The Falklands War - Timeline

Day 25 of the Falklands War, April 26th 1982

Margaret Thatcher pens a memo to Secretary Haig; “The repossession of South Georgia of course alters the situation regarding the tremendous efforts you are making to produce a negotiated settlement of the present crisis. On the one hand there is the important change that the Falkland Islands Dependencies are no longer occupied by Argentina. On the other hand, the successful British military action should bring home to Argentina her interests in negotiating seriously for a settlement..”

A 'defence area' is declared around theA task group as it sails south. Argentine troops stationed at Leith, on South Georgia, surrender.

Speeches to the OAS meeting in Washington are reported to London; “... Most Rio Treaty signatories were represented … Costa Mendez's violent speech was followed by warm applause. A firm statement by Haig that force had been used by an American State and Security Council Resolution 502 laid down the basis for a settlement was greeted with total silence. .. Costa Mendez claimed … British aggression threatened not only Argentina but the peace and security of the whole Latin American region. The British attack on South Georgia demonstrated how the UK disregarded the course of peaceful negotiation. The UK had answered Argentina's peaceful intentions with “an act of war. .. Argentina would defend itself to the maximum extent: the Argentine flag would not be lowered until the last drop of blood had been expended by the Argentine soldiers..”

Margaret Thatcher warns, in a speech to Parliament, that the time for diplomacy is running out; “The Falklanders' loyalty to Britain is fantastic. If they wish to stay British we must stand by them. Democratic nations believe in the right of self-determination. . . . The people who live there are of British stock. They have been for generations, and their wishes are the most important thing of all. Democracy is about the wishes of the people.”

At Leith, on South Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfredo Astiz 233 agree to surrender his forces. “It was decided that we would go in at 08.30 and accept the surrender on the football pitch. However, at about 07.30, I had second thoughts about trying to land in an area which was still effectively controlled by enemy troops. I changed the rendezvous at the last moment and Astiz reluctantly agreed. The surrender went smoothly enough and Astiz confirmed our assumption that the building was heavily mined. In fact … our suspicions were further aroused. … There were wires leading out to the middle of the football pitch where they had marked an H for the helicopter landing. … Astiz told me he had found the prospect vaguely amusing. I told him that the white flag obviously meant nothing to him...”

Photo of  Captain Astiz formally surrendering onboard HMS Plymouth. Together with the 39 scrap metal workers this now meant that the Task Group had nearly 200 detainees and prisoners of war.”



On the Falklands, Governor Menendez appoints himself as Head of the Malvinas Joint Command.

The Guardian, 26 April 1982.

Day 27 of the Falklands War, April 28th 1982

Secretary Haig telephones Francis Pym; “ Mr. Haig said that there was still no word from Buenos Aires. There appeared to be a stalemate, with the Navy in favour of action, and the Air Force and Army preferring negotiation. … if there was still no reply by the morning of 29 April, the United States would go public. ..”

The Prime Minister tells a War Cabinet meeting that the American proposals for an Anglo-Argentine agreement have been communicated to the Argentine government with the request that they should be accepted without amendment or rejected, but that no reply has as yet been received from the Argentines.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appeals to both Britain and Argentina to discharge their obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

Britain's Defence Secretary Nott makes a statement to the House of Commons; “The following statement was issued by the Government earlier today: From 1100 GMT on 30th April 1982, a Total Exclusion Zone will be established around the Falkland Islands. The outer limit of this Zone is the same as for the Maritime Exclusion Zone established on Monday 12th April 1982, namely a circle of 200 nautical miles radius from latitude 51 degrees 40 minutes South, 59 degrees 30 minutes West. From the time indicated, the Exclusion Zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. The Exclusion Zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation. Any ship and any aircraft whether military or civil which is found within this Zone without due authority from the MOD in London will be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by British Forces. Also from the time indicated, Port Stanley airport will be closed; and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and accordingly is liable to attack. These measures are without prejudice to the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the UN Charter.”

Margaret Thatcher sends a message to President Reagan; “.. In the Cabinet's view, the proposals must now be regarded as having been rejected by the Argentines, who have ignored the deadline and publicly restated that they are not prepared to alter their position on sovereignty.”

A final Resolution is adopted by the OAS urging Argentina and the UK to; “ .. immediately to call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of the sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas Islands and the interests of the Islanders.”

On leaving the OAS meeting, Costa Mendez tells the waiting press that; “The first phase – OAS endorsement of Argentinian sovereignty – is complete.”

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym telegrams Washington; “ … The (OAS) Resolution is not acceptable to us. We cannot forego our undoubted rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, as the Resolution suggests we should. The OAS Resolution is to be conveyed to the President of the Security Council. Argentina may additionally seek an early debate in the Council and the adoption of a Resolution on similar lines. We have so far been successful in keeping the issue out of the Council since the adoption of SCR 502. … We therefore continue to hope that the Council will stand fast on 502. We will be working hard to achieve this.”

Haig telephones Pym from Buenos Aires; “He had just spent one and a quarter hours with Costa Mendez who had made a clear and plaintive request for the negotiating process to continue. Costa Mendez has said that the alternatives were for Argentina to bring in “the others” (by which Haig presumably meant the Russians: Haig commented that he doubted that they would be interested) or go to the UN. He had asked Haig whether he would forward further suggestions to us. Haig had told him that the proposals as they stood offered Argentina more than she could reasonably have expected. There was no hope of improving them. .. On emerging from the State Department, Costa Mendez had said publicly that he had not rejected the US proposals and that the negotiating process continued...”

Her Majesty's Government's declaration of a 'Total Exclusion Zone' is delivered to the Argentine Government. Sir Anthony Parsons informs the President of the Security Council of the Zone, adding; “Port Stanley airport will be closed, and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and, accordingly, is liable to attack.”

Argentina, in a letter to the UN, describes the declaration of the TEZ as a, “new act of aggression” and calls the British use of force; “ … an unjustified act of reprisal aimed at restoring colonial occupation of the Argentine islands;..” Argentina also asserts that it is; “ … impossible for the United Kingdom to claim the right of selfdefence, under Article 51, in islands situated 8,000 miles from British territory.”

Department of State, Confidential Briefing Paper

After visiting London and Buenos Aires twice and consulting with top political leaders, "the Secretary has developed a US proposal which would provide an equitable solution. This proposal has been transmitted to both HMG and the Argentine government. Neither has yet accepted."

"Meanwhile, the conflict threatens to worsen. We are concerned that if the conflict drags on, [the Argentine government] might turn to the Soviet Union for military, economic, or political help. Such a development would have serious consequences for Argentina and the strategic security of the Western Hemisphere."

Day 29 of the Falklands War, April 30th 1982

General censorship is imposed across Argentina - for reasons of, “national security.”

The US Ambassador in Buenos Aires informs Secretary Haig; “ I asked to see President Galtieri and was received at midnight .. I told Galtieri that we came without instructions and with the only purpose of seeing what we could do to head off a fatal confrontation. I pointed out to the President that we had not received an adequate response to our proposal and that we would announce tomorrow several measures against Argentina. During more than an hour's conversation, he demonstrated no give whatsoever ..”

Investigative journalist Jack Anderson, speaking on the Good Morning America television programme, alleges that the British Task Force is armed with tactical nuclear weapons that they have permission to use.

Secretary Haig reports to a US National Security Council meeting. “Unfortunately, the Argentine government which is, in fact, made up of many moving and conflicting parts could not agree to the plan. The Navy holds the veto and is even more intransigent after losing South Georgia, whose Argentine garrison surrendered without firing a shot - a fact known to the Argentine government, but not to the Argentine people.”

Bud McFarlane, Reagan's deputy National Security Advisor, informs him that the Soviet Union has repositioned a satellite in order to keep track of the British Task Force.

Alexander Haig announces Argentina's rejection of his peace proposals; “ We had reason to hope that the United Kingdom would consider a settlement along the lines of our proposal, but Argentina informed us yesterday that it could not accept it. Argentina's position remains that it must receive an assurance now of eventual sovereignty, or an immediate de facto role in governing the islands, which would lead to sovereignty. For its part, the British Government has continued to affirm the need to respect the views of the inhabitants in any settlement. … in the light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the U.S. cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes .. The President has therefore ordered: the suspension of all military exports to Argentina; the withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales; the suspension of new export-import bank credits and guarantees; and the suspension of commodity credit corporation guarantees.”

In New York, and coinciding with Haig's press conference, Costa Méndez tells Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar that his country does not see the negotiations as being 'dead'. He asserts that Argentina is ready to abide by Resolution 502 and accept a transitional administration; “ .. until the exercise of full Argentine sovereignty became possible.”

President Reagan terminates Haig's mission; declares US support for Britain and imposes economic sanctions on Argentina.

Alan Copeland of the Daily Express asks whether Pym's planned trip to see the Secretary-General of the UN precludes any use of force by Britain. Francis Pym responds; “No, because we are facing force now. As I have described they have a fleet at sea, they've got thousands of soldiers on the islands, they're occupying territory which they have no right to occupy. No. We are going to maintain our total exclusion zone. That is the position. If they challenge it, then of course there will be military action and that's how it is ...”

Ecuador's Foreign Minister makes a statement; “I have just learnt with profound concern of the attitude of the United States in imposing sanctions against the Argentine Republic and in supporting Great Britain. I must point out that the Resolution of the .. (OAS).. is obligatory for all the States members of the Treaty of InterAmerican Reciprocal Assistance. … The Resolution recalls the declaration of the Inter-American Legal Committee in the sense that, “the Argentine Republic has an unimpeachable right of sovereignty over the Islas Malvinas.” This is a legal and moral obligation which the members of the Treaty have assumed by virtue of the Resolution. In these circumstances the support which has been announced and declared by the United States for Great Britain and the imposition of sanctions against the Argentine Republic constitute disregard of the obligation which the United States assumed .. That country's vote of abstention does not prevent it from accepting and respecting the said Resolution. ..”

Brazil writes to the Secretary-General requesting the use of his 'good offices' in finding a peaceful solution, adding; “It is the responsibility of the United Nations to take prompt and effective measures, including those of a preventative nature, to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 in all its aspects.”

Unconfirmed intelligence suggests that Peru is providing military aircraft to Argentine 'on loan.'

At the UN, Costa Mendez contacts the President of the Security Council; “... (a) he reaffirmed Argentina's wish for a negotiated settlement: (b) Argentina was ready for the implementation of SCR 502 “as a package”: (c) Argentina hoped that there would be no confrontation. The UK was using disproportionate force and an armed encounter could have unforeseen consequences: (d) Argentina was ready to accept a transitional period in which all aspects of the dispute could be resolved: (e) the question of sovereignty was of the greatest importance to Argentina. Argentina was disposed to accept a mutually agreeable formula on sovereignty during the transitional period: (f) so far as Argentina was concerned, Haig was still in action but his latest proposals on sovereignty had not been acceptable to Argentina: (g) Argentina would accept the presence of a UN force in the Islands in order to enable Argentina to withdraw and to begin the transitional period.”

Parsons telegrams the FCO in London. “Costa Mendez's various statements here today amount to a smart PR move... My guess is that his purpose has been to present the Argentine position in the most favourable light particularly in UN eyes and try to distract attention from US and UK responses to the failure of Haig's mission. He has succeeded in creating the impression of a change in the Argentine position … I do not think however that we need to take Costa Mendez's PR success too tragically. His statements have been small beer by comparison with those of Haig … and they will soon be overtaken by a presumably less diplomatic response from the Generals in Buenos Aires ..

Intelligence suggests that Argentina's navy has been divided into three groups. The group supporting Argentina's aircraft carrier, 25 de Mayo, is sailing towards the north of Britain's declared TEZ, while another, led by Belgrano, is patrolling to the south of the archipelago. Reports suggest that the third group is also headed south.

Submarine HMS Conqueror diverts to search for the ARA Belgrano; “One curiosity lay in the activity of the southern Argentine Task Force, composed of the Belgrano and two destroyers. A few days earlier it had appeared to be guarding against Chile, and was even believed to have infringed Chilean territorial waters... possibly trying to provoke the Chilean Navy. … By the evening of the April 29th the group was noted to be patrolling between the Isla de los Estados and the Burwood Bank, in order to draw out British forces and test reactions within TEZ. The cruiser took up a course that would take it into the southern edge of the TEZ early Sunday morning where it would remain for a limited time before withdrawing. There were also indications that both Argentine Navy 209 submarines, were operating in the TEZ. Information on Argentina's offensive intent was distributed in intelligence summaries on the evening of April 30th,..”

Argentina submits a letter addressed to the Security Council; “ … the United Kingdom has no legal grounds whatsoever for invoking the right of self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter in justification of the military aggression it is carrying out in the South Georgia Islands. The fact that three weeks elapsed between Argentina's recovery of those islands for its national patrimony and the British attacks which began on 25 April, and the fact that the islands are 8,000 miles from the territory of the United Kingdom, clearly show how inappropriate it is to invoke Article 51 of the Charter as justification for this manifestly illegitimate use of force.…. The Argentine forces … certainly exercising the right of self-defence in order to repel a grave and imminent danger, have continued their resistance in the South Georgia Islands, thus giving the lie to the United Kingdom's statements that its authority has been restored in those territories. … continuation of the British Government's punitive actions compels my country to exercise its right of self-defence ...”

Exercising his right of reply, Parsons also addresses the Security Council. “On April 3rd 1982, notwithstanding current action in the Security Council and the adoption of SCR 502, Argentina carried out an armed invasion of the island of South Georgia. The small British garrison resisted but was eventually captured. On April 25th , in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, British forces re-established British authority on South Georgia. … There is no question of the United Kingdom Government having acted aggressively, having in any way breached the terms of SCR 502 (implementation of para.2 of which by Argentina is still awaited by the international community) or of having caused a breach of international peace and security. ...”

US intelligence reports Argentina's Air Force Chief of Staff, Juan Garcia, as saying that Argentina will not be the first to open fire but that an attack on Port Stanley will trigger a full scale attack on the British fleet; “Garcia .. reiterated that the Argentine Government could not present a peace plan to its people that did not assure sovereignty over the Falklands. He also said that British commandos have landed on the islands and Argentine forces are attempting to locate them. If the commandos succeed in mingling with the local population, measures to control the civilians would be imposed.”

Day 31 of the Falklands War, May 2nd 1982

Events of the Day before General Belgrano, sinking

Margaret Thatcher holds a meeting at Chequers; where it is agreed; “ .. that British forces should forthwith be authorised to attack any Argentine naval vessel (but not naval auxiliaries) ...

In the UK, British intelligence, acting on intercepted Argentine communications, conclude that Argentina's navy groups are set to deploy a pincer movement, with the 25 de Mayo attacking the British fleet from the north, while the Belgrano group was to come from the south-west; “The Belgrano group, TG 79.3, … was to deploy south to Burdwood Bank, and then close in on the British to deal with any surface units operating to the south of the Falklands, to the point where they could be attacked with Exocets... Lombardo urged an early reconnaissance followed by by a massive attack on the British fleet before any units had a chance to withdraw. It was the receipt of the detailed offensive plan that caused the most stir. Within a few hours of the order being issued by Allara, this was being relayed to the (British) Task Force...”

Francis Pym, hosts a press conference at the British Embassy in Washington; “Last week I came here to see Mr. Haig in his role as a mediator, today I have come back to consult him as an ally. The British people are very grateful to the United States for coming down in their support. We never had any doubt that they would come down in support of the victim and against the aggressor ... the long phase of Mr. Haig's mission ended with the rejection of the United States' proposals by the Argentines a few days ago, but that does not end the search for a diplomatic solution.”

Pym discusses a number of military, diplomatic and economic issues with Alexander Haig, including the latest Peruvian peace proposal, as amended by the Americans. This consists of (1) an immediate ceasefire, (2) a mutual withdrawal of forces, (3) a temporary administration made up of third party countries, (4) an acceptance by both Argentina and Britain that a dispute over sovereignty exists, (5) acknowledgement that the “views and interests” of the Islanders must be taken into account, (6) a “contact group” of Brazil, Peru, Germany and the USA would be formed, and (7) this group would be responsible for reaching a definitive agreement by April 30th 1983.

Reports indicate that Argentina now has 13,000 troops on the Falkland Islands, supported by artillery units armed with 42 105mm guns, 4 155mm guns, 23 quick-firing anti-aircraft guns plus surface-to-air missiles, and 23 armoured cars. Argentina attempts to jam the BBC's 'Spanish Service' to South America.

Spain's Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, speaking at a rally, asserts that Britain has negotiated, “little and badly,” and adds that Spain has a clearer claim to Gibraltar than Argentina has to the Falklands.

HMS Conqueror versus ARA General Belgrano

At 13:07 London time the British Taskforce gets new rules of engagements: 

“The decision was taken because this was a military threat. … I should make it clear that we did not order the submarine to sink the Belgrano. We told all submarines down there that they were now free to attack Argentine warships when they had an opportunity to do so. We did not say, to Conqueror, ‘Sink the Belgrano’, although we knew that was going to be the effect. We hoped it would be the effect. By the time she got the signal, she might possibly have lost contact.”

“Admiral Fieldhouse told us that one of our submarines, HMS Conqueror, had been shadowing the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Belgrano was escorted by two destroyers. The cruiser itself had substantial fire power provided by 6 inch guns with a range of 13 miles and anti-aircraft missiles. We were advised that she might have been fitted with Exocet anti-ship missiles, and her two destroyer escorts were known to be carrying them. The whole group was sailing on the edge of the Exclusion Zone. We had received intelligence about the aggressive intentions of the Argentine fleet. There had been extensive air attacks on our ships the previous day and Admiral Woodward , in command of the Task Force, had every reason to believe that a full scale attack was developing. ... Admiral Woodward had to come to a judgement about what to do with the Belgrano in the light of these circumstances. From all the information available, he concluded that the carrier and the Belgrano group were engaged in a classic pincer movement against the Task Force...“

At the same time Argentina Taskforce 79 has change of plans when in the South Atlantic, Admiral Allara, commanding Task Force 79, decides to call off the planned attack on British ships:

“As the hours passed, two things made me decide to call (the attack) off. First was confirmation the British were not landing, so not preoccupied with that operation. Second, the weather conditions. There was absolutely no wind. It was, therefore, not possible for our planes to take off from the carrier with the weapons, and fuel, needed. These weather conditions were forecast for the whole day of May 2nd. Therefore we called it off, and pulled the carrier back to shallow waters,..”

South of the Falklands archipelago, some 30 nautical miles outside the TEZ, Britain's nuclear submarine Conqueror closes in on ARA General Belgrano. Having turned towards the south-west, Belgrano is now heading away from the Falklands archipelago.

At 15:57 (Falkland Islands Time), whilst approximately 35 miles south-west of the 'Total Exclusion Zone', HMS Conqueror fires three 21 inch Mk 8 mod 4 torpedoes each with an 805-pound (363 kg) Torpex warhead at the ARA General Belgrano.  One of the torpedoes struck 10 to 15 metres (33 to 49 ft) aft of the bow, outside the area protected by either the ship's side armour or the internal anti-torpedo bulge. This blows off the ship's bow, but the internal torpedo bulkheads hold and the forward powder magazine for the 40 mm gun does not detonate.

The second torpedo strucks about three-quarters of the way along the ship, just outside the rear limit of the side armour plating. The torpedo punches through the side of the ship before exploding in the aft machine room. The explosion tore upward through two messes and a relaxation area called "the Soda Fountain" before finally ripping a 20-metre-long hole in the main deck. After the explosion, the Belgrano rapidly fills with smoke. The explosion also damaged Belgrano's electrical power system, preventing her from putting out a radio distress call. Though the forward bulkheads holds, water was rushing in through the hole created by the second torpedo and could not be pumped out because of the electrical power failure. In addition, although the ship should have been "at action stations", she was sailing with the water-tight doors open.

Having launched here three torpedoes, HMS Conqueror immediately turn away to avoid retaliatory attacks by the accompanying destroyers and, while doing so, transmits an initial report (1630 local time). Less than 30 minutes after the torpedoes struck and, with 200 men killed by the explosions, the crew of the General Belgrano at 16:24 are ordered to abandon the stricken ship. No distress signal is sent and the escorting vessels only become aware of the severity of the attack when they observe the Belgrano's crew taking to the boats. ARA General Belgrano sinks with a total loss of 321 crew and 2 civilian lives.

Photo: General Belgrano, sinking.


Events of the Day after General Belgrano, sinking

In London, a statement is issued by the Ministry of Defence: “At approximately 8pm London time this evening the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano was hit by torpedoes fired from a British submarine. The cruiser is believed to be severely damaged. On Friday April 23th, HMG warned the Argentine Government that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. The cruiser posed a significant threat to the British Task Force maintaining the TEZ. The action taken was fully in accordance with the instructions given to the Task Force Commander based on the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The British submarine suffered no damage in the engagement and has resumed her patrol.”

News of Conqueror's attack reaches Buenos Aires: “In Buenos Aires, the Military Committee's meeting began at 1900. It has been reported that at 1930 Admiral Anaya announced the news of the loss of the Belgrano, although this seems rather early given what is known about the Argentine response times to the tragedy. When the news was confirmed the Junta was now unwilling to explore any negotiation involving the United States, assumed to be complicit in the British action,..

Peru's Embassy in Washington pass on a message to the US Department of State for Secretary Haig: “President Belaunde ... had just finished speaking with President Galtieri. He reported that Galtieri stated that the Argentine Government was prepared to study the Peruvian peace proposal with serenity and thoroughness. However, Galtieri said that owing to the quote unspeakable unquote British military actions of today's date, specifically the torpedoing and presumed destruction of the Argentine flagship “Belgrano” there was nothing left for Argentina to discuss. All that remained was to fight. President Belaunde said that with this message from President Galtieri he considered the Peruvian peace initiative to be terminated. The President said it was very lamentable that the British actions should have occurred when serious negotiations were underway with a high chance for success. He condemned the UK's attacks and said they would enflame the Hemisphere.”

Secretary Haig speaks to Ambassador Henderson, who reports to London: “He told me that ... It was being put about that the cruiser had been hit as a result of intelligence passed by US satellites and with the help of a special weapon provided by the Americans .. (Haig said) President Belaunde believed that something real must be done to bring about a ceasefire. He believed that the Argentinians would accept the seven proposals … No less pressing, in his mind, was the need to do something immediately to stop the fighting. He thought is was desperately urgent for the Prime Minister to propose a ceasefire … I told him that after waiting three weeks while the Argentinians reinforced the Islands we were not in a mood to rush to an armistice just because the Argentinians were losing...”

Map depicting events from May 1st to May 2nd 1982



The British press announces "VULCAN VICTORY" after the news of Operation BlackBuck reaches the United Kingdom (see below).

Day 33 of the Falklands War, May 4th 1982

Argentina first strike

The British Type 42, guided missile destroyer, HMS Sheffield is hit by an Exocet missile fired from a Super Etendard of the Argentine Navy. The missile fails to explode but causes an uncontrollable fire; “... three Type 42 destroyers were occupying air defence stations some 18nm west in front of the main body of the force. Glasgow was in the middle with Sheffield on its left and Coventry on its right... two Super Etendards approached the Sheffield group. … they came across the three ships. It may be that the Glasgow's release of chaff caused them to swerve towards Sheffield, but it was probably that this was simply the first ship they picked up. The two Exocets were released. One passed by into the sea; and the other hit the destroyer. After a quick look to confirm a hit they veered back to the mainland and returned safely... the single Exocet hit Sheffield at the starboard side, leaving a large hole and causing widespread minor shock damage and an immediate loss of fighting capability. Fortunately the warhead did not detonate. Nonetheless large fires still broke out... ”

Drawing:  Argentine Super Etendards firing Exocet.



Photo: HMS Sheffield burns shortly after being hit by an Argentine Exocet missile on May 4th



Photo: HMS Arrow (F173) coming to assist HMS Sheffield (D80) after she was hit by an Exocet cruise missile on May 4th



At 1200, Sheffield's Captain orders the ship to be abandoned.

Events of the Day

In Lima, the British Ambassador is summoned to the Foreign Ministry; “The Foreign Minister .. communicated to me a formal note .. about the sinking of the Belgrano. .. In the ensuing conversation Dr. Arias said he wished me to be in no doubt about the profound shock and consternation felt by the Peruvian Government on learning of the attack on the cruiser after President Belaunde had announced his peace initiative. Dr. Arias said that Costa Mendez had told him on the telephone that the 7 point plan was being considered by the military Junta in Buenos Aires when the news of the attack brought further consideration, and the meeting, to a conclusion...”

Secretary Haig tells Ambassador Henderson that; “.. the reaction from the Peruvians and Argetinians during the night was extremely discouraging. The latter are being more intransigent than ever, saying that this is inevitable in light of our military action. Haig does not think that this should preclude us from considering the seven-point plan and if possible going along with it. If the Argentinians turned it down they would put themselves once again in the wrong with world public opinion. Haig's main emphasis this morning is on the real urgency, in his view … for London to take an initiative. .. he regards the Irish decision as “totally irresponsible” and as, “likely to prolong the war”... He was convinced that London must come up with something to try and head off the inevitable emergence of opposition.”

A White House spokesman comments on the Belgrano; “We regret the loss of life. It points out the seriousness of the situation and the absolute necessity to reach a peaceful settlement to this tragic conflict. .. We remain available to both parties. It is our hope that further fighting will be avoided. “ The spokesman denies Argentine claims that the Belgrano had been tracked by the USA on behalf of the British Task Force.

Parsons reports a conversation with Dorr; “I disembowelled him. When I had drawn breath, I summed up as follows: he could tell his Government following his conversation with me that (1) I was not pleading for a delay. I was ready to move into the Council immediately. But I was also ready to vote immediately on a Resolution which had the effect of enabling Argentina to continue to consolidate its position in the Falklands while leaving us with our hands tied, (2) a Council meeting at this stage would be polemic and divisive .. such a debate at this stage would kill the current confidential initiative taken by the Secretary-General …. Dorr was obviously shaken. He kept on saying that it was too late. .. However he could ask for an immediate meeting without insisting that the meeting should take place during the next day or so, ie he could give us and the Argentines a chance to respond to the Secretary-General's ideas. I said that he knew as well as I did that this idea would not fly … As soon as he asked for an immediate meeting the nasties would press things to a head as quickly as possible.”

The Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, asks Dorr not to press the matter until there is an answer to the peace 'ideas' put forward by himself on the 2nd. Dorr agrees. The Chinese President of the Security Council, Ling Qing, however schedules an 'informal' discussion to take place on the 5th .

A British Sea Harrier of No.800 NAS, HMS Hermes shot down over Goose Green by radar-controlled, 35mm Oerlikon fire (1.10 pm). Lt Taylor RN killed.

Argentine positions around Stanley are shelled.

US Secretary of State for the Navy, John Lehman, contacts Peter Blaker, Minister for the Armed Forces to say that the US Navy stood ready to supply intelligence, logistical support and the procurement of weapons. Lehman was also prepared to step in if channels operated too slowly.

Canada's Foreign Minister makes a statement; “We deplore the Argentine attack on the Falkland Islands and request the removal of Argentine troops … at the moment the British are engaged in actions of self-defence.”

Department of State, Secret cable

Just two days following the controversial sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires addresses circulating Argentine reports of U.S. intelligence assistance to the British to help them carry out this military attack. Ambassador Shlaudeman (U.S. Ambassador to Argentina) writes that the Argentine government "is carrying a story quoting an unnamed informant in the Pentagon to the effect that the US has 'at least one spy satellite' in the south Atlantic and that a great part of the information which it obtains is transmitted to the U.K". The Argentines also cited Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger as saying that the U.S. would assist the British with any type of support they might need.

Day 35 of the Falklands War, May 6th 1982

The Argonaut Group, sails from Ascension.

Two Sea Harriers of No.801 NAS, HMS Invincible lost in bad weather, presumably by collision, south east of Falklands (9.00 am). Lt Curtiss and Lt Cmdr Eyton-Jones RN lost.

Haig informs Pym that the Peruvian proposals have been rejected by Galtieri and that Argentina is now moving to the UN, and; “ .. that was the end of that.” Pym speaks to the press. “I am deeply disappointed that Argentine intransigence has once again frustrated a constructive initiative. Had they genuinely wanted peace, .. we could have had a ceasefire by 5pm tomorrow.”

Pérez de Cuéllar immediately issues a statement from the UN, that he has received positive comments regarding his own initiative from Buenos Aires and hopes to receive similar approval from London.

Sir Anthony Parsons telegrams the FCO; “I recommend that I should be authorised to deliver our reply to the Secretary-General immediately. This will upstage the Argentinians whose reply consisted only of an acceptance of the Secretary-General's demarche, a call for a ceasefire, and an expression of willingness to discuss details. I should also get our reply in before Costa Mendez arrives here …. we must protect ourselves against the mounting pressure on us to accept calls for unqualified ceasefires, cessation of hostilities, maximum restraint, etc. These will undoubtedly be renewed at this afternoon's Security Council consultations and I intend to stand as firm as I did yesterday. Obviously we cannot accept calls for a cease-fire unless they are clearly linked to unequivocal Argentinian agreement to withdraw ..”

Parsons is interviewed for Britain's World at One television programme and asked to make a statement about the Secretary-General's claim of a “positive reaction” from the Junta; “I think there is a certain amount of exaggeration, at least there was last night, and I think it has been corrected in the American media this morning. .. I don't believe they've accepted all the propositions, all the range of ideas that he's put forward, in fact I am perfectly sure they have not. ... we are still … at a very preliminary stage.”

Mexico's President tells the press that General Galtieri has offered to hold a face-to-face meeting with Margaret Thatcher, and that, in no circumstances is Argentina willing to agree to any proposals put forward by, or otherwise associated with, the USA; although the Peruvian proposals had been broadly acceptable.

Argentina's Defence Minister, Amadeo Frugoli, tells reporters that Argentina is not an aggressor country, but that the aggression is being perpetrated by Great Britain and that his country will respond to that aggression with every means - at the right place and in due time.

NATO's “Eurogroup” issue a communique; “Ministers condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Island and the dependencies as well as the failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 502. Ministers noted the importance of maintaining the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties..”