Post by eurofed on Sept 10, 2018 18:31:22 GMT
Let's assume ITTL Germany does not cause WWII because it has a more moderate leader and it is able to fulfil all its reasonable claims (end of reparations, rearmament, remilitarization of Rhineland, acquisition of Austria, the Sudetenland, and Danzig/the Corridor) by peaceful means, or at least w/o triggering a general war. It may be the NSDAP is never able to seize power, and Weimar democracy stabilizes or is replaced by a DNVP vanilla right-wing regime. Alternatively, Hitler dies after Munich (Maurice Bavaud or Georg Elser get lucky) and his successor (Goering or a military junta) finds a sensible compromise with Britain and France about Poland. Nevertheless, an anti-communist version of WWII does still occur that squares the USSR against an EU/NATO-style Pan-European coalition (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, various Eastern European states). The main ally of the USSR in this scenario may either be China (the CCP is able to seize power or a pro-Soviet, left-leaning nationalist replaces Chiang as leader of the KMT) or Japan in a M-R Pact-style alliance of convenience, plus of course the Comintern and the radical fringes of the anti-colonial movement. The USA may either intervene if the right event to give them a casus belli occurs, or alternatively stays neutral but provides diplomatic and economic Lend-Lease-style assistance to the European Allies.
In this scenario, who do you deem would be the most likely Soviet leader(s) (either a single dictator or a small circle) to bring the USSR to ultimate military confrontation with the capitalist powers? It may be a purposeful reverse-Barbarossa- or Red Alert-style invasion of Europe, or a local crisis caused by a sequence of Soviet aggressions or destabilizations that causes the European powers to draw a line in the sand and escalates beyond the Soviet leaders' expectations. In the AH community, Trotzki is often deemed especially suited to fulfil this role, but I am aware his character flaws had alienated the rest of the Politburo and he failed to build proper power base, so it would be very difficult for him to seize the leadership's mantle after the death of Lenin. Likewise, Stalin is often deemed too cautious to make the same mistakes as Hitler and the Japanese militarists, but although I do not deem it especially likely, I would not entirely rule it out, since the man was also prone to make serious miscalculations in foreign policy (e.g. the Winter War, Barbarossa, the Korean War, the Berlin Blockade).
E.g. I once read a well-written and IMO entirely plausible TL (Explosion Heard Around the World) where Hitler died on Nov. 8, 1939 due to Georg Elser's bomb. Goering took over, purged Himmler, the SS, and assorted Nazi radicals (actually with this PoD Himmler, Goebbels, Hess, Heydrich, Frank, Rosenberg, and Streicher would have died in the bombing as well, but this detail likely escaped the author's attention), and implemented a more moderate policy platform. He made a compromise peace with Britain and France that ended the Phoney War. Germany kept Danzig, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia with a population exchange of Polish, Jew, and German minorities and Poland recovered its independence with an extraterritorial sea access at Gdynia. Germany and the Entente powers agreed to balanced partial demilitarization of the Franco-German border and mutual limitations of land and air forces, and restored the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Germany gradually reconciliated with the Western powers and China, took distance from the USSR and Japan, and eventually established an anti-Communist defence pact with Italy and various Eastern European nations. A coalition of the European powers and the USA strongarmed Japan into making a compromise peace with China with economic warfare and a threatened naval blockade. Japan withdrew from China but kept Manchuria, Shandong, and Hainan. The Japanese reluctantly submitted after the extremists staged a failed coup and were purged, although they resented the coercion greatly and aligned closer to the Soviets with a M-R Pact-style non-aggression and economic cooperation treaty. Discovery of Soviet espionage networks in America and Britain and violent Communist strikes in France drove the Western powers into an anti-Soviet mood, but Stalin failed to notice the shifting stance of the European powers, deeming Britain and France mired in spineless appeasement and Germany bound by the M-R Pact and economic dependence on Soviet trade. The Soviets annexed the Baltic states and Finland accepted their demands, getting their confidence inflated by these easy successes. When the Romanians instead chose to fight, and the flaws of the Red Army created a Winter War-style stalemate, their heroic resistance drew increasing support from Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, and the Soviets escalated their military engagement. Stalin failed to acknowledge the growing willingness to intervene of the European powers created by Soviet aggressiveness, which eventually drove Britain and France to bomb Baku and invade Crimea. The Soviets then reacted by staging a large-scale invasion of the Middle East. This triggered the intervention of Germany due to the defence pact with Turkey and the war escalated to an Euro-Soviet WWII.
The TL stalled its development indefinitely at this point, with a cliffhanger about Japan: it might stay an opportunist neutral, or deem the European powers distracted enough and the humiliation it suffered serious enough to backstab the Europeans with a Southern strike and draw America in the conflict the OTL way. Poland retreated into resentful isolationism after peace with Germany, but the first stirrings of an anti-Soviet uprising in Ukraine, the resulting border incidents with the Soviets, and a wish to recover its lost Eastern territories might well drive them to join the anti-Soviet coalition. An Anglo-German meeting, likely followed by a conference of the European powers, was underway to lay the groundwork of the anti-Soviet coalition and wartime cooperation. In this context, the Allies were likely going to agree to solve the 'Jew problem' of Germany by allowing German Jews to immigrate in the British Empire (quite possibly Palestine) or the USA. The peaceful interim between end of the Phoney War and start of the Romanian War as well as political backlash from discovery of Communist infiltration in America caused FDR to decline a third term, with Hull as a likely successor. This and events in Europe drove America to detente with Germany and confrontation with the USSR, so at least pro-Allies neutrality and a Lend-Lease to Europe were in the cards. If Japan goes the OTL way, of course, American intervention against the Soviet-Japanese Axis and formation of a full-fledged alt-NATO was inevitable.
In this scenario, who do you deem would be the most likely Soviet leader(s) (either a single dictator or a small circle) to bring the USSR to ultimate military confrontation with the capitalist powers? It may be a purposeful reverse-Barbarossa- or Red Alert-style invasion of Europe, or a local crisis caused by a sequence of Soviet aggressions or destabilizations that causes the European powers to draw a line in the sand and escalates beyond the Soviet leaders' expectations. In the AH community, Trotzki is often deemed especially suited to fulfil this role, but I am aware his character flaws had alienated the rest of the Politburo and he failed to build proper power base, so it would be very difficult for him to seize the leadership's mantle after the death of Lenin. Likewise, Stalin is often deemed too cautious to make the same mistakes as Hitler and the Japanese militarists, but although I do not deem it especially likely, I would not entirely rule it out, since the man was also prone to make serious miscalculations in foreign policy (e.g. the Winter War, Barbarossa, the Korean War, the Berlin Blockade).
E.g. I once read a well-written and IMO entirely plausible TL (Explosion Heard Around the World) where Hitler died on Nov. 8, 1939 due to Georg Elser's bomb. Goering took over, purged Himmler, the SS, and assorted Nazi radicals (actually with this PoD Himmler, Goebbels, Hess, Heydrich, Frank, Rosenberg, and Streicher would have died in the bombing as well, but this detail likely escaped the author's attention), and implemented a more moderate policy platform. He made a compromise peace with Britain and France that ended the Phoney War. Germany kept Danzig, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia with a population exchange of Polish, Jew, and German minorities and Poland recovered its independence with an extraterritorial sea access at Gdynia. Germany and the Entente powers agreed to balanced partial demilitarization of the Franco-German border and mutual limitations of land and air forces, and restored the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Germany gradually reconciliated with the Western powers and China, took distance from the USSR and Japan, and eventually established an anti-Communist defence pact with Italy and various Eastern European nations. A coalition of the European powers and the USA strongarmed Japan into making a compromise peace with China with economic warfare and a threatened naval blockade. Japan withdrew from China but kept Manchuria, Shandong, and Hainan. The Japanese reluctantly submitted after the extremists staged a failed coup and were purged, although they resented the coercion greatly and aligned closer to the Soviets with a M-R Pact-style non-aggression and economic cooperation treaty. Discovery of Soviet espionage networks in America and Britain and violent Communist strikes in France drove the Western powers into an anti-Soviet mood, but Stalin failed to notice the shifting stance of the European powers, deeming Britain and France mired in spineless appeasement and Germany bound by the M-R Pact and economic dependence on Soviet trade. The Soviets annexed the Baltic states and Finland accepted their demands, getting their confidence inflated by these easy successes. When the Romanians instead chose to fight, and the flaws of the Red Army created a Winter War-style stalemate, their heroic resistance drew increasing support from Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, and the Soviets escalated their military engagement. Stalin failed to acknowledge the growing willingness to intervene of the European powers created by Soviet aggressiveness, which eventually drove Britain and France to bomb Baku and invade Crimea. The Soviets then reacted by staging a large-scale invasion of the Middle East. This triggered the intervention of Germany due to the defence pact with Turkey and the war escalated to an Euro-Soviet WWII.
The TL stalled its development indefinitely at this point, with a cliffhanger about Japan: it might stay an opportunist neutral, or deem the European powers distracted enough and the humiliation it suffered serious enough to backstab the Europeans with a Southern strike and draw America in the conflict the OTL way. Poland retreated into resentful isolationism after peace with Germany, but the first stirrings of an anti-Soviet uprising in Ukraine, the resulting border incidents with the Soviets, and a wish to recover its lost Eastern territories might well drive them to join the anti-Soviet coalition. An Anglo-German meeting, likely followed by a conference of the European powers, was underway to lay the groundwork of the anti-Soviet coalition and wartime cooperation. In this context, the Allies were likely going to agree to solve the 'Jew problem' of Germany by allowing German Jews to immigrate in the British Empire (quite possibly Palestine) or the USA. The peaceful interim between end of the Phoney War and start of the Romanian War as well as political backlash from discovery of Communist infiltration in America caused FDR to decline a third term, with Hull as a likely successor. This and events in Europe drove America to detente with Germany and confrontation with the USSR, so at least pro-Allies neutrality and a Lend-Lease to Europe were in the cards. If Japan goes the OTL way, of course, American intervention against the Soviet-Japanese Axis and formation of a full-fledged alt-NATO was inevitable.