James G
Squadron vice admiral
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Post by James G on Mar 18, 2021 19:25:46 GMT
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gillan1220
Consul General
I've been depressed recently. Slow replies coming in the next few days.
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Post by gillan1220 on Mar 28, 2021 6:45:23 GMT
Probably not much difference since it functions the same as an Apache or Cobra.
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1bigrich
Sub-lieutenant
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Post by 1bigrich on Mar 28, 2021 14:15:28 GMT
Comanche would have been a winner in combat.
With a fuselage resistant to 23mm canon fire, fast and extremely maneuverable and well-armed, it would have been an asset to any force using it on the battlefield.
Compared the OH-58 Kiowas it would have replace it was much faster (cruiser speed 190 mph v 127 mph, top speed 201 mph v 149). In a high threat environment, it's stealthy design and internal weapon bays would have helped with survivability as well. It would have been a much more dangerous armed reconnaissance asset than any version of the Kiowa.
Kiowas finally left service in 2017, there have been attempts to get replacements, but none have been executed. The AH-64 Apache Guardians that have been forced into the reconnaissance role are a poor fit for the mission; they're too big.
The late Stuart Slade one said to me that insurgencies kill armies. He's right and Comanche is one of those casualties.
The turn away from the US Army's historical strengths, especially it's continental war-fighting ability to focus on the 'war on terror' hollowed out the army. Crusader was another casualty of the 'light' focus, and would have been another winning asset on a battlefield with a peer opponent.
My thoughts,
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lordroel
Administrator
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Post by lordroel on Mar 28, 2021 14:21:00 GMT
Always a shame that the RAH-66 Comanche never entered into service, was a good looking chopper.
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
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Post by oscssw on Mar 31, 2021 0:11:26 GMT
The late Stuart Slade one said to me that insurgencies kill armies. He's right and Comanche is one of those casualties. The turn away from the US Army's historical strengths, especially it's continental war-fighting ability to focus on the 'war on terror' hollowed out the army. My thoughts, 1bigrich, like you Stuart was my friend. Not sure about your history but I fought in an insurgency war, Vietnam. We won the military side of the war at Tet because General Gaap was forced by his Hanoi Masters to fight a conventional campaign. I was there. I saw it happen. I also read General Gaap's autobio and he was convinced Tet was an utter failure. He expected to be called back to Hanoi and get a 9 mm in his head for that failure.
IMNSHO, we screwed the pooch big time there. That said, it was not the US military that made the crucial decisions that caused that blood bath. Looking for military solutions to insurgency wars is looking in the wrong place. You got to get the politicians to understand conventional militaries can't win against an indigenous insurgency that has more than 10% cadre of fighters willing to die for their cause. Best you can do is buy, train and equip proxies to take on the insurgents in country. You must also ensure any foreign power that aids and abets the insurgents suffers catastrophic conventional destruction of whatever they value. That is how you win an insurgency without hollowing out your conventional forces.
By win I don't mean nation building. Only the locals can do that. By win I mean putting someone in power who will do whatever it takes to control the locals and keep us happy. If he can't, you replace him with someone else.
Nothing nice, moral or fair about it. It's called war.
1bigrich I'll leave you with Stu's, God bless him, favorite saying. "Great nations stay great not by being examples to others but by making examples of others!"
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1bigrich
Sub-lieutenant
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Post by 1bigrich on Mar 31, 2021 22:32:56 GMT
1bigrich, like you Stuart was my friend. Not sure about your history but I fought in an insurgency war, Vietnam. We won the military side of the war at Tet because General Gaap was forced by his Hanoi Masters to fight a conventional campaign. I was there. I saw it happen. I also read General Gaap's autobio and he was convinced Tet was an utter failure. He expected to be called back to Hanoi and get a 9 mm in his head for that failure.
IMNSHO, we screwed the pooch big time there. That said, it was not the US military that made the crucial decisions that caused that blood bath. Looking for military solutions to insurgency wars is looking in the wrong place. You got to get the politicians to understand conventional militaries can't win against an indigenous insurgency that has more than 10% cadre of fighters willing to die for their cause. Best you can do is buy, train and equip proxies to take on the insurgents in country. You must also ensure any foreign power that aids and abets the insurgents suffers catastrophic conventional destruction of whatever they value. That is how you win an insurgency without hollowing out your conventional forces.
By win I don't mean nation building. Only the locals can do that. By win I mean putting someone in power who will do whatever it takes to control the locals and keep us happy. If he can't, you replace him with someone else.
Nothing nice, moral or fair about it. It's called war.
1bigrich I'll leave you with Stu's, God bless him, favorite saying. "Great nations stay great not by being examples to others but by making examples of others!"
Senior,
I am grateful for your service. Thank you, it will not be forgotten.
I was born during the Vietnam War. One of my earliest memories is going to a welcome-home parade; I was probably five or six.
A late friend who was a veteran was there, and his tour ended in 1972. He said his unit was up near the DMZ at the time. They were to go south for transport home, whether to Da Nang or Hue or somewhere else I don't know. He said they were to travel down the coat by truck, and the coastal road was known for trouble. On their last day in country they were called together and everyone had to hand in their rifles. They were piled into deuce-and-a-half trucks (two and a half ton US Army trucks for our friends here unfamiliar with them) and they drove away. He said here go do down this road known for trouble and NO ONE has a gun. He said at that moment he knew the war was won.
By the way, I once shared this
with that friend.
I blame the political class for the rape of South Vietnam. We were obliged to help them if attacked, and when they were attacked, we turned a blind eye. Congress did not act, they were to busy gloating over getting Nixon and Ford refused to act unilaterally.
I miss Stuart, his insight and wisdom. I hope his forum continues for a long, long time.
G. Gordon Liddy passed today, and someone who while still very young met him quoted G. K. Chesterton on two kinds of great men. "There is the kind of great man who makes all men feel small. But the real great man is the man who makes every man feel great."
I think Stuart was one of the latter as well.
Regards,
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gillan1220
Consul General
I've been depressed recently. Slow replies coming in the next few days.
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Post by gillan1220 on Apr 1, 2021 3:51:41 GMT
The RAH-66 turned out to be the Attack Helicopter unit in Command and Conquer: Generals in an alternate take on The War on Terror.
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Post by La Rouge Beret on Sept 15, 2021 2:58:22 GMT
The RAH 66 Commanche was an incredibly interesting project in that it was designed for the Cold War and it would have found a niche within the US military. The role I imagined was akin to the AH 64 Apaches striking the Iraqi radar net at the start of Desert Storm and given the helicopter's complexity I maintain that the USAF would have used it as well within their SF community.
Anyway, there is certainly a son of Commanche aircraft that may enter service, which is promising and I still think the decision to cancel the AH 56 Cheyenne was a mistake.
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Post by simon darkshade on Sept 15, 2021 4:31:48 GMT
Looking at the flipside, the AH-64 ran into a bit of an issue in the mobile stages of Iraq 2003 at Karbala. Getting chewed up by relatively unsophisticated AAA wasn’t supposed to happen; it did happen because the enemy didn’t follow the script.
Whilst the RAH-66 is better protected, it is not so much so that it can shrug off enemy fire like the Terminator. Against a peer enemy, it may well run into not only the issues arising from 20 years of CI, but 71 years of neglect due to having a benign air environment. That breeds complacency, which in turn saps the efficacy of EMCON, ADA, artillery support practice and associated skills. Taking air superiority for granted not only has lead to a reduced focus on AAW, but on how the other side may approach it.
The Comanche was a silver bullet weapon in some respects, but the enemy was not a werewolf, before or after 2001.
As a point of clarification, whilst Crusader was given its final rites under Rumsfeld, the war against it was particularly waged by the likes of Shinseki and the light deployable mafia of the late 90s, back when tanks, SP artillery, IFVs and attack helos were all obsolete vestiges of the past that needed to be burnt on the altar of Transformation.
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lordroel
Administrator
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Post by lordroel on Sept 25, 2021 8:09:14 GMT
This RAH-66 Comanche Promotional Film made it look like it was the ultimate attack helicopter.
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