Post by eurofed on Jun 16, 2019 19:34:35 GMT
IOTL the July Revolution in France turned out to be the first substantial success of revolutionary liberalism in Europe during the 19th century, yet it did not change things that much for the continent at large, mostly because the Orleanist regime took a mostly cautious foreign-policy attitude, and forsworn the interventionist/expansionist approach of the Republicans and Bonapartists, so the other European powers in the end chose to let them be, despite their general drive to forcibly snuff any flare-up of liberal-nationalist unrest before and later. Yet this event helped trigger a revolutionary wave in 1830-31, and Orleanist France at times took a bolder foreign-policy stance that brought it and the other great powers somewhat close to stumbling into a general war, such as during the Oriental and Rhine crises of 1840-41.
Therefore, for the purpose of this scenario, let's assume that in 1830-31 political circumstances in France soon after the July Revolution led to the Party of Movement being in control. They became free to implement a more ambitious foreign policy about enforcing the traditional expansionist goals of France and supporting liberal revolutionaries across Europe, much like they later did in 1840-41 IOTL. They mistakenly assumed agitation for electoral reform in Britain, revolutionary unrest in the Low Countries, Italy, and Poland, and various other domestic concerns such as war debt for Prussia were going to keep the other great powers distracted enough, and yield themselves enough support from liberal-nationalist revolutionaries, for France to rearrange the 1815 settlement to its liking.
Orleanist France intervened in the Belgian Revolution, made territorial demands about the Left Bank of the Rhine, and took steps to support the Polish and Italian insurgents. It did not back down enough when the other great powers showed an increasingly alarmed and hostile attitude to this apparent revival of French attitudes of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic times. Austria, Prussia, and Russia declared war when the crisis escalated, eventually followed by Britain when its mediation attempts proved fruitless. Savoy-Piedmont, Naples, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the German Confederation at large joined the coalition when the French forces started to intervene in the Southern Netherlands, western Germany, and northern Italy. At first, things seemed promising for the French and their allies: they defeated the Dutch and the Piedmontese with ease and pushed back the Austrians and the Prussians, occupying large tracts of the Low Countries and northern Italy, and making some serious inroads in Rhineland-Palatinate. The Belgian and Italian revolutionaries enthusiastically supported the French forces and the Polish insurgents kept the Russians busy.
After a while, however, things started to fall apart for the French and their allies, much like it happened in 1812-15 or would happen in 1870-71 in a different timeline. The seeming revival of French aggressive expansionism at its worst greatly alarmed the British, driving them to push aside their domestic controversies for a while and focus on the war in Europe. They poured generous amounts of money to support their continental allies, allowing Austria, Prussia, and Russia to sidestep any financial obstacles to large-scale mobilization, and raised an army to intervene in the Low Countries. French invasion of, and territorial ambitions on, the Rhineland triggered a massive wave of German nationalist sentiment across the German states that boosted the war effort of Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation and suppressed any sympathy the German liberals might have shown for revolution. Anglo-German forces stopped French advance in the Low Countries and western Germany, and started to push back with increasing success. After a while, the Russians defeated the Polish insurgents and geared up for intervention in Western Europe. Austro-Russian troops gradually pushed the French out of Italy and crushed the Italian revolutionaries.
When the military situation started to turn really bad, and the Coalition forces reached the French borders on multiple fronts, the French government pleaded for a white peace, but by then the other great powers were in a punitive mood. They deemed the 1815 peace settlement had been far too generous for France, since it had relapsed into its aggressive bad habits just 15 years after Napoleon. They made their demands known for serious territorial concessions and large reparations, and when the French refused, they got busy to fight their way to Paris. The French overthrew Louis Philippe, put a republican regime in charge, and desperately tried to resist by staging a 1790s-style revolutionary mobilization, but by then their military situation was far too compromised. When the Coalition forces got close to Paris, they were forced to surrender.
The peace treaty made a few serious adjustments to the Congress of Vienna settlement. Britain seized the French colonial holdings in the Caribbean, Senegal, and India. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands annexed Calais, the French Flanders, French Hainaut, and Artois. Sardinia-Piedmont got Corsica. Spain took Roussillon and the French occupied territories in Algeria. Alsace and Lorraine were carved out to form the Kingdom of Lorraine, which joined the German Confederation. France thus was mostly pushed back into pre-Louis XIV borders. It only kept Franche-Comte because Switzerland declined taking it, and the powers could not agree to an alternative solution.
The Wettin took the throne of Lorraine, since Prussia annexed Saxony and the Thuringian states as its main war booty. Much the same way, Austria expanded its direct rule of northern Italy by annexing Parma, Modena, Lucca, Tuscany, and Romagna. This worked to compensate its war effort and was an attempt to suppress revolutionary instability in Italy, since indirect control by small vassal states ruled by junior branches of the Hasbburg or the Bourbon had worked poorly. The Pope's complaints about the loss of Romagna fell on deaf ears, since his government had a well-deserved repuation for misrule and ineptitude, and the powers judged the remaining lands of the Papal states were more than enough to secure his independence and prestige.
The renewed threat of French expansionism and revolution, and the wave of German nationalism unleashed by the war, persuaded the ruling elites of Austria and Prussia that conservative unification of Germany would better suit their interests than the 1815 settlement, so they implemented a centralizing reform of the German Confederation that turned it into a functional federation. The outline of the new German constitution broadly resembled the 1863 Austrian proposal for a reform of the Confederation. In practice, Austria and Prussia made a power-sharing compromise for a dual leadership of Germany. The new federation expanded its borders to include Prussia proper and Alsace-Lorraine, but not the Habsburg lands that did not already belong in the German Confederation. The Austrians and the Prussians agreed to this compromise in exchange for a guarantee about the defense of Austria's non-German territories. Russia annexed Posen, Galicia, and Krakow. The Russians did so to compensate their own war effort, and in the expectation control of whole Poland would better enable them to suppress Polish unrest. Austria and Prussia agreed to cede their own pieces of Poland, since they were getting their compensations in Germany and Italy.
Besides inflicting the aforementioned territorial losses, onerous reparations, and a period of military occupation until they got paid, the victor powers were at a loss about the political settlement of France. Legitimist scruples about the rights of the House of Bourbon were at an all-out low among the great powers, since the senior line had proved to be utterly inept at containing, and the Orleanist line actually in cahoots with, the forces of revolution and French aggression. The powers understood that to put reactionary and inflexible Charles X or his like-minded son back on the throne, or setting up a weak and unpopular Legitimist regency for his grandson, were an open invitation for the revolutionaries to seize power again the moment their backs were turned. The senior line was on the brink of extinction if his last legitimate member in the male line failed to have sons, and the Orleanist line discredited among the powers for its role during the war.
The victors seriously considered putting Napoleon II on the throne, thanks to his ties with Austria, but his sudden death removed this option. Napoleon's brothers and the powers had no interest in their re-entering public life, and at this point in his life, future Napoleon III looked like an obscure adventurer. There was not any other royal family of sufficient legitimacy to be accepted by the French, and more radical solutions such as a partition of France appeared unfeasible. A republic was utterly unacceptable, for ideological reasons and because the republicans had been among the staunchest supporters of war. For lack of a better option the powers decided to let the abdications of Charles X, his son, and Louis Philippe stick, and seriously vacillated between the default solutions of either Charles X's grandson (senior claim but a child, and belonging to a very unpopular line) or the son of Louis Philippe (sufficiently old to take the throne and popular, but tainted by revolution and the war). In the end, they embraced the compromise solution of putting the former on the throne, under the regency of the latter.
Therefore, for the purpose of this scenario, let's assume that in 1830-31 political circumstances in France soon after the July Revolution led to the Party of Movement being in control. They became free to implement a more ambitious foreign policy about enforcing the traditional expansionist goals of France and supporting liberal revolutionaries across Europe, much like they later did in 1840-41 IOTL. They mistakenly assumed agitation for electoral reform in Britain, revolutionary unrest in the Low Countries, Italy, and Poland, and various other domestic concerns such as war debt for Prussia were going to keep the other great powers distracted enough, and yield themselves enough support from liberal-nationalist revolutionaries, for France to rearrange the 1815 settlement to its liking.
Orleanist France intervened in the Belgian Revolution, made territorial demands about the Left Bank of the Rhine, and took steps to support the Polish and Italian insurgents. It did not back down enough when the other great powers showed an increasingly alarmed and hostile attitude to this apparent revival of French attitudes of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic times. Austria, Prussia, and Russia declared war when the crisis escalated, eventually followed by Britain when its mediation attempts proved fruitless. Savoy-Piedmont, Naples, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the German Confederation at large joined the coalition when the French forces started to intervene in the Southern Netherlands, western Germany, and northern Italy. At first, things seemed promising for the French and their allies: they defeated the Dutch and the Piedmontese with ease and pushed back the Austrians and the Prussians, occupying large tracts of the Low Countries and northern Italy, and making some serious inroads in Rhineland-Palatinate. The Belgian and Italian revolutionaries enthusiastically supported the French forces and the Polish insurgents kept the Russians busy.
After a while, however, things started to fall apart for the French and their allies, much like it happened in 1812-15 or would happen in 1870-71 in a different timeline. The seeming revival of French aggressive expansionism at its worst greatly alarmed the British, driving them to push aside their domestic controversies for a while and focus on the war in Europe. They poured generous amounts of money to support their continental allies, allowing Austria, Prussia, and Russia to sidestep any financial obstacles to large-scale mobilization, and raised an army to intervene in the Low Countries. French invasion of, and territorial ambitions on, the Rhineland triggered a massive wave of German nationalist sentiment across the German states that boosted the war effort of Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation and suppressed any sympathy the German liberals might have shown for revolution. Anglo-German forces stopped French advance in the Low Countries and western Germany, and started to push back with increasing success. After a while, the Russians defeated the Polish insurgents and geared up for intervention in Western Europe. Austro-Russian troops gradually pushed the French out of Italy and crushed the Italian revolutionaries.
When the military situation started to turn really bad, and the Coalition forces reached the French borders on multiple fronts, the French government pleaded for a white peace, but by then the other great powers were in a punitive mood. They deemed the 1815 peace settlement had been far too generous for France, since it had relapsed into its aggressive bad habits just 15 years after Napoleon. They made their demands known for serious territorial concessions and large reparations, and when the French refused, they got busy to fight their way to Paris. The French overthrew Louis Philippe, put a republican regime in charge, and desperately tried to resist by staging a 1790s-style revolutionary mobilization, but by then their military situation was far too compromised. When the Coalition forces got close to Paris, they were forced to surrender.
The peace treaty made a few serious adjustments to the Congress of Vienna settlement. Britain seized the French colonial holdings in the Caribbean, Senegal, and India. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands annexed Calais, the French Flanders, French Hainaut, and Artois. Sardinia-Piedmont got Corsica. Spain took Roussillon and the French occupied territories in Algeria. Alsace and Lorraine were carved out to form the Kingdom of Lorraine, which joined the German Confederation. France thus was mostly pushed back into pre-Louis XIV borders. It only kept Franche-Comte because Switzerland declined taking it, and the powers could not agree to an alternative solution.
The Wettin took the throne of Lorraine, since Prussia annexed Saxony and the Thuringian states as its main war booty. Much the same way, Austria expanded its direct rule of northern Italy by annexing Parma, Modena, Lucca, Tuscany, and Romagna. This worked to compensate its war effort and was an attempt to suppress revolutionary instability in Italy, since indirect control by small vassal states ruled by junior branches of the Hasbburg or the Bourbon had worked poorly. The Pope's complaints about the loss of Romagna fell on deaf ears, since his government had a well-deserved repuation for misrule and ineptitude, and the powers judged the remaining lands of the Papal states were more than enough to secure his independence and prestige.
The renewed threat of French expansionism and revolution, and the wave of German nationalism unleashed by the war, persuaded the ruling elites of Austria and Prussia that conservative unification of Germany would better suit their interests than the 1815 settlement, so they implemented a centralizing reform of the German Confederation that turned it into a functional federation. The outline of the new German constitution broadly resembled the 1863 Austrian proposal for a reform of the Confederation. In practice, Austria and Prussia made a power-sharing compromise for a dual leadership of Germany. The new federation expanded its borders to include Prussia proper and Alsace-Lorraine, but not the Habsburg lands that did not already belong in the German Confederation. The Austrians and the Prussians agreed to this compromise in exchange for a guarantee about the defense of Austria's non-German territories. Russia annexed Posen, Galicia, and Krakow. The Russians did so to compensate their own war effort, and in the expectation control of whole Poland would better enable them to suppress Polish unrest. Austria and Prussia agreed to cede their own pieces of Poland, since they were getting their compensations in Germany and Italy.
Besides inflicting the aforementioned territorial losses, onerous reparations, and a period of military occupation until they got paid, the victor powers were at a loss about the political settlement of France. Legitimist scruples about the rights of the House of Bourbon were at an all-out low among the great powers, since the senior line had proved to be utterly inept at containing, and the Orleanist line actually in cahoots with, the forces of revolution and French aggression. The powers understood that to put reactionary and inflexible Charles X or his like-minded son back on the throne, or setting up a weak and unpopular Legitimist regency for his grandson, were an open invitation for the revolutionaries to seize power again the moment their backs were turned. The senior line was on the brink of extinction if his last legitimate member in the male line failed to have sons, and the Orleanist line discredited among the powers for its role during the war.
The victors seriously considered putting Napoleon II on the throne, thanks to his ties with Austria, but his sudden death removed this option. Napoleon's brothers and the powers had no interest in their re-entering public life, and at this point in his life, future Napoleon III looked like an obscure adventurer. There was not any other royal family of sufficient legitimacy to be accepted by the French, and more radical solutions such as a partition of France appeared unfeasible. A republic was utterly unacceptable, for ideological reasons and because the republicans had been among the staunchest supporters of war. For lack of a better option the powers decided to let the abdications of Charles X, his son, and Louis Philippe stick, and seriously vacillated between the default solutions of either Charles X's grandson (senior claim but a child, and belonging to a very unpopular line) or the son of Louis Philippe (sufficiently old to take the throne and popular, but tainted by revolution and the war). In the end, they embraced the compromise solution of putting the former on the throne, under the regency of the latter.
