Post by eurofed on Dec 19, 2020 2:47:27 GMT
The topic is to examine how European 'New Imperialism' colonization would have turned out if Europe had been united since early-mid 19th century and the Europeans had only been interested in settler colonies and trade posts, continuing the pattern their ancestors had established in previous centuries. PoD is during or just before the ARW for various reasons. Because of this, British domination of India, and by extension Southeast Asia, is still a thing, but the British Empire is politically separate and distinct from united Europe.
ITTL the vast majority of the continent is bound in a federal EU equivalent, a 'United States of Europe' or 'European Empire', hereby identified with the working name of 'European Federation', which includes continental Western Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe, and Scandinavia; the British Isles, Russia, and Turkey are independent. As it concerns the latter two, the Russian Empire has been pushed back into the equivalent of 1939 borders; it may keep Belarus and Ukraine, or they may have been absorbed by the EF as well. The Ottoman Empire remains independent in its Eastern Mediterranean core, but it has been expelled from the Balkans; the role of the Balkan lands may vary ITTL between absorbed by Europe, a constellation of European and Russian client states, or a contested buffer zone.
The EF is a liberal-democratic federal union and is as strong and stable as the post-ACW USA. Plausible divergences for its origin may include a successful Napoleonic Empire that later turned liberal and federal, successful 1848-style revolutions that spurned ethnic nationalism and instead embraced Pan-European unity and solidarity, or possibly a mix of the two. Unification in a EU-style environment fostered vigorous industrialization throughout the continent. Economic development, liberal democracy, and federalism cemented the loyalty of the European peoples to the new order and toned down nationalist resistance to negligible levels.
The new Europe is liberal-democratic but just as imperialist as OTL; the main difference is TTL Europe shows a marked reluctance to establish economic colonies or annex land for prestige reasons. Much like America, Europe already has a vast internal market, a favorable position in global trade patterns and/or the means to impose it short of direct rule, and all the superpower prestige it may need. The Europeans have relatively little use for crowded captive markets or owning vast tracts of jungle or desert to increase their prestige. This especially concerns densely-populated Asia and those portions of Sub-Saharan Africa that seem ill-suited for significant European settlement b/c of climate or disease. As it concerns these parts of the world, the Europeans are typically content with deploying indirect imperialist influence and dominating trade at most.
On the other hand, since they are experiencing an economic and population boom, they are greatly interested in doing what their ancestors did to the Americas to the parts of Africa that seem relatively rich in resources, not so densely populated, and somewhat suitable for mass settlement. Moreover, North Africa inevitably becomes a target b/c of strategic value, proximity, and historical precedent. Their M.O. about dealing with the natives in these areas may vary between (forced) cultural assimilation and religious conversion combined with extensive intermarriage with settlers (as in Latin America), their removal or marginalization by means of genocide or forced population transfers combined with their replacement by settlers (as in the USA/Canada/Australia), or a mix of the above. In any case it includes using all the necessary force to crush their resistance. Much like OTL, ideological opposition to colonialism and imperialism or critique to the widespread notion of European superiority do not really begin to enter the picture, given the dominant cultural atmosphere of the age.
In these favorable circumstances, Europe may be expected to experience vast population growth for a century or so. The rise of Nazism or Communism in Europe with their humanitarian disasters seems theoretically possible but just as unlikely as in the USA. Due to the unity and strength of the EF, a close equivalent of the World Wars seems impossible. A general war or three against other great powers (esp. Britain and Russia) are quite possible, but almost surely much less damaging and destructive for the continent than OTL events. Europe is very likely to get the upper hand in any such conflict, esp. if it fights close to its home ground. The Europeans are going to spend much less blood and money to do so, and mostly fight in peripheral battlegrounds that keep the EF core intact. This means there are going to be a lot of bright-eyed young Europeans eager to improve their lot in life. Part of them is going to stay home and get employed in the many new factories and offices that are going to spring up; others may choose immigration to the Americas; the natural destination of the rest is the EF settler colonies.
Tentatively I expect in this scenario that Europe is going to assimilate a vast half-circle of African territory from Agadir to Luanda that includes Northwest Africa, the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa. The rest of the continent (West Africa, Central Africa) probably does not experience much colonial encroachment at all. Unlike OTL the second wave of European colonialism mostly becomes an all-or-nothing phenomenon: what the European giant seizes, it tends to keep for good and remake in its image. Decolonization does not become a meaningful issue, at least for the EF; British colonies in Asia are a different matter. Federalism, settler colonization, and modern technology make the issue of giving political representation to the European colonies to prevent rebellions trivial. On the other hand, in the parts of the world it leaves alone, its influence is indirect at best, although quite possibly substantial all the same. To analyze how surviving pre-colonial states in West Africa and Central Africa may manage the transition to modernity seems a fascinating subject infrequently tapped by alt-history.
I am not entirely sure about what happens to Egypt-Sudan in this context: on one hand, its large population may easily discourage direct European colonialism; on the other hand, the Europeans are surely going to demand their exclusive control of the all-important Suez Canal resource. One feasible compromise may be Egypt-Sudan being turned into a client state, and the Suez Canal zone being annexed by the EF as an exclave. Unlike OTL, this version of Europe is all but surely going to have the necessary resources and political will to suppress any conceivable Egyptian/Arab/Ottoman challenge to its control of the Canal for the foreseeable future, just like how Israel defended itself. Much the same way, I expect the preferred European way of dealing with the Middle East is to turn the Ottoman Empire into a client state, esp. once oil and gas become important resources, and oppose any attempts of the Ottomans/Arabs or other great powers to challenge their influence. Since ITTL assimilation of European Jews is as successful as in America, almost nobody is going to give any serious thought to Zionism; if Russian pogroms are still an issue, Russian Jews may easily immigrate to Europe or America. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire may well be averted, radically changing the history of the Middle East.
Potential British rivalry in its turf is not going to be too much of a serious threat for Europe. Past a point in the late 19th century, their vast resources and vigorous industrialization are going to give the Europeans everything they need to out-compete, out-build, and out-fight the British Empire, short of Britain doing an all-out mobilization of Indian resources (and facing independence of the Raj or its wagging the British dog in short order). I tend to assume ITTL there is an Anglo-European colonial war, a reverse Boer War on steroids, in the late 19th century that expels Britain from the Med, Egypt, the Middle East, and Southern Africa, unless the British see the writing on the wall and accept to withdraw from these areas peacefully. If Britain truly proves to be too much of an implacable annoyance (i.e. the guys in London decide to play Wellington or Churchill), Europe can surely afford to amass enough resources to overwhelm the RN, invade the British Isles or blockade them into economic collapse, and dismantle the British Empire. If the British do not prove that unreasonable, the Europeans may well be content with letting Britain stay independent but ever more out-competed in the economic field and the great-power game, albeit with India and Southeast Asia as a good consolation prize for a while. As a matter of fact, for the sake of geopolitical simplicity and neatness, this scenario does assume Britain seized the DEI and the Philippines during the Napoleonic Wars as a compensation for the losses it suffered or was going to suffer elsewhere. This may also concern the Southern Cone, although Britain may easily lose that colony (and Australasia) to US expansion later. TTL Britain may or may not care to set up a few economic colonies in West Africa and/or Central Africa as more of a consolation prize; since the EF mostly treats the region as outside its sphere of influence, it probably does not care much.
As it concerns Russia, Europe's strength surely forced it to lose all meaningful influence in the Baltic and Central Europe and withdraw within its pre-WWII or possibly even Brest-Litovsk borders. Strategic circumstances may or may not allow the Russians to be a meaningful rival of Europe in the Balkans and the Middle East, although all but surely as the underdog. In any case, it surely means Russia is forced to give up any westward drive and re-orient its expansionist vectors southward and eastward, doubling down on the colonization of Siberia and Central Asia and eating pieces of the Ottoman, Persian, and Chinese empires. The latter may concern Greater Armenia, Iranian Azerbajian, Afghanistan, Xinjiang, and Greater Mongolia; Japan's rise prevents Russia from doing the same to Greater Manchuria. This expansion pattern might heat up the Great Game, as underdog great powers fight for the remaining scraps. However, it is just as, if not more, likely Britain and Russia strike a compromise and team up to try and contain the European giant, just as it happened during the Napoleonic Wars and the World Wars. The all-important differences are this version of European hegemony faces no meaningful internal resistance and can easily pool all of its resources to overwhelm its Anglo-Russian enemies; moreover, unless Europe proves truly unreasonable about trade or US strategic interests, America has no real reasons to fight it and come to Britain's rescue. If Russia does prove too much of a threat, Europe may easily turn willing and is surely able to cut it down to Brest-Litovsk or 1992 levels. Anything more, however, seems unfeasible given Russia's size and population, unless the Europeans decide there is no other way but direct control to neutralize the Russian threat. On the other hand, if push comes to shove, a pissed-off Europe can surely afford to pull a 1066 and do to the British what the Western Allies did to the Axis powers after WWII.
As it concerns the Americas, this scenario does assume divergence actually starts during or just before the ARW and sends the USA on a development trajectory that makes it more expansionist, inclusive (with the possible exception of the freedmen), multi-cultural, and multi-lingual. It gradually expands to absorb all of North America (give or take NFL, Haiti, and the British West Indies), a varying but sizable portion of South America (surely including at least Gran Colombia, quite possibly Peru as well), and quite possibly Australasia too. ITTL the Southern Cone is British, but in the right circumstances to cause an Anglo-American clash, the USA may seize it and Australia. Brazil's role may vary. TTL circumstances make America more focused on its chosen turf, more self-sufficient, less Anglophile, and less interested in Old World affairs. A possible indirect exception may concern a potential outcome of the slavery issue. ITTL it does settled either by peaceful abolition and mass resettlement of the African diaspora into West Africa, or effective integration (by 19th century standards) of freedmen in American society.
If the former occurs, Liberia may easily grow from insignificant footnote of history to a regional power and potential hegemon of uncolonized Africa, an American-African equivalent of Israel on steroids. The Americo-Liberian settlers may easily exploit their large numbers and superior know-how to dominate/assimilate the indigeous peoples, absorb vast portions of West Africa, and potentially dominate or unify most or all of uncolonized Africa. The USA may easily grant them some significant support, although after having sent them far away, the Americans are unlikely to wish any closer relationship with them than patron and client.
In all likelihood, India's trajectory is not going to be much different from OTL, except schedule of its self-rule may vary, it may occur in different circumstances, and partition may be averted or occur in a different way. What happens in the subcontinent may easily become a template for British Southeast Asia, although things may change if the British resist decolonization too much or other powers seriously interfere. Indochina's role may vary, but lack of European colonization is going to make a serious difference. The entire region may well turn broadly similar to Siam.
As it concerns Japan and Northeast Asia, this scenario does assume circumstances drive the Japanese to undergo their modernization earlier (say 10-20 years) and give it a more liberal-democratic character. This enables the Japanese Empire to conquer Korea, Greater Manchuria, Sakhalin/Karafuto, Taiwan, and Hainan by the late 19th century and assimilate this Northeast Asian and insular core beyond any possible challenge by Korean nationalists, Russia, or China in the following decades. This gives the Japanese Empire the population, resources, and strategic depth it needs to prosper as a great power. It salso make the Japanese much less interested in exercising any more control on China than supporting friendly factions and proxies, at least as long as the Chinese stay mindful the Willow Palisade existed for a reason and do not attempt to seize Japanese territories. The Japanese may well be interested in exploiting anti-colonialism to challenge British control of Southeast Asia and replace it with its own hegemony. However this is only likely to happen if Britain is sufficienly weakened or distracted elsewhere (e.g. fighting America, Europe, or anti-colonial insurrections). If Japan is leaving China alone and focusing more on defending its core, its entire relationship with America may easily turn entirely different and much moe friendly. Sino-Japanese relationship may go various ways.
TTL circumstances make it almost sure China is going to lose all its border and island territories and experience even more shock from indirect colonial encroachment during the decline of the Qing, although direct colonization becomes even more unlikely. This might ultimately lessen the pain of transition to modernization and prevent much of the 20th century mess if monarchist or Nationalist reformers are able to seize power and stabilize the country timely, and enact necessary reforms. On the other hand, it might make things even worse, e.g. if militant xenophobia and nationalist resentment about lost territories and colonial encroachment lead the Chinese down the paths of the OTL bad guys by surrendering to toxic nationalism. As it concerns EF attitude about, most likely it broadly resembles the one of America: eager to secure good access to Chinese markets and pro-Chinese if China turns into a good trade partner, anti-Chinese if China turns into a threat, intolerant of other great powers' attempts to dominate the area as their exclusive turf. However, distance may tone down this pattern somewhat in comparison to the American behavior, unless the situation somehow inpinges on European vital interests, such as say China and Russia form a hostile alliance.
ITTL the vast majority of the continent is bound in a federal EU equivalent, a 'United States of Europe' or 'European Empire', hereby identified with the working name of 'European Federation', which includes continental Western Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe, and Scandinavia; the British Isles, Russia, and Turkey are independent. As it concerns the latter two, the Russian Empire has been pushed back into the equivalent of 1939 borders; it may keep Belarus and Ukraine, or they may have been absorbed by the EF as well. The Ottoman Empire remains independent in its Eastern Mediterranean core, but it has been expelled from the Balkans; the role of the Balkan lands may vary ITTL between absorbed by Europe, a constellation of European and Russian client states, or a contested buffer zone.
The EF is a liberal-democratic federal union and is as strong and stable as the post-ACW USA. Plausible divergences for its origin may include a successful Napoleonic Empire that later turned liberal and federal, successful 1848-style revolutions that spurned ethnic nationalism and instead embraced Pan-European unity and solidarity, or possibly a mix of the two. Unification in a EU-style environment fostered vigorous industrialization throughout the continent. Economic development, liberal democracy, and federalism cemented the loyalty of the European peoples to the new order and toned down nationalist resistance to negligible levels.
The new Europe is liberal-democratic but just as imperialist as OTL; the main difference is TTL Europe shows a marked reluctance to establish economic colonies or annex land for prestige reasons. Much like America, Europe already has a vast internal market, a favorable position in global trade patterns and/or the means to impose it short of direct rule, and all the superpower prestige it may need. The Europeans have relatively little use for crowded captive markets or owning vast tracts of jungle or desert to increase their prestige. This especially concerns densely-populated Asia and those portions of Sub-Saharan Africa that seem ill-suited for significant European settlement b/c of climate or disease. As it concerns these parts of the world, the Europeans are typically content with deploying indirect imperialist influence and dominating trade at most.
On the other hand, since they are experiencing an economic and population boom, they are greatly interested in doing what their ancestors did to the Americas to the parts of Africa that seem relatively rich in resources, not so densely populated, and somewhat suitable for mass settlement. Moreover, North Africa inevitably becomes a target b/c of strategic value, proximity, and historical precedent. Their M.O. about dealing with the natives in these areas may vary between (forced) cultural assimilation and religious conversion combined with extensive intermarriage with settlers (as in Latin America), their removal or marginalization by means of genocide or forced population transfers combined with their replacement by settlers (as in the USA/Canada/Australia), or a mix of the above. In any case it includes using all the necessary force to crush their resistance. Much like OTL, ideological opposition to colonialism and imperialism or critique to the widespread notion of European superiority do not really begin to enter the picture, given the dominant cultural atmosphere of the age.
In these favorable circumstances, Europe may be expected to experience vast population growth for a century or so. The rise of Nazism or Communism in Europe with their humanitarian disasters seems theoretically possible but just as unlikely as in the USA. Due to the unity and strength of the EF, a close equivalent of the World Wars seems impossible. A general war or three against other great powers (esp. Britain and Russia) are quite possible, but almost surely much less damaging and destructive for the continent than OTL events. Europe is very likely to get the upper hand in any such conflict, esp. if it fights close to its home ground. The Europeans are going to spend much less blood and money to do so, and mostly fight in peripheral battlegrounds that keep the EF core intact. This means there are going to be a lot of bright-eyed young Europeans eager to improve their lot in life. Part of them is going to stay home and get employed in the many new factories and offices that are going to spring up; others may choose immigration to the Americas; the natural destination of the rest is the EF settler colonies.
Tentatively I expect in this scenario that Europe is going to assimilate a vast half-circle of African territory from Agadir to Luanda that includes Northwest Africa, the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa. The rest of the continent (West Africa, Central Africa) probably does not experience much colonial encroachment at all. Unlike OTL the second wave of European colonialism mostly becomes an all-or-nothing phenomenon: what the European giant seizes, it tends to keep for good and remake in its image. Decolonization does not become a meaningful issue, at least for the EF; British colonies in Asia are a different matter. Federalism, settler colonization, and modern technology make the issue of giving political representation to the European colonies to prevent rebellions trivial. On the other hand, in the parts of the world it leaves alone, its influence is indirect at best, although quite possibly substantial all the same. To analyze how surviving pre-colonial states in West Africa and Central Africa may manage the transition to modernity seems a fascinating subject infrequently tapped by alt-history.
I am not entirely sure about what happens to Egypt-Sudan in this context: on one hand, its large population may easily discourage direct European colonialism; on the other hand, the Europeans are surely going to demand their exclusive control of the all-important Suez Canal resource. One feasible compromise may be Egypt-Sudan being turned into a client state, and the Suez Canal zone being annexed by the EF as an exclave. Unlike OTL, this version of Europe is all but surely going to have the necessary resources and political will to suppress any conceivable Egyptian/Arab/Ottoman challenge to its control of the Canal for the foreseeable future, just like how Israel defended itself. Much the same way, I expect the preferred European way of dealing with the Middle East is to turn the Ottoman Empire into a client state, esp. once oil and gas become important resources, and oppose any attempts of the Ottomans/Arabs or other great powers to challenge their influence. Since ITTL assimilation of European Jews is as successful as in America, almost nobody is going to give any serious thought to Zionism; if Russian pogroms are still an issue, Russian Jews may easily immigrate to Europe or America. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire may well be averted, radically changing the history of the Middle East.
Potential British rivalry in its turf is not going to be too much of a serious threat for Europe. Past a point in the late 19th century, their vast resources and vigorous industrialization are going to give the Europeans everything they need to out-compete, out-build, and out-fight the British Empire, short of Britain doing an all-out mobilization of Indian resources (and facing independence of the Raj or its wagging the British dog in short order). I tend to assume ITTL there is an Anglo-European colonial war, a reverse Boer War on steroids, in the late 19th century that expels Britain from the Med, Egypt, the Middle East, and Southern Africa, unless the British see the writing on the wall and accept to withdraw from these areas peacefully. If Britain truly proves to be too much of an implacable annoyance (i.e. the guys in London decide to play Wellington or Churchill), Europe can surely afford to amass enough resources to overwhelm the RN, invade the British Isles or blockade them into economic collapse, and dismantle the British Empire. If the British do not prove that unreasonable, the Europeans may well be content with letting Britain stay independent but ever more out-competed in the economic field and the great-power game, albeit with India and Southeast Asia as a good consolation prize for a while. As a matter of fact, for the sake of geopolitical simplicity and neatness, this scenario does assume Britain seized the DEI and the Philippines during the Napoleonic Wars as a compensation for the losses it suffered or was going to suffer elsewhere. This may also concern the Southern Cone, although Britain may easily lose that colony (and Australasia) to US expansion later. TTL Britain may or may not care to set up a few economic colonies in West Africa and/or Central Africa as more of a consolation prize; since the EF mostly treats the region as outside its sphere of influence, it probably does not care much.
As it concerns Russia, Europe's strength surely forced it to lose all meaningful influence in the Baltic and Central Europe and withdraw within its pre-WWII or possibly even Brest-Litovsk borders. Strategic circumstances may or may not allow the Russians to be a meaningful rival of Europe in the Balkans and the Middle East, although all but surely as the underdog. In any case, it surely means Russia is forced to give up any westward drive and re-orient its expansionist vectors southward and eastward, doubling down on the colonization of Siberia and Central Asia and eating pieces of the Ottoman, Persian, and Chinese empires. The latter may concern Greater Armenia, Iranian Azerbajian, Afghanistan, Xinjiang, and Greater Mongolia; Japan's rise prevents Russia from doing the same to Greater Manchuria. This expansion pattern might heat up the Great Game, as underdog great powers fight for the remaining scraps. However, it is just as, if not more, likely Britain and Russia strike a compromise and team up to try and contain the European giant, just as it happened during the Napoleonic Wars and the World Wars. The all-important differences are this version of European hegemony faces no meaningful internal resistance and can easily pool all of its resources to overwhelm its Anglo-Russian enemies; moreover, unless Europe proves truly unreasonable about trade or US strategic interests, America has no real reasons to fight it and come to Britain's rescue. If Russia does prove too much of a threat, Europe may easily turn willing and is surely able to cut it down to Brest-Litovsk or 1992 levels. Anything more, however, seems unfeasible given Russia's size and population, unless the Europeans decide there is no other way but direct control to neutralize the Russian threat. On the other hand, if push comes to shove, a pissed-off Europe can surely afford to pull a 1066 and do to the British what the Western Allies did to the Axis powers after WWII.
As it concerns the Americas, this scenario does assume divergence actually starts during or just before the ARW and sends the USA on a development trajectory that makes it more expansionist, inclusive (with the possible exception of the freedmen), multi-cultural, and multi-lingual. It gradually expands to absorb all of North America (give or take NFL, Haiti, and the British West Indies), a varying but sizable portion of South America (surely including at least Gran Colombia, quite possibly Peru as well), and quite possibly Australasia too. ITTL the Southern Cone is British, but in the right circumstances to cause an Anglo-American clash, the USA may seize it and Australia. Brazil's role may vary. TTL circumstances make America more focused on its chosen turf, more self-sufficient, less Anglophile, and less interested in Old World affairs. A possible indirect exception may concern a potential outcome of the slavery issue. ITTL it does settled either by peaceful abolition and mass resettlement of the African diaspora into West Africa, or effective integration (by 19th century standards) of freedmen in American society.
If the former occurs, Liberia may easily grow from insignificant footnote of history to a regional power and potential hegemon of uncolonized Africa, an American-African equivalent of Israel on steroids. The Americo-Liberian settlers may easily exploit their large numbers and superior know-how to dominate/assimilate the indigeous peoples, absorb vast portions of West Africa, and potentially dominate or unify most or all of uncolonized Africa. The USA may easily grant them some significant support, although after having sent them far away, the Americans are unlikely to wish any closer relationship with them than patron and client.
In all likelihood, India's trajectory is not going to be much different from OTL, except schedule of its self-rule may vary, it may occur in different circumstances, and partition may be averted or occur in a different way. What happens in the subcontinent may easily become a template for British Southeast Asia, although things may change if the British resist decolonization too much or other powers seriously interfere. Indochina's role may vary, but lack of European colonization is going to make a serious difference. The entire region may well turn broadly similar to Siam.
As it concerns Japan and Northeast Asia, this scenario does assume circumstances drive the Japanese to undergo their modernization earlier (say 10-20 years) and give it a more liberal-democratic character. This enables the Japanese Empire to conquer Korea, Greater Manchuria, Sakhalin/Karafuto, Taiwan, and Hainan by the late 19th century and assimilate this Northeast Asian and insular core beyond any possible challenge by Korean nationalists, Russia, or China in the following decades. This gives the Japanese Empire the population, resources, and strategic depth it needs to prosper as a great power. It salso make the Japanese much less interested in exercising any more control on China than supporting friendly factions and proxies, at least as long as the Chinese stay mindful the Willow Palisade existed for a reason and do not attempt to seize Japanese territories. The Japanese may well be interested in exploiting anti-colonialism to challenge British control of Southeast Asia and replace it with its own hegemony. However this is only likely to happen if Britain is sufficienly weakened or distracted elsewhere (e.g. fighting America, Europe, or anti-colonial insurrections). If Japan is leaving China alone and focusing more on defending its core, its entire relationship with America may easily turn entirely different and much moe friendly. Sino-Japanese relationship may go various ways.
TTL circumstances make it almost sure China is going to lose all its border and island territories and experience even more shock from indirect colonial encroachment during the decline of the Qing, although direct colonization becomes even more unlikely. This might ultimately lessen the pain of transition to modernization and prevent much of the 20th century mess if monarchist or Nationalist reformers are able to seize power and stabilize the country timely, and enact necessary reforms. On the other hand, it might make things even worse, e.g. if militant xenophobia and nationalist resentment about lost territories and colonial encroachment lead the Chinese down the paths of the OTL bad guys by surrendering to toxic nationalism. As it concerns EF attitude about, most likely it broadly resembles the one of America: eager to secure good access to Chinese markets and pro-Chinese if China turns into a good trade partner, anti-Chinese if China turns into a threat, intolerant of other great powers' attempts to dominate the area as their exclusive turf. However, distance may tone down this pattern somewhat in comparison to the American behavior, unless the situation somehow inpinges on European vital interests, such as say China and Russia form a hostile alliance.
