Post by lordroel on May 28, 2020 15:17:56 GMT
So this YouTube clip, Reddit post and other stuff i found got me wondering, could Sweden in the 1940 to 1943 period have been able to stop a German invasion.
YouTube (Could Sweden have withstood a German Blitzkrieg in WW2?)
- As late as February 26th 1940 there were discussions about including Sweden in the German operation "Weserübung", but when the operation began on April 9th 1940 Sweden had been excluded. [s63]
- Bolt-action rifles dating to the late 19th century was standard armament in all armies in ww2, with the exception of the US army - the US being the only country with the industrial capacity (and the infantry doctrine) to equip all their men with with semi-automatic rifles (except the Marine Corps, which continued to use M1903 Springfield bolt-action rifles).
- The 1925 defence decision called for 4 line divisions, but you completely miss both the motorised brigade (created out of the cavalry division that was disbanded) and the local defence/landstormen that consisted of the oldest 10 classes and was almost as large as the line army and tasked with local defence. The army was far larger than just 4 divisions and could mobilise roughly 400 000 men in 1939.
- Swedish had more artillery than that in 1939. There were 120 modernised light field guns, 200 ww1 vintage light field guns, 174 pre-ww1 light field guns (without recoil system), 160 ww1 vintage medium howitzers, 48 modern heavy field guns, 12 ww1 vintage heavy field guns, 53 pre-ww1 heavy field guns (without recoil system), 28 modern heavy howitzers, 66 ww1 vintage heavy howitzers and 12 ww1 vintage heavy siege howitzers, for a total of 227 pre-ww1, 450 ww1 vintage and 176 modern artillery pieces.
- Sweden had in active service 48 MG-armed tanks and 16 cannon-armed tanks in 1939, with 7 MG-armed and 5 cannon-armed older tanks in depots used for training. There were 25 cannon-armed and 21 MG-armed and armoured cars in active service, with 8 MG-armed armoured cars in depots used for training. Total numbers are thus 21 gun-armed and 55 MG-armed tanks and 25 cannon-armed and 29 MG-armed armoured cars.
- Sweden had 173 planes in active service in 1939, plus around 50 planes in reserve (a mix of reserves for the active units and older planes) with a further roughly 50 trainer and liason planes. While most were biplanes, the roughly 45 B 3 (Junkers Ju 86) and 11 T 2 (Heinkel He 115) were not.
- Sweden did not get most of her equipment abroad - all equipment save some planes were produced locally, albeit often on license. Ammunition was standard 6,5x55mm (for rifles, LMGs and MGs) and 9x21mm (for pistols and SMGs) in 1939. It was only the war that led to some imports of non-standard calibre weapons, including 7,92x57mm Mauser and the switch of the standard pistol bullet from the 9x21mm to the 9x19mm. Non-standard weapons were usually sent back to the depots and modified to standard calibres once enough arms were available and the immediate invasion threat died down.
- Only the US feared Sweden would go over to the other side and impounded arms orders - mostly aircrafts in the form of 60 J 9 (Serversky EP-106), 58 B 6 (Repubic 2PA) and 144 J 10 (Vultee P-66 Vanguard). Sweden purchased arms from Germany (including captured Bofors weapons from Poland and Austria), Switzerland, Italy and Finland and eventually radar stations from Britain. No-one gave arms - they were paid for, and in the Italian case, through the nose in strategic materials.
- One needs to remember that Germany actively threatened war with Sweden if Sweden allowed Allied troops on its soil, which influenced the Swedish "no" quite a bit. Germany would not stand idly by if the Allies tried to secure the Swedish iron ore.
- The Landstorm that manned the Per-Albin line had served on average 360 days of conscription and at least 100 days of neutrality watch during ww1. To claim that they could not operate the weapons of the line is simply silly - the line had very few anti-tank weapons, mostly because tanks as part of a naval landing on a beach were not a thing in 1940 (and would remain a very minor thing until the Allies built a large amount of amphibious tanks and landing crafts for tanks for the invasion of Normandy in 1944). The Germans certainly had nothing that could land tanks at beaches in 1940.
- The Swedish offensive plans against German-occupied Norway in 1941-1944 focused on Mo-i-Rana, which was the closest port to the border and also lacked a rail connection to the rest of Norway, making it a much easier target, not Narvik.
- In 1940 there were 230 000 men in the line army, and 190 000 men in local defence units, which were tactically but not operationally mobile. The local defence held down fortified lines, air fields, garrisons, cities, ports and beach defences, freeing up the line army to deploy wherever it was needed and for offensive or counter-offensive work. In 1941, this had increased to 340 000 men in the line army and 260 000 men in the local defence, plus another 100 000 in the home guard. By that time, the local defence actually had more MGs and AT guns than the line army, since they manned a lot of fixed fortifications.
- The German intelligence on the Swedish army was beyond horrible. The officer responsible, Major Karl Ogilvie at Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West) simply copied the same assessment from 1939 to 1944, indicating that Sweden lacked AA capability (despite that more than 1 000 40mm Bofors guns and 1 200 20mm AA guns had been delivered to the army), lacked mechanised forces (despite Sweden having a motorised brigade since 1937 and creating 2 armoured brigades, each with 140 tanks in Summer 1943, which grew to 3 armoured brigades with 185 tanks each in early 1944) and was entirely focused on defence (despite General Rappe conducting a very skilled infantry attack in the Finnish style durin the great exercises of January 1942). The German military attaché in Sweden, Bruno von Uthmann writes in his memoirs that no German plans on Sweden was ever made, which means he was not consulted at all (and he was probably the one who knew the Swedish army the best). On the other hand, Swedish intelligence on the German forces in Norway was excellent. 2 days after 25. Panzer-division moved from Oslo to Trondheim, the new location shows up in the staff reports of II. MILO, the Swedish military area tasked with defending that part of the border. Sweden also acquired the report the German staff of the 25. Panzer-division prepared for the planned invasion (this if anything is an intelligence master-piece!). The report also included that Sweden lacked any armoured units. The Germans were completely unaware of the Swedish 9. and 10. Pansarbrigaden armoured brigades placed in reserve to counter any German armoured trusts in Summer 1943.
- By Summer 1943, it was obvious that while the Germans might be able to conquer Sweden, they could ill afford to move the resources necessary to do so from other fronts - the resources in Norway was not enough, and Sweden's attitude changed accordingly. Sweden had 360 planes in combat units Summer 1943 - the Germans had 155 in Denmark, Norway and Finland.
- von Schell's plan called for at least one regiment of paratroopers, 2 panzer divisions and at least 4 infantry divisions, he never had any paratroopers, only 1 panzer division (weakly equipped and completely green) and 2-3 infantry divisions, depending on how much the other divisions in Norway were cannibalised. Sweden at this time had 10 infantry divisions, 1 motorised and 2 armoured brigades (that had more tanks than the German 25. Panzer-division) as well as the local defence and the home guard, their numbes being equilent to about 10 more infantry divisions (albeing lacking in artillery).
- von Schell himself commented his plan when it was discovered in the archives and then debated heatedly in Sweden in the 60s in a polite reply that he never had the forces the plan called for.
- The force mobilised in 1943 was 300 000 men, with another 300 000 plus 100 000 in the Home Guard available for mobilisation. They were mobilised because Sweden planned to cancel the transition treaty and wanted to be ready for a potential German armed response, or at least make a show of force to discourage the Germans from any armed response. Sweden knew the Germans had a panzer division in Norway and closely tracked its movement, but did not know the details of the German plan - it was discovered in the 60s.
- Sweden did not fear a communist take-over of Denmark and Norway. The "police" troops were created to give the Norwegian and Danish governments a reliable force to establish order after a German collapse (or perhaps even invade if the German forces refused to surrender after Berlin did), arrest collaborators and prevent the Germans from taking civilians as hostages or destroying evidence of their war crimes.
- You keep consistently call mortars "grenade launchers" - there's a substantial difference. Mortars were quick-fire weapons with dedicated crews and forward observers, grenade launchers were attached to rifles and used by the infantry to throw hand grenade sized rifle grenades further than a man could throw them, but much shorter and with a much lower rate of fire than mortars.
YouTube (Could Sweden have withstood a German Blitzkrieg in WW2?)
- As late as February 26th 1940 there were discussions about including Sweden in the German operation "Weserübung", but when the operation began on April 9th 1940 Sweden had been excluded. [s63]
- Bolt-action rifles dating to the late 19th century was standard armament in all armies in ww2, with the exception of the US army - the US being the only country with the industrial capacity (and the infantry doctrine) to equip all their men with with semi-automatic rifles (except the Marine Corps, which continued to use M1903 Springfield bolt-action rifles).
- The 1925 defence decision called for 4 line divisions, but you completely miss both the motorised brigade (created out of the cavalry division that was disbanded) and the local defence/landstormen that consisted of the oldest 10 classes and was almost as large as the line army and tasked with local defence. The army was far larger than just 4 divisions and could mobilise roughly 400 000 men in 1939.
- Swedish had more artillery than that in 1939. There were 120 modernised light field guns, 200 ww1 vintage light field guns, 174 pre-ww1 light field guns (without recoil system), 160 ww1 vintage medium howitzers, 48 modern heavy field guns, 12 ww1 vintage heavy field guns, 53 pre-ww1 heavy field guns (without recoil system), 28 modern heavy howitzers, 66 ww1 vintage heavy howitzers and 12 ww1 vintage heavy siege howitzers, for a total of 227 pre-ww1, 450 ww1 vintage and 176 modern artillery pieces.
- Sweden had in active service 48 MG-armed tanks and 16 cannon-armed tanks in 1939, with 7 MG-armed and 5 cannon-armed older tanks in depots used for training. There were 25 cannon-armed and 21 MG-armed and armoured cars in active service, with 8 MG-armed armoured cars in depots used for training. Total numbers are thus 21 gun-armed and 55 MG-armed tanks and 25 cannon-armed and 29 MG-armed armoured cars.
- Sweden had 173 planes in active service in 1939, plus around 50 planes in reserve (a mix of reserves for the active units and older planes) with a further roughly 50 trainer and liason planes. While most were biplanes, the roughly 45 B 3 (Junkers Ju 86) and 11 T 2 (Heinkel He 115) were not.
- Sweden did not get most of her equipment abroad - all equipment save some planes were produced locally, albeit often on license. Ammunition was standard 6,5x55mm (for rifles, LMGs and MGs) and 9x21mm (for pistols and SMGs) in 1939. It was only the war that led to some imports of non-standard calibre weapons, including 7,92x57mm Mauser and the switch of the standard pistol bullet from the 9x21mm to the 9x19mm. Non-standard weapons were usually sent back to the depots and modified to standard calibres once enough arms were available and the immediate invasion threat died down.
- Only the US feared Sweden would go over to the other side and impounded arms orders - mostly aircrafts in the form of 60 J 9 (Serversky EP-106), 58 B 6 (Repubic 2PA) and 144 J 10 (Vultee P-66 Vanguard). Sweden purchased arms from Germany (including captured Bofors weapons from Poland and Austria), Switzerland, Italy and Finland and eventually radar stations from Britain. No-one gave arms - they were paid for, and in the Italian case, through the nose in strategic materials.
- One needs to remember that Germany actively threatened war with Sweden if Sweden allowed Allied troops on its soil, which influenced the Swedish "no" quite a bit. Germany would not stand idly by if the Allies tried to secure the Swedish iron ore.
- The Landstorm that manned the Per-Albin line had served on average 360 days of conscription and at least 100 days of neutrality watch during ww1. To claim that they could not operate the weapons of the line is simply silly - the line had very few anti-tank weapons, mostly because tanks as part of a naval landing on a beach were not a thing in 1940 (and would remain a very minor thing until the Allies built a large amount of amphibious tanks and landing crafts for tanks for the invasion of Normandy in 1944). The Germans certainly had nothing that could land tanks at beaches in 1940.
- The Swedish offensive plans against German-occupied Norway in 1941-1944 focused on Mo-i-Rana, which was the closest port to the border and also lacked a rail connection to the rest of Norway, making it a much easier target, not Narvik.
- In 1940 there were 230 000 men in the line army, and 190 000 men in local defence units, which were tactically but not operationally mobile. The local defence held down fortified lines, air fields, garrisons, cities, ports and beach defences, freeing up the line army to deploy wherever it was needed and for offensive or counter-offensive work. In 1941, this had increased to 340 000 men in the line army and 260 000 men in the local defence, plus another 100 000 in the home guard. By that time, the local defence actually had more MGs and AT guns than the line army, since they manned a lot of fixed fortifications.
- The German intelligence on the Swedish army was beyond horrible. The officer responsible, Major Karl Ogilvie at Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West) simply copied the same assessment from 1939 to 1944, indicating that Sweden lacked AA capability (despite that more than 1 000 40mm Bofors guns and 1 200 20mm AA guns had been delivered to the army), lacked mechanised forces (despite Sweden having a motorised brigade since 1937 and creating 2 armoured brigades, each with 140 tanks in Summer 1943, which grew to 3 armoured brigades with 185 tanks each in early 1944) and was entirely focused on defence (despite General Rappe conducting a very skilled infantry attack in the Finnish style durin the great exercises of January 1942). The German military attaché in Sweden, Bruno von Uthmann writes in his memoirs that no German plans on Sweden was ever made, which means he was not consulted at all (and he was probably the one who knew the Swedish army the best). On the other hand, Swedish intelligence on the German forces in Norway was excellent. 2 days after 25. Panzer-division moved from Oslo to Trondheim, the new location shows up in the staff reports of II. MILO, the Swedish military area tasked with defending that part of the border. Sweden also acquired the report the German staff of the 25. Panzer-division prepared for the planned invasion (this if anything is an intelligence master-piece!). The report also included that Sweden lacked any armoured units. The Germans were completely unaware of the Swedish 9. and 10. Pansarbrigaden armoured brigades placed in reserve to counter any German armoured trusts in Summer 1943.
- By Summer 1943, it was obvious that while the Germans might be able to conquer Sweden, they could ill afford to move the resources necessary to do so from other fronts - the resources in Norway was not enough, and Sweden's attitude changed accordingly. Sweden had 360 planes in combat units Summer 1943 - the Germans had 155 in Denmark, Norway and Finland.
- von Schell's plan called for at least one regiment of paratroopers, 2 panzer divisions and at least 4 infantry divisions, he never had any paratroopers, only 1 panzer division (weakly equipped and completely green) and 2-3 infantry divisions, depending on how much the other divisions in Norway were cannibalised. Sweden at this time had 10 infantry divisions, 1 motorised and 2 armoured brigades (that had more tanks than the German 25. Panzer-division) as well as the local defence and the home guard, their numbes being equilent to about 10 more infantry divisions (albeing lacking in artillery).
- von Schell himself commented his plan when it was discovered in the archives and then debated heatedly in Sweden in the 60s in a polite reply that he never had the forces the plan called for.
- The force mobilised in 1943 was 300 000 men, with another 300 000 plus 100 000 in the Home Guard available for mobilisation. They were mobilised because Sweden planned to cancel the transition treaty and wanted to be ready for a potential German armed response, or at least make a show of force to discourage the Germans from any armed response. Sweden knew the Germans had a panzer division in Norway and closely tracked its movement, but did not know the details of the German plan - it was discovered in the 60s.
- Sweden did not fear a communist take-over of Denmark and Norway. The "police" troops were created to give the Norwegian and Danish governments a reliable force to establish order after a German collapse (or perhaps even invade if the German forces refused to surrender after Berlin did), arrest collaborators and prevent the Germans from taking civilians as hostages or destroying evidence of their war crimes.
- You keep consistently call mortars "grenade launchers" - there's a substantial difference. Mortars were quick-fire weapons with dedicated crews and forward observers, grenade launchers were attached to rifles and used by the infantry to throw hand grenade sized rifle grenades further than a man could throw them, but much shorter and with a much lower rate of fire than mortars.
