Cuban Missile Crisis in real time

Day 1 of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Monday, October 16th 1962

YouTube (Shall we destroy Cuba, Mr. President?)

The Cuban Missile Crisis begins. President Kennedy assembles his advisors in EXCOMM to find an adequate response to the threat posed by Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba.



Hour by Hour

8:45A.M.: McGeorge Bundy informs President Kennedy that "hard photographic evidence" has been obtained showing Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. Kennedy immediately calls an 11:45A.M. meeting and dictates the names of the fourteen or so advisers he wants present. This is the group that becomes known as the " ExComm "--the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. Later that morning, President Kennedy briefs his brother Robert, who expresses surprise at the news. Kennedy also telephones John McCloy , a Republican lawyer who acted as a private adviser to the president. McCloy recommends that the president take forceful action to remove the missiles, even if that involves an airstrike and an invasion. 

11:15A.M.: President Kennedy confers for half an hour with Charles Bohlen, the former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union who has just been appointed ambassador to France. Bohlen later recalls that at this early stage in the crisis, "there seemed to be no doubt in [Kennedy's] mind, and certainly none in mine, that the United States would have to get these bases eliminated...the only question was how it was to be done." Bohlen participates in the first ExComm meeting later that morning but leaves for France on the following day.

11:50A.M.: The first meeting of the ExComm convenes. Photographic evidence is presented to the group, including pictures of missile sites under construction with canvas-covered missile trailers. The missiles are initially identified by photoanalysts as nuclear tipped SS-3s by their length; by evening, the MRBMs are correctly identified as longer range SS-4 missiles. No nuclear warheads are reported seen in the area. CIA photoanalyst Sidney Graybeal informs the group that "we do not believe [the missiles] are ready to fire." The first part of the noon meeting covers questions regarding the validity and certainty of the evidence, Soviet military capabilities in Cuba and what additional U.S. surveillance might be required. Further U-2 flights are ordered, and six U-2 reconnaissance missions are flown during the day. In the freewheeling discussion, participants cover a number of different options for dealing with the Cuban situation. The principle options discussed are: (1) a single, surgical airstrike on the missile bases; (2) an attack on various C uban facilities; (3) a comprehensive series of attacks and invasion; or (4) a blockade of Cuba. Preliminary discussions lean toward taking some form of military action. As discussions continue on proposals to destroy the missiles by airstrike, Robert Kennedy passes a note to the president: "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.

"Map of the western hemisphere showing the full range of the nuclear missiles under construction in Cuba



Afternoon: McNamara , Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, and the JCS hold a luncheon meeting to begin preparing the military for any actions that might be ordered. At the State Department, additional discussions continue with Dean Rusk, Undersecretary of State George Ball , Adlai Stevenson , Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin , Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, and State Department Soviet specialist Llewellyn Thompson.

The USIB meets to examine U-2 photographs and to coordinate intelligence on the crisis. During the meeting, the USIB directs the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) to prepare an immediate evaluation of the Soviet missile sites. The GMAIC concludes that the missiles are clearly under Soviet control and that there is no evidence that nuclear warheads are present in Cuba. It also concludes that the missile installations thus far identified do not appear to be operational.

The SGA convenes in the White House prior to the second ExComm meeting. According to Richard Helms's notes, Robert Kennedy expresses President Kennedy 's "general dissatisfaction" with progress under the MONGOOSE program. The SGA discusses but rejects several alternatives for eliminating the newly discovered Soviet missile sites in Cuba, including a proposal to have Cuban emigrés bomb the missile sites.

6:30P.M.: At the second ExComm meeting, Marshall Carter states that the missiles could be "fully operational within two weeks," although a single missile might achieve operational capability "much sooner." After the intelligence report is presented, Robert McNamara outlines three broad options for action. The first is "political," involving communications with Fidel Castro and Premier Khrushchev ; the second is "part political, part military," involving a blockade of weapons and open surveillance; the third is "military" involving an attack on Cuba and the missile sites. The ExComm members debate, but do not resolve, which option should be used.

Premier Khrushchev receives U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler for a three-hour conversation on a variety of subjects. Khrushchev reassures Kohler that the Cuban fishing port that the Soviet Union has recently agreed to help build will remain entirely non-military. Khrushchev adds that the Cuban government has announced the agreement without consulting Soviet officials, and that when he learned of the leak, he "cursed them and said they should have waited until after the U.S. elections." Once again, Khrushchev insists that all Soviet activity in Cuba was defensive and sharply criticizes U.S. bases in Turkey and Italy.

A map of Cuba, with a partial listing of Soviet military equipment, used during the President's meetings with political and military advisors.

Day 3 of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Wednesday, October 18th 1962

YouTube (The Soviet Nuclear Forces on Cuba)

President Kennedy meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, one of the architects of placement of missiles on Cuba. While the two beat around the bush, Khrushchev and Gromyko's execution of the Soviet military and nuclear build up on Cuba continues.



Hour By Hour

11:00A.M.: The ExComm convenes for further discussions. The JCS, attending part of the meeting, recommends that President Kennedy order an airstrike on the missiles and other key Cuban military installations. However, Robert Kennedy responds by asking whether a surprise air attack would be a morally acceptable course of action. According to Robert Kennedy , the ExComm spent "more time [deliberating] on this moral question during the first five days than on any other single matter."

2:30P.M.: More discussions take place in Dean Rusk 's conference room at the State Department. President Kennedy , who does not attend the talks, confers privately with Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara at 3:30P.M. During the day, Kennedy also meets privately with Dean Acheson for over an hour. When the president raises his brother's concern over the morality of a "Pearl Harbor in reverse," Acheson reportedly tells Kennedy that he was being "silly " and that it was "unworthy of [him] to talk that way." Acheson again voices his opinion that the surgical airstrike was the best U.S. option. Acheson, however, is in the minority in dismissing the Pearl Harbor analogy. Although Paul Nitze also recalls thinking that the analogy was "nonsense," others like George Ball find it persuasive. In some cases, as with Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, the moral argument becomes the deciding factor behind their support for the blockade.

5:00P.M.: Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and President Kennedy meet at the White House. Gromyko states that Premier Khrushchev plans to visit the United Nations following the U.S. elections in November and that he believes a meeting with Kennedy at that time would be useful. After Kennedy agrees to meet the Soviet Premier, Gromyko turns the discussion to Cuba, charging that the United States is "pestering" a small country. According to the minutes of the meeting, "Gromyko stated that he was instructed to make it clear...that [Soviet military] assistance, [was] pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba...If it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would never had become involved in rendering such assistance." Kennedy has decided not to discuss U.S. awareness of the missiles with Gromyko. So, without taking exception to Gromyko's claim, Kennedy responds by reading a portion of his September 4 statement warning against the deployment of offensive weapons in Cuba. After a discussion of other issues, the meeting ends at 7:08P.M. Following the talk with Gromyko, Kennedy directs Llewellyn Thompson to inform Ambassador Dobrynin that a summit would not in fact be appropriate at that time. Kennedy then meets with Robert Lovett, a former government official brought in to give advice in the crisis. Lovett warns that an airstrike would appear to be an excessive first step. He argues that a blockade is a better alternative, although he expresses a preference for blocking the movement of all materials into Cuba except for food and medicine, rather than limiting the quarantine to offensive weapons.

Photo: President Kennedy meets with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Andrei Gromyko in the Oval Office. The President does not reveal that he is now aware of the missile build-up.



9:00P.M.: Meeting at the White House, the ExComm presents its recommendations to President Kennedy . By this time, most members of the committee support the blockade option. As the meeting progresses however, individual opinions begin to shift and the consensus behind the blockade brakes down. Kennedy directs the group to continue its deliberations.

Evening: Robert Kennedy phones his deputy, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, to request the preparation of a brief establishing the legal basis for a blockade of Cuba. The legality of a blockade is also examined independently at the State Department by Leonard C. Meeker, the deputy legal adviser.

Memo: By October 18th, the president and his advisers weighed only two options: blockade or invasion.



Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba

The first of a series of daily "Joint Evaluation" intelligence reports is disseminated. The evaluation, the product of collaboration between the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), states that the MRBMs in Cuba could probably be launched within eighteen hours.

Offensive Missiles

1. At least one Soviet regiment consisting of eight launchers and sixteen 1020-nm (SS-4) medium range ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites. These sites presently contain unrevetted, field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection, checkout, and support equipment. These missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Although there is continuing improvement of these sites, these mobile missiles must be considered operational now and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch. A refire from each launcher could be accomplished within 5 hours after the initial firing.

2. Fixed, soft sites which could achieve initial operational capability during December 1962 are now being developed near Havana. We believe that the 2200-nm (SS-5) intermediate range ballistic missile is probably intended for these sites. Photography of these sites show eight, fixed launch pads under construction which probably equate to an additional missile regiment with eight ready missiles and eight for refire.

3. All of these offensive missile systems are Soviet manned and controlled. We believe that offensive action by these systems would be commanded from the Soviet Union but have not yet found the command and control communication links.

Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

4. There is no positive evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba, nor have weapons storage facilities of the standard, highly secure Soviet type been identified. However, there are seven, large Cuban munitions' storage areas south of Havana which could be converted to Soviet needs in a relatively short time. Temporary storage could be pro­vided in ships or field sites which might not be identified.

5. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear warheads could now be available in Cuba to support the offensive missile capability as it becomes operational. The warheads expected for these missiles weigh approximately 3,000 pounds and have yields in the low megaton range.

Coastal Defense Missiles

6. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). In an alert status, these cruise missiles can be fired in about 10 minutes, with subsequent firings from each launcher at 5 minute intervals.

Air Defense Missiles

7. There are now 22 surface-to-air missiles (SA-2) sites located in Cuba, nine of which are believed to be individually operational at the present time. The remaining SA-2 sites could be operational in two to three weeks. Each site contains six missiles with six additional missiles in an adjacent hold area. The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert, providing the site has reached readiness. Retire from a single launcher will take approximately 3 to 5 minutes.

Force Levels

9. There are now at least sixteen 1020-nm Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba which are in such a state of readiness that they could be fired within 18 hours of a decision to launch. It is likely that o.ther installations now being examined in photography will raise the number to 32, all of which could be ready in the next week. Furthermore, 8 launchers with sixteen 2200-nm missiles will probably be operational in Cuba during December 1962. We must emphasize that this is the visible threat, and that additional missiles may be discovered as additional photography is analyzed.

Support and Supply

10. Offensive missiles systems are being introduced into Cuba primarily through the Port of Mariel. Possible central missile checkout, storage and repair bases have been tentatively located at Soroa near the western deployment sites and at Managua south of Havana. It is significant that all three of the Soviet missiles now being deployed in Cuba (SS-4, SS-5, SA-2) probably use red fuming nitric acid as an oxidizer so that a common propellant supply and storage could be used.

Significance

11. The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of strength.

12. A mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U.S. (see map). By deploying stockpiled shorter range ballistic missiles at overseas bases against which we have no BMEWS warning capability, the Soviet Union will supplement its ICBM home force in a significant way. This overseas strategic force is protectedby an extensive SA-2 deployment in Cuba.

13. This same offensive force also poses a common threat to the U.S. and a large portion of Latin America for the first time.

14. The Soviet Union is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and put into motion last spring.

Day 5 of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Friday, October 20th 1962

YouTube (President Kennedy Considers War)

US President John F Kennedy moves to side more with the hawks advising a forceful response to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Meanwhile in Moscow, the Soviets now believe that they deterred the Americans from using force.



Hour by Hour

9:00A.M.: ExComm meetings continue at the State Department. Final planning for the implementation of a naval blockade is completed, and Theodore Sorensen's draft speech for President Kennedy is amended and approved. As McNamara leaves the conference room, he reportedly phones the Pentagon and orders four tactical squadrons to be readied for a possible airstrike on Cuba. McNamara explains to an official who overhears the conversation, " If the president doesn't accept our recommendation, there won't be time to do it later."

2:30P.M.: President Kennedy meets with the full group of planning principals. He notes that the airstrike plan as presented is not a "surgical" strike but a massive military commitment that could involve heavy casualties on all sides. As if to underscore the scale of the proposed U.S. military attack on Cuba, one member of the JCS reportedly suggests the use of nuclear weapons, saying that the Soviet Union would use its nuclear weapons in an attack. President Kennedy directs that attention be focused on implementing the blockade option, calling it the only course of action compatible with American principles. The scenario for the full quarantine operation, covering diplomatic initiatives, public statements, and military actions, is reviewed and approved. Kennedy's address to the nation is set for October 22, at 7:00P.M.

Adlai Stevenson , who has flown in from New York, enters the discussion late. He proposes that the quarantine be accompanied by a U.S. proposal for a settlement involving the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey and the evacuation of Guantanamo. The proposal is promptly attacked by several of the participants who believe it concedes too much. President Kennedy is among those critical of Stevenson 's proposal. According to minutes of the meeting, Kennedy "agreed that at an appropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to take strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by the Russians....But he was firm in saying we should only make such a proposal in the future." After the meeting adjourns at 5:10P.M., President Kennedy tells Theodore Sorensen that he is canceling the remainder of his midterm election campaign trip. Kennedy instructs Sorensen to redraft the quarantine speech, although he notes that he would not make a final decision on whether to opt for the quarantine or an airstrike until he has consulted one last time with Air Force officials the next morning.

Late night: James Reston, Washington Bureau Chief for the New York Times, phones George Ball and McGeorge Bundy to ask why there is such a flurry of activity in Washington. Reston is given a partial briefing on the Cuban situation but is requested to hold the story in the interests of national security.

Special Sational Intelligence Estimate 11-19-62 (SNIE 11-19-62). "Major Consequences of Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba"

Short version of SNIE 11-19-62

The intelligence community prepares another SNIE reviewing the possible consequences of certain courses of action that the United States could follow with regard to Cuba. The study, numbered SNIE 11-19-62, describes the status of armaments deployed in Cuba. It is estimated that sixteen launchers for SS-4 MRBMs are operational and that these operational missiles could be fired within eight hours of a decision to launch. The inventory of other major Soviet weapons identified in Cuba by the SNIE includes: (a) twenty-two IL-28 jet light bombers; (b) thirty-nine MiG-21 jet fighters; (c) sixty-two less advanced jet fighters; (d) twenty-four 24 SA-2 missile sites; (e) three cruise missile sites for coastal defense; and (f) twelve Komar cruise missile patrol boats.

Full version of SNIE 11-19-62

STATUS OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

1. Firm evidence indicates the presence in Cuba of four MRBM and two IRB3M launch sites in various stages of construction and organized into at least three regiments. Of these, two regiments of eight launchers each are mobile and designed to launch MRBMs with a range of about 1,100 n.m., while one regiment of eight fixed launchers may be designed for IRBMs with a range of about 2,200 n.m.

2. The 16 launchers for 1,100 n.m. MRBMs must be considered operational now. Four of the fixed launchers for the 2,200 n.m. IRBMs could probably become operational within the next six weeks. The other four would become operational in 8 to 10 weeks. We have no direct evidence that nuclear weapons are now present in Cuba, and it is unlikely that we would be able to obtain such evidence. However, the construction of at least one probable nuclear storage facility is a strong indication of the Soviet intent to provide nuclear warheads. In any case, it is prudent to assume that when the missiles are otherwise operational, nuclear warheads will be available. These could be brought in by air, submarine, or surface ship.

3. We estimate that operational MRBM missiles can be fired in eight hours or less after a decision to launch, depending on the condition of readiness. After the IRBM sites are completed and missiles are on launcher, a state of readiness of five hours may be maintained. Both systems are believed to be provided with two missiles per launcher, providing a refire capability from each launcher after about four to six additional hours for the MRBMs and six to eight hours for the IRBMs.

4. It is possible that further evidence will uncover additional launch sites which are presently undetected, but the extent of our coverage leads us to believe that such evidence would not drastically iIncrease the total now deployed. On the other hand, new deployments could be started at any time.

5. The inventory of other major Soviet weapons new identified in Cuba includes:

a. 22 IL-28 jet light bombers, of which one is assembled and three others have been uncrated;

b. 39 MIG-21 jet fighters, of which 35 are assembled and four are still crates, and 62 other jet fighters of less advanced types;

c. 24 SA-2 sites, of which 16 are believed to be individually operational with some missiles on launcher;

d. 3 cruise missile sites for coastal defense, of which 2 are now operational;

e. 12 Komar cruise missile patrol boats, all probably operational or nearly so.

6. Cuban-based MRBMs and IRBMs with nuclear warheads would augment the present limited Soviet ICBM capability by virtue of their ability to strike at similar types of targets with warheads of generally similar yields. In the near future, therefore, Soviet gross capabilities for initial attack on US mlitary and civilian targets can be increased considerably by Cuban-based nissiles. However, the deployment of these missiles in Cuba will probably not, in the Soviet judgment, insure destruction of the US second strike capability to a degree vhich would eliminate an unacceptable heavy retaliatory attack on the USSR. If the missile buildup in Cuba continues, the Soviet capability to blunt a retaliatory attack will be progressively enhanced.

PURPOSE OP SOVIET BUILDUP

7. A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere. In this connection they assume, of course, that these deployments sooner or later will become publicly known. At the same time, they expect their missile forces in Cuba to make an important contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US.

8. Consequently, it is unlikely that the USSR is installing these missiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions

elsewhere. Moreover, the public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious problems in the USSR's relations with Castro; it would cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere.

US ACQUIESCENCE IN THE BUILDUP

9. If the US acquiesces to the presence of strategic missiles In Cuba, we believe that the Soviets will continue the buildup. We have no basis for estimating the force level whlch they would wish to reach, but It seems entirely clear now that they are going well beyond a token capability.

10. This course of US action would provide strong encouragement to Conmunlsts, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America. We believe that, especially over the long run, there would be loss of confidence in US power and determination and a serious decline of US influence, particularly in Latin Anerica. Should any additional Latin American government fall to the Communists the Soviets would feel free to establish bases in the country in question if they chose. A major immediate consequence would be that the Soviets would probably estimate lower risks in pressing the US ham in other confrontations, such as Berlin.

EFFECT OF WARNING

11. If the US confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge of the MRBM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, tbey would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the US of tight control over the missiles. They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to US actions in Cuba.

12. There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers to negotiate, continued buildup, and counterpressures, and we think the result in the end would be the same.

13. Any warning would of course degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent US attack.

A US BLOCKADE

14. Two basic modes of blockade could be considered: total and selective. We believe that even under a total blockade individual air­craft and submarines might get through to deliver vital military items, e.g., nuclear warheads. Even the most severe blockade would not deprive the Soviets of the use of missiles already in Cuba for a nuclear strike on the US.

15. Under any form of blockade, the Soviets would concentrate on political exploitation, especially in the UN. They might risk violent encounters in attempts to penetrate the blockade, but they would not resort to major force in the area of Cuba or forceful retaliation' elsewhere, at least initially. If US enforcement of the blockade involved use of force by the US, the Soviets night respcad en an equivalent level, but vculd seek to avoid escalation.

16. Thus any blockade situation would place the Soviets under no immediate pressure to cheese a response with force. They cculd rely on political means to compel the US to desist, and reserve a resort to force until the US had actually used force. They would estiisate that the inherent difficulties of enforcing the blockade and the generally adverse reactions, including those of US allies to it, would result in enormous pressures on the US to desist. They could heighten these pressures by threatening retaliation in Berlin or actually undertaking major harassments on the access routes, which could become tantamount to a blockade, and would probably do so at some stage.

17. He do not believe that even a severe blockade, of itself, would bring down the Cuban regime. Castro would tighten internal security and, unless action against the regime subsequently developed on Cuban soil, the Cuban population would be increasingly reluctant to oppose the regime. Direct action would still be required to bring down the Castro regime.

SOVIET REACTION TO USE OF MILITARY FORCE

18. In the case of US use of force against Cuban territory, the likelihood cf a Soviet response by force, either locally or for retaliation elsewhere, would fce greater than in the case of blockade. The Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save Cuba, would inflict an offsetting injury to US interests. This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to neutralize the [XXX] missiles, or these missiles plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile sites, or in fact an outright invasion designed to destroy the Castro regime.

19. In reaction to any of the various forms of US action, the Soviets would be surprised and probably alarmed, since they appear to have estimated that the US would probably not take military action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear war. They would recognize that US military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war.

20. On the other hand, the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island. This situation provides them with a pretext for treating US military action against Cuba as, an affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe that the USSR would attack the US, either from Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firing.

21. Since the USSR would almost certainly not resort to general war ard could not hope to prevail locally, we believe that the Soviets would consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. The timing and selection of such coves would depend heavily upon immediate context of events and the USSR'S appreciation of US attitude. The most likely location for broad retaliation outside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They vould probably react here with major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace treaty. Retaliation against some US installation overseas is possible but in our view unlikely.

22. We believe that there vcmld probably be a difference between Soviet reaction to all-out invasion and Soviet reaction to more limited US use of force against selected objectives in Cuba. We believe that the Soviets would be somewhat less likely to retaliate with military force in areas outside Cuba in response to speedy, effective invasion than in response to more limited forms of military action against Cuba. We recognize that such an estimate cannot be made with very great assurance and do not rule out the possibility of Soviet retaliation outside Cuba in case of invasion. But we believe that a rapid occupation of Cuba would be more likely to make the Soviets pause in. opening new theaters of conflict than limited action or action which drags out.

23. Finally, we believe that, whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, tbe Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general war or take military measures, which in their calculation, would run grave risks of general war.

First Soviet nuclear warhead storage bunker is identified in Cuba

A nuclear warhead storage bunker is identified at one of the Cuban MRBM sites for the first time. U.S. intelligence proves unable to establish definitively whether warheads are actually in Cuba at any time, however, and the ExComm believes it prudent simply to assume that they are. Soviet sources have recently suggested that twenty of a planned deployment of forty nuclear warheads reached the islands but that none of the warheads were ever actually "mated" to the missiles.

Photo: A U.S. intelligence photograph of Nuclear Warhead Bunker Site 1 under construction in San Cristobal

Day 7 of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Sunday, October 22nd 1962

YouTube (Kennedy and Khrushchev face reality)

The world is shocked to find out that the US and the Soviet Union are facing off with nuclear arms in the Caribbean. In the world's first televised announcement of an international military crisis, US President John F. Kennedy sets off panic and sudden fear of a third world war, with nuclear arms involved.



Newspaper:  The Guardian



Chronology of Submarine Contact During the Cuban Missile Crisis

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson warns Fleet Commanders of possible submarine attacks against blockade forces: "I cannot emphasize too strongly how smart we must be to keep our heavy ships, particularly carriers, from being hit by surprise attack [sic] from Soviet Submarines. Use all available intelligence, deceptive tactics, and evasion during forthcoming days. Good luck."

Hour by Hour

10:55A.M.: The State Department transmits a special "go" message to most U.S. diplomatic posts abroad instructing envoys to brief foreign heads of government or foreign ministers about the Cuban missile crisis.

11:00A.M.: Dean Acheson briefs Charles de Gaulle and delivers President Kennedy 's letter on the Cuban situation. Acheson is not able to provide de Gaulle with a copy of Kennedy's speech because only part of the text has arrived. After Acheson concludes his summary of the contents of the letter, de Gaulle declares, "it is exactly what I would have done...You may tell your President that France will support him." At about the same time, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain David Bruce briefs Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Lord Home, the British foreign minister. Bruce al so fails to receive a complete copy of Kennedy's speech and briefs MacMillan without it. MacMillan's initial reaction upon seeing the photos of the missiles sites reportedly is to remark: "Now the Americans will realize what we here in England have lived through for the past many years." He hastens to assure Bruce that he will assist and support the United States in any way possible.

The ExComm meets with President Kennedy for a brief discussion. The President directs that personal messages be sent to commanders of Jupiters missiles in Italy and Turkey instructing them to destroy or render inoperable the Jupiters if any attempt is made to fire them without Kennedy's authorization. During the meeting, State Department Legal Advisor Abram Chayes successfully suggests changing the legal justification for the blockade presented in Kennedy's speech. Instead of basing the action on the U.N. charter, which assures a countr y's inherent right of self-defense in case of armed attack, Chayes suggests citing the right of the OAS to take collective measures to protect hemispheric security. In addition, Kennedy accepts Leonard Meeker's suggestion that the limited nature of the "blockade" be stressed by calling it a "quarantine." 

12:00 noon: SAC initiates a massive alert of its B-52 nuclear bomber force, guaranteeing that one-eighth of the force is airborne at any given time. B-52 flights begin around the clock, with a new bomber taking off each time another bomber lands. The alert is directed to take place quietly and gradually and to be in full effect by October 23. SAC also begins dispersing 183 B-47 nuclear bombers to thirty-three civilian and military airfields. The Air Defense Command (ADC) also disperses 161 aircraft to sixteen bases in nine hours. For the first time in ADC history, all aircraft are armed with nuclear weapons. 

2:14P.M.: The JCS notify the State Department that U.S. military forces worldwide would go to DEFCON 3--an increased alert posture--effective at 7:00P.M. They also state that Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) Lauris Norstad has been ordered to try to persuade NATO forces to assume a comparable alert posture but that he is authorized to "exercise his discretion in complying with this directive." During the day, Norstad confers with Harold MacMillan, who strongly argues against "mobilizing" European forces. Aware that an alert might weaken European support for the United States--and having received a personal message from President Kennedy stressing the need to keep the alliance together--Norstad decides not to put European forces on higher alert status.

3:00P.M.: The President reviews the crisis in a formal meeting of the National Security Council. During the meeting, attended by representatives from the Office of Emergency Planning for the first time, Kennedy formally establishes the ExComm . 

5:00P.M.: Seventeen congressional leaders from both parties assemble at the White House for a briefing by President Kennedy , Secretary of State Rusk and an intelligence officer. Most express support for Kennedy's blockade plan. Others, however, led by Senators Richard B. Russell and J. William Fulbright, argue that the quarantine will not compel the Soviet Union to remove the missiles from Cuba and that an airstrike or invasion should be employed instead. 

6:00P.M.: Secretary of State Rusk meets with Anatoly Dobrynin . Calling the Soviet missile deployment "a gross error," Rusk hands the Soviet ambassador an advance copy of President Kennedy 's speech. Rusk later recalls that Dobrynin , who had never been told by Soviet leaders of the Cuban missile deployment, aged "ten years right in front of my eyes." 

U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler calls the Kremlin to deliver a letter from President Kennedy and the text of the speech. "I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed," read the president's letter.

6:26P.M.: The State Department receives a letter addressed to President Kennedy from British Prime Minister Macmillan. MacMillan warns that Premier Khrushchev , in reaction to the blockade, ...may try to escort his ships into the Caribbean and force you to attack them. This `fire-first' dilemma has always worried us and we have always hoped to impale the Russians on this horn. We must be ready for retaliatory action against Berlin [as well as for] pressure on the weaker parts of the Free World defense system. President Kennedy phones MacMillan late that evening. During the crisis, the two leaders remain in close contact, speaking with each other over the telephone as often as three times a day. 

7:00P.M.: President Kennedy addresses the nation in a televised eighteen-minute speech. Announcing that "unmistakable evidence" has established the presence of Soviet MRBM and IRBM sites and nuclear capable bombers in Cuba, he states that as one of his "initial steps," a "strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment" is being put into effect. Kennedy further warns the Soviet government that the United States will "regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response against the Soviet Union." According to dissident Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, Khrushchev responds to the speech by "issuing orders to the captains of Soviet ships...approaching the blockade zone to ignore it and to hold course for the Cuban ports." Khrushchev 's order was reportedly reversed at the prompting of Anastas Mikoyan as the Soviet ships approached the quarantine line on the morning of October 24. 

YouTube (JFK 18-minute television speech)



U.S. military forces worldwide, with the exception of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), are placed on DEFCON 3. ICBM missile crews are alerted and Polaris nuclear submarines in port are dispatched to preassigned stations at sea. During the president's speech, twenty-two interceptor aircraft go airborne in the event the Cuban government reacted militarily.

7:30P.M.: Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin conducts a further closed-door briefing for Latin American ambassadors at the State Department. At around 8:00P.M., Secretary Rusk speaks to a meeting of all other ambassadors in Washington. Rusk reportedly tells the group, "I would not be candid and I would not be fair with you if I did not say that we are in as grave a crisis as mankind has been in."

The first U.S. Jupiter missile site is formally turned over to the Turkish Air Force for maintenance and operation. Although the move is publicized in Turkey and probably detected by Moscow, U.S. decision-makers apparently are not aware of the action.

Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovsky is arrested in the Soviet Union. From April 1961 to the end of August 1962, Penkovsky has been a spy for British and U.S. intelligence services, providing them with material on Soviet military capabilities, including important technical information on Soviet MRBM and ICBM programs. Penkovsky had been given a few telephonic coded signals for use in emergency situations, including one to be used if he is about to be arrested and one to be used in case of imminent war. When he learns he was about to be arrested, Penkovsky apparently chose to use the signal for an imminent Soviet attack. Western intelligence analysts decide, however, not to credit Penkovsky's final signal, and the ExComm is not informed of Penkovsky's arrest or its circumstances.

President Kennedy's letter to Premier Khrushchev, Page 1, October 22nd 1962.

Day 9 of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Tuesday, October 24th 1962

YouTube (Blockade starts and low altitude flybys over Cuba)

The US led blockade on Cuba goes into effect, but It's not the be the showdown that it looks like! In the same time the US Navy starts flying RF8 Crusader reconnaissance jets 400 feet over the missile sites on Cuba, to see what's really going on. As the jets roar over the heads of the Cuban and Soviet soldiers, the crisis deepens.



Chronology of Submarine Contact During the Cuban Missile Crisis

During a meeting of the National Security Council Executive Committee (Excom) McNamara reports that there is a Soviet submarine close to ships that are approaching the blockade line; that presents a "very dangerous situation" for U.S. destroyers. After McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Taylor discuss submarine signaling arrangements, including the use of practice depth charges, Kennedy asks what if a submarine refuses to surface: "we don't want to have the first thing we attack as a Russian submarine." McNamara points to the danger of deferring an attack on the submarine and reviews plans to "put pressure on the submarine, move it out of that area by pressure, by the pressure of potential destruction."

Hour by Hour

6:00A.M.: A CIA report based on information as of 6:00A.M. states that communist reaction to the U.S. quarantine against Cuba has "not gone beyond the highly critical but noncommittal statement" issued by the Soviet government on October 23. Official world reaction is reported to be generally favorable, particularly in Latin America. Surveillance of Cuba indicates continued rapid progress in completion of IRBM and MRBM missile sites. No new offensive missile sites have been discovered, but nuclear storage buildings are being assembled with great speed.

Early morning: Soviet ships en route to Cuba capable of carrying military cargoes appear to have slowed down, altered or reversed their courses. Sixteen of the nineteen Soviet ships en route to Cuba at the time the naval quarantine is announced, including five large-hatch vessels, reverse course and are returning to the Soviet Union. Only the tanker Bucharest continues toward the quarantine line. 

Photo: Low-level photograph of the Poltava, turning back towards Moscow, carrying IRBM missiles (circled are the IRBM launch rings on trucks).



Morning: William Knox, a U.S. businessman, has a 3 1/4-hour interview with Premier Khrushchev at Khrushchev 's request. Khrushchev states that it is now too late for the United States to take over Cuba, and that he will eventually give orders to sink a U.S. vessel enforcing the blockade if Soviet ships are stopped. 

9:35A.M.: President Kennedy has a brief conversation with his brother, Robert, during which the president reportedly expresses deep concern that Soviet ships appear ready to challenge the quarantine:

"It looks really mean, doesn't it? But then, really there was no other choice. If they get this mean in our part of the world, what will they do next?" "I just don't think there was any choice," [ Robert Kennedy ] said, "and not only that, if you hadn't acted, you would have been impeached." The President thought for a moment and said, "That's what I think--I would have been impeached." 

10:00A.M.: The U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba officially goes into effect. 

10:00A.M.: The ExComm meets to consider the situation in Cuba. According to Robert Kennedy 's memoirs on the crisis, the meeting "seemed the most trying, the most difficult, and the most filled with tension." Robert McNamara tells the group that Soviet ships approaching the quarantine line show no indications of stopping and that two Soviet ships, the Gagarin and the Komiles, are within a few miles of the line. Naval intelligence then reports that a Soviet submarine has moved into position between the two ships. McNamara states that the aircraft carrier USS Essex has been directed to make the first interception, and that antisubmarine tactics, including the use of small explosives, has been ordered to prevent the Soviet submarine from interfering with the blockade.

According to Robert Kennedy , the president asks, "Isn't there some way we can avoid our first exchange with a Russian submarine--almost anything but that?" McNamara replies, "No, there's too much danger to our ships...Our commanders have been instructed to avoid hostilities if at all possible, but this is what we must be prepared for, and this is what we must expect." At 10:25A.M., a new intelligence message arrives and John McCone announces: "We have a preliminary report which seems to indicate that some of the Russian ships have stopped dead in the water." Dean Rusk leans over to McGeorge Bundy and says, "We're eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked." President Kennedy directs that no ship be intercepted for at least another hour while clarifying information is sought.

11:24A.M.: A cable drafted by George Ball is transmitted to U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Raymond Hare and U.S. Ambassador to NATO Thomas Finletter, notifying them that the United States is considering a Turkey-for-Cuba missile trade. The cable states that while the comparison of missiles in Turkey with those in Cuba was "refutable," it is nonetheless possible that a negotiated solution to the crisis might "involve dismantling and removal" of the Jupiters. Each diplomat is requested to assess the political consequences of the removal of the Jupiters in a variety of different circumstances. Finletter presents his recommendations on October 25.

2:00P.M.: In his first communication with President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev during the crisis, U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant sends identical private appeals to the two leaders, urging that their government "refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war." U Thant's plea, made at the request of more than forty non-aligned states, calls for the voluntary suspension of arms shipments to Cuba together with the voluntary suspension of the naval quarantine for between two and three weeks. 

5:15P.M.: A Defense Department spokesperson announces publicly that some of the Soviet Bloc vessels proceeding toward Cuba appear to have altered their course. 

Evening: TASS releases an exchange of telegrams between British philosopher and passivist Bertrand Russell and Nikita Khrushchev . In his first public statement since the onset of the crisis, Khrushchev warns in his telegram that if the United States carries out its program of "pirate action," the Soviet Union will have no alternative but to "make use of the means of defense against the aggressor." Khrushchev also proposes a summit meeting with Kennedy to discuss how to end the conflict and "remove the threat of the unleashing of a thermonuclear war." 

9:24P.M.: The State Department receives a letter for President Kennedy from Premier Khrushchev . At 10:52P.M., the message is read to Kennedy. Khrushchev writes, "if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States." Khrushchev warns that the Soviet Union views the blockade as "an act of aggression" and that, as a consequence, he will not instruct Soviet ships bound for Cuba to observe the quarantine. 

At the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SAC increases its alert posture to DEFCON 2 for the first time in history. Thomas Powers, the commander-in-chief of SAC, believed, as he later wrote, that while discreet preparations had been appropriate before, it was now "important for [the Soviets] to know of SAC's readiness." Consequently, Powers decides on his own authority to transmit uncoded messages to SAC commanders noting that SAC plans are well prepared and that the alert process was going smoothly. 

At the request of President Kennedy , the Defense Department drafts two separate plans to increase civil defense preparations during a possible military engagement with Cuba. The first outlines civil defense measures which could be taken in the vicinity of targets close to Cuba under attack with conventional weapons, while the second suggests measures which could be taken in response to possible nuclear attack within MRBM range

Day 11 of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Thursday, October 26th 1962

YouTube (Will President Kennedy invade Cuba after all?)

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev is preparing to offer the US an olive branch. Meanwhile US President John F Kennedy continue to plan an invasion of Cuba. While the politicians make new plans, their previous military plans take on a life of their own.



Hour by Hour

6:00A.M.: The CIA memorandum reporting information as of 6:00A.M. notes that construction of IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba is proceeding without interruption.

10:00A.M.: President Kennedy tells the ExComm that he believes the quarantine by itself will not cause the Soviet government to remove the missiles from Cuba, and that only an invasion or a trade of some sort will succeed. After discussing the airstrike option again at some length, Kennedy agrees to apply further pressure by increasing the frequency of low-level flights over Cuba from twice per day to once every two hours. The ExComm also decides not to undertake any emergency civil defense programs at this time, although preliminary measures have been initiated.

Morning: President Kennedy orders the State Department to proceed with preparations for a crash program aimed at establishing a civil government in Cuba after an invasion and occupation of the country. During the meeting, Robert McNamara reports to the president that the military believes that heavy casualties should be expected in an invasion; several days later, CINCLANT estimates that up to 18,484 U.S. casualties might occur during the first ten days of fighting.

1:00P.M.: John Scali, State Department correspondent for ABC News, lunches with Aleksandr Fomin at the Occidental Restaurant in Washington at Fomin's urgent request. The two have met together on several previous occasions. Fomin, officially the Soviet Embassy public affairs counselor, is known to be the KGB's Washington station chief. Noting that "war seems about to break out," he asks Scali to contact his "high-level friends" in the State Department to ascertain whether the United States would be interested in a possible solution to the crisis. According to Scali's notes, Fomin's proposal runs along the following lines: "[Soviet] bases would be dismantled under United Nations supervision and Castro would pledge not to accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever, in return for pledge not to invade Cuba." Following the lunch, Scali goes directly to the State Department to report on the meeting to Roger Hilsman.

1:18P.M.: The State Department receives a cable from U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Raymond Hare warning that Turkish officials will "deeply resent" any Turkey-for-Cuba missile trade. Hare expresses his opinion that the most satisfactory resolution to the crisis would avoid the Jupiter issue altogether but suggests that if the missiles have to be removed, it should be done gradually. Hare also acknowledges that an alternative solution could be the "dismantling of Jupiters...on A strictly secret basis with Soviets."

Photo: Enforcing the quarantine, "The U.S. destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy stops, boards and inspects the Marucla, a dry-cargo ship of Lebanese registry under Soviet charter to Cuba"



2:00P.M.: U.S. Ambassador to Brazil A. Lincoln Gordon is requested to ask the Brazilian government to have the Brazilian ambassador in Havana, Luis Batian Pinto, meet privately with Fidel Castro to relay a message from the U.S. government. The message that Pinto is to give to Castro includes reassurances that the United States is unlikely to invade Cuba if the missiles are removed.

6:00P.M.: The State Department begins receiving a message from the U.S. embassy in Moscow containing a new, private letter from Premier Khrushchev . The message arrives in four sections, with the final portion arriving at 9:00P.M., some twelve hours after the text has been delivered to the U.S. embassy. The letter, almost certainly composed by Khrushchev himself, is, in Robert Kennedy 's words, "very long and emotional." But it contains a proposal for a settlement: "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear."

6:45P.M.: John Scali tells Dean Rusk and Roger Hilsman of Aleksandr Fomin's proposal (see entry for October 26, 1962--1:00P.M.). U.S. officials assume that Fomin's message has been initiated by the Kremlin and interpret Khrushchev 's newly arrived letter in light of Fomin's offer that the Soviet Union remove its missiles under U.N. inspection in return for a U.S. non-invasion pledge. Recent information from Soviet sources suggests that, contrary to U.S. assumptions at the time, Fomin's proposal was not in fact authorized by Moscow.

7:35P.M.: Meeting again with Aleksandr Fomin, John Scali recites a message given to him by Dean Rusk . Scali states, "I have reason to believe that the [U.S. government] sees real possibilities and supposes that the representatives of the two governments in New York could work this matter out with U Thant and with each other. My impression is, however, that time is very urgent." Fomin assures Scali that his remarks would be communicated immediately to the "highest Soviet sources."

10:00P.M.: The ExComm reconvenes in an extraordinary session to consider Premier Khrushchev 's letter. Further textual analysis of the letter is ordered, and two Soviet specialists, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Joseph Neubert, are directed to analyze the letter alongside the proposal from Aleksandr Fomin.

Night: Unknown to any of the ExComm members, Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin meet at the Soviet embassy, one of a series of secret meetings the two held during the crisis. ( Dobrynin has since disclosed that when he defended the Soviet missile deployment by noting that the United States had stationed Jupiter missiles to Turkey, Robert Kennedy offered to introduce the Turkish missiles into a potential settlement.) The attorney general reportedly leaves the room to phone the president. When he returns, he tells Dobrynin , "the president said that we are ready to consider the question of Turkey, to examine favorably the question of Turkey." Dobrynin reports the conversation to the Kremlin. (Allyn, p. 158)

Around this time, according to Nikita Khrushchev , "we received information from our Cuban comrades and from other sources which directly stated that this attack [on Cuba] would be carried out within the next two or three days." Khrushchev 's statement may refer to a cable from Fidel Castro that was transmitted on the evening of October 26. Fearing that a U.S. invasion is imminent, Castro reportedly composes the message--dictating in Spanish to Soviet Ambassador Alekseyev, who translates the letter into Russian--while spending the night in a bomb shelter in the Soviet embassy in Havana. Khrushchev apparently understood the cable both as a warning of an impending invasion and as an attempt to get Khrushchev to launch the missiles in Cuba against the United States. According to an unpublished portion of Khrushchev 's memoirs, Khrushchev recalls Castro warning that "an American invasion would take place within a few hours. Therefore, he was proposing to preempt the invasion and inflict a nuclear strike on the U.S." At the Havana Conference in January 1992, Castro states that his letter was mistranslated; that he was suggesting that if Cuba was invaded, the Soviet Union would need to defend itself from attack by using nuclear weapons.

Fidel Castro orders Cuban anti-aircraft forces to open fire on all U.S. aircraft flying over the island. According to one source, Castro's order reportedly replaces his standing orders to fire only on groups of two or more low-altitude airplanes. When Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alekseyev asks Castro to recind his order, he apparently is rebuffed.

As a result of the increased frequency of low-level reconnaissance missions, additional military targets in Cuba are identified. Military planners consequently revise air attack targeting and plans. The airstrike plan now includes three massive strikes per day until Cuban air capability is destroyed. Some 1,190 bombing sorties are planned for the first day of operations.

Nikita Khrushchev demands from the U.S. a removal of nuclear missiles in Turkey as well as a promise to not invade Cuba as preconditions for his removal of Soviet missiles on Cuba. President Kennedy replies that all work in Cuba must stop prior to any negotiations.

Photo: This image shows Soviet technicians assembling their Ilyushin-28 bombers, which had been shipped in parts to Cuba.