stevep
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Post by stevep on May 1, 2020 11:13:54 GMT
I think we're disagreed on that 2nd point before. 
Steve
Can't remember if we did. I was assuming you were talking about the time of the Munich Affair?
If you mean the surrender of Czechoslovakia then yes, or possibly even earlier. If the allies had been willing to say no on the reoccupation of the Rhineland that would have made it impossible for Hitler to go on the warpath and the prestige loss and realisation of the risks they were running might even have seriously weakened his regime.
Steve
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Post by EwellHolmes on May 1, 2020 15:31:23 GMT
Can't remember if we did. I was assuming you were talking about the time of the Munich Affair?
If you mean the surrender of Czechoslovakia then yes, or possibly even earlier. If the allies had been willing to say no on the reoccupation of the Rhineland that would have made it impossible for Hitler to go on the warpath and the prestige loss and realisation of the risks they were running might even have seriously weakened his regime.
Steve
The Rhineland in 1936 I agree, but by the time of Munich in late 1938 the balance of power was overwhelmingly in favor of the Germans. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2020 10:36:25 GMT
If you mean the surrender of Czechoslovakia then yes, or possibly even earlier. If the allies had been willing to say no on the reoccupation of the Rhineland that would have made it impossible for Hitler to go on the warpath and the prestige loss and realisation of the risks they were running might even have seriously weakened his regime.
Steve
The Rhineland in 1936 I agree, but by the time of Munich in late 1938 the balance of power was overwhelmingly in favor of the Germans.
Lets see, heavily outnumbered and with largely green forces, lacking much of a tank force and with a still inexperienced air arm. Having to fight on at least two fronts. In the east facing powerful defences boosted by the terrain. Yes there might be some extremists in the region who could try taking on a well armed military with personal weapons but with their homes becoming a war zone I suspect most of the German minority would look for shelter until the conflict was over. Also no allies in this scenario so the economic situation is markedly worse.
Steve
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Post by EwellHolmes on May 2, 2020 11:24:54 GMT
The Rhineland in 1936 I agree, but by the time of Munich in late 1938 the balance of power was overwhelmingly in favor of the Germans.
Lets see, heavily outnumbered and with largely green forces, lacking much of a tank force and with a still inexperienced air arm. Having to fight on at least two fronts. In the east facing powerful defences boosted by the terrain. Yes there might be some extremists in the region who could try taking on a well armed military with personal weapons but with their homes becoming a war zone I suspect most of the German minority would look for shelter until the conflict was over. Also no allies in this scenario so the economic situation is markedly worse.
Steve
Alright, so 1938 is the scenario right? By October of 1938, the Wehrmacht had four Panzer divisions and was standing up a fifth in November. By contrast, the first French tank division was not put into service until January of 1940. Even ignoring that, it only took three tank divisions at Sedan in 1940 to beat the French. The S35 tank that would equip the French during the Battle of France had only just entered full production at the start of the year, and less than 100 had been completed by mid 1938.They were also not green; the Wehrmacht had been conducting field exercises since 1934, the French did not start doing the same until 1938, as a result of the Munich Crisis. The same held true for infantry; the Germans actually had more divisions and men under arms than the French and Czechs combined in 1938 and, as stated, had been conducting field exercises for years by that point while the French...hadn't. A good example of this was how badly the French offensive in late 1939 went, with a major issue being they lacked sufficient engineers to even clear minefields. The situation was even worse for the British, who in October of 1938 only had two-yes, just two-divisions which could be deployed. Once cannot overstate how mobilization from late 1938 to early 1940 helped the Anglo-French, with France going from 65 Divisions in 1939 to 117 in 1940. How about the air? The MS. 406 was the only French fighter equal to the Me-109 but production in 1938 was only 65 aircraft. In contrast, the Germans had over 500 by this point. In addition, they also had over 60 Bf-110s and about 300 older biplanes. The most common fighter they would face were the Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which were outdated (They had fixed landing gear and open cockpits compared to the Me-109s and Me-110s). The RAF, meanwhile, had just one-yes, just one-squadron of Hurricanes which had 16 planes with four more forming in November. No Spitfires were to be had at all at this point. As for experience, the Luftwaffe had just gained years of it in Spain, while the Anglo-French hadn't. So the Germans held an overwhelming technical, numerical and experience edge of the Anglo-French to the point any contest is beyond questioning of how it would go. As for the Czechs, most of their fortifications were rated by themselves and the Germans as medium to light, with few actually being heavy. The German plan was a pincer attack and paratrooper drops to disrupt the communications; they actually conducted war games Post-Occupation in order to learn lessons for dealing with the French in the near-future and assessed that, in an absolute best case scenario, the Czechs would've held out for two to three months in total, so basically a better Poland. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2020 13:44:06 GMT
Lets see, heavily outnumbered and with largely green forces, lacking much of a tank force and with a still inexperienced air arm. Having to fight on at least two fronts. In the east facing powerful defences boosted by the terrain. Yes there might be some extremists in the region who could try taking on a well armed military with personal weapons but with their homes becoming a war zone I suspect most of the German minority would look for shelter until the conflict was over. Also no allies in this scenario so the economic situation is markedly worse.
Steve
Alright, so 1938 is the scenario right? By October of 1938, the Wehrmacht had four Panzer divisions and was standing up a fifth in November. By contrast, the first French tank division was not put into service until January of 1940. Even ignoring that, it only took three tank divisions at Sedan in 1940 to beat the French. The S35 tank that would equip the French during the Battle of France had only just entered full production at the start of the year, and less than 100 had been completed by mid 1938.They were also not green; the Wehrmacht had been conducting field exercises since 1934, the French did not start doing the same until 1938, as a result of the Munich Crisis. The same held true for infantry; the Germans actually had more divisions and men under arms than the French and Czechs combined in 1938 and, as stated, had been conducting field exercises for years by that point while the French...hadn't. A good example of this was how badly the French offensive in late 1939 went, with a major issue being they lacked sufficient engineers to even clear minefields. The situation was even worse for the British, who in October of 1938 only had two-yes, just two-divisions which could be deployed. Once cannot overstate how mobilization from late 1938 to early 1940 helped the Anglo-French, with France going from 65 Divisions in 1939 to 117 in 1940. How about the air? The MS. 406 was the only French fighter equal to the Me-109 but production in 1938 was only 65 aircraft. In contrast, the Germans had over 500 by this point. In addition, they also had over 60 Bf-110s and about 300 older biplanes. The most common fighter they would face were the Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which were outdated (They had fixed landing gear and open cockpits compared to the Me-109s and Me-110s). The RAF, meanwhile, had just one-yes, just one-squadron of Hurricanes which had 16 planes with four more forming in November. No Spitfires were to be had at all at this point. As for experience, the Luftwaffe had just gained years of it in Spain, while the Anglo-French hadn't. So the Germans held an overwhelming technical, numerical and experience edge of the Anglo-French to the point any contest is beyond questioning of how it would go. As for the Czechs, most of their fortifications were rated by themselves and the Germans as medium to light, with few actually being heavy. The German plan was a pincer attack and paratrooper drops to disrupt the communications; they actually conducted war games Post-Occupation in order to learn lessons for dealing with the French in the near-future and assessed that, in an absolute best case scenario, the Czechs would've held out for two to three months in total, so basically a better Poland.
The French had large numbers of trained men to call upon. The Germans had only recently been able to introduce conscription so many of their men had minimal experience. France had older equipment which had been in place for some time. German armour was newer but how many at this stage were still the machine gun armed very poorly protected Pz1's? Furthermore they still lacked real combat experience with much of their new equipment which only came, apart from the Condor League, from the invasion of Poland, many aspects of which disappointed the Germans in terms of the armies performance. Also they wouldn't have the considerable stocks they gained from the Czechs or the results of Czech industry under German rule than they had OTL in 1939/40.
The allies definitely started accelerating their production to catch up with Germany in new forces/equipment but in the period 1938-39 Germany was allowed to pull away somewhat. Its not surprising that Britain only had a couple of Inf Divs available for immediate deployment in 38 because of the serious cut backs in the army and deployments elsewhere but they weren't massively greater in Sept 39 and it was only after the seizure of the rump Czech state in March 39 that Britain introduced conscription.
Also there's no treaty with the Soviets here and a lot more distrust of the Germans, especially after an attack against the Czechs so what are they going to survive on?
Steve
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Post by EwellHolmes on May 4, 2020 22:30:16 GMT
Alright, so 1938 is the scenario right? By October of 1938, the Wehrmacht had four Panzer divisions and was standing up a fifth in November. By contrast, the first French tank division was not put into service until January of 1940. Even ignoring that, it only took three tank divisions at Sedan in 1940 to beat the French. The S35 tank that would equip the French during the Battle of France had only just entered full production at the start of the year, and less than 100 had been completed by mid 1938.They were also not green; the Wehrmacht had been conducting field exercises since 1934, the French did not start doing the same until 1938, as a result of the Munich Crisis. The same held true for infantry; the Germans actually had more divisions and men under arms than the French and Czechs combined in 1938 and, as stated, had been conducting field exercises for years by that point while the French...hadn't. A good example of this was how badly the French offensive in late 1939 went, with a major issue being they lacked sufficient engineers to even clear minefields. The situation was even worse for the British, who in October of 1938 only had two-yes, just two-divisions which could be deployed. Once cannot overstate how mobilization from late 1938 to early 1940 helped the Anglo-French, with France going from 65 Divisions in 1939 to 117 in 1940. How about the air? The MS. 406 was the only French fighter equal to the Me-109 but production in 1938 was only 65 aircraft. In contrast, the Germans had over 500 by this point. In addition, they also had over 60 Bf-110s and about 300 older biplanes. The most common fighter they would face were the Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which were outdated (They had fixed landing gear and open cockpits compared to the Me-109s and Me-110s). The RAF, meanwhile, had just one-yes, just one-squadron of Hurricanes which had 16 planes with four more forming in November. No Spitfires were to be had at all at this point. As for experience, the Luftwaffe had just gained years of it in Spain, while the Anglo-French hadn't. So the Germans held an overwhelming technical, numerical and experience edge of the Anglo-French to the point any contest is beyond questioning of how it would go. As for the Czechs, most of their fortifications were rated by themselves and the Germans as medium to light, with few actually being heavy. The German plan was a pincer attack and paratrooper drops to disrupt the communications; they actually conducted war games Post-Occupation in order to learn lessons for dealing with the French in the near-future and assessed that, in an absolute best case scenario, the Czechs would've held out for two to three months in total, so basically a better Poland.
The French had large numbers of trained men to call upon. The Germans had only recently been able to introduce conscription so many of their men had minimal experience. France had older equipment which had been in place for some time. German armour was newer but how many at this stage were still the machine gun armed very poorly protected Pz1's? Furthermore they still lacked real combat experience with much of their new equipment which only came, apart from the Condor League, from the invasion of Poland, many aspects of which disappointed the Germans in terms of the armies performance. Also they wouldn't have the considerable stocks they gained from the Czechs or the results of Czech industry under German rule than they had OTL in 1939/40.
The allies definitely started accelerating their production to catch up with Germany in new forces/equipment but in the period 1938-39 Germany was allowed to pull away somewhat. Its not surprising that Britain only had a couple of Inf Divs available for immediate deployment in 38 because of the serious cut backs in the army and deployments elsewhere but they weren't massively greater in Sept 39 and it was only after the seizure of the rump Czech state in March 39 that Britain introduced conscription.
Also there's no treaty with the Soviets here and a lot more distrust of the Germans, especially after an attack against the Czechs so what are they going to survive on?
Steve
The French did not have large masses of reserves, as France began full mobilization in 1938 which is what allowed them to increase to 65 Divisions in 1939 and then to the 117 in 1940. Even if they did, that's not how you defeat German mobile warfare; the entire period of 1939-1942 showed this, in that if the Germans have control of the air and the advantage in mechanized elements, they're going to cut your infantry to pieces. See the defense of Poland itself, the rapid collapse of the Weygand Line in 1940 and the utter disaster of the Soviets in forward defense in 1941. Further in this vein, the French even in 1939-1940 were lacking in heavy weapons, particularly Anti-Tank, as well as specialized elements like engineers; basically everything you need to actually construct a defensive line to attrit a WWII-era tank led attack vs the WWI-style Trench Warfare the French Army was still geared towards at this time. As for your other points, everything you list as a defect for the Germans is doubly so for the Anglo-French. No experience outside of the Condor Legion? The Anglo-French have none, outside of recent Anti-Colonial operations which have no bearing on mechanized warfare with a peer opponent; Germans also have had extensive adviser/testing relationships outside of those with Franco, such as in the USSR and in KMT-ruled China. The Czech Campaign will allow them to iron out any issues, just like the Polish Campaign, and then invade France with no issues in the Spring of 1939. The idea that the Anglo-French "allowed" Germany to pull away in 1938-1939 has long been thoroughly discredited; rather, it was the complete opposite. In 1938, the French produced 400 tanks and in 1939 this increased to over 1,000, which was more than France had built in the entire time period of 1934-1937 ( The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 by Julian T. Jackson, P. 13). As for Czech stocks for the Germans, in 1938-1939, they looted 244 tanks and then built a further 237 by 1940. In other words, while the Czech invasion netted them over 500 tanks, it allowed the French alone to increase their own stocks by over 1,400 over the course of 1938 and 1939, a clear net negative for the Germans. This is further revealed when looks at how the French armored forces developed, with the entire French Army only having two DLM on paper in 1938, which were rated as only fit for reconnaissance duties vs the five fully operational Panzer Divisions the Germans held by November of '38 ( To Lose a Battle by Sir Alistair Horne, Pg 118). By 1940, this had completely changed, with France having three active DCRs and five DLMs. Finally, with regards to the Soviets, Poland is in the way of them in 1938 and Warsaw had made it clear she would not tolerate any violation of her sovereignty. Looting of Czechoslovakia will tie the Reich over, as it did IOTL, and then the collapse of the Anglo-French in the Spring of 1939 will make Stalin more than happy to cut a deal with the Germans for the same strategic reasons he did IOTL. One difference here is that Poland is more likely to diplomatically accord herself to Germany and enabling a 1940 Barbarossa. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 5, 2020 11:31:15 GMT
The French had large numbers of trained men to call upon. The Germans had only recently been able to introduce conscription so many of their men had minimal experience. France had older equipment which had been in place for some time. German armour was newer but how many at this stage were still the machine gun armed very poorly protected Pz1's? Furthermore they still lacked real combat experience with much of their new equipment which only came, apart from the Condor League, from the invasion of Poland, many aspects of which disappointed the Germans in terms of the armies performance. Also they wouldn't have the considerable stocks they gained from the Czechs or the results of Czech industry under German rule than they had OTL in 1939/40.
The allies definitely started accelerating their production to catch up with Germany in new forces/equipment but in the period 1938-39 Germany was allowed to pull away somewhat. Its not surprising that Britain only had a couple of Inf Divs available for immediate deployment in 38 because of the serious cut backs in the army and deployments elsewhere but they weren't massively greater in Sept 39 and it was only after the seizure of the rump Czech state in March 39 that Britain introduced conscription.
Also there's no treaty with the Soviets here and a lot more distrust of the Germans, especially after an attack against the Czechs so what are they going to survive on?
Steve
The French did not have large masses of reserves, as France began full mobilization in 1938 which is what allowed them to increase to 65 Divisions in 1939 and then to the 117 in 1940. Even if they did, that's not how you defeat German mobile warfare; the entire period of 1939-1942 showed this, in that if the Germans have control of the air and the advantage in mechanized elements, they're going to cut your infantry to pieces. See the defense of Poland itself, the rapid collapse of the Weygand Line in 1940 and the utter disaster of the Soviets in forward defense in 1941. Further in this vein, the French even in 1939-1940 were lacking in heavy weapons, particularly Anti-Tank, as well as specialized elements like engineers; basically everything you need to actually construct a defensive line to attrit a WWII-era tank led attack vs the WWI-style Trench Warfare the French Army was still geared towards at this time. As for your other points, everything you list as a defect for the Germans is doubly so for the Anglo-French. No experience outside of the Condor Legion? The Anglo-French have none, outside of recent Anti-Colonial operations which have no bearing on mechanized warfare with a peer opponent; Germans also have had extensive adviser/testing relationships outside of those with Franco, such as in the USSR and in KMT-ruled China. The Czech Campaign will allow them to iron out any issues, just like the Polish Campaign, and then invade France with no issues in the Spring of 1939. The idea that the Anglo-French "allowed" Germany to pull away in 1938-1939 has long been thoroughly discredited; rather, it was the complete opposite. In 1938, the French produced 400 tanks and in 1939 this increased to over 1,000, which was more than France had built in the entire time period of 1934-1937 ( The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 by Julian T. Jackson, P. 13). As for Czech stocks for the Germans, in 1938-1939, they looted 244 tanks and then built a further 237 by 1940. In other words, while the Czech invasion netted them over 500 tanks, it allowed the French alone to increase their own stocks by over 1,400 over the course of 1938 and 1939, a clear net negative for the Germans. This is further revealed when looks at how the French armored forces developed, with the entire French Army only having two DLM on paper in 1938, which were rated as only fit for reconnaissance duties vs the five fully operational Panzer Divisions the Germans held by November of '38 ( To Lose a Battle by Sir Alistair Horne, Pg 118). By 1940, this had completely changed, with France having three active DCRs and five DLMs. Finally, with regards to the Soviets, Poland is in the way of them in 1938 and Warsaw had made it clear she would not tolerate any violation of her sovereignty. Looting of Czechoslovakia will tie the Reich over, as it did IOTL, and then the collapse of the Anglo-French in the Spring of 1939 will make Stalin more than happy to cut a deal with the Germans for the same strategic reasons he did IOTL. One difference here is that Poland is more likely to diplomatically accord herself to Germany and enabling a 1940 Barbarossa.
Your ignoring the quality of the very fragile German tanks at this point and also the numbers they were themselves producing during this time period. As well as the losses they would have taken in attacking Czechoslovakia.
Yes the allies did accelerate at a much faster rate after the Munich disaster but the greater expansion of the Germans meant that in modern weapons they were still better off. More to the point the big issue is that there is NO alliance with the Soviets so Germany will be desperately short of resources very quickly.
There is a chance the Germans can make a successful attack in 39 if the French don't attack the Rhineland in 38 but its a good bit less without the later, more powerful tanks and the additional training and experience they had OTL.
Anyway we're not so much drifted away from the threat as hi-jacked it.
Steve
Economically your missing the point I was making. Apart from the fact its more difficult to loot a country your taken by force, here it has to last a lot longer since there is no follow on against Poland. More to tyyour had to take by force the big issue is that there is no alliance with the Soviets so Germany will lack the resources they had OTL to tide them over.
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Post by EwellHolmes on May 5, 2020 12:46:45 GMT
The French did not have large masses of reserves, as France began full mobilization in 1938 which is what allowed them to increase to 65 Divisions in 1939 and then to the 117 in 1940. Even if they did, that's not how you defeat German mobile warfare; the entire period of 1939-1942 showed this, in that if the Germans have control of the air and the advantage in mechanized elements, they're going to cut your infantry to pieces. See the defense of Poland itself, the rapid collapse of the Weygand Line in 1940 and the utter disaster of the Soviets in forward defense in 1941. Further in this vein, the French even in 1939-1940 were lacking in heavy weapons, particularly Anti-Tank, as well as specialized elements like engineers; basically everything you need to actually construct a defensive line to attrit a WWII-era tank led attack vs the WWI-style Trench Warfare the French Army was still geared towards at this time. As for your other points, everything you list as a defect for the Germans is doubly so for the Anglo-French. No experience outside of the Condor Legion? The Anglo-French have none, outside of recent Anti-Colonial operations which have no bearing on mechanized warfare with a peer opponent; Germans also have had extensive adviser/testing relationships outside of those with Franco, such as in the USSR and in KMT-ruled China. The Czech Campaign will allow them to iron out any issues, just like the Polish Campaign, and then invade France with no issues in the Spring of 1939. The idea that the Anglo-French "allowed" Germany to pull away in 1938-1939 has long been thoroughly discredited; rather, it was the complete opposite. In 1938, the French produced 400 tanks and in 1939 this increased to over 1,000, which was more than France had built in the entire time period of 1934-1937 ( The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 by Julian T. Jackson, P. 13). As for Czech stocks for the Germans, in 1938-1939, they looted 244 tanks and then built a further 237 by 1940. In other words, while the Czech invasion netted them over 500 tanks, it allowed the French alone to increase their own stocks by over 1,400 over the course of 1938 and 1939, a clear net negative for the Germans. This is further revealed when looks at how the French armored forces developed, with the entire French Army only having two DLM on paper in 1938, which were rated as only fit for reconnaissance duties vs the five fully operational Panzer Divisions the Germans held by November of '38 ( To Lose a Battle by Sir Alistair Horne, Pg 118). By 1940, this had completely changed, with France having three active DCRs and five DLMs. Finally, with regards to the Soviets, Poland is in the way of them in 1938 and Warsaw had made it clear she would not tolerate any violation of her sovereignty. Looting of Czechoslovakia will tie the Reich over, as it did IOTL, and then the collapse of the Anglo-French in the Spring of 1939 will make Stalin more than happy to cut a deal with the Germans for the same strategic reasons he did IOTL. One difference here is that Poland is more likely to diplomatically accord herself to Germany and enabling a 1940 Barbarossa.
Your ignoring the quality of the very fragile German tanks at this point and also the numbers they were themselves producing during this time period. As well as the losses they would have taken in attacking Czechoslovakia.
Yes the allies did accelerate at a much faster rate after the Munich disaster but the greater expansion of the Germans meant that in modern weapons they were still better off. More to the point the big issue is that there is NO alliance with the Soviets so Germany will be desperately short of resources very quickly.
There is a chance the Germans can make a successful attack in 39 if the French don't attack the Rhineland in 38 but its a good bit less without the later, more powerful tanks and the additional training and experience they had OTL.
Anyway we're not so much drifted away from the threat as hi-jacked it.
Steve
Economically your missing the point I was making. Apart from the fact its more difficult to loot a country your taken by force, here it has to last a lot longer since there is no follow on against Poland. More to tyyour had to take by force the big issue is that there is no alliance with the Soviets so Germany will lack the resources they had OTL to tide them over.
I'm not sure where the idea of German tanks being fragile comes from; the Panzer II was the main type in 1938...and was in 1939, 1940, and almost so into 1941. As for overall production, the Germans produced just 370 tanks of all types in 1939 compared to 3,502 between 1933 and 1938. As I said earlier, France alone was able to increase her stockpiles by 1,400 which, compared to the just mentioned German production, represented a growth in 1,100 in their favor. This was also not obsolete models but the S35s, capable of matching any German tank including the IVs, so I have no idea where this idea of the Germans having an advantage in modern arms comes from. The whole idea that Munich was a missed chance for the Anglo-French has been thoroughly discredited since the 1960s and always was a sort of political beating stick to hit the "weak" Chamberlain in favor of people like Churchill. There's just absolutely no evidence in favor of it. As for the Soviets, German–Soviet Commercial Agreement wasn't signed until February of 1940 anyway. More importantly, once Hitler proves how advanced and powerful the Wehrmacht is, Stalin will seek an accord, same as he did IOTL: Germany survived 1939 without the agreement, with the British and Dutch refusing to trade anyway, so I see no reason they couldn't here. |
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sandyman
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Post by sandyman on May 5, 2020 13:26:06 GMT
Percival was an idiot he out numbered the Japanese troops had more ammo so yes he could have. I used to spend hours listening to both my Grandads who were in Singapore at the time of surrender one in the Navy and one in the army. My naval grandfather was on Repulse when it went down but thankfully lived. They We’re both childhood friends and joined up the same day one navy one army. They both made it through the horror of the prison camps and had some very unpleasant things done to them. Up until they died they hated the Japanese and Percival with a vengeance. A tragic time for all of the commonwealth troops some marched from the docks and straight in to the hell of captivity. I was reading on line over the week end about the Indian troops who turned traitor not very pleasant and they got away with it. If the government had some spine and put enough resources into the place then yes we could have won.
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Post by EwellHolmes on May 5, 2020 14:31:42 GMT
Percival was an idiot he out numbered the Japanese troops had more ammo so yes he could have. I used to spend hours listening to both my Grandads who were in Singapore at the time of surrender one in the Navy and one in the army. My naval grandfather was on Repulse when it went down but thankfully lived. They We’re both childhood friends and joined up the same day one navy one army. They both made it through the horror of the prison camps and had some very unpleasant things done to them. Up until they died they hated the Japanese and Percival with a vengeance. A tragic time for all of the commonwealth troops some marched from the docks and straight in to the hell of captivity. I was reading on line over the week end about the Indian troops who turned traitor not very pleasant and they got away with it. If the government had some spine and put enough resources into the place then yes we could have won. Funny enough, when Percival's representatives approached the Japanese to seek surrender terms, the Japanese were expecting the British to ask for their surrender. To be fair to Percival, however, he was dealt a very bad hand for the get go: |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 6, 2020 9:21:04 GMT
Your ignoring the quality of the very fragile German tanks at this point and also the numbers they were themselves producing during this time period. As well as the losses they would have taken in attacking Czechoslovakia.
Yes the allies did accelerate at a much faster rate after the Munich disaster but the greater expansion of the Germans meant that in modern weapons they were still better off. More to the point the big issue is that there is NO alliance with the Soviets so Germany will be desperately short of resources very quickly.
There is a chance the Germans can make a successful attack in 39 if the French don't attack the Rhineland in 38 but its a good bit less without the later, more powerful tanks and the additional training and experience they had OTL.
Anyway we're not so much drifted away from the threat as hi-jacked it.
Steve
Economically your missing the point I was making. Apart from the fact its more difficult to loot a country your taken by force, here it has to last a lot longer since there is no follow on against Poland. More to tyyour had to take by force the big issue is that there is no alliance with the Soviets so Germany will lack the resources they had OTL to tide them over.
I'm not sure where the idea of German tanks being fragile comes from; the Panzer II was the main type in 1938...and was in 1939, 1940, and almost so into 1941. As for overall production, the Germans produced just 370 tanks of all types in 1939 compared to 3,502 between 1933 and 1938. As I said earlier, France alone was able to increase her stockpiles by 1,400 which, compared to the just mentioned German production, represented a growth in 1,100 in their favor. This was also not obsolete models but the S35s, capable of matching any German tank including the IVs, so I have no idea where this idea of the Germans having an advantage in modern arms comes from. The whole idea that Munich was a missed chance for the Anglo-French has been thoroughly discredited since the 1960s and always was a sort of political beating stick to hit the "weak" Chamberlain in favor of people like Churchill. There's just absolutely no evidence in favor of it. As for the Soviets, German–Soviet Commercial Agreement wasn't signed until February of 1940 anyway. More importantly, once Hitler proves how advanced and powerful the Wehrmacht is, Stalin will seek an accord, same as he did IOTL: Germany survived 1939 without the agreement, with the British and Dutch refusing to trade anyway, so I see no reason they couldn't here.
Interesting. So there was relatively little armoured production in 39, although it was mainly in the heavier tank capacity. Hadn't realised how much had been produced earlier, although that was still of the Pz 1'a and 2's.
I sit corrected on the economic agreement between the Nazis and Soviets. The 1st winter might be very tough for Germany, as it was OTL, probably a bit worse as their less resources to grab but a lot may depend on the weather.
Disagree that Stalin would make such an agreement without a partition of Poland and especially not if the Germans still managed to defeat France. That would clearly make Germany the clear and only threat to him and given Hitler and the Nazis stance prior to the partition agreement I can't see him being that stupid. I know he refused to accept warnings of the German attack OTL but that was with an agreement already in place when he expected a long war in the west.
Steve
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 6, 2020 9:32:30 GMT
Percival was an idiot he out numbered the Japanese troops had more ammo so yes he could have. I used to spend hours listening to both my Grandads who were in Singapore at the time of surrender one in the Navy and one in the army. My naval grandfather was on Repulse when it went down but thankfully lived. They We’re both childhood friends and joined up the same day one navy one army. They both made it through the horror of the prison camps and had some very unpleasant things done to them. Up until they died they hated the Japanese and Percival with a vengeance. A tragic time for all of the commonwealth troops some marched from the docks and straight in to the hell of captivity. I was reading on line over the week end about the Indian troops who turned traitor not very pleasant and they got away with it. If the government had some spine and put enough resources into the place then yes we could have won.
Definitely agree with the last bit but unfortunately too many men and resources were wasted, especially in Greece and in possibly not clearing up Libya early enough. [The latter may not have been possible logistically however]. Coupled with too much being put into BC rather than defending supply links and realising that the region needed the defences that had been promised. It was less a lack of spine, at least if you mean London and more a lack of attention, which cost both the people involved and Britain a hell of a lot.
Interesting comments about your grandparents and Percival. I have heard elsewhere that he had a markedly better reaction from his men because he went into captivity with them and did much after the war to help survivors but it could be different people having different reactions. On a naval site where an Australian member has talked in the past about veterans he had talked to and compared the good feelings toward Percival with the loathing the Americans at Bataan towards MacArthur.
I suspect Percival was the wrong man in the job. Seems to have been a good planner but not a leader at that level. Probably would have been a very good number 2 but not the man to argue with his superiors or take the necessary active decisions. The colony needed to be successfully defended in northern Malaya to be held and also for the Dutch flanks to be held for it to hold out longer term. That needed more men, better equipped and trained, both on land and in the air than OTL.
Steve
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Post by EwellHolmes on May 9, 2020 1:54:00 GMT
I'm not sure where the idea of German tanks being fragile comes from; the Panzer II was the main type in 1938...and was in 1939, 1940, and almost so into 1941. As for overall production, the Germans produced just 370 tanks of all types in 1939 compared to 3,502 between 1933 and 1938. As I said earlier, France alone was able to increase her stockpiles by 1,400 which, compared to the just mentioned German production, represented a growth in 1,100 in their favor. This was also not obsolete models but the S35s, capable of matching any German tank including the IVs, so I have no idea where this idea of the Germans having an advantage in modern arms comes from. The whole idea that Munich was a missed chance for the Anglo-French has been thoroughly discredited since the 1960s and always was a sort of political beating stick to hit the "weak" Chamberlain in favor of people like Churchill. There's just absolutely no evidence in favor of it. As for the Soviets, German–Soviet Commercial Agreement wasn't signed until February of 1940 anyway. More importantly, once Hitler proves how advanced and powerful the Wehrmacht is, Stalin will seek an accord, same as he did IOTL: Germany survived 1939 without the agreement, with the British and Dutch refusing to trade anyway, so I see no reason they couldn't here.
Interesting. So there was relatively little armoured production in 39, although it was mainly in the heavier tank capacity. Hadn't realised how much had been produced earlier, although that was still of the Pz 1'a and 2's.
I sit corrected on the economic agreement between the Nazis and Soviets. The 1st winter might be very tough for Germany, as it was OTL, probably a bit worse as their less resources to grab but a lot may depend on the weather.
Disagree that Stalin would make such an agreement without a partition of Poland and especially not if the Germans still managed to defeat France. That would clearly make Germany the clear and only threat to him and given Hitler and the Nazis stance prior to the partition agreement I can't see him being that stupid. I know he refused to accept warnings of the German attack OTL but that was with an agreement already in place when he expected a long war in the west.
Steve
Stalin seemed oblivious of the emerging threat; German overflights dramatically increased over the course of 1941 and his own intelligence services were repeatedly warning the Germans were preparing for something. He refused to believe that and IOTL had a psychological collapse in June, after the German invasion. Given that after the Spring of 1940 he was the only player left vis-a-vis Germany, I fail to see how the situation here would result in anything different. As noted, talks to this effect had begun before it was even clear the Germans would seek aggression against Poland anyway IOTL. Here, in particular, the same strategic thinking is present and even more vital; he can make a pact to split Poland with Germany, and Stalin knows with absolute certainty he has to buy more time from Hitler in order to get the Red Army ready. Cutting a deal serves that interest. |
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on May 9, 2020 9:08:25 GMT
Interesting. So there was relatively little armoured production in 39, although it was mainly in the heavier tank capacity. Hadn't realised how much had been produced earlier, although that was still of the Pz 1'a and 2's.
I sit corrected on the economic agreement between the Nazis and Soviets. The 1st winter might be very tough for Germany, as it was OTL, probably a bit worse as their less resources to grab but a lot may depend on the weather.
Disagree that Stalin would make such an agreement without a partition of Poland and especially not if the Germans still managed to defeat France. That would clearly make Germany the clear and only threat to him and given Hitler and the Nazis stance prior to the partition agreement I can't see him being that stupid. I know he refused to accept warnings of the German attack OTL but that was with an agreement already in place when he expected a long war in the west.
Steve
Stalin seemed oblivious of the emerging threat; German overflights dramatically increased over the course of 1941 and his own intelligence services were repeatedly warning the Germans were preparing for something. He refused to believe that and IOTL had a psychological collapse in June, after the German invasion. Given that after the Spring of 1940 he was the only player left vis-a-vis Germany, I fail to see how the situation here would result in anything different. As noted, talks to this effect had begun before it was even clear the Germans would seek aggression against Poland anyway IOTL. Here, in particular, the same strategic thinking is present and even more vital; he can make a pact to split Poland with Germany, and Stalin knows with absolute certainty he has to buy more time from Hitler in order to get the Red Army ready. Cutting a deal serves that interest.
That's because he deluded himself that Hitler wouldn't be stupid enough to start a 2 front war while the Soviets were giving Germany massive economic aid. If no such agreement exists there is a good chance he will be a lot more logical. He may still be bloody stupid. That's the problem with people who have so much power in a totalitarian state, as they start to believe their own desires because no one dare question their opinions but its not certain.
You were talking earlier about Poland submitting to Germany without a fight to protect themselves from the Soviets - not realising that the Nazis are probably an even worse option until its too late. In that case there will be no such agreement because Hitler gets what he wants without a deal with Stalin as well as a much better front line for his attack.
Steve
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1bigrich
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Post by 1bigrich on May 9, 2020 17:12:39 GMT
What is needed is an equal commitment by all three branches of the British military. The navy had committed capital ships, but the RAF in the area was a joke. The Vickers Vildabeast is not an aircraft to deter the Japanese. Had the RAF committed some modern fighters, say some of those Hurricanes wasted on the Soviet Union for some of the northern airfields, some Spitfires for the defense of Singapore itself, a couple squadrons of medium and heavy bomber,and radar for all the airfields, the defense would have been much more sound. In addition the Army should have committed experienced infantry and some armored units, even units reconstructing after combat losses would have been adequate. Also, as with the Philippines, supplies for all three services should have been stockpiled in theatre. This thread might be of interest www.tapatalk.com/groups/alltheworldsbattlecruisers/what-should-have-been-sent-east-in-41-t8559.htmlI will say, as I said in the referenced thread, a cruiser/destroyer force in Singapore might have been better, with the capital ships in Australia or the Indian.
All that said, given Japanese local superiority, I'm not sure Singapore can be saved. But it can hold out longer and throw the Japanese timetables off for the southern offensive. Which helps the war effort all around.
My thoughts, |
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