eurofed
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Post by eurofed on Oct 2, 2018 15:03:48 GMT
Let's assume ITTL the Zionists are able to conquer all of Mandatory Palestine in 1948-49 and successfully defend its borders against the Arab states up to the armistice. The vast majority of the Arab population (especially the Muslims) flees or is expelled, so the population of this expanded Israel becomes overwhelmingly Jew, with a small Arab minority mostly made up of Christians. The increased influx of Arab refugees in the neighbor countries gives PLO revolutionary militants the power base to overthrow the Hashemite dynasty (as they almost did in 1970) and turn Jordan into (East) Palestine. How we can assume other events in the Middle East would likely turn out with this premise?
A few musings of my own: in the long term, there is going to be much less international support for the Palestinian cause beyond the Arab world. The rest of the world would just assume a two-state status quo with a Jewish homeland west of the Jordan and a Palestinian one east of it is the natural solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and there would be very little sympathy for any claim about a 'right of return' of the Arab refugees beyond the anti-Western far-left and anti-Semitic far-right fringes. Lack of a large and restive Arab population in the West Bank under Israeli rule would steal the Palestinian cause of its main source of sympathy, and the irredentist claims of the Arabs on Israeli land with an overwhelmingly Jewish population would make the Palestinians look like aggressive troublemakers and sore losers. Status of Jerusalem would still be somewhat of a tricky and controversial issue, but it would tend to boil down to a dispute about special status for the Al-Aqsa Mosque. By the end of the 20th century, there would likely be an increased drive among several Arab countries to make peace with Israel as they come to recognize the inevitability of its existence and lose interest in supporting diehard Palestinian revanchism. This would especially concern Egypt, whose peace bid would be somewhat less controversial than OTL, but also quite possibly Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab countries lacking a border with Israel. Jordan/Palestine would likely remain stubbornly defiant, however, at least as long as PLO or worse Hamas militants remain in charge of it.
Lebanon and Syria might turn out even more instable than OTL (because of the increased influx of un-assimilated refugees) or less so (because most of the refugees might relocate to Jordan after the PLO takes it over). If OTL PLO/Hamas management of West Bank and Gaza is anything to go by, Jordan under the rule of Palestinian militant organizations is likely going to be a more instable, poor, oppressive, and corrupt place than under the Hashemite dynasty, probably largely similar to other Arab countries ruled by nationalist dictatorships such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The course of the Arab-Israeli wars up to and including the Kippur War probably won't change much. I assume Israel would still conquer the Sinai and the Golan Heights in any equivalent of the Six Days War. I am not sure if they would care to occupy the East Bank of the Jordan valley as well, or just not bother. They are likely still going to hand back Sinai to Egypt in exchange for a peace treaty. Same as it concerns any portion of Southern Lebanon they may come to occupy, although it also depends on how TTL events affect the domestic stability of Lebanon. Not sure how things would turn out for the Golan Heights, an equivalent of the OTL armistice stalemate is quite possible and perhaps even likely, but a peace settlement might well occur. I assume persistent militarization and recurrent border incidents on the Jordan border, although Israel would not have a serious terrorism problem thanks to lack of a large Arab minority. Recurrent border incidents similar to what happens IOTL with Gaza are however quite likely, and so their recurrent escalation in limited conflicts all won hands down by Israel. I do not think addition of a third Jordan front would significantly change the course of any equivalent of the Kippur War, increased strategic depth and resources for Israel thanks to control of the West Bank would compensate for it. The possible occurrence of any equivalent of the 1982 and 2006 wars would depend on how things turn out in Lebanon.
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futurist
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Post by futurist on Oct 3, 2018 21:50:23 GMT
Let's assume ITTL the Zionists are able to conquer all of Mandatory Palestine in 1948-49 and successfully defend its borders against the Arab states up to the armistice. The vast majority of the Arab population (especially the Muslims) flees or is expelled, so the population of this expanded Israel becomes overwhelmingly Jew, with a small Arab minority mostly made up of Christians. The expanded influx of Arab refugees in the neighbor countries gives PLO revolutionary militants the power base to overthrow the Hashemite dynasty (as they almost did in 1970) and turn Jordan into (East) Palestine. How we can assume other events in the Middle East would likely turn out with this premise? A few musings of my own: in the long term, there is going to be much less international support for the Palestinian cause beyond the Arab world. The rest of the world would just assume a two-state status quo with a Jewish homeland west of the Jordan and a Palestinian one east of it is the natural solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and there would be very little sympathy for any claim about a 'right of return' of the Arab refugees beyond the far-left fringes. Lack of a large and restive Arab population in the West Bank under Israeli rule would steal the Palestinian cause of its main source of sympathy, and the irredentist claims of the Arabs on Israeli land with an overwhelmingly Jewish population would make the Palestinians look as aggressive troublemakers and sore losers. Status of Jerusalem would still be somewhat of a tricky issue, but it would tend to settle down into a dispute about a special status for the Al-Aqsa Mosque. By the end of the 20th century, there would likely be an increased drive among several Arab countries to make peace with Israel as they come to recognize the inevitability of its existence and lose interest in supporting diehard Palestinian revanchism. This would especially concern Egypt, whose peace bid would be somewhat less controversial than OTL, but also quite possibly Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab countries lacking a border with Israel. Jordan/Palestine would likely remain stubbornly defiant, however, at least as long as PLO or worse Hamas militants remain in charge of it. Lebanon and Syria might turn out even more instable than OTL (because of the increased influx of un-assimilated refugees) or less so (because most of the refugees might relocate to Jordan after the PLO takes it over). If OTL PLO/Hamas management of West Bank and Gaza is anything to go by, Jordan under the rule of Palestinian militant organizations is likely going to be a more instable, poor, oppressive, and corrupt place than under the Hashemite dynasty, probably broadly analogous to other Arab countries ruled by nationalist dictatorships such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The course of the Arab-Israeli wars up to and including the Kippur War probably won't change much. I assume Israel would still conquer the Sinai and the Golan Heights in any equivalent of the Six Days War. I am not sure if they would care to occupy the East Bank of the Jordan valley as well, or just not bother. They are likely still going to hand back Sinai to Egypt in exchange for a peace treaty. Same as it concerns any portion of Southern Lebanon they may come to occupy, although it also depends on how TTL events affect the domestic stability of Lebanon. Not sure how things would turn out for the Golan Heights, an equivalent of the OTL armistice stalemate is quite possible and perhaps even likely, but a peace settlement might well occur. I assume persistent militarization and recurrent border incidents on the Jordan border, although Israel would not have a serious terrorism problem thanks to lack of a large Arab minority. Recurrent border incidents similar to what happens IOTL with Gaza are however quite likely, and so their recurrent escalation in limited conflicts all won hands down by Israel. I do not think addition of a third Jordan front would significantly change the course of any equivalent of the Kippur War, increased strategic depth and resources for Israel thanks to control of the West Bank would compensate for it. The possible occurrence of any equivalent of the 1982 and 2006 wars would depend on how things turn out in Lebanon. All of this seems completely reasonable.  The one thing that I am curious about is whether the Palestinians who are in charge of Jordan in this TL are eventually going to aim to unify with Syria and perhaps western Iraq as well. After all, the idea of a Greater Syria was popular among Levantine Arabs right after the end of World War I and if the Palestinians cannot get their homeland back from the Zionists, then perhaps they could aim for a new national project with an attempt to create Greater Syria. |
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eurofed
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Post by eurofed on Oct 4, 2018 14:36:05 GMT
Let's assume ITTL the Zionists are able to conquer all of Mandatory Palestine in 1948-49 and successfully defend its borders against the Arab states up to the armistice. The vast majority of the Arab population (especially the Muslims) flees or is expelled, so the population of this expanded Israel becomes overwhelmingly Jew, with a small Arab minority mostly made up of Christians. The expanded influx of Arab refugees in the neighbor countries gives PLO revolutionary militants the power base to overthrow the Hashemite dynasty (as they almost did in 1970) and turn Jordan into (East) Palestine. How we can assume other events in the Middle East would likely turn out with this premise? A few musings of my own: in the long term, there is going to be much less international support for the Palestinian cause beyond the Arab world. The rest of the world would just assume a two-state status quo with a Jewish homeland west of the Jordan and a Palestinian one east of it is the natural solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and there would be very little sympathy for any claim about a 'right of return' of the Arab refugees beyond the far-left fringes. Lack of a large and restive Arab population in the West Bank under Israeli rule would steal the Palestinian cause of its main source of sympathy, and the irredentist claims of the Arabs on Israeli land with an overwhelmingly Jewish population would make the Palestinians look as aggressive troublemakers and sore losers. Status of Jerusalem would still be somewhat of a tricky issue, but it would tend to settle down into a dispute about a special status for the Al-Aqsa Mosque. By the end of the 20th century, there would likely be an increased drive among several Arab countries to make peace with Israel as they come to recognize the inevitability of its existence and lose interest in supporting diehard Palestinian revanchism. This would especially concern Egypt, whose peace bid would be somewhat less controversial than OTL, but also quite possibly Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab countries lacking a border with Israel. Jordan/Palestine would likely remain stubbornly defiant, however, at least as long as PLO or worse Hamas militants remain in charge of it. Lebanon and Syria might turn out even more instable than OTL (because of the increased influx of un-assimilated refugees) or less so (because most of the refugees might relocate to Jordan after the PLO takes it over). If OTL PLO/Hamas management of West Bank and Gaza is anything to go by, Jordan under the rule of Palestinian militant organizations is likely going to be a more instable, poor, oppressive, and corrupt place than under the Hashemite dynasty, probably broadly analogous to other Arab countries ruled by nationalist dictatorships such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The course of the Arab-Israeli wars up to and including the Kippur War probably won't change much. I assume Israel would still conquer the Sinai and the Golan Heights in any equivalent of the Six Days War. I am not sure if they would care to occupy the East Bank of the Jordan valley as well, or just not bother. They are likely still going to hand back Sinai to Egypt in exchange for a peace treaty. Same as it concerns any portion of Southern Lebanon they may come to occupy, although it also depends on how TTL events affect the domestic stability of Lebanon. Not sure how things would turn out for the Golan Heights, an equivalent of the OTL armistice stalemate is quite possible and perhaps even likely, but a peace settlement might well occur. I assume persistent militarization and recurrent border incidents on the Jordan border, although Israel would not have a serious terrorism problem thanks to lack of a large Arab minority. Recurrent border incidents similar to what happens IOTL with Gaza are however quite likely, and so their recurrent escalation in limited conflicts all won hands down by Israel. I do not think addition of a third Jordan front would significantly change the course of any equivalent of the Kippur War, increased strategic depth and resources for Israel thanks to control of the West Bank would compensate for it. The possible occurrence of any equivalent of the 1982 and 2006 wars would depend on how things turn out in Lebanon. All of this seems completely reasonable. The one thing that I am curious about is whether the Palestinians who are in charge of Jordan in this TL are eventually going to aim to unify with Syria and perhaps western Iraq as well. After all, the idea of a Greater Syria was popular among Levantine Arabs right after the end of World War I and if the Palestinians cannot get their homeland back from the Zionists, then perhaps they could aim for a new national project with an attempt to create Greater Syria. On paper, this is quite possible and even likely, since the PLO leadership is going to share the same political outlook (secular, authoritarian, 'socialist' Pan-Arab nationalism) as the ruling elites of Syria and Iraq. In practice, however, this would still face the same stumbling blocks that made unification of Syria and Iraq (and all other attempts to unite Arab countries) fail, despite the two states being ruled by two wings of the same Baath party. First, it would require the Sunnis being simultaneously in charge of all three countries (not too difficult, just let a Sunni ruling clique get in control of Syria instead of Assad and his Alawis); second, overcome the historical inability of the secular nationalist ruling elites of the Arab states to either accomplish a meaningful power-sharing agreement or conquer rival power centers for unification. As long as the Palestinian leadership remains dominated by the likes of Arafat, I assume they shall closely follow in the footsteps of the Nassers, Assads, Qaddafis, and Saddams, and not accomplish anything much better for their people or the Arab world at large than the other dictators of the region. Of course, if the PoD lets an ATL Arab Great Man emerge, a lot gets possible, although I'm quite skeptical even such a luminary would accomplish much better against Israel than OTL; the structural advantages of the Zionist state against its Arab enemies were far too great. On second thoughts from my OP, if OTL is anything to go by, peace between Israel and PLO Jordan/Palestine is not really feasible as long as the Cold War continues and the founder generation of Arafat and his cronies remains in charge. They would be far too committed to militant confrontation and nursing grudges with Israel to cement their power base and bloc antagonism would feed the Arab-Israel dispute. In the 21st century, however, as Soviet support vanishes (before the likes of Putin can stage a Russian comeback in the region) and the other Arab states mostly turn distracted by other concerns and tire out of endless confrontation with an invincible Israel, even a new generation of Palestinian leaders might turn more pragmatic and feel pressured enough by unfavorable circumstances to accept peace. This has more or less the same chances of occurring as Israel and Syria making peace. Of course, the same point applies if at some point political unification of Greater Syria occurred. Of course, if Israel did occupy the East Bank and feels reluctant to give it back for strategic and water resources reasons like it did for the Golan Heights, this might easily turn in the same diplomatic/strategic stalemate as the OTL Israel-Syria situation. Otherwise, an Israel-Palestine peace would face many less stumbling blocks than OTL. If Greater Syria forms, I tend to assume this would likely butterfly out the invasion of Kuwait-Gulf War-Iraq War sequence, but not the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War sequence (which Greater Syria would likely win), nor the Arab Spring and its effects. The latter's effects on TTL Mashriq are likely going to be... interesting in a Chinese sense, since PLO rule has proven to be rather vulnerable to Islamist destabilization. I tend to assume even w/o losing any wars against the West, the Saddam dynasty's rule of Iraq would not fare much better against Arab Spring destabilization than the Assad dynasty and Qaddafi did. It is a more complex guess whether a Pan-Arab secular nationalist Greater Syria would withstand the storms of revolution and Islamism any better than OTL Syria, Iraq, and Libya; it might, especially if it reaped a decisive success in the war with a weakened post-revolutionary Iran. of course, an ISIS equivalent overrunning vast swaths of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan would certainly be a bigger tragedy and headache for the region and the world, although I have no doubt Israel would have little trouble keeping the murderous crazies close to its borders at bay, and even an expanded ISIS would still ultimately fail, they have been even better than the Nazis at making the rest of the world their sworn enemy. |
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futurist
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Post by futurist on Oct 4, 2018 22:27:14 GMT
All of this seems completely reasonable. The one thing that I am curious about is whether the Palestinians who are in charge of Jordan in this TL are eventually going to aim to unify with Syria and perhaps western Iraq as well. After all, the idea of a Greater Syria was popular among Levantine Arabs right after the end of World War I and if the Palestinians cannot get their homeland back from the Zionists, then perhaps they could aim for a new national project with an attempt to create Greater Syria. 1. On paper, this is quite possible and even likely, since the PLO leadership is going to share the same political outlook (secular, authoritarian, 'socialist' Pan-Arab nationalism) as the ruling elites of Syria and Iraq. In practice, however, this would still face the same stumbling blocks that made unification of Syria and Iraq (and all other attempts to unite Arab countries) fail, despite the two states being ruled by two wings of the same Baath party. First, it would require the Sunnis being simultaneously in charge of all three countries (not too difficult, just let a Sunni ruling clique get in control of Syria instead of Assad and his Alawis); second, overcome the historical inability of the secular nationalist ruling elites of the Arab states to either accomplish a meaningful power-sharing agreement or conquer rival power centers for unification. 2. As long as the Palestinian leadership remains dominated by the likes of Arafat, I assume they shall closely follow in the footsteps of the Nassers, Assads, Qaddafis, and Saddams, and not accomplish anything much better for their people or the Arab world at large than the other dictators of the region. Of course, if the PoD lets an ATL Arab Great Man emerge, a lot gets possible, although I'm quite skeptical even such a luminary would accomplish much better against Israel than OTL; the structural advantages of the Zionist state against its Arab enemies were far too great. 3. On second thoughts from my OP, if OTL is anything to go by, peace between Israel and PLO Jordan/Palestine is not really feasible as long as the Cold War continues and the founder generation of Arafat and his cronies remains in charge. They would be far too committed to militant confrontation and nursing grudges with Israel to cement their power base and bloc antagonism would feed the Arab-Israel dispute. In the 21st century, however, as Soviet support vanishes (before the likes of Putin can stage a Russian comeback in the region) and the other Arab states mostly turn distracted by other concerns and tire out of endless confrontation with an invincible Israel, even a new generation of Palestinian leaders might turn more pragmatic and feel pressured enough by unfavorable circumstances to accept peace. This has more or less the same chances of occurring as Israel and Syria making peace. Of course, the same point applies if at some point political unification of Greater Syria occurred. Of course, if Israel did occupy the East Bank and feels reluctant to give it back for strategic and water resources reasons like it did for the Golan Heights, this might easily turn in the same diplomatic/strategic stalemate as the OTL Israel-Syria situation. Otherwise, an Israel-Palestine peace would face many less stumbling blocks than OTL. 4. If Greater Syria forms, I tend to assume this would likely butterfly out the invasion of Kuwait-Gulf War-Iraq War sequence, but not the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War sequence (which Greater Syria would likely win), nor the Arab Spring and its effects. 5. The latter's effects on TTL Mashriq are likely going to be... interesting in a Chinese sense, since PLO rule has proven to be rather vulnerable to Islamist destabilization. I tend to assume even w/o losing any wars against the West, the Saddam dynasty's rule of Iraq would not fare much better against Arab Spring destabilization than the Assad dynasty and Qaddafi did. It is a more complex guess whether a Pan-Arab secular nationalist Greater Syria would withstand the storms of revolution and Islamism any better than OTL Syria, Iraq, and Libya; it might, especially if it reaped a decisive success in the war with a weakened post-revolutionary Iran. of course, an ISIS equivalent overrunning vast swaths of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan would certainly be a bigger tragedy and headache for the region and the world, although I have no doubt Israel would have little trouble keeping the murderous crazies close to its borders at bay, and even an expanded ISIS would still ultimately fail, they have been even better than the Nazis at making the rest of the world their sworn enemy. 1. Or you could simply have Jordan use force to conquer Syria and western Iraq. Of course, this might be a challenge for the Palestinian army of Jordan. 2. Would Israel militarily intervene to prevent a giant Arab mega-state from emerging on its eastern border due to its fear that it would pose a more formidable challenger for it? 3. Agreed with all of this. 4. Actually, I'm thinking that there might be a different Iran-Iraq War in this TL. Specifically, I would think that Iraq's Shiites might try to rise up against their Sunni overlords and have Iranian backing in regards to this. This would be an especially pertinent concern if Greater Syria tried to forcibly annex Iraq. In such a scenario, Iraqi Shiites might seek to either halt this annexation or limit it to the western, Sunni Arab-majority parts of Iraq. Agreed that the Arab Spring still occurs in this TL. 5. You know, I wonder if Israel, Shiite Iraq, the Kurds, and Iran would have been willing to ally against an ISIS equivalent during the Arab Spring in this TL. After all, exactly who else is going to curse this TL's version of ISIS? |
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eurofed
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Post by eurofed on Oct 5, 2018 18:56:43 GMT
1. On paper, this is quite possible and even likely, since the PLO leadership is going to share the same political outlook (secular, authoritarian, 'socialist' Pan-Arab nationalism) as the ruling elites of Syria and Iraq. In practice, however, this would still face the same stumbling blocks that made unification of Syria and Iraq (and all other attempts to unite Arab countries) fail, despite the two states being ruled by two wings of the same Baath party. First, it would require the Sunnis being simultaneously in charge of all three countries (not too difficult, just let a Sunni ruling clique get in control of Syria instead of Assad and his Alawis); second, overcome the historical inability of the secular nationalist ruling elites of the Arab states to either accomplish a meaningful power-sharing agreement or conquer rival power centers for unification. 2. As long as the Palestinian leadership remains dominated by the likes of Arafat, I assume they shall closely follow in the footsteps of the Nassers, Assads, Qaddafis, and Saddams, and not accomplish anything much better for their people or the Arab world at large than the other dictators of the region. Of course, if the PoD lets an ATL Arab Great Man emerge, a lot gets possible, although I'm quite skeptical even such a luminary would accomplish much better against Israel than OTL; the structural advantages of the Zionist state against its Arab enemies were far too great. 3. On second thoughts from my OP, if OTL is anything to go by, peace between Israel and PLO Jordan/Palestine is not really feasible as long as the Cold War continues and the founder generation of Arafat and his cronies remains in charge. They would be far too committed to militant confrontation and nursing grudges with Israel to cement their power base and bloc antagonism would feed the Arab-Israel dispute. In the 21st century, however, as Soviet support vanishes (before the likes of Putin can stage a Russian comeback in the region) and the other Arab states mostly turn distracted by other concerns and tire out of endless confrontation with an invincible Israel, even a new generation of Palestinian leaders might turn more pragmatic and feel pressured enough by unfavorable circumstances to accept peace. This has more or less the same chances of occurring as Israel and Syria making peace. Of course, the same point applies if at some point political unification of Greater Syria occurred. Of course, if Israel did occupy the East Bank and feels reluctant to give it back for strategic and water resources reasons like it did for the Golan Heights, this might easily turn in the same diplomatic/strategic stalemate as the OTL Israel-Syria situation. Otherwise, an Israel-Palestine peace would face many less stumbling blocks than OTL. 4. If Greater Syria forms, I tend to assume this would likely butterfly out the invasion of Kuwait-Gulf War-Iraq War sequence, but not the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War sequence (which Greater Syria would likely win), nor the Arab Spring and its effects. 5. The latter's effects on TTL Mashriq are likely going to be... interesting in a Chinese sense, since PLO rule has proven to be rather vulnerable to Islamist destabilization. I tend to assume even w/o losing any wars against the West, the Saddam dynasty's rule of Iraq would not fare much better against Arab Spring destabilization than the Assad dynasty and Qaddafi did. It is a more complex guess whether a Pan-Arab secular nationalist Greater Syria would withstand the storms of revolution and Islamism any better than OTL Syria, Iraq, and Libya; it might, especially if it reaped a decisive success in the war with a weakened post-revolutionary Iran. of course, an ISIS equivalent overrunning vast swaths of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan would certainly be a bigger tragedy and headache for the region and the world, although I have no doubt Israel would have little trouble keeping the murderous crazies close to its borders at bay, and even an expanded ISIS would still ultimately fail, they have been even better than the Nazis at making the rest of the world their sworn enemy. 1. Or you could simply have Jordan use force to conquer Syria and western Iraq. Of course, this might be a challenge for the Palestinian army of Jordan. 2. Would Israel militarily intervene to prevent a giant Arab mega-state from emerging on its eastern border due to its fear that it would pose a more formidable challenger for it? 3. Agreed with all of this. 4. Actually, I'm thinking that there might be a different Iran-Iraq War in this TL. Specifically, I would think that Iraq's Shiites might try to rise up against their Sunni overlords and have Iranian backing in regards to this. This would be an especially pertinent concern if Greater Syria tried to forcibly annex Iraq. In such a scenario, Iraqi Shiites might seek to either halt this annexation or limit it to the western, Sunni Arab-majority parts of Iraq. Agreed that the Arab Spring still occurs in this TL. 5. You know, I wonder if Israel, Shiite Iraq, the Kurds, and Iran would have been willing to ally against an ISIS equivalent during the Arab Spring in this TL. After all, exactly who else is going to curse this TL's version of ISIS? 1. Well, Palestine could certainly try to be a Prussia/Piedmont's equivalent for the Mashriq, and unify the region by defeating and conquering Syria and Iraq, but it is not any really likely to have any important structural advantage that would make it substantially stronger than Syria or Iraq. So any real chance of success at this would come from Palestine getting lucky circumstances. It is one of those ATL crossroads where alternative outcomes are within striking distance of likelihood, and the scenario creator gets to choose who gets lucky. It might or might not happen, and since you seem to fancy this outcome, we may assume it does. Say it occurs soon after Palestinian takeover of Jordan, when the PLO revolutionaries are still riding the wave of victory, while Syria and Iraq by chance got both weakened by a bout of their recurrent domestic instability. Let's say the PoD causes a Palestinian leader that is more competent and lucky than Arafat and accomplishes this, because I can't imagine for a moment the likes of Arafat successfully pulling a Cavour/Bismarck act. 2. Again, it might, or might not. The Israeli may decide formation of Greater Syria is too much of a potential threat and intervene to strangle it in the cradle, or they may (correctly) assume even if it forms it shall be rather like Nasserist Egypt, big and tough-talking but a clumsy giant with clay feet whose armies they can smash w/o excessive effort again and again, potentially distracted by feuds with its neighbors (especially Iran, but also Saudi Arabia), and weakened by potential domestic instability, especially if it likely gets at least a few important non-Sunni areas. This is another ATL crossroads where the alternate outcomes are of similar likelihood and the scenario author has to choose. Since you seem to fancy the creation of Greater Syria, let's say the Israelis guess it would not be so much of a threat for them and do not bother to intervene, just like IOTL they didn't when Egypt and Syria briefly merged. 4. Well, if TTL Palestine is lucky and competent enough to smash Syria's and Iraq's regular armies to accomplish forcible unification of Greater Syria, I have serious trouble seeing how and why the Shiite Iraqis would be able to resist conquest by the Palestinians with poorly armed and organized militias that would be hastily assembled during the collapse of Iraq. If anything, I would be more inclined to credit the Kurds for pulling this feat rather than the Shiite Iraqis, and even for the Kurds it would be far from simple, w/o external help. As for whether any such third-party intervention might occur, we already mentioned Israel above, which leaves Turkey and Iran. Turkey would no doubt have the military resources, and it would likely intervene if it sees a serious risk of a Kurd independent state forming on its borders, but otherwise up to Erdogan seizing power it has historically shown little interest in projecting power in the Arab lands. Ataturk and his successors seemed to think the former Arab possessions of the Ottoman Empire were more or less a troublesome burden best discarded. As it concerns Iran, IMO it largely depends on when the unification wars of Greater Syria take place. If they occur after the Islamist regime took over and stabilized its grip on power, then yes, post-revolutionary Iran would be likely to intervene on behalf of the Shiite Iraqis out of religious solidarity, and try to make them into a client state, or even outright annex them in a bid to create some kind of Shiite Caliphate. If it happens when Iran is still a monarchy, however, I am much more skeptical. As far as I know, Cold War Imperial Iran was not really interested in the lot of the Shiite Iraqis, or shaping its foreign policy on the basis of religious issues. If Greater Syria forms before the Iranian Revolution, as I more or less guess it likely does, I only see the Shah and his ministers being willing to intervene if a) they think GS is going to be a serious threat to Iran if it stabilizes, by trying to do what Saddam tried to do IOTL and grab control of Khuzestan and the Shatt-el-Arab waterway, or b) Washington decides formation of GS is a serious threat to Western strategic interests in the Middle East and goads Iran to fight GS on the West's behalf as regional proxies (this might well be a reason why Turkey, too, is driven to intervene). Both might happen, but I do not see either as especially likely, especially if when the GS unification wars occur, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq are all more or less part of the same pro-Soviet Pan-Arab nationalist camp and the conflict looks like an internecine squabble to third-party observers. On the other hand, if the conflict happens when Palestinian revolutionary takeover is still recent, the Western powers might still be alarmed and resentful for losing Hashemite Jordan as a loyal and valuable client and decide further expansion of the contagion should be stopped, before it threatens the Gulf monarchies. To sum it up, if the Palestinian would-be unifiers of Greater Syria do vanquish the ruling cliques of Syria and Iraq on the battlefied, I do expect they reap the totality of Syrian and Iraqi territories as their prize. I do not see how the Shiite Iraqis, the Alawis, or even the Kurds would be able to resist conquest with their own resources, especially not the former two who have no tradition of successful military resistance to foreign rulers or conquerors in the modern age. The Kurds do to some degree, so I would be slightly more open-minded to their chances, but it would still be a very difficult feat w/o external help. If Israel, Turkey, or Iran decide to intervene, however, either by themselves or as proxies of the West, it would a wholly different case, but is far from certain. Otherwise, I see a Greater Syria-Iran conflict quite possible and perhaps even likely ITTL, but would probably be fairly similar to the OTL equivalent, i.e. a clash between an Islamist Iran trying to export its own revolution across the Middle East, or at least pull Shiite areas of Iraq in its orbit, and Greater Syria trying to grab Khuzestan. And in such a conflict, I would not bet on Iran doing any better than OTL. Otherwise, I would only see a real chance for the Kurds and the Shiites to break away from Sunni-dominated Greater Syria if and when the latter collapses because of TTL's equivalent of the Arab Spring. In such a circumstance, I do see quite possible and even likely an ISIS analogue does form, overruns the Sunni areas of GS, and makes a serious bid to grab the rest by bloody conquest. Then an uneasy coalition of convenience might indeed form to contain them, variously including Israel, Turkey, Iran, the Kurds, and the Shiites/Alawis. |
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Post by Anchises on Oct 6, 2018 19:14:52 GMT
Let's assume ITTL the Zionists are able to conquer all of Mandatory Palestine in 1948-49 and successfully defend its borders against the Arab states up to the armistice. The vast majority of the Arab population (especially the Muslims) flees or is expelled, so the population of this expanded Israel becomes overwhelmingly Jew, with a small Arab minority mostly made up of Christians. The increased influx of Arab refugees in the neighbor countries gives PLO revolutionary militants the power base to overthrow the Hashemite dynasty (as they almost did in 1970) and turn Jordan into (East) Palestine. How we can assume other events in the Middle East would likely turn out with this premise? A few musings of my own: in the long term, there is going to be much less international support for the Palestinian cause beyond the Arab world. The rest of the world would just assume a two-state status quo with a Jewish homeland west of the Jordan and a Palestinian one east of it is the natural solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and there would be very little sympathy for any claim about a 'right of return' of the Arab refugees beyond the anti-Western far-left and anti-Semitic far-right fringes. Lack of a large and restive Arab population in the West Bank under Israeli rule would steal the Palestinian cause of its main source of sympathy, and the irredentist claims of the Arabs on Israeli land with an overwhelmingly Jewish population would make the Palestinians look like aggressive troublemakers and sore losers. Status of Jerusalem would still be somewhat of a tricky and controversial issue, but it would tend to boil down to a dispute about special status for the Al-Aqsa Mosque. By the end of the 20th century, there would likely be an increased drive among several Arab countries to make peace with Israel as they come to recognize the inevitability of its existence and lose interest in supporting diehard Palestinian revanchism. This would especially concern Egypt, whose peace bid would be somewhat less controversial than OTL, but also quite possibly Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab countries lacking a border with Israel. Jordan/Palestine would likely remain stubbornly defiant, however, at least as long as PLO or worse Hamas militants remain in charge of it. Lebanon and Syria might turn out even more instable than OTL (because of the increased influx of un-assimilated refugees) or less so (because most of the refugees might relocate to Jordan after the PLO takes it over). If OTL PLO/Hamas management of West Bank and Gaza is anything to go by, Jordan under the rule of Palestinian militant organizations is likely going to be a more instable, poor, oppressive, and corrupt place than under the Hashemite dynasty, probably largely similar to other Arab countries ruled by nationalist dictatorships such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The course of the Arab-Israeli wars up to and including the Kippur War probably won't change much. I assume Israel would still conquer the Sinai and the Golan Heights in any equivalent of the Six Days War. I am not sure if they would care to occupy the East Bank of the Jordan valley as well, or just not bother. They are likely still going to hand back Sinai to Egypt in exchange for a peace treaty. Same as it concerns any portion of Southern Lebanon they may come to occupy, although it also depends on how TTL events affect the domestic stability of Lebanon. Not sure how things would turn out for the Golan Heights, an equivalent of the OTL armistice stalemate is quite possible and perhaps even likely, but a peace settlement might well occur. I assume persistent militarization and recurrent border incidents on the Jordan border, although Israel would not have a serious terrorism problem thanks to lack of a large Arab minority. Recurrent border incidents similar to what happens IOTL with Gaza are however quite likely, and so their recurrent escalation in limited conflicts all won hands down by Israel. I do not think addition of a third Jordan front would significantly change the course of any equivalent of the Kippur War, increased strategic depth and resources for Israel thanks to control of the West Bank would compensate for it. The possible occurrence of any equivalent of the 1982 and 2006 wars would depend on how things turn out in Lebanon. I would mostly agree. Israel would serve as a useful target for the different Arab-Socialist states. The increased size of the Palestinian diaspora would increase pressure from the "Arab street". Israel would probably end up in a conflict with Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. The Golan Heights and the Egyptian stranglehold over the Straits of Tiran is bound to cause clashes. Israel can't tolerate a blockade of the Straits or artillery attacks from the heights and it has a strong interest in securing its water supply, by holding the Golan heights. So 1967 and 1973 equivalents are very likely happening. From there on butterflies will make stuff unpredictable imho. Israel and Egypt are not that unlikely to find common ground, the Sinai is not vital for Israel but depending on how the wars ITTL played out we might see one more war. Jordan is going to be interesting. We might see a hollowed out Hashemite monarchy, that has to fullfill an agenda driven by PLO interests. Or the PLO takes over in a successful Black September. Either way the PLO is going to run into problems in this ATL. The IDF would probably conduct regular retaliatory raids as a response to Jordanian terror attacks. Once the PLO loses its initial revolutionary zeal, I think they would attempt to find a stable mode of operation regarding Israel. In the long run PLO leaders have an interest in not getting blown up by precision air strikes. As other already said: This makes them exceptionally vulnerable against Islamic extremism. My guess is that Jordan is going to be an instable state. Initially the Hashemite monarchy klings to power but I think the PLO would take over at some point. Then we would see a phase of revolutionary violence, until the PLO leadership becomes more moderate. Islamist groups would become the outlet for extremism, destabilizing the reign of the PLO. Imho we would see a state where clashes between Islamists and Secularists regularly happen and where Mossad and Aman constantly influence the situation. |
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perkeo
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Post by perkeo on Oct 7, 2018 13:15:24 GMT
But why should the Palestinian cause get LESS support by anti-Western leftists and right-wing antisemites?
IOTL, Israel essentially enforced the UN partition plan. Territorial gains in 1949 can be justified as necessary for defense.
ITTL, Israel really does prevent an Arab-Palestinian state in 1949 - rather than watching the rest of Cis-Jordan Palestine not even trying to form a sovereign state.
This difference is extremely important for at least my personal opinion about this conflict.
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eurofed
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Post by eurofed on Oct 7, 2018 15:06:37 GMT
But why should the Palestinian cause get LESS support by anti-Western leftists and right-wing antisemites? IOTL, Israel essentially enforced the UN partition plan. Territorial gains in 1949 can be justified as necessary for defense. ITTL, Israel really does prevent an Arab-Palestinian state in 1949 - rather than watching the rest of Cis-Jordan Palestine not even trying to form a sovereign state. This difference is extremely important for at least my personal opinion about this conflict. Perhaps I did not explain my point adequately. I meant to say I expect ITTL the Palestinian cause is going to to reap much less support by anybody EXCEPT anti-Western leftists and right-wing antisemites, which are going to hate Israel just the same for the usual reasons. The reason is dual. First, ITTL there is no large and restive Arab minority being forced to live under Israeli rule in the West Bank; the population of entire former Mandatory Palestine is overwhelmingly Jewish and wholeheartedly supports the Israeli state. The Arab minority is small, mostly Christian, largely integrated or at least tolerated in Israel, and prone to think its current status is the best option realistically available in a region plagued by poverty, oppression, violence, and Islamist extremism. As a rule, the main source of international sympathy for the Palestinian cause by modern OTL conditions is the captive status of the Arab population of the West Bank. The world cares much less about the fate of the Palestinian diaspora, because the long-term failure of the Arab states to assimilate it despite the overwhelming cultural affinities of the refugees with their own population is largely unprecedented in the history of population displacements, and/or third-party observers expect it is going to resettle in the new Palestinian state in the West Bank when the two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict creates it. Second and more importantly, as I and other posters pointed out, in the long term the expanded, PLO-led Palestinian diaspora is in all likelihood going to take over Jordan and make it the Palestinian state in everything that matters. Heck, I even explictly mentioned it as part of the OP scenario. At that point, the two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict would have naturally taken shape: there is a Jewish homeland west of the Jordan River and a Palestinian homeland east of the Jordan River, the original partition scheme has been fulfilled in spirit if on a larger scale, and the two nations now have the territorial means to reap a fulfilling existence. In a way, this turned out even better than the original plan, since the Jordan River makes a good natural border to separate two hostile nations. The Palestinian diaspora gets an easy solution to their plight by resettling in Jordan and building up their new homeland just like the Zionist refugees did in theirs, even if the other Arab nations remain culpably unable or unwilling to integrate them. At that point, almost nobody but diehard Palestinian/Arab revanchists and radicals that hate the Zionist state for ideological reasons is going to care about the legalistic detail the allotted portion of the Palestinians was originally supposed to be west of the Jordan River, for the same reasons very few third-party observers today care about the fact after the 1948-49 war Israel got a bigger portion than what was awarded by the UN partition plan. As a rule, the overwhelming majority of the mainstream political spectrum tends to support the political status quo backed by ethnic-linguistic and religious facts on the ground, and has little sympathy for the efforts of radical nationalists to try and reverse the effects by violent means of population transfers or cultural assimilation that took place decades or centuries ago, for good or bad. And for that matter, TTL territorial gains by Israel are even easier to justify for defense, since the Jordan River makes an excellent natural border to keep two hostile nations separate, much more so than any artificial line you can draw across former Mandate Palestine, and control of the West Bank gives Israel the strategic depth it craves to defend itself from sudden conventional attacks and terrorist raids by hostile neighbors. |
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