Post by lordroel on Jul 13, 2018 9:42:36 GMT
What if: ARA General Belgrano wasn't sunk (1982)
If the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano had managed to avoid the British nuclear hunter-killer submarine HMS Conqueror while the Belgrano was steaming near Burwood Bank south of the Falklands, it would have proceeded with its two escorting destroyers (ARA Piedra Buena and ARA Hipólito Bouchard) to a rendezvous point to the west of the Islands. It may have been intended for the ship to link up with the second Argentine task force that had put to sea, this one centered on the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo and here escorts (ARA Hércules and ARA Santísima Trinidad). But whether it would ultimately have included the Argentine flat-top or not, the rendezvous was already part of Argentine war plans and was known to the oncoming British Royal Navy task force because of their excellent “SIGINT”—Signals Intelligence—meaning, the British were able to intercept, decode, and translate Argentine Navy radio traffic and thus they knew where the Belgrano was headed.
Had the Belgrano and the two destroyers with her successfully linked up with the Veinticinco de Mayo and its escorts, the combined task force would certainly have been the most powerful that the Argentine Navy could have put to sea during the Falklands War and as a result the Royal Navy would have to face this in combat:
ARA General Belgrano (former USS Phoenix),a light cruiser of the Brooklyn Class armed with 15 radar aimed cannons of 150 mm with a range of 19 km and a air defense system called SeaCat.
And the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (former HNLMS Karel Doorman).
Another British nuclear submarine had already been assigned to find and destroy the Argentine carrier, and given the generally inadequate antisubmarine skill and equipment in the Argentine Navy of that time, it is hard to argue with the Armada’s decision to return to port for the duration of hostilities.
On the other hand, had the rendezvous occurred and had a combined carrier air strike and ship-launched Exocet bombardment commenced (as was in fact originally planned), the Argentines could conceivably have caused significant though probably not decisive damage to the British task force.
Because the British Task Force would have received a very large hit being attacked by 16 A-4Q’s with heavy bomb load unlike the single 500lbs or 3 small bombs of the A-4Bs of the Air Force operating at the limit of their range.
And the bombs used by the Navy had a 100% rate of explosion thanks to being designed for the task and had air brakes.
Doing this
Then the Belgrano could launched, with its escorts, 3 Alouette helicopters armed with the antiship missiles AS-12.
And then get close to fire its cannons. Massive 150 mm armor piercing shells over aluminum tin cans would wrecked them in a single shot, but even then most of the Argentine Navy, including the Veinticinco de Mayo and the Belgrano, would most likely have been destroyed in the battle. How much the damage inflicted by the Armada before the Royal Navy reached the Islands themselves would have affected subsequent British operations is difficult to determine. Unless this hypothetical attack had badly damaged or destroyed one of the two British aircraft carriers, it is most probable that the rest of the war would have played out in a fairly similar manner to the way the actual conflict occurred. But even absent this outcome, perhaps an Argentine naval strike that had some success would have bolstered the morale of Buenos Aires’ forces sufficiently for them to keep fighting for longer than they actually did, with higher resultant casualties on both sides.
If the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano had managed to avoid the British nuclear hunter-killer submarine HMS Conqueror while the Belgrano was steaming near Burwood Bank south of the Falklands, it would have proceeded with its two escorting destroyers (ARA Piedra Buena and ARA Hipólito Bouchard) to a rendezvous point to the west of the Islands. It may have been intended for the ship to link up with the second Argentine task force that had put to sea, this one centered on the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo and here escorts (ARA Hércules and ARA Santísima Trinidad). But whether it would ultimately have included the Argentine flat-top or not, the rendezvous was already part of Argentine war plans and was known to the oncoming British Royal Navy task force because of their excellent “SIGINT”—Signals Intelligence—meaning, the British were able to intercept, decode, and translate Argentine Navy radio traffic and thus they knew where the Belgrano was headed.
Had the Belgrano and the two destroyers with her successfully linked up with the Veinticinco de Mayo and its escorts, the combined task force would certainly have been the most powerful that the Argentine Navy could have put to sea during the Falklands War and as a result the Royal Navy would have to face this in combat:
ARA General Belgrano (former USS Phoenix),a light cruiser of the Brooklyn Class armed with 15 radar aimed cannons of 150 mm with a range of 19 km and a air defense system called SeaCat.
And the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (former HNLMS Karel Doorman).
Another British nuclear submarine had already been assigned to find and destroy the Argentine carrier, and given the generally inadequate antisubmarine skill and equipment in the Argentine Navy of that time, it is hard to argue with the Armada’s decision to return to port for the duration of hostilities.
On the other hand, had the rendezvous occurred and had a combined carrier air strike and ship-launched Exocet bombardment commenced (as was in fact originally planned), the Argentines could conceivably have caused significant though probably not decisive damage to the British task force.
Because the British Task Force would have received a very large hit being attacked by 16 A-4Q’s with heavy bomb load unlike the single 500lbs or 3 small bombs of the A-4Bs of the Air Force operating at the limit of their range.
And the bombs used by the Navy had a 100% rate of explosion thanks to being designed for the task and had air brakes.
Doing this
Then the Belgrano could launched, with its escorts, 3 Alouette helicopters armed with the antiship missiles AS-12.
And then get close to fire its cannons. Massive 150 mm armor piercing shells over aluminum tin cans would wrecked them in a single shot, but even then most of the Argentine Navy, including the Veinticinco de Mayo and the Belgrano, would most likely have been destroyed in the battle. How much the damage inflicted by the Armada before the Royal Navy reached the Islands themselves would have affected subsequent British operations is difficult to determine. Unless this hypothetical attack had badly damaged or destroyed one of the two British aircraft carriers, it is most probable that the rest of the war would have played out in a fairly similar manner to the way the actual conflict occurred. But even absent this outcome, perhaps an Argentine naval strike that had some success would have bolstered the morale of Buenos Aires’ forces sufficiently for them to keep fighting for longer than they actually did, with higher resultant casualties on both sides.
