The Falklands War - Timeline

Day 47 of the Falklands War, May 18th 1982

In London, the meeting of the War Cabinet considers Operation SUTTON; “It was for the Chiefs of Staff to advise on the military feasibility of the operation. Their advice, presented first by CDS (Lewin), was that this was about the only option left that was feasible. There was no satisfactory settlement available to be negotiated nor was a long blockade viable. The recommendation was therefore that the landing should go ahead as soon as practicable... Individually the Chiefs made their own submissions, all pointing to the same conclusion... The War Cabinet accepted the advice: the landing and repossession operations would go ahead unless it was clear that an acceptable diplomatic settlement was available by the afternoon of 20 May... The decision was made...”

In Parliament, PM Thatcher makes a statement; “Our representative at the United Nations has had a further meeting with Senor Perez de Cuellar. The negotiations are continuing and we are doing all that we can to reach a peaceful settlement, although there are principles on which we cannot compromise. There remain substantial difficulties. I believe that we shall know within the next day or two whether an agreement is attainable. We cannot have endless Argentine prevarication. We have been negotiating in good faith for six weeks and there has still been no sign of Argentine willingness to implement the Security Council's mandatory resolution. Our determination to ensure that all Argentine forces are withdrawn from the islands remains absolute. We have throughout made it clear that we shall take whatever steps are necessary to bring this about. We are meanwhile increasing the military pressures on the Argentine Government.... I believe that any military action or option cannot and must not be delayed by people who are extending negotiations.”

In Washington, Stoessel reports to President Reagan; “I had a long talk with UK Ambassador Henderson today. He expects the Argentinians will not accept the latest UK proposals, but will come back tomorrow with suggested changes. Henderson anticipates that these in turn will be unacceptable to the British and that the UN Secretary General will thereupon declare his mediation mission at an end. Henderson intimated that a major UK assault on the main island would ensue on the heels of the SG's declaration; he predicted with confidence that the operation would be successful and that the battle—while possibly involving high casualties on both sides - would be over “sooner rather than later.” Henderson thought that when the assault takes place there will be pressure in the UN Security Council for a simple ceasefire without withdrawal (which would be unacceptable to the UK) and that—in his “personal view”—the time would then be appropriate for the US again to come forward as the only power capable of bringing about a settlement.”

Still awaiting an Argentine response, Parsons speaks privately to the Secretary-General; “Pérez de Cuéllar was already regretting that British tactics had made it difficult for him to produce a paper of his own, as he had expected to do by this stage of the process... The end game was still going to be tricky, Parsons warned London. He could now see that Pérez de Cuéllar would probably want to put some proposals to both sides, just to say that he had done so, but without any expectation of success.”

Late in the evening in New York, Deputy Foreign Minister Ros submits a document to the Secretary-General's office; “They were a mixture of requests for clarification, re-statement of known Argentine positions and introduction of new points. ... (a) The Argentines said that they were not clear what we meant by “in consultation with”.. Did it mean that the opinion of the Councils would be binding on the Administrator or not? .. (b) they did not like the references to Article 73 of the Charter, (c) they were prepared to change the date to 30 June 1983, but required a provision that if no agreement had been reached by then the General Assembly would intervene .. They needed a mechanism to ensure that the negotiations did not continue for ever, (d) they wanted the Dependencies included, (e) they wanted a reference to the relevant GA Resolutions in the preamble if possible, and in any case in the terms of reference, (f) they suggested that in the negotiations the SecretaryGeneral should “resort to” a four State Contact Group, two States being nominated by each party, with each party having the right to veto one of the two States proposed by the other, (g) on withdrawal, they proposed a very general clause which would provide for complete withdrawal and return to normal areas of operations within 30 days, (h) there was also a point about communications and access to the Islands for the nationals of both parties during the interim period.” After Ros has left, Pérez de Cuéllar summons Parsons.

“He said that Ros had given him a document containing Argentine “ideas and views” to bridge the differences between us. De Soto then described these. ... I said that I would transmit all this to you … but I could say right away that you would consider this Argentine response as completely unsatisfactory. It did not constitute a clear reply … You would only be able to draw the conclusion that the Argentines were playing for time. .. I had made clear yesterday that such a response would be interpreted by HMG as rejection..”

Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the UN, speaks to Ros and her Argentine opposite number, Eduardo Roca; “I attempted without success to persuade them that the British proposal is not so bad; that Argentina could, if she chose, accept it and declare she had won by the establishment of a UN authority responsible for the government...”

Near the Falklands' TEZ, two elements of Britain's naval force, the carrier group (TG317.8) and the amphibious group (TG317.0) rendezvous to facilitate a redistribution of men and supplies via ship-to-ship transfers. Over 4,000 troops are present. Reconnaissance teams are landed using Sea King helicopters.

Day 49 of the Falklands War, May 20th 1982

Just after midnight, Sir Anthony Parsons sends an urgent telegram to London; “.. the Secretary General has dropped an embarrassing bombshell .. he has now launched his own paper.. When we remonstrated with his staff that this move was inconsistent with the British position as I had described it as recently as lunchtime today.. they said he had been encouraged to make it by the Prime Ministers concluding remarks .. It looks therefore as though Pérez de Cuéllar, in his desperate desire not to sign off, has chosen to ignore the clarification of the Prime Minister's remarks which I gave him this evening. The paper is very cleverly drafted and is undoubtedly more favourable to us than to Argentina, but I fully realise that it has come too late ...”

Pérez de Cuéllar's aide memoire outlines four areas where he says that agreement must be reached – (a) certain aspects of the interim-Administration, (b) provision for the extension of the time for completion of negotiations and related duration of the interim-Administration, (c) certain aspects of mutual withdrawal of forces, and (d) the geographic area to be covered by the terms of the Interim Agreement. The proposal also includes: (1) inclusion of the Dependencies within the Interim Agreement, (2) references to UN General Assembly Resolutions, (3) the flags of the parties and the UN to fly over the Islands, (4) inconclusive arrangements to extend the UN administration if the target date is not met, (5) consideration of a relaxation of restrictions on residence and the acquisition of property.

Margaret Thatcher speaks to the House of Commons; “... On Monday of this week our ambassador to the United Nations handed to the Secretary-General our proposals for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. These proposals represented the limit to which the Government believe it was right to go. We made it clear to Senor Pérez de Cuéllar that we expected the Argentine Government to give us a very rapid response to them. By yesterday morning we had had a first indication of the Argentine reaction. It was not encouraging. By the evening we received their full response in writing. It was in effect a total rejection of the British proposals.

We have reached this very serious situation because the Argentines clearly decided at the outset of the negotiations that they would cling to the spoils of invasion and occupation by thwarting at every turn all the attempts that have been made to solve the conflict by peaceful means. Ever since 2 April they have responded to the efforts to find a negotiated solution with obduracy and delay, deception and bad faith…..

Since May 6th, when it became clear that the United States-Peruvian proposals were not acceptable to Argentina, the United Nations Secretary-General, Senor Pérez de Cuéllar, has been conducting negotiations with Britain and Argentina. Following several rounds of discussions, the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations was summoned to London for consultation last Sunday. On Monday Sir Anthony Parsons returned to New York and presented to the Secretary-General a draft interim agreement between Britain and Argentina which set out the British position in full. He made it clear that the text represented the furthest that Britain could go in the negotiations. Yesterday we received the Argentine Government's reply. It amounted to a rejection of our own proposals, and we have so informed the Secretary-General…. The proposals have been rejected. They are no longer on the table… ”

Secretary Haig telephones Ambassador Henderson to give his impressions of the Prime Ministers speech; “He thought we were “well-postured”. We had played things intelligently and efficiently.”

Foreign Secretary Pym telegrams Sir Anthony Parsons to tell him that the Secretary-General's “ideas” represent a “significant downwards from what was our absolute bottom line.” With regard to military plans, Parsons should; “.. emphasize, as has been constantly stated in Parliament, that our search for a negotiated settlement has not affected and cannot affect the pressures, including military, which we have been bringing to bear on the Argentines.”

Parsons speaks to Pérez de Cuéllar; “I said that we appreciated the positive aspects of the aide memoire, but it differed in important respects from out bottom line. .. Even if acceptable to both sides as a basis for negotiations it would take days if not weeks to know whether success could be achieved. I had emphasised the importance of our deadline. Pérez de Cuéllar interrupted to say that he knew the importance of our deadline. His idea had been to work today with the Argentines in order to see whether he could persuade them to prepare a comprehensive paper for presentation to us in place of their unsatisfactory document... In conclusion Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had not told the press that he had produced a plan, just confidential ideas which he hoped would assist the parties to reach a negotiated settlement. He had no intention of publishing these..”

Francis Pym instructs Embassies and Missions; “You should now carry out the instructions .. If asked about the UN Secretary-General's last-minute proposals, you should say that we have throughout warmly appreciated Sr. Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts. However, given the hardening of the Argentine position in their latest text, it was clear that further negotiations would be fruitless.”

President Belaunde of Peru announces that he has put forward new proposals to the British and Argentine Ambassadors. Belaunde states that he has been encouraged by a telephone call from Costa Mendez saying that the Argentine Government are urgently examining the Peruvian proposal. Described as a 'two document' proposal, it states; “ (1) Each Nation subscribes unilaterally to the latest proposal for an agreement presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; (2) The Secretary-General fulfills the clauses in which there are points of agreement, such as – (a) ceasefire; (b) mutual withdrawal of forces; (c) Administration of the Government of the Islands by the UN or by a contact group, formed of various countries, within a period which is agreed in the two proposals; (3) The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar, or the contact group, acceptable to both parties, which he will propose, will be responsible for organising and presiding over negotiations in pursuit of a permanent solution and for supervising the immediate withdrawal from the zone of conflict of the forces of both countries.”

Parsons reports; “The Secretary-General has spent the whole day waiting for an Argentine reaction to his aide memoire of 19 May. At 2345z this evening he had still not had one.”

The Secretary-General speaks to Ros to say that he has not received a reply from the Argentines and has no choice but to inform the President of the Security Council that he cannot continue his efforts. Ros replies that he has been unable to get any response from Buenos Aires.

Pérez de Cuéllar writes to the President of the Security Council; "... I felt the time for reaching agreement through negotiations that would restore peace in the South Atlantic was extremely short. It remains my view that substantial progress was achieved in the past two weeks towards a diplomatic solution, but I must now state that the necessary accommodations which were still needed to end the conflict have not been forthcoming. In these circumstances, I feel it my duty to inform you that, in my judgement, the efforts in which I have been engaged, with the support of the Council, do not offer the present prospect of bringing about an end to the crisis nor, indeed, of preventing the intensification of the conflict.”

HMS Glamorgan bombards targets on the south coast to give the impression that a 'softening-up' is taking place ahead of a landing south of Stanley.

To the north of West Falkland, Fearless, Intrepid and Yarmouth head towards San Carlos with Plymouth and Brilliant following.

Britain's Embassies and Missions throughout the world receive orders. “... carry out the instructions .. If asked about the UN Secretary-General's last-minute proposals, you should say that we have throughout warmly appreciated Sr. Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts. However, given the hardening of the Argentine position in their latest text, it was clear that further negotiations would be fruitless.”

At midnight in the Falklands; Britain's invasion force is in position.

Photo: HMS Cardiff waits in station to refuel from RFA Olna en route to the Falklands and war 1982

Day 51 of the Falklands War, May 22nd 1982

From the Vatican, Pope John Paul II, expresses his anguish and appeals for; “ … an immediate ceasefire that will open the way to a peaceful settlement of the dispute.”

In London, an MoD spokesman amends the previous day's statement; “Further reports on yesterday's operations in the Falklands up-date Argentine aircraft losses as follows: 9 Mirages, 5 Skyhawks, 2 Pucaras and 4 helicopters. We have not received final casualty reports for yesterday's operations. Initial reports indicate British casualties of 27 wounded, 2 missing and 3 dead. The two ships reported yesterday as being seriously damaged were hit by bombs in the series of air attack launched against our forces. The other three ships remain operational.”

John Nott makes a statement; “This morning the Union Jack is once again flying on the Falkland Islands... A major bridgehead has been established in the area of San Carlos on East Falkland. The major amphibious landing yesterday was a complete success. Tactical surprise was achieved and our troops landed safely with almost no interference from Argentine forces. We are now ashore on British sovereign territory in considerable force and have three Royal Marine Commandos and two Battalions of the Parachute Regiment firmly in place with their supporting arms including artillery and rapier and other air defence weapons. … To compliment the landings there were raids yesterday in other parts of East and West Falklands. In one of these Royal Marines captured an Argentine position on Fanning Head overlooking Falkland Sound. In another the airfield at Goose Green, and Argentine positions close by, were raided by our forces. Carrier based RAF Harriers launched attacks in the course of the morning against Argentine installations at Port Stanley airfield and the helicopters on the ground nearby, as well as military installations at Fox Bay. During these operations we lost two Gazelle helicopters, and one RAF Harrier is missing. The Argentine navy has so far made no attempt to intervene.. The Argentine force has, as expected, launched heavy raids on our ships... We are back on the Falkland Islands, and back in strength. We intend to ensure that aggression does not pay“

Two Harriers attack an Argentine patrol boat, Rio Iguazu, in Choiseul Sound. The vessel is beached and abandoned. Two Argentine Puma helicopters and their escorting Agusta A109 are fired on by Sea Harriers. One helicopter is shot down while the other two land. The Agusta A109 is set alight by gunfire. Near the San Carlos beachhead, a field hospital is established at Ajax Bay.

Photo: The Ajax Bay Hospital was set up in 24 hours in an old farm outhouse



Peruvian President Belaunde announces that the Argentines have accepted “in principle” the latest Peruvian ideas albeit with certain reservations; “ .. which President Belaunde thought might not be insuperable. In particular, President Belaunde said that Galtieri had shown himself to be receptive to the idea of an “equidistant” withdrawal of forces. The Argentines feel that 150 miles is too near because their own bases are further away. … The president also said that the Argentines are not opposed to a UN Group governing the Islands for six months or even one year during which negotiations could take place. If at the end of this period there was no agreement, the Argentines would propose to return the problem to the United Nations. .. he understood that Costa Mendez was on his way to the UN, and that he thought it was therefore important that you should be informed straight away of the nature of Galtieri's response...”

Uruguay agrees that casualties may be repatriated via Montevideo.


Two Dagger aircraft and three A4Bs attack British ships at San Carlos. No vessels are hit or damaged. One Sea Harrier explodes shortly after takeoff. Bad weather prevents further Argentine air attacks.

In New York, Parsons reviews tactics in the Security Council; “We have already got Canada and New Zealand on board, they will probably speak today, thus to some extent offsetting the torrent of Latin American rhetoric which is in store for us ( .. it will bore the Council to death). We are working on the Caribbeans, Americans and members of the Community... Abdulah (Trinidad) is on our side but gutless. … The new Barbadian Ambassador is a man of sterner stuff and I have some hopes of him. Our African friends – Zambia, Botswana, Kenya etc. are cheering us vigorously from the pavilion but are reluctant to go to the wicket. … The US and France are bound to make substantive comments at some stage but, given the personal qualities of Mrs Kirkpatrick and de Nanteuil, I suspect that the Guyanian statement will be more helpful. From the point of view of getting out Third World Commonwealth speakers, it might be worth your seeing if Ramphal would help ..”

When the Security Council reconvenes; Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Soviet Union, Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, Panama, Canada, Guatemala and the United States contribute their views before the meeting is again adjourned; “Of the Latins the Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign ministers were abusive; the others made reasonably moderate statements, notably Guatemala. The Soviet Union was hostile but not abusive. Canada was excellent. The US statement was a little too even-handed. Mrs Kirkpatrick made small but important changes to the advance text.”

Secretary Haig sees Ambassador Henderson privately to say that the US Government is increasingly concerned at the consequences for US interests in the continuing battle over the Falkland islands.

Day 53 of the Falklands War, May 24th 1982

Late morning in the Falklands, five Argentine Skyhawks fly in over San Carlos Water. RFA Sir Galahad, Sir Lancelot and Sir Bedivere are hit in the attack. Fires break out on Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot although the bombs fail to explode. The bomb striking Sir Bedivere passes through the ship. In a second attack by four Daggers Sir Lancelot is hit for a second time but this bomb bounces off. Argentine cannon fire hits Fearless and Sir Galahad. British Sea Harriers shoot down 3 Daggers with Sidewinder missiles. Throughout the attacks the other vessels continue landing stores, equipment and men.

The MoD announce that HMS Antelope has sunk.

Photo: HMS Antelope's magazines exploding.



Photo: The bow and stern sections of HMS Antelope visible after she was sank by Argentine air attack a day earlier.



In London, Defence Secretary Nott makes a statement in Parliament; “On the night of Thursday 20 May, Her Majesty's forces re-established a secure base on the Falkland Islands and the Union Flag is today flying over the settlement of San Carlos in East Falkland—where it will remain. The whole House will have been delighted to see the expressions of delight on the faces of the islanders and their children—published widely yesterday. The amphibious landing was the culmination of a long period of planning by the force commander and of preparation by the Royal Marine commandos, members of the Parachute Regiment and supporting arms during their six weeks voyage into the South Atlantic. Whilst they sailed south, the Government worked unremittingly to persuade Argentina to withdraw peacefully and honourably from the Falkland Islands. But the Government met only with Argentine intransigence.

Last week it became clear that the only possible course left open to us was the repossession of the Falkland Islands by military means. In this the Government have been encouraged—as I think has the country as a whole—that Her Majesty's Opposition and the other main political parties in the House have supported us. Certainly I believe that our Service men have been greatly encouraged by the support that they have received from right hon. and hon. Members of this House... We all feel deeply too for the constant concern and worry of the families and friends of our Service men. They are showing great patience and understanding in very difficult circumstances. Names of casualties will not be released until the next of kin have been informed, although to counter the false propaganda coming out of Argentina we have had to give some general information on the progress of military action as soon as it is confirmed.

Our forces are now established on the Falkland Islands with all the necessary supplies, together with their heavy equipment and air defence missiles. They have mobility with a large number of helicopters at their disposal—and their spirits are high. But I must emphasise that our men still face formidable problems in difficult terrain with a hostile climate. We must expect fresh attacks upon them, and there can be no question of pressing the force commander to move forward prematurely—the judgement about the next tactical moves must be his—and his alone. But, one thing is certain: the days of the occupying Argentine garrison are numbered and it will not be long before the Falkland Islanders once again have their democratic rights restored.”

Economic sanctions imposed by the European Community against Argentina are extended for an unspecified period.

British aircraft attack Stanley airfield shortly after dawn, damaging a helicopter and a Pucara and causing some damage to the runway.

In Argentina, Conviccion, tells its readers; “The marines, immobilized at San Carlos, await their Dunkirk. As Argentine troops concentrate to throw them into the sea, the British continue in the little beachhead without resupply.” Panama's press report their Foreign Minister describing Margaret Thatcher as; “Hitler with skirts.”

The Washington Post reports; “Secretary of State Alexander Haig suggests that Britain's successful landings on the Falklands – plus the sacrifices sustained by both sides – may make enough of a difference to permit negotiations to resume. Surely he is right. In its bridgehead and in its evident capacity to sustain operations ashore, Britain has something real to convert into political coin. Argentina may hope to raise the cost to the British and limit their military gains, but it cannot expect to boot them off the Islands again. The 40 isolated marines it swept up on April 2 are one thing, the 5,000 troops ashore, with their fleet protection, are quite another.”

In New York, the Security Council, debate continues; “Maina (Kenya) made an admirably robust statement which was an effective antidote to all the Latins have been saying about a cultural confrontation between the West and Latin America. He said that the Breach of the Peace had started with Argentina's aggression on 2 April. That was a separate question from the rights and wrongs of Argentina's claims to sovereignty. Some of those who “felt obliged” to support Argentina's case on sovereignty had tried to treat the two problems as one. …

The Decolonisation argument was irrelevant. All of North and South America had been colonised in the 18th and 19th centuries. .. That was a fact of the world's unfortunate past. This was not a colonial issue: Argentina was engaged in the purely territorial claim, in total disregard of the inhabitants of the Islands. The Argentine claim could not be settled at their expense: their interests were paramount. If the principle of decolonisation was distorted to redistribute peoples, the United Nations would be in real trouble. ...

Ling Qing (China) speaking in his national capacity, said that the failure of the SecretaryGeneral’s efforts and the arrival of British forces had brought about an escalation which China deeply deplored. ... There should be an immediate ceasefire and resumption of negotiations. The substantive problem was a legacy of colonialism..”

In Washington, Haig expresses his fears to Britain's Ambassador; “.. Haig said that the US Government, by coming down on the British side, had already greatly jeopardised US interests in Latin America. What was at stake in the future was enormous. It was not simply a question of the economic sacrifices involved but of the enormous increase in Soviet and communist influence. Haig's problem therefore was somehow to avoid a resolution under the Rio Treaty later this week that would isolate the USA still further from the rest of the American hemisphere. ... Haig then suggested the sort of plan which I have already hinted to you might be on his mind: ceasefire and withdrawal, US/Brazilian interim administration and discussions without prejudice regarding the future – ideas that I told Haig have gone down in London like a lead balloon. .. ”

On receiving Henderson's telegram, Pym comments; “It is disconcerting that Haig should be so volatile. Haig was urging us only a few days ago to take military action...”

Brazil suggests a draft Resolution to the President of the Council; .. the Security Council of the United Nations can no longer delay taking firm and decisive action to restore international peace and security. .. there is no alternative but that the Security Council must take a decision to put an immediate end to the military confrontation and to establish the bases for a permanent settlement of the problem. The Brazilian Government wish to submit .. the following points which .. can be the basis for a Council Resolution that will ensure a just and honourable peace without winners or losers.”

Brazil's “points” include: (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) simultaneous withdrawal to equal distances, (3) withdrawal to be complete within 21 days, (4) a UN administration which will consult the “representatives of the inhabitants,” (5) a Committee made up of both Britain and Argentina plus four other States with a mandate to conduct negotiations.

Parsons comments to the FCO; “We have told the Brazilians here that the time for such arrangements is now past and that there could be no question of our allowing a Resolution on these lines to be adopted.”

Ireland's Ambassador Dorr, also tables a draft Resolution which, inter alia, calls for a suspension of hostilities for 72 hours; “.. the Non-Aligned members (excluding Panama) were annoyed with Dorr for going ahead and tabling a draft which he and everyone else knew that we would veto. The three Africans, Jordan and Guyana were desperately anxious to avoid a deadlock in the Security Council which could be followed by a major row generated by the Latin Americans in an emergency session of the General Assembly. This would only polarise relations between the regions, benefit the radicals and damage any prospect there might be of a peaceful outcome to the present crisis...”

Representatives from Panama and Japan also prepare draft texts. The Non-Aligned Movement submits a proposal for an amended version of the Irish draft Resolution while the Council meeting is adjourned until the 25th. Parsons seeks instructions from London.

In an interview with the 'Panorama' news team in New York, Costa Mendez asserts – (a) that Argentina would defend the Falklands as long as there is “one Argentine alive in either the continent or in the Islands,” (b) he was still looking for a peaceful solution; they had been seeking one for 17 years in the UN. .. he considered the invasion to be part of that search for a peaceful settlement, (c) Argentina had fully accepted Resolution 502 from the beginning but they had not withdrawn because the UK sent 40 warships, (d) 502 did not authorise the UK to impose a solution on Argentina, (e) Argentina was willing to make any concession except sovereignty.

Uruguay's Foreign Minister condemns the British attack on Argentina, calls for a ceasefire and attacks the United States for its support for, “colonial policies of confrontation.”

Argentina seeks Chilean support for an OAS draft Resolution condemning British aggression; calling for a cessation of hostilities with a return to 'natural' bases; a resumption of UN negotiations and the adoption by OAS States of measures to discourage the UK and assist Argentina. The Chilean Foreign Ministry inform the British Embassy that they will vote against each point except that calling for a resumption of negotiations.

Information is received from Caracas that the Venezuelan Government is attempting to persuade all Latin American countries to withdraw their Ambassadors from the UK. In Lima, President Belaunde is contacted by Costa Mendez and told that the Argentines have no objection to a cease-fire without the withdrawal of British forces from their, “present positions.”

During the night, an SAS reconnaissance team arrive on Mount Kent to discover it deserted. 

Day 55 of the Falklands War, May 26th 1982

US Ambassador, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, messages the State Department from the UN regarding a meeting with Argentine Air Force General Jose Miret; “According to Gen. Miret the military situation was developing favorably for Argentina. Just that morning 21 Argentinian warplanes had attacked British ships and had inflicted severe damage to the Canberra troop carrier. Yesterday they had sunk a frigate. British were not accurately portraying their losses and he was sceptical that their San Carlos beachhead was as well established as they claimed. Although presently the military situation favored Argentina, Argentina was aware that ultimately Britain would prevail because Argentina could not expect to defeat a world power. Argentina naturally did not want to lose but neither did it find comfort in the thought of winning in a manner that would humiliate Britain. …

Britain's expansion of the war zone to include the River Plate estuary necessarily dragged Uruguay and probably Brazil into the conflict. Uruguayan Foreign Minister was coming to New York to raise the issue. As the conflict expands and its intensity increases, it will become increasingly difficult to foresee its consequences or to find an acceptable solution.

Without an American restraining influence, Britain will insist on pursuing its military objectives until the bitter end. ..

In Bonn, Rheinishe Post asserts that Germany's support for the UK is, “grudging and full of reservations stemming from incomprehension at many aspects of Mrs. Thatcher's Falklands strategy,” and that Germany will not go, “through thick and thin,” with Britain.

In London, John Nott makes a statement to Parliament “During the past seven weeks the Royal Navy has assembled, organised and despatched over 100 ships, involving over 25,000 men and women, 8,000 miles away to the other end of the world. The Task Force has recaptured South Georgia and successfully accomplished a hazardous amphibious landing of around 5,000 men without a single fatal land casualty. The morale of our forces is high. …

Our forces on the ground are now poised to begin their thrust upon Port Stanley; behind them are another 3,000 men of 5 Brigade, whilst reinforcements and resupply are virtually denied to the Argentine garrison on the island. Generally the military objective to repossess the Falkland Islands has gone forward exactly as we planned it. ..”

Francis Pym is informed that; “President Turbay had spoken to the Presidents of Brazil and Peru, who had agreed to put forward ideas on an informal basis .. In the absence of any diplomatic activity to resolve the crisis, there would be strong pressures at the Rio Treaty meeting on 27 May to take radical positions against the UK. What was needed was time to allow pressures to be brought to bear on Argentina to reach an agreement which the UK could accept. .. The three Governments therefore wished to know whether we could consider agreement to a suspension of military operations for 5 days ..” Pym politely says “No.”

Off South Georgia, 3,000 men are transferred from QE2 to Canberra, Stromness and Norland.

On the Falklands, C Company, 2 Para, set up a forward base at Camilla Creek House.

Photo: Gazelle supplying 2 PARA at Camilla Creek House.



In Mexico, Britain's Ambassador Tickell updates President Portillo before reporting to London; “(Portillo) asked me to convey his warm thanks to the Prime Minister. He deplored the loss of life and waste of resources involved in the conflict. He did not doubt our capacity to recover the Islands and indicated that he hoped we would not be too long about it...”

In Washington, Haig updates President Reagan; “Our latest exchanges with the British confirm that they are currently not of a mind to work toward a negotiated settlement which gives anything at all to the Argentines before they retake the Islands. …

The two sides could not be further apart. The Secretary General has asked us to put pressure on the British to accept mutual withdrawal, warning that he will announce Thursday evening that a ceasefire is not possible if the British have not moderated their position... Given the mood in London, American pressure would be in vain; … There is virtually no hope of productive negotiations before the British complete their re-occupation of the Islands. Even then, the British will be reluctant to offer anything to the Argentines. … they will not be flexible, at least in the short term, in the flush of victory. ”

Meanwhile, in New York, the Security Council's debate continues; “Spain and Togo listed the cessation of hostilities, negotiation and peace as the priorities of the Council’s action, as did several other speakers who urged the Council to call for an immediate ceasefire. Jordan asserted that the Council should not resign itself to the role of onlooker while blood was being shed, and Brazil said the Council was duty bound to prevent a worsening of the situation. Greece said the Council’s prestige would be enhanced if it unequivocally condemned all invasions and breaches of the Charter provisions. Colombia asserted that the United Nations would emerge greatly weakened if it failed to enforce international law and maintenance of international peace and security, while the United States considered that the Organization had functioned in the crisis in the manner foreseen by its founders and its Charter. … Several countries, among them Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela, held the United Kingdom responsible for blocking the negotiating efforts. China said the negotiations had broken down due to a tough stand taken by the party with superior military strength. Bolivia asserted that any peace effort would be doomed to failure as long as the United Kingdom persisted in its equivocal stand. Panama and the USSR said the United Kingdom had resorted to the language of ultimatums and virtually broken off negotiations by resorting to the use of force. Antigua and Barbuda believed the United Kingdom had made genuine attempts to reach a negotiated settlement.

The United States said the United Kingdom had indicated its willingness to consider, but Argentina had rejected or chosen not to consider, first the United States proposal and subsequently the Peruvian peace plan, both based on the Council’s 3 April resolution. New Zealand said it was Argentina’s obduracy and rigidity that had frustrated and blocked the Secretary-General’s efforts just when it looked as if an agreement was within reach. …

Germany, Guyana, Jordan, Uganda and Zaire believed the mandate should be based on the Council’s 3 April resolution. … Australia said Argentina’s invocation of paragraph 1 of the 3 April resolution in accusing the United Kingdom of hostile action was a perverted reading of that text, as that paragraph, it said, was directed to the state of armed conflict caused by the Argentine seizure of the Falklands.... the majority of Latin American countries, along with China, Equatorial Guinea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Poland, the USSR, Yugoslavia and Zaire, supported Argentina’s territorial claim, while endorsing efforts to find a peaceful solution to the dispute. El Salvador asserted that Argentina’s occupation of the Islands was in accordance with its lawful title to them, which led Panama to state that there had been no breach of peace on 3 April, when Argentina recovered the Islands.

Belgium and Kenya said territorial claims should not be allowed to override the interests of peoples in choosing democratically their own destinies. Australia considered that Argentina had been insistent on loaded arrangements in the Falklands which, if accepted, would lead to conceding its demand of sovereignty and ignoring the rights of the Falklanders; if Argentina’s aggression was allowed to persist, it would itself amount to colonialism. In a similar vein, Kenya said Argentina could not claim any right to impose its own form of colonialism on the Islands’ inhabitants. New Zealand added that the two aggrieved parties in the crisis were the United Kingdom and the people of the Falklands. In contrast, Panama called it illogical to talk of the right to self-determination- the right of the oppressed-in the Malvinas case, when the inhabitants of the Islands were dependents of a British colonial company; ..

Colombia, noting that the United Kingdom’s policy of decolonization had allowed the independence of many countries by means of negotiations, believed it reasonable to expect that the Malvinas case could also be solved in that manner. Zaire also noted the United Kingdom’s past record of decolonization, ....

The Netherlands felt that Argentina’s resort to force could not be justified in terms of international law. Antigua and Barbuda said that, as a small island State dependent for its security on the United Nations, it had to deplore Argentina’s illegal use of force in seizing the Falklands in defiance of the Council. In a similar vein, Guyana rejected the attitude of those which held aloft the action of 2 April as an example to be emulated, and said aggression should not be rewarded.”

Argentina's Costa Mendez indicates that Buenos Aires can accept the draft-Resolution as amended. Put to a vote, the Security Council adopt the amended Resolution.

Security Council Resolution 505 -

Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982), Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,

Having heard the statement made by the Secretary-General at its 2360th meeting, on 21 May 1982, as well as the statements made in the debate by the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Concerned to achieve, as a matter of the greatest urgency, a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and the United Kingdom,

1. Expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts that he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, bearing in mind resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982;

3. Urges the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the ceasefire;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the present resolution."

In exercise of a right of reply, Sir Anthony Parsons speaks to the Council; “My delegation voted in favour of the Resolution just adopted .. We did so because it contains a clear reaffirmation of SCR 502. It registers beyond doubt that the Secretary-General's efforts have been, and will be, concentrated on ensuring the implementation of SCR 502. This is the key to the return of peace to the region...

In particular, this key lies in the second operative paragraph of SCR 502, namely the unconditional demand for the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. I must make clear, so that there is no misunderstanding, that for our part the only acceptable condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked to an immediate commencement of Argentine withdrawal. The history of the last two months has done nothing to create British confidence in the Government of Argentina …

Hence a simple verbal agreement by Argentina to withdraw its forces would not be sufficient for a ceasefire. Mr. President the Council should also be quite clear on another point. The situation has changed … we are talking about Argentine withdrawal.

We cannot now accept that Argentine withdrawal be linked in any way to parallel British withdrawal.”

In a telegram to London, Parsons sums up the day's proceedings; “We owe a lot to the old Commonwealth, Kenya, Guyana and Belgium for their robust support, slightly less to the FRG (Germany), little or nothing to the rest of our partners who spoke, including France: the US statement was too even handed for our liking. However, to a greater or lesser extent, all these statements offset the Latin American barrage …

The fact that we emerged without having to veto, which seemed most unlikely at the outset, was due to a number of factors – the firmness with which we stated our own positions both privately and publicly: the reluctance of the Non-Aligned members of the Council to allow a veto situation to develop both because of basic sympathy for us and because they realised that a deadlock would effectively deal the UN out of any further useful role in the crisis: the Irish tactics which the Non-Aligned found both irritating and unacceptable: and the Latin American desire to get out of the Council in order to leave their hands free for the OAS meeting in Washington on the 27th...

It is ironic .. that our best support should have come from Africans, Asians and Caribbeans, with our partners and allies either useless or actively unhelpful.”

“...the new mission was undertaken without enthusiasm by the Secretary-General. He told the Council: You've asked me to do this. I will try, but you should understand that what you are asking is practically impossible. A war is now underway, and it is simply not realistic to think in terms of achieving a cease fire.”

With only seven days available before he has to report back to the Security Council, Pérez de Cuéllar requests that Argentina and Britain provide, within 24 hours, the terms each consider acceptable for a cease-fire; “Pérez de Cuéllar asked to see me privately … Was it really the case that we could no longer contemplate any parallel British withdrawal? I confirmed that it was. … He did not think that he would have any alternative but to report to the Security Council that mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire were unobtainable. .. I urged him nevertheless to try to find some change in the Argentine position.”

Argentina's Central Bank announces that payments for imported goods can only be made 180 days after shipment; “.. aimed at saving foreign currency to meet needs arising from the Falklands conflict. .. ”

Thanks for the notice, will edit it.

Day 57 of the Falklands War, May 28th 1982

At 0430 local time, a report is sent back from 2 Para that the assault on Goose Green/Darwin is going as planned, however, as dawn approaches the momentum slows; “... concerned about further delays, (Jones) concentrated on what he could control and focused on the obstacle ahead of him, the enemy position on Darwin Ridge leading towards the Hill... Jones decided to lead from the front... Armed with a sub-machine gun, he charged off towards the nearest enemy trench but was exposed to enemy fire from other trenches. Having been shot once he picked himself up and carried on firing but close to his target, he was hit again... He died before he could be evacuated.”

Map: Actual course of British attack: Goose Green.



A few moments later, a British 66mm anti-tank rocket scores a direct hit on the trench from where Jones had been killed. White flags are seen arising from Argentine trenches on Darwin Ridge. 2 Para have six dead and eleven wounded.

An Argentine Pucara shoots down a British Scout helicopter, but then crashes on its way back to Stanley.

Painting: British Harrier supporting the attack by the Paras on Goose Green.



At 0710 Falklands time, Argentine positions at Boca House surrender after taking a heavy bombardment leaving twelve dead. 2 Para continue to move towards Goose Green.

Photo: A Royal Navy Westland Sea King HC.4 of 825 Naval Air Squadron takes off after transporting J Company, 42 Commando, Royal Marines from Port San Carlos to Darwin, East Falklands. 



Shortly after 1400, Argentine white flags are seen, but not honoured, leaving three British dead. Remotivated, the British platoon overrun the Argentine position.

In London, Brazil's Ambassador, Roberto Campos, calls on Francis Pym; “Matters were now at a critical point. British insistence on an unconditional Argentine withdrawal would have a destabilising effect both on Argentina and the Region. If Argentina were faced with military humiliation, it might have no choice but to turn to the Soviet Union. .. (he) wished to know whether the British position on Argentine withdrawal and on full restoration of British sovereignty was irreversible. He hoped not ..

He hoped that we might indicate a continued willingness to negotiate a solution which might involve a phased and mutual withdrawal and interim administration arrangements. I said .. following our landing on the Islands, the circumstances were inevitably different. .. We intended to repossess the Islands and to restore our administration. .. Campos, who was in a waspish mood, went on to make some sharp criticism of our position on sovereignty … It was not a productive exchange. ..

Pope John Paul arrives in Britain for a 6 day visit.

On the Falklands, Darwin is occupied by British troops at 1700 local time. Local FIC agent, Robert Hardcastle, reports to the company; “Very thankful to be liberated. .. Some houses destroyed. All employees and visitors safe. … Regret to advise goons occupied and looted all houses, stores, farm materials, Rovers, tractors and equipment. Settlement area a shambles. Much indiscriminate sheep killing for food by goons in helicopters ...”

PM Thatcher asks Lord Shackleton to update his report.

Argentina answers Pérez de Cuéllar's urgent question of the 26th, providing their minimum terms for a ceasefire. These include a suspension of all operations by troops; monitoring by the UN; separate zones to be established on the Islands if necessary; no military reinforcement; the UN to provide food etc to the troops and civilians; negotiations to take place on the withdrawal of both parties and an interim administration.

At Goose Green, Argentine commanders make contact with their British counterparts. An ultimatum is delivered by two captured Argentine officers. 45 Commando take up their positions at Douglas. Islanders using tractors and trailers assist in moving equipment over boggy ground.