Dark Earth Timeline

So that Belgium division might have its hands full in Belgium Congo.

There would be a theoretical chance of the Dutch providing military aid, but the Belgians are already on their way out as of 1961; in any case, the deployment of Dutch conscripts to a Belgian colony in Central Africa may prove to be slightly controversial.

Belgium, and indeed even the Benelux group, lacks the military and economic capacity to maintain long term control of such a large area when facing opposition from the United States and the Soviet Union. Attempting to do so would be spending blood and treasure on an essentially doomed cause.

What the Belgians are going to try and do is to slide sideways out of direct control of the Congo into a position of indirect influence and economic control, with air forces and small units of supporting troops providing heavy back-up to indigenous forces. This is the model that the French have adopted in South Vietnam, where it is encountering mixed success. As such, it could be described as a Belgian Vietnam, but on a far-reduced level concomitant with their capacity. Whether or not the situation develops to Belgian advantage will play out in the 1960s.

The driver for this approach comes from the different experience of decolonisation that has occurred since the Second World War, without many of the events which directly and indirectly influenced Belgian policy in 1960/61 in @, such as Vietnam, Suez and the Winds of Change.

The lack of the inclusion of Katanga makes the Congo a slightly less valuable prize, but only from our external viewpoint.

That is the major focus of their expeditionary capacity prior to the events of 1961, which thereafter also focus upon the general Allied defence of Europe as a dual mission. Dutch plans for dealing with Indonesian aggression are based upon the movement of airborne and marine forces to the Far East and reinforcement of RNLAF elements present in the rump DEI; in a wider sense, a concerted defence would not be possible without British and Australian cooperation and involvement.

Yes, given the overall political situation and the threat posed by Indonesia to the north and south. The Soviets would need to tread carefully in regards to support and involvement, given the presence of British nuclear bombers in Singapore and Malaya and Australian atomic weapons. The whole business could get out of control very quickly.

There is a Benelux nuclear weapons programme underway, but it hasn't really had the funding and infrastructure required to make any real inroads through the 1950s.

The Australian arsenal as of 1960 is quite small; the real Western nuclear umbrellas come in the form of that of the United States, France and Britain. There has been some background discussion of the notion of nuclear sharing, which would provide the means of answering the question of German and Austrian weapons.

One of the factors that will complicate Allied/NATO developments in the 1960s will be Italy, Spain, Greece and Sweden having their own bombs, with all of the associated strategic and command issues.

Another factor to consider is that the USA's arsenal will not stop growing in the mid 60s as it did under McNamara, allowing the Soviets to achieve parity.

On the matter of Netherlands New Guinea and the Moluccas, a Dutch nuclear defence may not necessarily be either possible or advisable. Their main strategy is to deter aggression and, in the event of that failing, fight a delaying action until aid arrives from the USA, Commonwealth powers and other PATO allies.

The intent of an Indonesian atomic weapons project was featured in the 1959 update, if I recall correctly.