What if: 1918 US shipbuilding program completed as planned

lordroel
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What if: 1918 US shipbuilding program completed as planned Aug 2, 2020 9:43:23 GMT 1bigrich likes this

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Post by lordroel on Aug 2, 2020 9:43:23 GMT

What if: 1918 US shipbuilding program completed as planned

So in 1918 the General Board of the United States Navy for the building program for 1920, recommended that a large building program be adopted in order that by 1925 the policy enunciated in 1915 might be assured, and the Navy of the United States would be, so far as the future could be seen, equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world. This was in effect a six-year building program, and would induce:

12 Battleships

Class for class, our battleships compare favorably in power with those of any other nation. Nos. 49-54, soon to be laid down, are designed for a displacement of 43,000 tons, 23 knots speed, a main battery of twelve 16-inch guns, and are heavily armored. They will be the most powerful vessels now building or, so far as is known, projected in the world.

For future capital ship construction, however, there are advocates of a so-called fast battleship which shall combine the qualities of the battleship (dreadnaught) and the battle cruiser.

The General Board, after long and close study of this question, is of the opinion that it would be unwise to attempt at this time the construction of such combination ships which would have a displacement of at least 54,500 tons as against the 43,000-ton battleship, less armor protection, and a speed of 29 knots as against the proposed 35 knots for the battle cruiser. The cost of the battleship of the 49-54 class is estimated at $27,121,365 complete, and of the fast battleship at $36,876,125.

The reasons for not adopting the fast battleship, as summarized by the General Board, are as follows:

1. Merging two types, each of which is needed, into one failing to answer fully the requirements of either, on account of—

2. Loss of speed as battle cruiser, and

3. Loss of protection as battleship.

4. Will introduce new elements into fleet maneuvering and tactics, being

5. More disturbing to homogeneity, without compensating advantages to the fleet as a whole.

6. Represents a radical departure from the gradual increases hitherto prevalent in battleship construction, and therefore

7. Would demand a rebuilding of the fleet, similarly to the introduction of the dreadnaught. This necessity the General Board is not prepared to admit.

8. It is unnecessarily large and therefore inordinately expensive, considered either as a battleship or battle cruiser, for meeting the like type of a possible enemy.

9. Will take a longer time for design and construction than the General Board type of either battleship or battle cruiser.

16 Battle cruisers

The 1920 building program adds 16 battle cruisers to the 6 already authorized; making a total by 1925 of 22. Great Britain has now 13 of these vessels built or building, and it is estimated that if she continues building on the annual average in the last 20 years, she will have 19 or 20 battle cruisers in 1925.

As in all other types of naval ships, the battle cruiser must be provided because other navies have them. Type must meet type. The battle cruiser is in reality a glorified scout. She must have high speed and cruising endurance, that she may overtake and bring to battle enemy vessels of similar type and also that she may be employed in scouting, in protecting our own sea transportation routes, or in raiding the enemy's routes. She must be heavily armed in order that she may successfully fight enemy vessels of similar type and also that she may be able to fight for information and break through an enemy screen or successfully support our own protective screen of lighter vessels formed to detect the approach of the enemy and guard the main body from surprise.

By her size, speed, and armament, the battle cruiser is well able to perform other combatant services. She may aid the battleship line in a general action by taking up a favorable torpedo position (possible through her great speed) where her own heavy guns will also be effective.

The effectiveness of battle cruisers was well illustrated in the battles of the Falkland Islands and the North Sea (Jutland).
One of the greatest anxieties of the United States after entering the war, when our troops in great numbers were crossing the Atlantic, was that one or more of the German battle cruisers might get on the transport route and sink great numbers of the crowded transports. We had nothing of sufficient speed and power to overtake or even to chase away such a vessel. The damage possible by submarines under the conditions obtaining was small compared with the possibilities for havoc should a battle cruiser appear on the trans-Atlantic route.

16 Scouts cruisers

The 1920 building program provides for 30 scouts in addition to the 10 authorized by the act of August 29, 1916 (3 years' building program), making 40 in all.

Great Britain has 31 cruisers of the first class and 89 light cruisers, most of them of high speed, a total of 120. A scout is an information seeking and patrol vessel. This type forms the most efficient screen for the main fleet; to gather information; to prevent surprise and to guard against the approach of torpedo craft. They are, so to speak, the cavalry of the fleet. Their uses in naval operations are innumerable. They take the place of the frigates for which Nelson was always calling.

Our fleet has always been lamentably short in scouting and screening vessels. It is hardly too much to say that except for the 10 scouts just begun we have none. We have had to have recourse to our destroyers, which besides not being well fitted to the work of screening vessels have other important duties to perform.

30 Destroyers

The 1920 program provides for 108 destroyers. There are now built or building 330 and 12 not yet ordered, a total of 342. The total in 1925 would, therefore, be 450. Great Britain has in destroyers and destroyer leaders, built or building, approximately 516.

A careful study of the Navy's requirements leads the General Board to believe that the number mentioned, 450, will be sufficient, so far as can now be foreseen. The importance of the destroyer type and the need for large numbers of them have been amply demonstrated in the war.

108 Submarines

The 1920 building program provides for the following submarines in addition to those now building or authorized:

21 Fleet submarines.

146 S Type subamrines.

24 Antisubmarine.

There are now built, building, or authorized a total of 169 coast submarines and 12 fleet submarines; 65 of the authorized coast submarines are of the S type, about 800 tons. Many of the earlier types of boats are obsolete and others, as shown by the experience of the war, unable to properly perform the service required of them.

The General Board estimates that a total of 294 S type boats are required for the Navy, including 120 boats for the patrol of the Atlantic, 84 for the Pacific, and 90 for a mobile force to act at a distance from bases, allow for those under repair, etc.

As the older type boats become inefficient they should be replaced by the S type. The General Board recommends that of the 146 eventually required, 75 be authorized now (revised estimate).

Twelve fleet submarines have been authorized, but work has only been done on three of them. The General Board estimated that 33 such vessels are needed for the fleet of 1925. In view of present conditions the General Board does not recommend any new construction of fleet submarines in the pending bill. Mine-laying submarines, of which we now have none, have been found during the war to be of great use. We should possess some of this type, that we may familiarize ourselves with their construction and manipulation tactically and otherwise. The construction of a small number, say 10, as pilot vessels of the type, should be commenced at once.

The antisubmarine submarine, of which 24 were recommended, was in response to an apparent demand for vessels of this type as a result of war experience. They were, however, more for use in the North Sea and adjacent waters should the war continue than for general service, and this type should be held in abeyance for the present so far as our Navy is concerned.

The British Navy has now built or building, 222 submarines, of which about 75 are of large or fleet type, varying from 1,160 tons (the size of our 3-AA) to about 2,650 tons surface displacement.

6 Airplane Carriers

The airplane carrier is a development of the present war. The development of aircraft, both heavier and lighter than air, has been very great. Aircraft will in future play an important part in all scouting operations of the fleet.

The General Board is convinced that fleet engagements will in future be preceded by operations in the air. It is therefore necessary that facilities be provided our fleet to carry on such operations.

In a letter dated January 21, 1917, Admiral Beatty, commander in chief of the British Grand Fleet, said that according to latest information the Germans have 6 seaplane carriers and that in fleet operations they appear to be working seaplanes in conjunction with Zeppelins (rigid airships). He further remarks that "Every effort should be made to develop the use of naval aircraft for fleet purposes in every possible respect.

"In March, 1918, the British had 11 such vessels in service, the Compania of 18,000 tons being the largest. To these have been added the Argus, Furious, and Eagle, and perhaps a few others. The Argus is so far as our information goes, the first ship specially built as a seaplane carrier. The Furious was adapted from the battle cruiser of that name and the Eagle from a ship building for the Chilean Government at the outbreak of the war, the Almirante Cochrane."

The General Board has proposed tentative characteristics for a ship of this type for our Navy, and has recommended its development by the Department. In the 1920 program the inclusion of six ships of this type was recommended. This number, again, may safely be modified, but we should proceed with the construction of, say, two of these vessels for work with the fleet.

(full list can be see here: COMMITTEE OF NAVAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D. C, Thursday, December 12, 1918)

Last Edit: Aug 2, 2020 9:44:35 GMT by lordroel

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stevep
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What if: 1918 US shipbuilding program completed as planned Aug 2, 2020 11:29:03 GMT lordroel and 1bigrich like this

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Post by stevep on Aug 2, 2020 11:29:03 GMT

lordroel ,

The title refers to the 1918 programme, a modified version of the original 1916 one but you also mention details of a proposed 1920 one. I'll restrict myself to the former for the moment.

OTL from what I've read/heard there was insufficient political will for the 1918 programme to be completed even if the WNT had broken down without an agreement but its possible in that case that most/all of the USN programme would be completed, at least until the Japanese programme collapses - which is likely to occur when the Tokyo earthquake occurs in 1923 if not before. However if it does and given the immense size of the 1918 programme its likely to exhaust the willpower of the US government and population.

There is a lot where the navy is playing fast and loose with the facts. For instance until 1916 it had rejected the idea of the BC or any fast BB, settling for a slow but very heavily protected battle line. There is still reference to this in the document with its support for the Mahan idea of a single decisive battle. Similarly by seeking to compare itself with a RN at its war time size and with expected continued mass production its setting an artificially very high bar that unless deeply ignorant it knows won't be met. The RN will shrink considerably in the years ahead simply because that is a wartime maximum even apart from the huge costs of the war for Britain. Similarly seeking to say the USN needs 43.000 ton BCs to match older RN BCs 4 of which are less than half that size and most of the others much smaller. Also the claim that they need a very large fleet to protect the large merchant ship programme under construction, which is itself a political project and according to some sources a huge economic disaster. Ditto its reference to how Germany with the 2nd largest fleet in 1914 saw its merchant trade quickly swept from the seas. This was less due to the size of the Germany fleet and far more geography as Britain had worldwide bases and a position that effectively blockaded German ports simply from the location of the UK, which wouldn't be the case in the event of an [extremely] unlikely UK-US conflict.

It could be in part because traditionally Congress has drastically cut back naval plans, either directly or by starving them of funds that the navy is aiming for Luna orbit in order to get something that can fly so to speak.

Or that they are seeing a lot of career options in such a huge force.

However assuming most/all of the 1918 programme as revised is completed then their likely to face a number of problems. Its going to need a lot of people to crew and support this force and from what I've read between the wars the USN had serious problems manning the ships they had OTL. Even in the depth of the recession in the early 30's they were struggling to man there forces. As such to construct and operate the force is going to be hugely expensive. The US can afford this but its far larger than the navy they maintained after WWII when the US was realising it was accepting world wide commitments and had a markedly larger industrial base as well as a larger demographic one. As such I can see it being unpopular with an increasing proportion of the US population and hence Congress and a lot of pressure to return to the traditional aim of a fleet that can protect its coastal trade and local interests in areas such as the Caribbean and be the basis of a fleet that could serve wider afield in the event of a war, most likely with Japan at some point. Especially since that mammoth MS fleet is likely to only be viable on protected coastal and colonial trade from which other nations are banned as US manning costs were too large. Alternatively much of the existing battle-fleet, most of which is relatively new will be retired/mothballed and the USN's active battle-fleet may consist largely of those 16 new capital ships and say the last 5-7 ships completed during WWI. Which many will see as a huge waste of money.

The other problem for the US, since I can't see major new construction after this for some time is the huge shipyard capacity, created for those naval and merchant programmes, is going to face a distinct lack of work once their completed so your likely to see the boom followed by a massive bust with a lot of shipyards closing down and people being made unemployed. Longer term with so much of their fleet constructed in a short period of time and then a sharp contraction of the capacity for new construction and probably very little if any new ships built for a decade or so their going to face a serious mass obsolescent problem. Similarly to what the RN faced in the late 30's due to the large lump of construction started during the run up to WWI then the naval treaties and government hostility which made them possible to spending money on new capital ships. Its not likely to be as bad for the US as assuming no treaties you could see the will to build new ships starting to emerge in the early 30's say and also the naval is far less important to the US's survival than it is to Britain with its dependency on maritime trade and world wide commitments.

For the capital ships themselves the BBs are decent and powerful designs but slow so in a war they can only force combat if able to restrict the movement of the enemy probably by attacking somewhere that enemy must defend. Also the S Dakota class, which forms the core of the fleet are tight ships with relatively little capacity for additional growth. I.e. not much scope to add on more equipment without them becoming top heavy. Since as time passes there will be demands for more electronic equipment, such as assorted radars and for many more AA guns, which also need storage of ammo and of men to operate them this restricts their ability to be upgraded. There will be some capacity as power plants improve in capacity meaning smaller and more modern turbines and boilers can free up weight. However this would need major reconstruction and also since the weight lost is low in the ship if too much weight is added above the hull level that worsens the top weight problem.

The BC's are markedly improved from their initial 1916 designs in part because of improvements in engine technology and also information transferred from the RN one of who's designers gave details of HMS Hood and ideas for how the US ships could be improved. However while fast - 34-35 kts as designed - and armed with 8x16" guns they are very thinly armoured with the belts being only 7-8" max. As such if going up against opponents armed with 14-16" guns, let alone possibly 18" or simply air attacks as a/c develop in capacity they could be very vulnerable. It might be that a couple would be completed as CVs as OTL as the USN could struggle to get money for carriers as well as gun ships. Its noted that in 1918 they still seem to be thinking largely of seaplane carriers or possible that's what their mentioning because that's the vast bulk of the carriers in service elsewhere.

Well that was more of a tome than I intended but as you may have gathered I've thought about it and discussed it a lot on the naval boards.

In terms of other countries and wider impacts that would probably be largely restricted to the other two great naval powers. I.e. Britain and Japan. Taking the latter 1st this will put more pressure on it to complete its own 8:8 programme which was triggered in part by the earlier 1916 US programme. I can't see this happening, especially after the 1923 quake. Japan simply doesn't have the economic base at this point and the project was already swallowing a large proportion of the GDP. Plus both liberal elements and the army, which won't want so much money going to its bitter rival are likely to oppose completing the programme and looking for an alternative. As such I would expect serious economic problems to be critical in 1924/25 say, which is likely to see the Japanese programme sharply curtailed. A lot would depend on how things develop. At best there is a reaction against high military spending and a victory for the more liberal elements of Japanese society, which might be more likely if the alliance with Britain has survived. Japan could swing onto a far better path, both for it and its neighbours. This would be likely to also result in new pressure for some sort of naval treaty, which could occur. At worst you get the militarists taking over earlier but with a clearer domination by the army. The Japanese fleet by 1925 is going to be larger than OTL, say 6-8 of the planned ships ultimately completed but that's probably going to be it and carrier development especially is likely to be retarded.

For Britain again a lot would depend on the details. US determination to complete their massive programme would mean no treaty agreement on restricting construction. As such the initial 4G3's are likely to go ahead, while the alliance with Japan might continue, in part because it gave Britain influence in Tokyo and also Australia and New Zealand definitely wanted this. I suspect that the N3's wouldn't be started quickly but I could be wrong. Assuming both other powers still build large numbers of ships ideally I would say another, somewhat improved 4G3's are laid down say in ~1925-26-27. After that it would depend on circumstances. By this time you would probably see most/all of the 12" and 13.5" ships retired

Growing economic strain and political pressure might see some sort of treaty agreed although if the US has produced most/all of its planned ships by ~1925 its going to be difficult to get some sort of agreement due to the tonnage balance. With 10-12 ships in the ~43Kton category and Britain almost certainly wanting equality that would mean a fair bit more construction for Britain. 8 G3's in total during the 20's would go some way to balance that but probably Britain would still be able to build more in the early 30's - although if the depression still occurs that could reduce/remove the political will. Also of course with so many ships in the 40-50kton size about its likely that any new treaty ships would probably be say in the 40k category.

This would be a better position for Britain as its able to avoid the collapse of its infrastructure and the terrible mass obsolescence that occurred OTL. Especially since its likely that no other naval powers apart from the big three are likely to construct large ships before the early/mid 30's at least. However there are so many butterflies that just about anything could occur.

Steve

PS That as you can tell is from my British prospective. Be interesting to see what 1bigrich thinks of it.

Last Edit: Aug 2, 2020 11:35:36 GMT by stevep

lordroel
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What if: 1918 US shipbuilding program completed as planned Aug 2, 2020 11:39:45 GMT

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Post by lordroel on Aug 2, 2020 11:39:45 GMT

Aug 2, 2020 11:29:03 GMT stevep said: