reduced and replaced by ships of the Tiger Class and guided weapon
vessels. The four older battleships now in reserve will be scrapped. The
future of H.M.S. Vanguard will be discussed with NATO. Reductions will
also be made in the various classes of smaller vessels.
(d) It is the Government^ intention to maintain British naval strength
East of Suez at about its present level. One carrier group will normally be
stationed in the Indian Ocean and a small force at Singapore. Thus the
proposed reductions will primarily affect the forces in peacetime in Home
Waters and in the Mediterranean.
(e) While there can be no doubt about the value of sea power in localised
emergencies, the role of naval forces in total war is uncertain. It may well
bs that the initial nuclear bombardment and counter-bombardment by aircraft
or rockets would be so crippling as to bring the war to an end within a few
weeks or even days, in which case naval operations would not play any
significant part. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the nuclear
battle of the opening phase might noi prove immediately decisive. In that
event, Russia's large fleet of ocean-going submarines would constitute a
formidable threat.
(/) So long as this uncertainty remains, Britain must continue to be
vitally concerned in keeping open her Atlantic life-line; and it is, therefore,
right that she should make her contribution to the maritime forces of NATO.
What that contribution should be is a matter which will have to be discussed
with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance.
16. Headquarters and Rearward Services
(A) The more the overall strength of the forces is reduced, the more
important it is to prune to the utmost the elements which do not directly
contribute to fighting capacity.
(Jb) The Service Departments and Ministry of Supply are engaged in a
further intensive drive to reduce administrative overheads of all kinds, and
in particular to cut down the numbers of headquarters and the size of staffs,
both military and civilian.
(c) Economies will also be sought by eliminating duplication between the
Services on common tasks such as signal communications, and by reducing
the number of men serving in depots and base installations.
(d) To make this possible, it will be necessary to concentrate work in a
smaller number of establishments and to curtail greatly the holdings of
stores.
(e) Consideration will also have to be given to the larger problems of
integration which will emerge as the size of the forces comes down.
(f) These examinations will be carried out under the direction of the
Ministry of Defence.
17. " Civilianisation "
(a) It is generally accepted that it is more efficient and economical to
employ civilians to perform civilian tasks; and every endeavour will be made
to extend the application of this principle.
(b) The Service Departments are reviewing their establishments, with the
object, wherever possible, of reducing uniformed personnel on duties such as
store-keeping, accounting, repair and maintenance of equipment, policing and
catering, by increased use of directly employed civilians or civilian contractors.
(c) By these methods it should be possible to reduce substantially the
number of uniformed staff required.
18. National Service Training
(d) The measure which by itself would produce the largest saving in
overheads would be the abolition of National Service.
(b) National Service is an efficient method of producing large numbers
of trained reserves against a possible emergency and was originally designed
mainly for this purpose. It is, however, an expensive and inefficient, but
hitherto unavoidable, method of manning active forces.
(c) The shorter the period of service, the more men are occupied in
training or being trained. There are at present no less than 75,000 men in
the Army alone in training establishments in the United Kingdom.
19. Reduction in Size of Forces
(a) The reshaping and redistribution of the armed forces, on the general
lines indicated above, will greatly reduce the military manpower required.
(b) The total strength of the three Services to-day is about 700,000*.
The revised plan aims to reduce the forces to not much more than half their
present size over the next few years. Provided that commitments are
curtailed in the manner indicated above, the Government believe that Britain
should be able to discharge her essential defence responsibilities with
reduced forces of this size.
(c) That assumes that they could be recruited on an all-regular basis and
that the heavy overheads of National Service would be eliminated.
20. Regular Enlistment
(a) So long as it was felt necessary to maintain the strength of the Services
at anything approaching their present level, it would have been unrealistic
to imagine that such large numbers of men could be obtained wholly by
voluntary enlistment. However, the big reduction in the demands on
manpower, which will result from the revised defence plan, now makes it
reasonable to contemplate the possibility of putting the armed forces on to
an all-regular footing.
(Jb) The Government accordingly propose to take positive action to
encourage recruiting. In particular, they will endeavour to make Service
conditions more agreeable; and, despite the general need for economy, they
will press ahead with further measures tp secure this end. Barrack accommodation
will be modernised. Better recreational facilities will be provided.
The number of married quarters will be increased. The standard of Service
rations will be raised with effect from April 1st next. Methods of improving
the Serviceman's prospect of good employment on his return to civilian life
are also being considered. In these and other ways, it is hoped to make
a career in the Services more attractive for all ranks.
(c) In order to waste no time in building up the Regular element in the
forces, the recruiting campaign will be intensified and more money will be
provided in the coming year for this purpose.
21. National Service
(a) There is undoubtedly a general desire in the country to see National
Service abolished as soon as this is practicable, consistent with the needs of
defence; and that is the Governments declared aim.
(b) Even with the reductions in manpower requirements resulting from
the new plan, it is not going to be easy to go over to all-regular forces. The
task of bridging the gap between the present long-service regular element and
the minimum strength required is a formidable one.
(c) There are less than 260,000 long-service regular other ranks in the
forces to-day; and the number of these in the Army is only about 80,000.
It is true that there are in addition over 100,000 men on three-year
engagements. But it must be recognised that a large number of these would
* This figure relates to adult male uniformed United Kingdom personnel.
not have enlisted had it not been for their liability to National Service and
that, with the abolition of National Service, the three-year engagement would
lose much of its appeal.
(d) There are so many uncertain factors that it is impossible to predict
with confidence the future level of recruitment. However, with sufficient
improvement in conditions of service, the Government believe there is a
reasonable prospect of increasing the rate of regular enlistment sufficiently to
make it unnecessary to call up any further National Servicemen after 1960;
and they have accordingly decided to plan on this basis.
(e) It must be, however, emphasised that, should there be any serious
shortfall below the much reduced numbers now planned, the Services would
be unable to discharge their essential defence tasks, and the position would
clearly have to be reconsidered.
(f) While regular recruitment is building up and the size of the forces
is being run down, the men becoming available for National Service will,
to a growing extent, exceed the numbers required. It will therefore be
necessary during the period of transition to reduce progressively the size of
the intake. Every effort will be made to ensure that this is done in as fair
and reasonable a manner as possible.
22. Civil Defence
(a) Passive preparations for nuclear war must take second place to active
measures to prevent it; and expenditure on civil defence must as far as
possible be curtailed. Nevertheless, plans must be made to enable organised
society to survive.
(b) The civil defence services will be maintained, and will be supplied
with adequate equipment for training. The work of strengthening essential
communications will continue. Research and planning will go forward.
23. Expenditure
(a) The Defence Estimates for the year 1956/57 amounted to about £1,600
million, before deducting receipts from the United States and Germany. Had
the programme as planned a year ago been allowed to continue unchanged,
the figure for 1957/58 would have risen to about £1,700 million.
(b) However, as a result of strenuous efforts to effect economy, it has been
found possible to keep the defence estimates for the coming year down to a
total of £1,484 million. From this must be deducted receipts from Germany
and the United States, which are expected to amount to about £50 million and
£10 million respectively. Thus the net estimate of total defence expenditure
for the year 1957/58 will amount to about £1,424 million.
(c) This large saving has been secured by various measures, including in
particular a substantial reduction in the overall strength of the forces, the
cutting down of production orders and purchases of stores and some pruning
of the research and development programme.
(d) It is not as yet possible to forecast the level of expenditure in later
years. It should not however be expected that it will show a decline in any
way comparable with that in the manpower strengths of the forces. This
is primarily due to the ever-increasing complication of modern weapons and
equipment, the higher cost per man of regular forces and the fact that
proportionately more civilians will be employed. Nevertheless, it can safely
be assumed that the new plan, when it is fully implemented, will further
appreciably reduce the burden on the economy. Above all, it will release for
productive employment in industry several hundred thousand men, including
many badly needed scientists and technicians.
24. Effects of Contraction of Forces
(a) Any large change—and this will be the largest change in defence policy
ever carried through in normal times—must mean some temporary
dislocation. It will not be possible for the level of work in all factories,
dockyards, depots and establishments to be maintained; and some will have
to be closed. Where this happens the Government will do everything possible
to help those displaced to find other employment [and to see that the resources
set free are put to productive use.]
(b) The new plan will mean many changes in the Services, but the
fundamental traditions will be maintained.
(c) With so large a contraction of the forces some units will have to be
disbanded, and the services of some regular officers and N.C.O.'s will have
to be terminated. Those whose Service careers have to be terminated will
receive fair compensation and will be helped in every possible way to find
suitable employment in civil life.
(d) Plans are being prepared for the different ranks and branches of each
Service, which will be designed to provide good long-term careers for all who
join the new all-regular forces.
25. Conclusion
(a) The Government have adopted this new defence plan in the confident
belief that it will not only give relief to the country's sorely strained economy,
but will produce compact military forces of the highest quality.
(b) All three Services will be provided with the newest weapons. The
reduced Fleet will be composed of the most modern vessels; the Army will be
equipped with atomic artillery and given a high degree of strategic mobility;
the Air Force will be supplied with a British megaton bomb; a missile system
of air defence will be developed; and ballistic rockets will be introduced to
supplement the V-bombers.
(c) Standards of training and efficiency will be attained such as are
possible only in an all-regular force. The aim will be to produce long-service
professional forces of the highest quality and standing.
