lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Jun 29, 2018 21:21:58 GMT
Kingdom of Italy will want some Austria-Hungary territory, others might as well, doubt we will see a Austria-Hungary looking like this United States of Greater AustriaYeah, what I'd expect in this scenario is for Austria-Hungary to keep Czechia, Slovakia, the Sudetenland, German Austria, (Hungarian) Hungary, and perhaps Slovenia and northern Croatia as well but to lose everything else. Would the allies also put a limit on how large the Austria-Hungary Army and Navy are going to be. |
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futurist
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Post by futurist on Jun 29, 2018 21:34:38 GMT
Yeah, what I'd expect in this scenario is for Austria-Hungary to keep Czechia, Slovakia, the Sudetenland, German Austria, (Hungarian) Hungary, and perhaps Slovenia and northern Croatia as well but to lose everything else. Would the allies also put a limit on how large the Austria-Hungary Army and Navy are going to be. If they don't need Austria-Hungary's help in fighting Germany, then Yes, they probably would. |
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Post by lordroel on Jun 29, 2018 21:38:14 GMT
Would the allies also put a limit on how large the Austria-Hungary Army and Navy are going to be. If they don't need Austria-Hungary's help in fighting Germany, then Yes, they probably would. Would Austria-Hungary be forced to declare war on the German Empire as part of a peace deal. |
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futurist
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Post by futurist on Jun 29, 2018 21:52:13 GMT
If they don't need Austria-Hungary's help in fighting Germany, then Yes, they probably would. Would Austria-Hungary be forced to declare war on the German Empire as part of a peace deal. Probably not; however, I can't be sure. Of course, I certainly don't think that Austria-Hungary would be very willing to end one war if this would mean that it would have to start another war. |
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Post by stevep on Jun 29, 2018 22:36:25 GMT
A hell of a lot would depend on the details of course. I did read that some negotiations were discussed but that the British and French didn't go ahead with it because it would alienate the Italians. Which might seem a bit pointless because if you have Austria out of the war then there's virtually nowhere for Italy to fight as I doubt it would be willing to send troops to the western front. This does also suggest that Italy wasn't going to be offered a lot if anything in the suggested deal. Which would antagonise the Italians but if it put Austria out of the war then it would be a huge boost to the allies. Also I did read a reference that, although the circumstances were unclear, Austria might be compensated by regaining Silesia from Prussia/Germany. However not sure of the basis for this.
If say we have some agreements, with Austria conceding say some small areas to Italy and more importantly Polish Galicia to Russia and removing forces from Serbia and Montenegro - possibly also with giving Bosnia to the new Serbian state. Negotiations were going on during the winter after Karl came to the throne and failed to get Wilhelm to agree to a general peace. As such it could be agreed and/or announced before or after the Russian revolution in February. The questions then are:
a) Does Germany, possibly with support from some hard liner in Austria seek to occupy Austria? Might be but going to be bloody stupid as they know big allied attacks are coming on both eastern and western fronts and are already thinly stretched while even if the Austrian army largely collapses they have to consider the unrest, especially in the Slavic parts of the empire and the need to defend its borders with few Austrian units to support them.
b) At what date does this peace occur and what happens to POWs on both sides? Returning a lot of men could be a big boost to both Karl in Austria and the Provisional Government in Russia, plus Karl is also bringing much needed peace. On the other hand those men will need work to do as will in Austria a rapidly disbanding wartime army. Furthermore are those men largely going to be loyal to the old regimes - which could mean more royalists in Russia or be alienated by the ordeal their been through and probably either despondent or widely revolutionary. Also the morale boost in Russia will be limited by the fact that the government is going to continue the war. Unless?
c) Will Germany fight on, even after Austria makes peace or seek terms itself. Suspect initially it will but possibly not for long simply because of the odds against it and growing unrest internally as a result. However it could decide to defend a shorter line in the east and seek a final victory in the west, a bit like 1918 OTL but the year before. Or they could try an approach of sitting on the defensive and defying the allies to attack them. Which won't work in the longer run but might seem attractive to some of the war hawks rather than making concessions.
d) This presumes that the Germans don't try and hold the entire eastern front themselves, which I suspect is impossible. Pasts of it may be in Austrian territory but if they try and hold a line down to the Black Sea they also have very limited supply to such areas. You might see then withdraw to Russian Poland and a line, possibly not far from the Curzon Line, extending northwards to cover East Prussia. This would free up men and resources which were committed to helping Austria and also their other allies. The down side to this means that the Russian line is also shortened and you are almost certainly going to see Bulgaria and Turkey forced to make peace very quickly. Bulgaria is now pretty much totally isolated and can't garrison both Serbia and Romania to prevent uprising in those countries, let alone invasions from their allies. Once it comes to terms the Ottomans are even more isolated and Constantinople and the straits are vulnerable to a land attack so their resistance may not last much longer.
e) Presuming a shorter defensive line in the east and the return of POWs what happens in Russia especially? Germany is still likely, presuming it fights on, to send its plague eastwards i.e. Lenin and co. The chance of peace will be dashed but they will be able to concentrate forces on a much shorter front - which is however unlikely to help them much. However the Germans are almost certainly not going to launch their attacks towards Riga so the Russians won't have that defeat undermining their morale. Also depending on how long the Turks persist they have at least the hope of the reopening of the straits enabling trade and military supplies from the west a lot more easily as well as the ending of the Caucasus front. Probably still likely to make a major attack in summer 1917 and it could be an even bigger disaster with more Russian troops committed but the Germans having a denser defence as forces are released from Austria and places further south.
f) Do you still have the July days crisis and if so does Lenin still escape the round up of Bolsheviks. If he does do you still have another crisis in September over Kornilov's reported coup d'etat? Possibly not this as the war could well be over by then.
I get the feeling that you might still see a Bolshevik coup attempted as OTL, especially if Lenin escapes arrest but if the war has been won or is obviously nearly over by then its markedly less likely to be successful. Hence i could see such an agreement with Austria preventing the establishment of a Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia. Although there is likely to be a lot of unrest and terrorism and possibly a civil war its likely to be far, far less destructive than OTL.
On a couple of points mentioned: 1) I can't see the allies demanding Austria joins the war against Germany as that's never going to fly and they know it. They are likely to insist on restricting imports to Austria as with other neutrals to prevent/mimimise German bypassing of the blockade. Given the state of the Austrian economy by this time and desperate shortages I doubt Austria is likely to sell much to Germany anyway.
2) I don't see any point in the allies seeking to impose limitations on the Austrian military. The country is already on the verge of economic and social collapse, although its weakness may not be fully realised by the allies, so its military is going to be contracting sharpely. Furthermore they will want an adequate force to maintain order inside the empire and also to deter/oppose any Germany intervention.
Anyway initial thoughts on the issue.
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futurist
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Post by futurist on Jun 29, 2018 23:46:27 GMT
A hell of a lot would depend on the details of course. I did read that some negotiations were discussed but that the British and French didn't go ahead with it because it would alienate the Italians. Which might seem a bit pointless because if you have Austria out of the war then there's virtually nowhere for Italy to fight as I doubt it would be willing to send troops to the western front. This does also suggest that Italy wasn't going to be offered a lot if anything in the suggested deal. Which would antagonise the Italians but if it put Austria out of the war then it would be a huge boost to the allies. Also I did read a reference that, although the circumstances were unclear, Austria might be compensated by regaining Silesia from Prussia/Germany. However not sure of the basis for this.
If say we have some agreements, with Austria conceding say some small areas to Italy and more importantly Polish Galicia to Russia and removing forces from Serbia and Montenegro - possibly also with giving Bosnia to the new Serbian state. Negotiations were going on during the winter after Karl came to the throne and failed to get Wilhelm to agree to a general peace. As such it could be agreed and/or announced before or after the Russian revolution in February. The questions then are:
a) Does Germany, possibly with support from some hard liner in Austria seek to occupy Austria? Might be but going to be bloody stupid as they know big allied attacks are coming on both eastern and western fronts and are already thinly stretched while even if the Austrian army largely collapses they have to consider the unrest, especially in the Slavic parts of the empire and the need to defend its borders with few Austrian units to support them.
b) At what date does this peace occur and what happens to POWs on both sides? Returning a lot of men could be a big boost to both Karl in Austria and the Provisional Government in Russia, plus Karl is also bringing much needed peace. On the other hand those men will need work to do as will in Austria a rapidly disbanding wartime army. Furthermore are those men largely going to be loyal to the old regimes - which could mean more royalists in Russia or be alienated by the ordeal their been through and probably either despondent or widely revolutionary. Also the morale boost in Russia will be limited by the fact that the government is going to continue the war. Unless?
c) Will Germany fight on, even after Austria makes peace or seek terms itself. Suspect initially it will but possibly not for long simply because of the odds against it and growing unrest internally as a result. However it could decide to defend a shorter line in the east and seek a final victory in the west, a bit like 1918 OTL but the year before. Or they could try an approach of sitting on the defensive and defying the allies to attack them. Which won't work in the longer run but might seem attractive to some of the war hawks rather than making concessions.
d) This presumes that the Germans don't try and hold the entire eastern front themselves, which I suspect is impossible. Pasts of it may be in Austrian territory but if they try and hold a line down to the Black Sea they also have very limited supply to such areas. You might see then withdraw to Russian Poland and a line, possibly not far from the Curzon Line, extending northwards to cover East Prussia. This would free up men and resources which were committed to helping Austria and also their other allies. The down side to this means that the Russian line is also shortened and you are almost certainly going to see Bulgaria and Turkey forced to make peace very quickly. Bulgaria is now pretty much totally isolated and can't garrison both Serbia and Romania to prevent uprising in those countries, let alone invasions from their allies. Once it comes to terms the Ottomans are even more isolated and Constantinople and the straits are vulnerable to a land attack so their resistance may not last much longer.
e) Presuming a shorter defensive line in the east and the return of POWs what happens in Russia especially? Germany is still likely, presuming it fights on, to send its plague eastwards i.e. Lenin and co. The chance of peace will be dashed but they will be able to concentrate forces on a much shorter front - which is however unlikely to help them much. However the Germans are almost certainly not going to launch their attacks towards Riga so the Russians won't have that defeat undermining their morale. Also depending on how long the Turks persist they have at least the hope of the reopening of the straits enabling trade and military supplies from the west a lot more easily as well as the ending of the Caucasus front. Probably still likely to make a major attack in summer 1917 and it could be an even bigger disaster with more Russian troops committed but the Germans having a denser defence as forces are released from Austria and places further south.
f) Do you still have the July days crisis and if so does Lenin still escape the round up of Bolsheviks. If he does do you still have another crisis in September over Kornilov's reported coup d'etat? Possibly not this as the war could well be over by then.
I get the feeling that you might still see a Bolshevik coup attempted as OTL, especially if Lenin escapes arrest but if the war has been won or is obviously nearly over by then its markedly less likely to be successful. Hence i could see such an agreement with Austria preventing the establishment of a Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia. Although there is likely to be a lot of unrest and terrorism and possibly a civil war its likely to be far, far less destructive than OTL.
On a couple of points mentioned: 1) I can't see the allies demanding Austria joins the war against Germany as that's never going to fly and they know it. They are likely to insist on restricting imports to Austria as with other neutrals to prevent/mimimise German bypassing of the blockade. Given the state of the Austrian economy by this time and desperate shortages I doubt Austria is likely to sell much to Germany anyway.
2) I don't see any point in the allies seeking to impose limitations on the Austrian military. The country is already on the verge of economic and social collapse, although its weakness may not be fully realised by the allies, so its military is going to be contracting sharpely. Furthermore they will want an adequate force to maintain order inside the empire and also to deter/oppose any Germany intervention.
Anyway initial thoughts on the issue.
Excellent post, Steve! Anyway, my scenario here has Kaiser Karl being more willing to make the necessary compromises in order to achieve peace in this scenario. Indeed, it made sense for the Italians to insist on as much territory as possible considering that the U.S. was on the verge of entering the war and considering that the Central Powers were in a more precarious position than the Entente were (due to the British blockade). Here is what I think that Austria-Hungary should have expected if it would have genuinely been willing to make the necessary compromises for peace:  Note--while this map might have been rather humiliating for Austria-Hungary, it is actually relatively generous to Austria-Hungary based on ethnic criteria. After all, Italy would acquire Italian-majority Trentino, Trieste, and Istria, Serbia would acquire Serb-majority/Serb-plurality Vojvodina and Slavic-majority Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavic-majority Dalmatia would go to either Italy or Serbia or be split between the two of them (with Serbia getting eastern Dalmatia for sea access and Italy getting western Dalmatia). Meanwhile, Romania would acquire Romanian-majority Transylvania while Russia would acquire Ukrainian-majority eastern Galicia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia and Polish-majority western Galicia. This map would be generous to Austria-Hungary because it will allow Austria-Hungary to keep South Tyrol, Slovenia, northern Croatia (for sea access; after all, Fiume was an important Austro-Hungarian port), Czechia, Slovakia, and the Sudetenland in addition to keeping both German Austria and (Hungarian) Hungary. Letting Austria-Hungary keep more territory than that would probably be unrealistic since Italians, Serbs, Romanians, and Russians would want to have some meaningful territorial gains to show to their people. For instance, would you really expect Romanians to tolerate it if their leadership told them "We know that we entered the war because of Transylvania, but we're going to abandon our goal so that we can get Austria-Hungary out of the war more quickly!"? As for letting Austria-Hungary's acquire German Silesia, this could perhaps be possible given Austria-Hungary's historical claim to this territory. However, Russia might want Polish-majority Upper Silesia for itself (or for Poland, if the Russian Tsar will already be overthrown and the Russian Provisional Government will already commit to Polish independence). Anyway, in response to your points here: A) I think that it would be wiser for Germany not to invade Austria as long as Austria refuses to allow its territory to be used as a base for the Entente to attack Germany. If Austria does allow its territory to be used as a base by the Entente, though, then Germany would probably have no choice but to attack Austria. Indeed, in such a scenario, Germany might actually be desperate enough to try rekindling German nationalist sentiment in Austria-Hungary by outright annexing the German-majority parts of Austria-Hungary to the German Reich (so that the people there would hopefully become energetic about fighting for Germany). Meanwhile, Germany could set up a puppet state in Czechia and put some pro-German King in power in Hungary if it will be able to capture it. Anyway, long story short, Austria would be wise to avoid letting the Entente use its territory to attack Germany. If Austria makes this move, the situation there could become a big mess afterwards. B) I am unsure about the date of this peace, though I'm presuming that at least a couple of months will be necessary to work out the details of this peace. As for the POWs, they could either be a reliable source of manpower for Austria-Hungary and Russia or a big source of trouble for them. I do think that Russia is going to continue fighting in this scenario, though. C) I don't think that Germany would be able to launch a large-scale offensive in the West in this scenario. It simply wouldn't have the available troops considering that it would still need a large number of forces to fight Russia in the East. Rather, what I think that Germany is going to do is to try holding a short defensive line on both fronts and to try bleeding the Allies to exhaustion to the point that they agree to a compromise peace which Germany can swallow. D) Agreed that Germany is going to have to withdraw from Austro-Hungarian territories (if it is smart, that is). Also, completely agreed that both Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire aren't going to be able to hold out for long after Austria-Hungary makes peace. E) Agreed that an attack on Germany in 1917 is still unlikely to fare well for Russia considering that Germany would be able to have a narrower front line and thus more dense defenses in this scenario. However, you are also correct that the opening of the Straits is going to be a huge boost to Russia's economy. Now, the question is--can the Russians convert this economic boost into increased support for the war effort at home? F) Agreed that the odds of this go down in this scenario. However, I certainly wouldn't completely rule it out of the question. Also, in regards to the Bolsheviks, it is possible that they would decide to bide their time in this scenario. After all, even if the war is won by this point in time, they could hope that Russia will experience, say, an economic depression in the future which will allow them to finally seize power in Russia. In addition to this, I completely agree with your last two points here, Steve. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jun 30, 2018 11:22:21 GMT
A hell of a lot would depend on the details of course. I did read that some negotiations were discussed but that the British and French didn't go ahead with it because it would alienate the Italians. Which might seem a bit pointless because if you have Austria out of the war then there's virtually nowhere for Italy to fight as I doubt it would be willing to send troops to the western front. This does also suggest that Italy wasn't going to be offered a lot if anything in the suggested deal. Which would antagonise the Italians but if it put Austria out of the war then it would be a huge boost to the allies. Also I did read a reference that, although the circumstances were unclear, Austria might be compensated by regaining Silesia from Prussia/Germany. However not sure of the basis for this.
If say we have some agreements, with Austria conceding say some small areas to Italy and more importantly Polish Galicia to Russia and removing forces from Serbia and Montenegro - possibly also with giving Bosnia to the new Serbian state. Negotiations were going on during the winter after Karl came to the throne and failed to get Wilhelm to agree to a general peace. As such it could be agreed and/or announced before or after the Russian revolution in February. The questions then are:
a) Does Germany, possibly with support from some hard liner in Austria seek to occupy Austria? Might be but going to be bloody stupid as they know big allied attacks are coming on both eastern and western fronts and are already thinly stretched while even if the Austrian army largely collapses they have to consider the unrest, especially in the Slavic parts of the empire and the need to defend its borders with few Austrian units to support them.
b) At what date does this peace occur and what happens to POWs on both sides? Returning a lot of men could be a big boost to both Karl in Austria and the Provisional Government in Russia, plus Karl is also bringing much needed peace. On the other hand those men will need work to do as will in Austria a rapidly disbanding wartime army. Furthermore are those men largely going to be loyal to the old regimes - which could mean more royalists in Russia or be alienated by the ordeal their been through and probably either despondent or widely revolutionary. Also the morale boost in Russia will be limited by the fact that the government is going to continue the war. Unless?
c) Will Germany fight on, even after Austria makes peace or seek terms itself. Suspect initially it will but possibly not for long simply because of the odds against it and growing unrest internally as a result. However it could decide to defend a shorter line in the east and seek a final victory in the west, a bit like 1918 OTL but the year before. Or they could try an approach of sitting on the defensive and defying the allies to attack them. Which won't work in the longer run but might seem attractive to some of the war hawks rather than making concessions.
d) This presumes that the Germans don't try and hold the entire eastern front themselves, which I suspect is impossible. Pasts of it may be in Austrian territory but if they try and hold a line down to the Black Sea they also have very limited supply to such areas. You might see then withdraw to Russian Poland and a line, possibly not far from the Curzon Line, extending northwards to cover East Prussia. This would free up men and resources which were committed to helping Austria and also their other allies. The down side to this means that the Russian line is also shortened and you are almost certainly going to see Bulgaria and Turkey forced to make peace very quickly. Bulgaria is now pretty much totally isolated and can't garrison both Serbia and Romania to prevent uprising in those countries, let alone invasions from their allies. Once it comes to terms the Ottomans are even more isolated and Constantinople and the straits are vulnerable to a land attack so their resistance may not last much longer.
e) Presuming a shorter defensive line in the east and the return of POWs what happens in Russia especially? Germany is still likely, presuming it fights on, to send its plague eastwards i.e. Lenin and co. The chance of peace will be dashed but they will be able to concentrate forces on a much shorter front - which is however unlikely to help them much. However the Germans are almost certainly not going to launch their attacks towards Riga so the Russians won't have that defeat undermining their morale. Also depending on how long the Turks persist they have at least the hope of the reopening of the straits enabling trade and military supplies from the west a lot more easily as well as the ending of the Caucasus front. Probably still likely to make a major attack in summer 1917 and it could be an even bigger disaster with more Russian troops committed but the Germans having a denser defence as forces are released from Austria and places further south.
f) Do you still have the July days crisis and if so does Lenin still escape the round up of Bolsheviks. If he does do you still have another crisis in September over Kornilov's reported coup d'etat? Possibly not this as the war could well be over by then.
I get the feeling that you might still see a Bolshevik coup attempted as OTL, especially if Lenin escapes arrest but if the war has been won or is obviously nearly over by then its markedly less likely to be successful. Hence i could see such an agreement with Austria preventing the establishment of a Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia. Although there is likely to be a lot of unrest and terrorism and possibly a civil war its likely to be far, far less destructive than OTL.
On a couple of points mentioned: 1) I can't see the allies demanding Austria joins the war against Germany as that's never going to fly and they know it. They are likely to insist on restricting imports to Austria as with other neutrals to prevent/mimimise German bypassing of the blockade. Given the state of the Austrian economy by this time and desperate shortages I doubt Austria is likely to sell much to Germany anyway.
2) I don't see any point in the allies seeking to impose limitations on the Austrian military. The country is already on the verge of economic and social collapse, although its weakness may not be fully realised by the allies, so its military is going to be contracting sharpely. Furthermore they will want an adequate force to maintain order inside the empire and also to deter/oppose any Germany intervention.
Anyway initial thoughts on the issue.
Excellent post, Steve! Anyway, my scenario here has Kaiser Karl being more willing to make the necessary compromises in order to achieve peace in this scenario. Indeed, it made sense for the Italians to insist on as much territory as possible considering that the U.S. was on the verge of entering the war and considering that the Central Powers were in a more precarious position than the Entente were (due to the British blockade). Here is what I think that Austria-Hungary should have expected if it would have genuinely been willing to make the necessary compromises for peace: Note--while this map might have been rather humiliating for Austria-Hungary, it is actually relatively generous to Austria-Hungary based on ethnic criteria. After all, Italy would acquire Italian-majority Trentino, Trieste, and Istria, Serbia would acquire Serb-majority/Serb-plurality Vojvodina and Slavic-majority Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavic-majority Dalmatia would go to either Italy or Serbia or be split between the two of them (with Serbia getting eastern Dalmatia for sea access and Italy getting western Dalmatia). Meanwhile, Romania would acquire Romanian-majority Transylvania while Russia would acquire Ukrainian-majority eastern Galicia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia and Polish-majority western Galicia. This map would be generous to Austria-Hungary because it will allow Austria-Hungary to keep South Tyrol, Slovenia, northern Croatia (for sea access; after all, Fiume was an important Austro-Hungarian port), Czechia, Slovakia, and the Sudetenland in addition to keeping both German Austria and (Hungarian) Hungary. Letting Austria-Hungary keep more territory than that would probably be unrealistic since Italians, Serbs, Romanians, and Russians would want to have some meaningful territorial gains to show to their people. For instance, would you really expect Romanians to tolerate it if their leadership told them "We know that we entered the war because of Transylvania, but we're going to abandon our goal so that we can get Austria-Hungary out of the war more quickly!"? As for letting Austria-Hungary's acquire German Silesia, this could perhaps be possible given Austria-Hungary's historical claim to this territory. However, Russia might want Polish-majority Upper Silesia for itself (or for Poland, if the Russian Tsar will already be overthrown and the Russian Provisional Government will already commit to Polish independence). Anyway, in response to your points here: A) I think that it would be wiser for Germany not to invade Austria as long as Austria refuses to allow its territory to be used as a base for the Entente to attack Germany. If Austria does allow its territory to be used as a base by the Entente, though, then Germany would probably have no choice but to attack Austria. Indeed, in such a scenario, Germany might actually be desperate enough to try rekindling German nationalist sentiment in Austria-Hungary by outright annexing the German-majority parts of Austria-Hungary to the German Reich (so that the people there would hopefully become energetic about fighting for Germany). Meanwhile, Germany could set up a puppet state in Czechia and put some pro-German King in power in Hungary if it will be able to capture it. Anyway, long story short, Austria would be wise to avoid letting the Entente use its territory to attack Germany. If Austria makes this move, the situation there could become a big mess afterwards. B) I am unsure about the date of this peace, though I'm presuming that at least a couple of months will be necessary to work out the details of this peace. As for the POWs, they could either be a reliable source of manpower for Austria-Hungary and Russia or a big source of trouble for them. I do think that Russia is going to continue fighting in this scenario, though. C) I don't think that Germany would be able to launch a large-scale offensive in the West in this scenario. It simply wouldn't have the available troops considering that it would still need a large number of forces to fight Russia in the East. Rather, what I think that Germany is going to do is to try holding a short defensive line on both fronts and to try bleeding the Allies to exhaustion to the point that they agree to a compromise peace which Germany can swallow. D) Agreed that Germany is going to have to withdraw from Austro-Hungarian territories (if it is smart, that is). Also, completely agreed that both Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire aren't going to be able to hold out for long after Austria-Hungary makes peace. E) Agreed that an attack on Germany in 1917 is still unlikely to fare well for Russia considering that Germany would be able to have a narrower front line and thus more dense defenses in this scenario. However, you are also correct that the opening of the Straits is going to be a huge boost to Russia's economy. Now, the question is--can the Russians convert this economic boost into increased support for the war effort at home? F) Agreed that the odds of this go down in this scenario. However, I certainly wouldn't completely rule it out of the question. Also, in regards to the Bolsheviks, it is possible that they would decide to bide their time in this scenario. After all, even if the war is won by this point in time, they could hope that Russia will experience, say, an economic depression in the future which will allow them to finally seize power in Russia. In addition to this, I completely agree with your last two points here, Steve.
futurist
I think that might be rather harsh on the empire. After all Serbia and Romania have both been occupied so getting additional land as well as their freedom is fairly generous. Also while Dalmatic is largely Slavic its predominantly Croat I believe and their largely loyal to the empire. As OTL shows the Croats and Serbs do not mix well and I think they would be very happy staying in a reformed empire giving them full equality. Similarly I suspect that the Poles of Galicia would prefer Austrian to Russian rule. [Although if the Russian government was offering a new Polish state, as I think they were that would be a different matter. Hence why I think that could be an obvious transfer.] Also there are a lot of Hungarians [and some Germans] in Transylvania and they are politically very important so a full transfer would probably prompt a full scale Hungarian revolt.
Hence I would suggest Galicia goes to Russia for a Polish state. Italy gets the gains you mention, with possibly some minor changes where Germans are clearly in the majority. Serbia gets independence restored and some border changes, including being able to absorb Montenegro and possibly Bosnia-HG although don't forget there are a lot of Croats and Muslims there so you might have some agreement on a plebiscite. Similarly in the east Romania gets restored to independence and some border changes, possibly again directed by a number of plebiscites, which could get them much of the territory but not all.
Agree that Austria must insist on its neutrality being respected. Although possibly with a proviso of allied support if Germany does try and attack them. However think this latter is extremely unlikely, at least by overt military means. Could see Berlin seeking to arrange some sort of pro-German coup but given how war weary the country was and how clumsy German 'diplomacy' was in this period I suspect this is likely to fail.
Given they have a much shorter eastern front and the Russian army is in some level of turmoil, plus forces being freed up from supporting Austria and occupying Romania say I could see it pulling back to a much shorter line in the east, between the Baltic and the Austrian border and seeking a military victory in the west. Both because this was the standard military philosophy of the time and because, especially with signs that the US was entering the war trying to stick solely to the defensive would seem - as least to the leadership a lot cause. Especially if because of the timing of events the Nivelle Offensive is launched and has the same disastrous impact on the French army. True it appears that the Germans didn't know about the French military strike but they must realise the French army has suffered badly. As such I could see them making an attack in the west and probably in the south against the French. The big danger of this is that if/when it fails and the Germans lose heavily they are likely to seriously shorten the war and may even have weakened the eastern front enough, in terms of both numbers and morale than even a shorter line may struggle to hold the Russians from even a limited success.
Agree that other than this scenario the Russians are likely to suffer badly if they attack in ~June 17 as OTL.
With the opening of the straits it would depend on when that occurred and how well the Russian government can make use of it. They could gain a lot of equipment to boost their military although the question would be how quickly and how well they can move those items from Black Sea ports and distribute them to the army. Also they might export some grain and other items as I think the food riots that were a major reason for the collapse of the empire were less due to failures in grain production and more in terms of being unable to ship the grain north so much rotted in storehouses and railway trucks. Since a lot was exported before the war the infrastructure should be in place for some to be shipped out. However this could be politically unpopular in the northern cities.
In terms of the Bolsheviks I think that Lenin especially will push for a quick seizure of power. His bid is based on providing land to peasants by breaking up the aristocratic estates and peace. Not sure what the stance of the Provisional Government will be on the former and that could cause a lot of unrest. However with Austria at peace, the southern German allies collapsing and the US entering the war it will be obvious that Germany won't last much longer and if the PG get peace before Lenin moves, along with an impressive victory this is going to greatly strength their position. If he tries after Germany is defeated the Bolsheviks are likely to continue being nothing more than a fringe terrorist movement and seen as such by most Russians. A democratic government welcoming the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionary Party as political movements are going to leave the Bolsheviks very isolated.
Steve
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steffen
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Post by steffen on Jul 2, 2018 17:58:43 GMT
Ehm, there is some false timing in this.
The germans sended Lenin in late1916 to russia, earlier as this timeline.
Karl maybe could betray germany (but that wouldn´t be seen positive by the germans in austria), it would not save his country from separation (in 1917 the USA did entry in the war and wilson was pushed by his 14 points... just guess witch country would be teared in parts).
Another point who is overlooked here - the austrian army was no longer an independent army, but basically it was german divisions and austrians around them. To remove this mess in war times, by betraying your only ally - the one who was pushed into the war because of austrian stupidity - is a bit - well overoptimistic.
AH will not turn against germany... without the german forces AH is open to
serbians - who want to take their pound of flesh
romania - not beaten (by the germans) yet
bulgaria - beeing betrayed by an allied nation doesn´t make you friends
russia - white russia - they want to "control" all of the balkan slaves... so basically everything including hungary...
poland (allready founded by the germans (in 1915)) - if russia fell into anarchy.. galizia will be something they really really want to have
italy - loosing 1 million troops to the austrians for - well exactly nothing is not a good idea.
then you have germany, who will be ROYAL pissed about that betrayal. (if it is done as described - something different is to try to negotiate peace in the "status quo ante"-way for both states). I have the feeling they will strike hard and very brutal against the austrians in this scenario. For sure the will to let italians into austria is basically nil,the hungarians will see the signs at the wall and could turn to the germans - so the second largest part break apart, hoping to gain something from this betrayal.
Nope, the scenario cannot work, not in this way.
For russia it is allready to late - lenin is allready sent, the casulties and the economic situation IN russia is allready to bad to recover -> revolution is on its way. The only way to avoid the communist revolution for russia is to end the war yesterday, accept some border corrections with germany, appologize and ask for help to feed the own population.
But they will not do this - wait. Mabye they will, because if their strongest allies accept austrian demands (stay intact) they have nothing to win if they fight on.
With german forces moving to the west in 1917 - much more as OTL - the western allies face the full might of a german army, propably (if timing is bad for the Entente) before the germans start USW and gain the US declaration of war.
Even if we accept the "austria stay neutral, german forces remove orderly" the germans will benefit. No need to bolster the austrians in russia, against italy. They do not need to send urgently needed trains and rolling stock to austria (that was completly depending on this after the desaster in galicia as they lost so many trains and rolling stock). So less tear and wear for the german economy - good chance that the negative impact of the turnpip-winter is avoided for germany.
Germany easily could promise the hungarians independence and large romanian and slavic areas to control, so these still start a rebellion, fed by german spies and informants. This could fail (because in 1917 the things weren´t as bad as some think), but with this stunt of Karl things could move quickly...
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 2, 2018 19:13:56 GMT
Ehm, there is some false timing in this. The germans sended Lenin in late1916 to russia, earlier as this timeline. Karl maybe could betray germany (but that wouldn´t be seen positive by the germans in austria), it would not save his country from separation (in 1917 the USA did entry in the war and wilson was pushed by his 14 points... just guess witch country would be teared in parts). Another point who is overlooked here - the austrian army was no longer an independent army, but basically it was german divisions and austrians around them. To remove this mess in war times, by betraying your only ally - the one who was pushed into the war because of austrian stupidity - is a bit - well overoptimistic. AH will not turn against germany... without the german forces AH is open to serbians - who want to take their pound of flesh romania - not beaten (by the germans) yet bulgaria - beeing betrayed by an allied nation doesn´t make you friends russia - white russia - they want to "control" all of the balkan slaves... so basically everything including hungary... poland (allready founded by the germans (in 1915)) - if russia fell into anarchy.. galizia will be something they really really want to have italy - loosing 1 million troops to the austrians for - well exactly nothing is not a good idea. then you have germany, who will be ROYAL pissed about that betrayal. (if it is done as described - something different is to try to negotiate peace in the "status quo ante"-way for both states). I have the feeling they will strike hard and very brutal against the austrians in this scenario. For sure the will to let italians into austria is basically nil,the hungarians will see the signs at the wall and could turn to the germans - so the second largest part break apart, hoping to gain something from this betrayal. Nope, the scenario cannot work, not in this way. For russia it is allready to late - lenin is allready sent, the casulties and the economic situation IN russia is allready to bad to recover -> revolution is on its way. The only way to avoid the communist revolution for russia is to end the war yesterday, accept some border corrections with germany, appologize and ask for help to feed the own population. But they will not do this - wait. Mabye they will, because if their strongest allies accept austrian demands (stay intact) they have nothing to win if they fight on. With german forces moving to the west in 1917 - much more as OTL - the western allies face the full might of a german army, propably (if timing is bad for the Entente) before the germans start USW and gain the US declaration of war. Even if we accept the "austria stay neutral, german forces remove orderly" the germans will benefit. No need to bolster the austrians in russia, against italy. They do not need to send urgently needed trains and rolling stock to austria (that was completly depending on this after the desaster in galicia as they lost so many trains and rolling stock). So less tear and wear for the german economy - good chance that the negative impact of the turnpip-winter is avoided for germany. Germany easily could promise the hungarians independence and large romanian and slavic areas to control, so these still start a rebellion, fed by german spies and informants. This could fail (because in 1917 the things weren´t as bad as some think), but with this stunt of Karl things could move quickly...
Actually Lenin was still in Switzerland when the Russian revolution occurred. The true one in Feb/Mar 1917 not Lenin's coup in Oct/Nov. He found the only way he could get back to Russia was by negotiating with Germany and they sent him and some colleagues because they decided, correctly, that this would be extremely harmful to the new Provisional Government. Hence the notorious sealed train to Sweden and hence onto Finland in April 1917.
Poland wasn't founded in 1915. All three occupying powers had plans to gain Polish support by offering some sort of self-government to Poland and the Germans occupied most of the Polish heartland in 1915 but they didn't set up an independent state. There was talk of some Polish satellite, probably with an Hapsburg monarch but no actual certainty it would occur at this point.
Austria will be committed by the negotiations to some territorial losses but those will be limited by the treaty simply because its in the allies interest to. Serbia and Romania have been largely occupied, the latter relying on Russian support for relatively small parts of the country that stayed out of enemy control so neither of those are going to be in a condition to threaten Austria. Ditto with Italy that has suffered badly in fruitless attacks and would be isolated from the allies if it broke the terms of the treaty. Bulgaria is on its last legs anyway and has no border with Austria so its not going to be trying to march on Vienna, or even Budapest.
Russia by this time while fragile is a democratic state and has seen enough suffering that their not interested in further annexations. Their biggest mistake was probably not to seek a separate peace but they underestimated how weak the new government would be to the stress of a continued war while they felt indebted to the western powers and didn't want to leave them in the lurch. Possibly they should have insisted that they would need to regroup and it would be extremely unlikely Russia could launch any attacks in 1917 but would play a defensive role. Which would probably boost the morale considerable against future German attacks. There is no basis for apologising for supporting an ally under attack and it would be bloody stupid to ask the Germans to help feed the Russians as the latter had food, but problems distributing it and the Germans would have neither the capacity or will to help there.
The big threat from Austria would be an enraged - but stupid - German response. If it decided to seek to attack Austria it would probably have a good bit of success initially but cause a lot of resentment. The Hungarian aristocrats might be stupid enough to support such a move, which would tear the country apart into civil war and also, since it involved a breach of the peace treaty would open them up to the many groups who wanted to escape from their rule and foreign neighbours. By this time the bulk of the population were extremely war weary and the Slavic majority, as well I suspect a lot of Germans and Hungarians would react strongly to Germany snatching away the hope of peace and reform. The Germans would create a massive new quagmire and remove the forces that were helping them, however ineffectively holding the line in the east. This is going to need a lot of German troops and supplies they can ill afford. They might be able to loot some materials, especially foodstuff from the Hungarian plains but are likely to have trouble moving any such good back to Germany and are going to make a lot of enemies.
Austria did make a big mistake determining on war regardless in 1914 but this mistake was definitely encouraged by Germany's blank cheque of unquestioning support.
You should note that Karl only approached the allies for a separate peace after he tried to get a general one but the Germans refused to consider this. So the German high command may call it betrayal but they have only themselves to blame for Austria seeking a separate peace.
If the Germans accept the Austrian peace they can free up a lot of men if they give up a good chunk of eastern and SE Europe they have occupied. Not sure if they can even reach Serbia and other areas if Austria is neutral but if they can the Germans can't hold the entire eastern front without being stretched even thinner.
Presuming they do withdraw to more defensive positions the Germans may well be able to free up troops for one last desperate attack in the west - not really the capacity in the east, especially having withdrawn from areas to shorten the line. However its extremely unlikely to succeed due to the advantages the allies will have on the defensive, at least not in one campaign. It is probably however their best chance.
Wilson's 14 points won't apply to Austria, even if the speech, which OTL occurred in Jan 1918, is still made. Because Austria is at peace with internationally recognised borders and because with the war probably finishing in 1917 and a friendly and relatively stable Russia in place the US will have a hell of a lot less influence.
Also by the time the negotiations for a separate Austria peace started, in early 1917 USW had already been in use for several months and war with the US was almost certain. The Zimmerman telegram was issued in Jan 1917 so that would also be in play.
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steffen
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Post by steffen on Jul 2, 2018 20:07:26 GMT
Ehm, there is some false timing in this. The germans sended Lenin in late1916 to russia, earlier as this timeline. Karl maybe could betray germany (but that wouldn´t be seen positive by the germans in austria), it would not save his country from separation (in 1917 the USA did entry in the war and wilson was pushed by his 14 points... just guess witch country would be teared in parts). Another point who is overlooked here - the austrian army was no longer an independent army, but basically it was german divisions and austrians around them. To remove this mess in war times, by betraying your only ally - the one who was pushed into the war because of austrian stupidity - is a bit - well overoptimistic. AH will not turn against germany... without the german forces AH is open to serbians - who want to take their pound of flesh romania - not beaten (by the germans) yet bulgaria - beeing betrayed by an allied nation doesn´t make you friends russia - white russia - they want to "control" all of the balkan slaves... so basically everything including hungary... poland (allready founded by the germans (in 1915)) - if russia fell into anarchy.. galizia will be something they really really want to have italy - loosing 1 million troops to the austrians for - well exactly nothing is not a good idea. then you have germany, who will be ROYAL pissed about that betrayal. (if it is done as described - something different is to try to negotiate peace in the "status quo ante"-way for both states). I have the feeling they will strike hard and very brutal against the austrians in this scenario. For sure the will to let italians into austria is basically nil,the hungarians will see the signs at the wall and could turn to the germans - so the second largest part break apart, hoping to gain something from this betrayal. Nope, the scenario cannot work, not in this way. For russia it is allready to late - lenin is allready sent, the casulties and the economic situation IN russia is allready to bad to recover -> revolution is on its way. The only way to avoid the communist revolution for russia is to end the war yesterday, accept some border corrections with germany, appologize and ask for help to feed the own population. But they will not do this - wait. Mabye they will, because if their strongest allies accept austrian demands (stay intact) they have nothing to win if they fight on. With german forces moving to the west in 1917 - much more as OTL - the western allies face the full might of a german army, propably (if timing is bad for the Entente) before the germans start USW and gain the US declaration of war. Even if we accept the "austria stay neutral, german forces remove orderly" the germans will benefit. No need to bolster the austrians in russia, against italy. They do not need to send urgently needed trains and rolling stock to austria (that was completly depending on this after the desaster in galicia as they lost so many trains and rolling stock). So less tear and wear for the german economy - good chance that the negative impact of the turnpip-winter is avoided for germany. Germany easily could promise the hungarians independence and large romanian and slavic areas to control, so these still start a rebellion, fed by german spies and informants. This could fail (because in 1917 the things weren´t as bad as some think), but with this stunt of Karl things could move quickly...
Actually Lenin was still in Switzerland when the Russian revolution occurred. The true one in Feb/Mar 1917 not Lenin's coup in Oct/Nov. He found the only way he could get back to Russia was by negotiating with Germany and they sent him and some colleagues because they decided, correctly, that this would be extremely harmful to the new Provisional Government. Hence the notorious sealed train to Sweden and hence onto Finland in April 1917.
Poland wasn't founded in 1915. All three occupying powers had plans to gain Polish support by offering some sort of self-government to Poland and the Germans occupied most of the Polish heartland in 1915 but they didn't set up an independent state. There was talk of some Polish satellite, probably with an Hapsburg monarch but no actual certainty it would occur at this point.
Austria will be committed by the negotiations to some territorial losses but those will be limited by the treaty simply because its in the allies interest to. Serbia and Romania have been largely occupied, the latter relying on Russian support for relatively small parts of the country that stayed out of enemy control so neither of those are going to be in a condition to threaten Austria. Ditto with Italy that has suffered badly in fruitless attacks and would be isolated from the allies if it broke the terms of the treaty. Bulgaria is on its last legs anyway and has no border with Austria so its not going to be trying to march on Vienna, or even Budapest.
Russia by this time while fragile is a democratic state and has seen enough suffering that their not interested in further annexations. Their biggest mistake was probably not to seek a separate peace but they underestimated how weak the new government would be to the stress of a continued war while they felt indebted to the western powers and didn't want to leave them in the lurch. Possibly they should have insisted that they would need to regroup and it would be extremely unlikely Russia could launch any attacks in 1917 but would play a defensive role. Which would probably boost the morale considerable against future German attacks. There is no basis for apologising for supporting an ally under attack and it would be bloody stupid to ask the Germans to help feed the Russians as the latter had food, but problems distributing it and the Germans would have neither the capacity or will to help there.
The big threat from Austria would be an enraged - but stupid - German response. If it decided to seek to attack Austria it would probably have a good bit of success initially but cause a lot of resentment. The Hungarian aristocrats might be stupid enough to support such a move, which would tear the country apart into civil war and also, since it involved a breach of the peace treaty would open them up to the many groups who wanted to escape from their rule and foreign neighbours. By this time the bulk of the population were extremely war weary and the Slavic majority, as well I suspect a lot of Germans and Hungarians would react strongly to Germany snatching away the hope of peace and reform. The Germans would create a massive new quagmire and remove the forces that were helping them, however ineffectively holding the line in the east. This is going to need a lot of German troops and supplies they can ill afford. They might be able to loot some materials, especially foodstuff from the Hungarian plains but are likely to have trouble moving any such good back to Germany and are going to make a lot of enemies.
Austria did make a big mistake determining on war regardless in 1914 but this mistake was definitely encouraged by Germany's blank cheque of unquestioning support.
You should note that Karl only approached the allies for a separate peace after he tried to get a general one but the Germans refused to consider this. So the German high command may call it betrayal but they have only themselves to blame for Austria seeking a separate peace.
If the Germans accept the Austrian peace they can free up a lot of men if they give up a good chunk of eastern and SE Europe they have occupied. Not sure if they can even reach Serbia and other areas if Austria is neutral but if they can the Germans can't hold the entire eastern front without being stretched even thinner.
Presuming they do withdraw to more defensive positions the Germans may well be able to free up troops for one last desperate attack in the west - not really the capacity in the east, especially having withdrawn from areas to shorten the line. However its extremely unlikely to succeed due to the advantages the allies will have on the defensive, at least not in one campaign. It is probably however their best chance.
Wilson's 14 points won't apply to Austria, even if the speech, which OTL occurred in Jan 1918, is still made. Because Austria is at peace with internationally recognised borders and because with the war probably finishing in 1917 and a friendly and relatively stable Russia in place the US will have a hell of a lot less influence.
Also by the time the negotiations for a separate Austria peace started, in early 1917 USW had already been in use for several months and war with the US was almost certain. The Zimmerman telegram was issued in Jan 1917 so that would also be in play.
Hi, about Lenin - here i made a mistake and want to apologize. The germans sended him in april. So the basic removal of the tsar had happened, but the final revolution not yet. We disagree about the term "democratic" in the context of Kerensky. We also disagree about the situation in russia in april 1917. They were gone as a nation the moment they continued the war. Problem was, the people wanted peace. Kerensky and co (the bourgouise) wanted to continue the war. For 5 months they could delay with that the inevitable, but it doesn´t matter if they stay on the defence or attack - russia was gone. The only thing that could save this government is to negotiate a peace the second they come into power. Period. You should inform you about poland. It WAS grounded in 1915, by the germans. If you do not know that, please inform you. The germans did that to gain support and people who were willing to fight the russians. So no - russia may not like polands existence, but for sure they themself wanted to be in their own country. Just because that poland wasn´t antigerman build but a puppet doesn´t mean it doesn´t existed. You should stop using methods to turn the historical facts into a suitable direction. I call this a VERY unpleasant and unkindly move by you. And this country should have (in their eyes) parts of germany and austria-hungaria. Any peacesettlement with AH that exculde the polish interests - AH was a broken shattered country at this time, living by german power - excluding german power - would cause a huge problem, one that ALSO would mean that france would be VERY unhappy. As i allready mentioned, the russian civil war is a given with russia IN the war. If russia drop out the need for AH to make peace has massivly reduced, the whole idea was to end the war because russia stay in. But if russia stay in, AH will ask for terms - as they did. Again the main problem (germany) is avoided in that discussion. Your idea to ignore the italian motives is - carefully said not very sane and rational for the Entente. Italy wanted austrian areas, they lost nearly as much soldiers as the british for that. Ground the british promised em. Just because - Entente POV the austrians give up short before the end the italians (a loyal ally) get kicked in the balls for that? This will NOT happen, not at all. And austria will not accept loosing areas to italy. The whole (idiotic) idea of Karl was a deathchild otl, because he was as sane in his demands as the 1944-assasins around staufenberg with their "ideas" about what germany should keep. We allready mentioned serbia - the country that was - in british propaganda - attacked with beeing innocent (in opposition they STARTED the war by their terror sponsering) - that want a lot stuff that is also austrian. you keep the chechs and slowaks propably calm, maybe also the croats. But bosnia Karl did not want to give up, not even that. Bulgaria had forces next to the austrians, together with the germans. The austrian move was senseless idiotic - because it opened a weak spot for the entente to keep on fighting. The germans understood that, it was just Karl who was a moron. The military situation IN the country is problematic, as i mentioned. The germans are in the country, keep its frontline together. Russia will DEMAND stuff, either for themself (galicia - for AH a no go) or for serbia (the protegee) (again, no go for AH). Hungaria wasn´t the aristocrats, as the comming events showed clearly. Then you have the faililng trust. Why should Karl or his follow up trust the entente - they betrayed italy (if they really talk with AH about that) and russia (otherwise the demands are way to big for Karl to accept them). And Wilson - as i mentioned wanted his 14 points urgently, even if he only offered them in 1918. For the strategic situation in germany - yes as long as austria doesn´t betray germany it is better NOT to hit them hard. But i reacted to some "possible demands" about that. In these the entente should/would "demand" that Austria-Hungaria switch sides and attack germany. This - i explained - would be seen rightfully as 100% betraying, i doubt that most armed forces would follow that, because it was the german army that was laying next to them in the trenches, not the kaiser and his aristocrats in vienna. And no - the german army wanted no war. Stop repeating this - kindly spoken - nonsense. It was the kaiser who gave card blanc to austria for a war against serbia - to punish these criminals. This was the same as the card blanc france gave to russia in the same time. Nobody claim that france wanted war, or do you claim that? With the austrians reacting either quicker (hitting serbia hard - everyone agrees, even the russian tsar) or different (no crisis that lead to war) there is no war at all. Why on earth would the germans (in case the russians stay in the war) retreat here? Russia was broken, the germans knew it. The last thing they do is to stop crushing the russians. In opposition they crush russia harder, now they have many more forces and supplies they have to give the austrians as support. You have to decide - either russia fell into red hands as otl (100% proof if they fight on) or they make peace EARLY with germany - something the germans could happily do - because russia and germany had no qualms to fight about - it was austria that had the problems with russia. THen you have the entente making peace with AH, ignoring the russians but these give a shit about that and attack russia, but make peace with germany  that is a fun scenario. Because this happens in summer 1917... the food thing, propably a mistake. I meant that germany give help so the russians could deliver their food and in the same time could give the germans urgently needed food. As i mentioned logistics, the WHOLE austrian supply system run in 1916-1918 on german rolling stock. With AH dropping out the germans will remove their rolling stocks. More rolling stocks mean - as long as AH stay neutral as you claim they will do - they could fuel their country better - more production, more people could do work on the fields -> more supplies later on. If AH change sides and attack germany, this end badly - for AH. For sure the germans would need troops to crush the austrians, but that would be very easy... it was the german army that fought the war for the austrians... This would be more something like Italy september 1943, with germany removing the austrian forces. And a lot austrians would SUPPORT the germans, because their kaiser was a betraying scum. Finally - the main problem with this scenario is, that is lacks any realistic chance to sucseed. You could similary talk about "how the germans in december 1944 destroy the whole allied forces in france because of a sucsessfull ardennen-operation. Impossible. here you get some informations about all these peace negotiations: encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/peace_initiativesas it made clear, Karl wanted status-quo-ante in early 1917, in late 1917 he was "ready to reinstall serbia (that they had overrun in 1915)" puh, at last he wanted to reinstall serbia... what a great offer! Sorry, dead in childbed is the best you could say about that. If the entente accept this, why should they bother to fight against germany? Status-quo-ante was anything the germans wanted, esp. after russia turned red. This is something they could get immidetly... but they didn´t wanted that. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 3, 2018 12:08:25 GMT
Actually Lenin was still in Switzerland when the Russian revolution occurred. The true one in Feb/Mar 1917 not Lenin's coup in Oct/Nov. He found the only way he could get back to Russia was by negotiating with Germany and they sent him and some colleagues because they decided, correctly, that this would be extremely harmful to the new Provisional Government. Hence the notorious sealed train to Sweden and hence onto Finland in April 1917.
Poland wasn't founded in 1915. All three occupying powers had plans to gain Polish support by offering some sort of self-government to Poland and the Germans occupied most of the Polish heartland in 1915 but they didn't set up an independent state. There was talk of some Polish satellite, probably with an Hapsburg monarch but no actual certainty it would occur at this point.
Austria will be committed by the negotiations to some territorial losses but those will be limited by the treaty simply because its in the allies interest to. Serbia and Romania have been largely occupied, the latter relying on Russian support for relatively small parts of the country that stayed out of enemy control so neither of those are going to be in a condition to threaten Austria. Ditto with Italy that has suffered badly in fruitless attacks and would be isolated from the allies if it broke the terms of the treaty. Bulgaria is on its last legs anyway and has no border with Austria so its not going to be trying to march on Vienna, or even Budapest.
Russia by this time while fragile is a democratic state and has seen enough suffering that their not interested in further annexations. Their biggest mistake was probably not to seek a separate peace but they underestimated how weak the new government would be to the stress of a continued war while they felt indebted to the western powers and didn't want to leave them in the lurch. Possibly they should have insisted that they would need to regroup and it would be extremely unlikely Russia could launch any attacks in 1917 but would play a defensive role. Which would probably boost the morale considerable against future German attacks. There is no basis for apologising for supporting an ally under attack and it would be bloody stupid to ask the Germans to help feed the Russians as the latter had food, but problems distributing it and the Germans would have neither the capacity or will to help there.
The big threat from Austria would be an enraged - but stupid - German response. If it decided to seek to attack Austria it would probably have a good bit of success initially but cause a lot of resentment. The Hungarian aristocrats might be stupid enough to support such a move, which would tear the country apart into civil war and also, since it involved a breach of the peace treaty would open them up to the many groups who wanted to escape from their rule and foreign neighbours. By this time the bulk of the population were extremely war weary and the Slavic majority, as well I suspect a lot of Germans and Hungarians would react strongly to Germany snatching away the hope of peace and reform. The Germans would create a massive new quagmire and remove the forces that were helping them, however ineffectively holding the line in the east. This is going to need a lot of German troops and supplies they can ill afford. They might be able to loot some materials, especially foodstuff from the Hungarian plains but are likely to have trouble moving any such good back to Germany and are going to make a lot of enemies.
Austria did make a big mistake determining on war regardless in 1914 but this mistake was definitely encouraged by Germany's blank cheque of unquestioning support.
You should note that Karl only approached the allies for a separate peace after he tried to get a general one but the Germans refused to consider this. So the German high command may call it betrayal but they have only themselves to blame for Austria seeking a separate peace.
If the Germans accept the Austrian peace they can free up a lot of men if they give up a good chunk of eastern and SE Europe they have occupied. Not sure if they can even reach Serbia and other areas if Austria is neutral but if they can the Germans can't hold the entire eastern front without being stretched even thinner.
Presuming they do withdraw to more defensive positions the Germans may well be able to free up troops for one last desperate attack in the west - not really the capacity in the east, especially having withdrawn from areas to shorten the line. However its extremely unlikely to succeed due to the advantages the allies will have on the defensive, at least not in one campaign. It is probably however their best chance.
Wilson's 14 points won't apply to Austria, even if the speech, which OTL occurred in Jan 1918, is still made. Because Austria is at peace with internationally recognised borders and because with the war probably finishing in 1917 and a friendly and relatively stable Russia in place the US will have a hell of a lot less influence.
Also by the time the negotiations for a separate Austria peace started, in early 1917 USW had already been in use for several months and war with the US was almost certain. The Zimmerman telegram was issued in Jan 1917 so that would also be in play.
Hi, about Lenin - here i made a mistake and want to apologize. The germans sended him in april. So the basic removal of the tsar had happened, but the final revolution not yet. We disagree about the term "democratic" in the context of Kerensky. We also disagree about the situation in russia in april 1917. They were gone as a nation the moment they continued the war. Problem was, the people wanted peace. Kerensky and co (the bourgouise) wanted to continue the war. For 5 months they could delay with that the inevitable, but it doesn´t matter if they stay on the defence or attack - russia was gone. The only thing that could save this government is to negotiate a peace the second they come into power. Period. You should inform you about poland. It WAS grounded in 1915, by the germans. If you do not know that, please inform you. The germans did that to gain support and people who were willing to fight the russians. So no - russia may not like polands existence, but for sure they themself wanted to be in their own country. Just because that poland wasn´t antigerman build but a puppet doesn´t mean it doesn´t existed. You should stop using methods to turn the historical facts into a suitable direction. I call this a VERY unpleasant and unkindly move by you. And this country should have (in their eyes) parts of germany and austria-hungaria. Any peacesettlement with AH that exculde the polish interests - AH was a broken shattered country at this time, living by german power - excluding german power - would cause a huge problem, one that ALSO would mean that france would be VERY unhappy. As i allready mentioned, the russian civil war is a given with russia IN the war. If russia drop out the need for AH to make peace has massivly reduced, the whole idea was to end the war because russia stay in. But if russia stay in, AH will ask for terms - as they did. Again the main problem (germany) is avoided in that discussion. Your idea to ignore the italian motives is - carefully said not very sane and rational for the Entente. Italy wanted austrian areas, they lost nearly as much soldiers as the british for that. Ground the british promised em. Just because - Entente POV the austrians give up short before the end the italians (a loyal ally) get kicked in the balls for that? This will NOT happen, not at all. And austria will not accept loosing areas to italy. The whole (idiotic) idea of Karl was a deathchild otl, because he was as sane in his demands as the 1944-assasins around staufenberg with their "ideas" about what germany should keep. We allready mentioned serbia - the country that was - in british propaganda - attacked with beeing innocent (in opposition they STARTED the war by their terror sponsering) - that want a lot stuff that is also austrian. you keep the chechs and slowaks propably calm, maybe also the croats. But bosnia Karl did not want to give up, not even that. Bulgaria had forces next to the austrians, together with the germans. The austrian move was senseless idiotic - because it opened a weak spot for the entente to keep on fighting. The germans understood that, it was just Karl who was a moron. The military situation IN the country is problematic, as i mentioned. The germans are in the country, keep its frontline together. Russia will DEMAND stuff, either for themself (galicia - for AH a no go) or for serbia (the protegee) (again, no go for AH). Hungaria wasn´t the aristocrats, as the comming events showed clearly. Then you have the faililng trust. Why should Karl or his follow up trust the entente - they betrayed italy (if they really talk with AH about that) and russia (otherwise the demands are way to big for Karl to accept them). And Wilson - as i mentioned wanted his 14 points urgently, even if he only offered them in 1918. For the strategic situation in germany - yes as long as austria doesn´t betray germany it is better NOT to hit them hard. But i reacted to some "possible demands" about that. In these the entente should/would "demand" that Austria-Hungaria switch sides and attack germany. This - i explained - would be seen rightfully as 100% betraying, i doubt that most armed forces would follow that, because it was the german army that was laying next to them in the trenches, not the kaiser and his aristocrats in vienna. And no - the german army wanted no war. Stop repeating this - kindly spoken - nonsense. It was the kaiser who gave card blanc to austria for a war against serbia - to punish these criminals. This was the same as the card blanc france gave to russia in the same time. Nobody claim that france wanted war, or do you claim that? With the austrians reacting either quicker (hitting serbia hard - everyone agrees, even the russian tsar) or different (no crisis that lead to war) there is no war at all. Why on earth would the germans (in case the russians stay in the war) retreat here? Russia was broken, the germans knew it. The last thing they do is to stop crushing the russians. In opposition they crush russia harder, now they have many more forces and supplies they have to give the austrians as support. You have to decide - either russia fell into red hands as otl (100% proof if they fight on) or they make peace EARLY with germany - something the germans could happily do - because russia and germany had no qualms to fight about - it was austria that had the problems with russia. THen you have the entente making peace with AH, ignoring the russians but these give a shit about that and attack russia, but make peace with germany that is a fun scenario. Because this happens in summer 1917... the food thing, propably a mistake. I meant that germany give help so the russians could deliver their food and in the same time could give the germans urgently needed food. As i mentioned logistics, the WHOLE austrian supply system run in 1916-1918 on german rolling stock. With AH dropping out the germans will remove their rolling stocks. More rolling stocks mean - as long as AH stay neutral as you claim they will do - they could fuel their country better - more production, more people could do work on the fields -> more supplies later on. If AH change sides and attack germany, this end badly - for AH. For sure the germans would need troops to crush the austrians, but that would be very easy... it was the german army that fought the war for the austrians... This would be more something like Italy september 1943, with germany removing the austrian forces. And a lot austrians would SUPPORT the germans, because their kaiser was a betraying scum. Finally - the main problem with this scenario is, that is lacks any realistic chance to sucseed. You could similary talk about "how the germans in december 1944 destroy the whole allied forces in france because of a sucsessfull ardennen-operation. Impossible. here you get some informations about all these peace negotiations: encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/peace_initiativesas it made clear, Karl wanted status-quo-ante in early 1917, in late 1917 he was "ready to reinstall serbia (that they had overrun in 1915)" puh, at last he wanted to reinstall serbia... what a great offer! Sorry, dead in childbed is the best you could say about that. If the entente accept this, why should they bother to fight against germany? Status-quo-ante was anything the germans wanted, esp. after russia turned red. This is something they could get immidetly... but they didn´t wanted that.
Steffen
Thanks for the link. It differs in some aspects from what I've read before, for instance that Karl's government was still unwilling to sign a separate peace once he realised that Germany was unwilling to agree to a general peace. The latter being supported in that link. Also it gives more details of the cluster of peace attempts made.
This later is part of the problem as numerous attempts were made by different peace, frequently at the same time, from Austria, Germany and Russia - I've looked through the section on the 1817-18 peace initiatives. As such there was a fair bit of confusion and uncertainly. For instance your link mentions that in the Sixtus negotiations that Karl offers the restoration of Serbia in March and seemed amenable to French terms but Czernin, his foreign minister, was opposed to a separate peace.
I have heard suggestions, by Germany among others, for a kind of Polish state after the war but I've never seen any mention of it actually being put in place. Do note that Germany thought so little of the idea that it was willing, at least under the Erzberger approach to Russia, to accept the 1914 borders, albeit with probably some changes and a plebisect in Poland as to whether it would under Russian sovereignty or not. This was in contradiction to much harsher terms for conquests in the east by other German negotiators at this point. Also Erzberger's terms were offer in the hope of getting a separate peace in the east so they could win in the west and the PG refused such a deal.
On the "betrayal" I took your blanket statement as a rejection of Austria signing a separate peace, not of it being forced to attack Germany, which I had already mentioned was stupid and not something I could see the allies even suggesting, let alone the Austrians accepting. Accept that you were talking about the latter but given the background I think you can understand I thought otherwise.
We will have to disagree about the viability of a democratic government in Russia if it didn't immediately sue for peace. Not to mention its pretty clear if they had done that the terms, while probably not as extreme as the 1918 Brest-Litovsk would very likely have been harsh and hence unpopular in themselves. Very likely if the new government had refrained from attacking for a while but made clear it would defend the country against further German attacks you would have had much more cohesion in the armed forces. It would have helped if the government itself had been more united over what it needed and Kerensky's decision to look for support from the pro-Bolshevik Soviets proved disastrous but if Lenin hadn't been about to push for hard line attempts to overthrown the government or had been arrested or killed in some incident. Or if the OTL summer offensive had been better organised and more successful, as it might have been in TTL as the forces initially fought well. It was the failure of that operation and the lack of clear leadership in Petrograd that was fatal to the regime.
You are factually wrong in saying Serbia, i.e. the government was responsible for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. The leader of the terrorist group responsible was actually an opponent of the Serbian government because it wasn't supporting such actions. Yes there is an argument that if Austria, while the continent was reeling in shock at the assassination, had immediately attacked Serbia they might well have got away with it - although they might well have failed militarily at 1st, which would have given time for more rational attitudes to prevail. However the decision to go to war in cold blood, regardless of the reaction of the Serbian government after emotions had cooled elsewhere was a serious mistake.
Returning to the failure of the peace attempts the section headed "Explaining the Failure of Peace Initiatives: Perceptions of the Cost of Defeat" makes clear that as well as the confusion caused by multiple peace feelers there was a fundamental mismatch between the aims of Germany's leaders and those of their opponents. If the latter wanted any security they must at the very least gain a return to the pre-war status quo and preferably weaken Germany's military strength so it couldn't be such a threat in the future. The aim of the German leadership was to establish Germany military dominance so that it could never be rivaled again and everybody else would be vulnerable to it. Note this is an important reason why the PG refused to consider a separate peace with Germany in 1917.
It says that the tragedy for Austria was that Karl and his government thought they were tied too much to Germany and couldn't risk a separate peace. Although it also seems to suggest in the Sixtus talks he was willing to consider this but the allies backed out because of Italian opposition. We will never know but obviously the path of not making peace was a disaster for the empire and its people, both in the short term and the longer. Frankly while it would have broken agreements with Italy, with the advantage of hindsight I [in say Lloyd-George's position] would have pushed for accepting the Sixtus agreement, because it would have greatly reduce the deaths and destruction, both in the next couple of years and the longer term. Harsh on Italy but they could have been offered compensation elsewhere, such as an enlarged sphere of influence in Anatolia and say shares of colonies in Africa and elsewhere and it would have been a hell of a lot cheaper, especially in human life. You might still have had resentment and unrest, probably leading to a dictator like Mussolini arising but with a more stable peace in Europe that is likely to be a lot less dangerous.
Steve
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Post by lukedalton on Jul 3, 2018 16:44:49 GMT
It says that the tragedy for Austria was that Karl and his government thought they were tied too much to Germany and couldn't risk a separate peace. Although it also seems to suggest in the Sixtus talks he was willing to consider this but the allies backed out because of Italian opposition. We will never know but obviously the path of not making peace was a disaster for the empire and its people, both in the short term and the longer. Frankly while it would have broken agreements with Italy, with the advantage of hindsight I [in say Lloyd-George's position] would have pushed for accepting the Sixtus agreement, because it would have greatly reduce the deaths and destruction, both in the next couple of years and the longer term. Harsh on Italy but they could have been offered compensation elsewhere, such as an enlarged sphere of influence in Anatolia and say shares of colonies in Africa and elsewhere and it would have been a hell of a lot cheaper, especially in human life. You might still have had resentment and unrest, probably leading to a dictator like Mussolini arising but with a more stable peace in Europe that is likely to be a lot less dangerous.
Steve
It's much more complicated, sure the British and the French can throw away Italy and accept sixtus offer, but in this manner they basically assure that nobody will take them seriously in any treaty for long time and what they can give at Italy in compensation will must come out from their rewards so i doubt that they will be very generous. And this for obtain what? The A-H offer was very generous with the thing of others and short of dow Germany there is no way that Wien can give them, so in the worst case scenario Germany simply occupy A-H and things go as before, but now Serbian, Romanian and Italian are out of the alliance and London and Paris have the diplomatic credibility of an used car salesman. In the best case scenario A-H remain neutral, sell what she can to Germany and the war continue as before, but the Entente had still lost 3 members and a lot of credibility...maybe Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire fall earlier but this will not save the Russian from the revolution, not considering that by 1917 the A-H empire was dead, do anybody really think that a construct more apt to the 18th century like A-H had any change to resist something like a biennio rosso level of social turmoil? |
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steffen
Ensign
Posts: 300
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Post by steffen on Jul 3, 2018 20:48:58 GMT
Hi, about Lenin - here i made a mistake and want to apologize. The germans sended him in april. So the basic removal of the tsar had happened, but the final revolution not yet. We disagree about the term "democratic" in the context of Kerensky. We also disagree about the situation in russia in april 1917. They were gone as a nation the moment they continued the war. Problem was, the people wanted peace. Kerensky and co (the bourgouise) wanted to continue the war. For 5 months they could delay with that the inevitable, but it doesn´t matter if they stay on the defence or attack - russia was gone. The only thing that could save this government is to negotiate a peace the second they come into power. Period. You should inform you about poland. It WAS grounded in 1915, by the germans. If you do not know that, please inform you. The germans did that to gain support and people who were willing to fight the russians. So no - russia may not like polands existence, but for sure they themself wanted to be in their own country. Just because that poland wasn´t antigerman build but a puppet doesn´t mean it doesn´t existed. You should stop using methods to turn the historical facts into a suitable direction. I call this a VERY unpleasant and unkindly move by you. And this country should have (in their eyes) parts of germany and austria-hungaria. Any peacesettlement with AH that exculde the polish interests - AH was a broken shattered country at this time, living by german power - excluding german power - would cause a huge problem, one that ALSO would mean that france would be VERY unhappy. As i allready mentioned, the russian civil war is a given with russia IN the war. If russia drop out the need for AH to make peace has massivly reduced, the whole idea was to end the war because russia stay in. But if russia stay in, AH will ask for terms - as they did. Again the main problem (germany) is avoided in that discussion. Your idea to ignore the italian motives is - carefully said not very sane and rational for the Entente. Italy wanted austrian areas, they lost nearly as much soldiers as the british for that. Ground the british promised em. Just because - Entente POV the austrians give up short before the end the italians (a loyal ally) get kicked in the balls for that? This will NOT happen, not at all. And austria will not accept loosing areas to italy. The whole (idiotic) idea of Karl was a deathchild otl, because he was as sane in his demands as the 1944-assasins around staufenberg with their "ideas" about what germany should keep. We allready mentioned serbia - the country that was - in british propaganda - attacked with beeing innocent (in opposition they STARTED the war by their terror sponsering) - that want a lot stuff that is also austrian. you keep the chechs and slowaks propably calm, maybe also the croats. But bosnia Karl did not want to give up, not even that. Bulgaria had forces next to the austrians, together with the germans. The austrian move was senseless idiotic - because it opened a weak spot for the entente to keep on fighting. The germans understood that, it was just Karl who was a moron. The military situation IN the country is problematic, as i mentioned. The germans are in the country, keep its frontline together. Russia will DEMAND stuff, either for themself (galicia - for AH a no go) or for serbia (the protegee) (again, no go for AH). Hungaria wasn´t the aristocrats, as the comming events showed clearly. Then you have the faililng trust. Why should Karl or his follow up trust the entente - they betrayed italy (if they really talk with AH about that) and russia (otherwise the demands are way to big for Karl to accept them). And Wilson - as i mentioned wanted his 14 points urgently, even if he only offered them in 1918. For the strategic situation in germany - yes as long as austria doesn´t betray germany it is better NOT to hit them hard. But i reacted to some "possible demands" about that. In these the entente should/would "demand" that Austria-Hungaria switch sides and attack germany. This - i explained - would be seen rightfully as 100% betraying, i doubt that most armed forces would follow that, because it was the german army that was laying next to them in the trenches, not the kaiser and his aristocrats in vienna. And no - the german army wanted no war. Stop repeating this - kindly spoken - nonsense. It was the kaiser who gave card blanc to austria for a war against serbia - to punish these criminals. This was the same as the card blanc france gave to russia in the same time. Nobody claim that france wanted war, or do you claim that? With the austrians reacting either quicker (hitting serbia hard - everyone agrees, even the russian tsar) or different (no crisis that lead to war) there is no war at all. Why on earth would the germans (in case the russians stay in the war) retreat here? Russia was broken, the germans knew it. The last thing they do is to stop crushing the russians. In opposition they crush russia harder, now they have many more forces and supplies they have to give the austrians as support. You have to decide - either russia fell into red hands as otl (100% proof if they fight on) or they make peace EARLY with germany - something the germans could happily do - because russia and germany had no qualms to fight about - it was austria that had the problems with russia. THen you have the entente making peace with AH, ignoring the russians but these give a shit about that and attack russia, but make peace with germany that is a fun scenario. Because this happens in summer 1917... the food thing, propably a mistake. I meant that germany give help so the russians could deliver their food and in the same time could give the germans urgently needed food. As i mentioned logistics, the WHOLE austrian supply system run in 1916-1918 on german rolling stock. With AH dropping out the germans will remove their rolling stocks. More rolling stocks mean - as long as AH stay neutral as you claim they will do - they could fuel their country better - more production, more people could do work on the fields -> more supplies later on. If AH change sides and attack germany, this end badly - for AH. For sure the germans would need troops to crush the austrians, but that would be very easy... it was the german army that fought the war for the austrians... This would be more something like Italy september 1943, with germany removing the austrian forces. And a lot austrians would SUPPORT the germans, because their kaiser was a betraying scum. Finally - the main problem with this scenario is, that is lacks any realistic chance to sucseed. You could similary talk about "how the germans in december 1944 destroy the whole allied forces in france because of a sucsessfull ardennen-operation. Impossible. here you get some informations about all these peace negotiations: encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/peace_initiativesas it made clear, Karl wanted status-quo-ante in early 1917, in late 1917 he was "ready to reinstall serbia (that they had overrun in 1915)" puh, at last he wanted to reinstall serbia... what a great offer! Sorry, dead in childbed is the best you could say about that. If the entente accept this, why should they bother to fight against germany? Status-quo-ante was anything the germans wanted, esp. after russia turned red. This is something they could get immidetly... but they didn´t wanted that.
Steffen
Thanks for the link. It differs in some aspects from what I've read before, for instance that Karl's government was still unwilling to sign a separate peace once he realised that Germany was unwilling to agree to a general peace. The latter being supported in that link. Also it gives more details of the cluster of peace attempts made.
This later is part of the problem as numerous attempts were made by different peace, frequently at the same time, from Austria, Germany and Russia - I've looked through the section on the 1817-18 peace initiatives. As such there was a fair bit of confusion and uncertainly. For instance your link mentions that in the Sixtus negotiations that Karl offers the restoration of Serbia in March and seemed amenable to French terms but Czernin, his foreign minister, was opposed to a separate peace.
I have heard suggestions, by Germany among others, for a kind of Polish state after the war but I've never seen any mention of it actually being put in place. Do note that Germany thought so little of the idea that it was willing, at least under the Erzberger approach to Russia, to accept the 1914 borders, albeit with probably some changes and a plebisect in Poland as to whether it would under Russian sovereignty or not. This was in contradiction to much harsher terms for conquests in the east by other German negotiators at this point. Also Erzberger's terms were offer in the hope of getting a separate peace in the east so they could win in the west and the PG refused such a deal.
On the "betrayal" I took your blanket statement as a rejection of Austria signing a separate peace, not of it being forced to attack Germany, which I had already mentioned was stupid and not something I could see the allies even suggesting, let alone the Austrians accepting. Accept that you were talking about the latter but given the background I think you can understand I thought otherwise.
We will have to disagree about the viability of a democratic government in Russia if it didn't immediately sue for peace. Not to mention its pretty clear if they had done that the terms, while probably not as extreme as the 1918 Brest-Litovsk would very likely have been harsh and hence unpopular in themselves. Very likely if the new government had refrained from attacking for a while but made clear it would defend the country against further German attacks you would have had much more cohesion in the armed forces. It would have helped if the government itself had been more united over what it needed and Kerensky's decision to look for support from the pro-Bolshevik Soviets proved disastrous but if Lenin hadn't been about to push for hard line attempts to overthrown the government or had been arrested or killed in some incident. Or if the OTL summer offensive had been better organised and more successful, as it might have been in TTL as the forces initially fought well. It was the failure of that operation and the lack of clear leadership in Petrograd that was fatal to the regime.
You are factually wrong in saying Serbia, i.e. the government was responsible for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. The leader of the terrorist group responsible was actually an opponent of the Serbian government because it wasn't supporting such actions. Yes there is an argument that if Austria, while the continent was reeling in shock at the assassination, had immediately attacked Serbia they might well have got away with it - although they might well have failed militarily at 1st, which would have given time for more rational attitudes to prevail. However the decision to go to war in cold blood, regardless of the reaction of the Serbian government after emotions had cooled elsewhere was a serious mistake.
Returning to the failure of the peace attempts the section headed "Explaining the Failure of Peace Initiatives: Perceptions of the Cost of Defeat" makes clear that as well as the confusion caused by multiple peace feelers there was a fundamental mismatch between the aims of Germany's leaders and those of their opponents. If the latter wanted any security they must at the very least gain a return to the pre-war status quo and preferably weaken Germany's military strength so it couldn't be such a threat in the future. The aim of the German leadership was to establish Germany military dominance so that it could never be rivaled again and everybody else would be vulnerable to it. Note this is an important reason why the PG refused to consider a separate peace with Germany in 1917.
It says that the tragedy for Austria was that Karl and his government thought they were tied too much to Germany and couldn't risk a separate peace. Although it also seems to suggest in the Sixtus talks he was willing to consider this but the allies backed out because of Italian opposition. We will never know but obviously the path of not making peace was a disaster for the empire and its people, both in the short term and the longer. Frankly while it would have broken agreements with Italy, with the advantage of hindsight I [in say Lloyd-George's position] would have pushed for accepting the Sixtus agreement, because it would have greatly reduce the deaths and destruction, both in the next couple of years and the longer term. Harsh on Italy but they could have been offered compensation elsewhere, such as an enlarged sphere of influence in Anatolia and say shares of colonies in Africa and elsewhere and it would have been a hell of a lot cheaper, especially in human life. You might still have had resentment and unrest, probably leading to a dictator like Mussolini arising but with a more stable peace in Europe that is likely to be a lot less dangerous.
Steve
Hi, as suggested - if you are uncertain what i mean - ask me. I have no troubles with that, because english isn´t my mother language. I think i made clear what i meant - if austria think hard about accepting the offer to attack germany they end in a VERY bad situation. If they make peace with security to the german borders they would actually HELP the germans. Austria was a net drain - esp. in logistics and military aid. i once read a book about the logistics (Eisenbahner des 1. Weltkrieges or similar), that was an eyeopener.. in a library. Without the austrians to feed and supply the germans gain a lot of their rolling stock back - the numbers aren´t set in stone, my feeling about that (in the book) was around 20-25% of the whole german rolling stock. That is important because germany run on rails and the break down of the civil supply system - that caused finally the revolution in russia was also a major point in germany. All caused by the galizia desaster of Conrad von H., who won the war for the entente by this. More as 60% of the rolling stock got lost, so austria needed from 1915 massive german support in this, causing the thin stretched german eisenbahner system to overdue -> with the negative consequences of wear and tear later on. About serbia - we completly disagree. Serbia was the most brutal, criminal and problematic state in europe in 1914. They slaughtered nonserbians in their new conquered areas in "nazi-similar" methods, they financed the anti-austrian propaganda, had financed MANY groups who planned to destabilize austria-hungaria. The group who killed the heir of the throne was only one of them. No, a failed state that only acted that way because they had a blanc check by russia, who tried to dissolve austria-hungaria to get their grip on all "serbians". About poland - sorry, there existed allready a kindom of poland, basically in the borders of russian-poland. Here very detailed (but in german) de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regentschaftsk%C3%B6nigreich_PolenOberost dreamed about an enlarged german empire - the bad influence of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, but the politicans had no interest in this. I bet the germans would betray this kingdom of poland, if it suits em, but with a plot in 1917 this country "existed" and was also part of the interest of austria-hungaria. Yes, the website is nice - it gives interesting informations who often are collected in "some peace negotiations were tried". But i think it make clear that the idea wasn´t thought through. The problem for the Entente - generally - was that their war goal was the dismantling of germany (france), enlarging their empire (russia), removing the stronger economic enemy (UK). It was true a fight for survival for the germans - they had incredible luck that a.) red russia was seen as a problem b.) the fear that germany turn red was to big c.) generally the war was so bloody that no soldier wanted to fight anymore. Otherwise the french and russians had teared appart germany, the french had propably enslaved or expulsed the ruhr-germans, maybe more. Ironically the most deadly enemy of germany (who caused the most crimes against em), UK was the one who wanted to use the germans for their interests. From a hindsightpoint a big failure. The german army - and the politicans - wanted to remove the thread against germany. That is not hegemonial interests, otherwise the germans had crashed the french in 1905. It is just (british) propaganda lies who painted the germans as agressors. They were no saints, never! But they were quite peaceful, they had no interest in the war. But the moment the war was no longer avoidable, they pushed for the "best method" to win it. This is not world domination, as the british tried in the 19th century. The germans also never did something like Kopenhagen a fleet (or in Dakar).-.. they weren´t as ruthless and brutal. But with the nazis as follow up it is easier to paint the germans of ww1 as "Nazis with different moustache". The same with the september-program. That is as realistic and possible as the ww2-Kaufmann-plan, but as "evidence for german evilness" it is suitable for many. Even if bullshit. Don´t get me wrong, the germans wouldn´t be nice guys - they would use their economic power to "rule", but with the own population absolutly not interested in a war (as was seen in ww2) they could not have done. Yes, the british empire would fail earlier, because the opposition with germany is something different to OTL, but you avoid the nazis and propably in the civil war in russia the germans supply the whites enough to bring the reds down. About russia - we disagree - because russia was ruined in econimic terms from 1915 on. They delayed the inevitable, but if you have nothing to eat (because you cannot move the stuff) you get sometimes the people starting troubles. OTL in 1917 the russians ONLY wanted peace. If the white government gives that, they could survive (or not), but anything else mean they will fail. The germans in early 17 would be very leninent in peace conditions, as often ignored (propably because of the nazis and Barbarossa), germany and russia were on very good terms before ww1. Even OTL they basically gave good conditions (hard? yes... but compared to OTL very mild and - very important - no russian areas would be demanded) and only with the communists playing on time the germans countered that. (Forget some individuals dreaming about a greater reich, such people existed, just like some massacres in poland, some protonazis killed jews in polish villiages, but that is nothing compared to 100.000 or more dead jews in the retreat of 1915 caused by the russian army - they blamed the jews for beeing german spies) So, the imperial germans would be hard, esp. if you try to blow things up, but if you get a treaty and keep peaceful you don´t suffer. Finnland stay russian, only half of the baltics get lost, the ukraine could propably kept (with some border corrections).. But for the entente this mean the germans will come early... and that mean the war ends in late 1917. |
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Jul 3, 2018 21:22:37 GMT
It says that the tragedy for Austria was that Karl and his government thought they were tied too much to Germany and couldn't risk a separate peace. Although it also seems to suggest in the Sixtus talks he was willing to consider this but the allies backed out because of Italian opposition. We will never know but obviously the path of not making peace was a disaster for the empire and its people, both in the short term and the longer. Frankly while it would have broken agreements with Italy, with the advantage of hindsight I [in say Lloyd-George's position] would have pushed for accepting the Sixtus agreement, because it would have greatly reduce the deaths and destruction, both in the next couple of years and the longer term. Harsh on Italy but they could have been offered compensation elsewhere, such as an enlarged sphere of influence in Anatolia and say shares of colonies in Africa and elsewhere and it would have been a hell of a lot cheaper, especially in human life. You might still have had resentment and unrest, probably leading to a dictator like Mussolini arising but with a more stable peace in Europe that is likely to be a lot less dangerous.
Steve
It's much more complicated, sure the British and the French can throw away Italy and accept sixtus offer, but in this manner they basically assure that nobody will take them seriously in any treaty for long time and what they can give at Italy in compensation will must come out from their rewards so i doubt that they will be very generous. And this for obtain what? The A-H offer was very generous with the thing of others and short of dow Germany there is no way that Wien can give them, so in the worst case scenario Germany simply occupy A-H and things go as before, but now Serbian, Romanian and Italian are out of the alliance and London and Paris have the diplomatic credibility of an used car salesman. In the best case scenario A-H remain neutral, sell what she can to Germany and the war continue as before, but the Entente had still lost 3 members and a lot of credibility...maybe Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire fall earlier but this will not save the Russian from the revolution, not considering that by 1917 the A-H empire was dead, do anybody really think that a construct more apt to the 18th century like A-H had any change to resist something like a biennio rosso level of social turmoil?
I disagree. Italy is probably lost, although the allies can and should offer a lot but Serbia and Romania gain their liberty and Germany is gravely weakened. There's a good chance that Germany can be defeated in 1917 and also that Russia can be saved from communism. Those are two big gains, possibly especially the latter as it avoids so many problems later on, including drastically reducing the chance of a WWII like OTL.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 3, 2018 21:48:05 GMT
Steffen
Thanks for the link. It differs in some aspects from what I've read before, for instance that Karl's government was still unwilling to sign a separate peace once he realised that Germany was unwilling to agree to a general peace. The latter being supported in that link. Also it gives more details of the cluster of peace attempts made.
This later is part of the problem as numerous attempts were made by different peace, frequently at the same time, from Austria, Germany and Russia - I've looked through the section on the 1817-18 peace initiatives. As such there was a fair bit of confusion and uncertainly. For instance your link mentions that in the Sixtus negotiations that Karl offers the restoration of Serbia in March and seemed amenable to French terms but Czernin, his foreign minister, was opposed to a separate peace.
I have heard suggestions, by Germany among others, for a kind of Polish state after the war but I've never seen any mention of it actually being put in place. Do note that Germany thought so little of the idea that it was willing, at least under the Erzberger approach to Russia, to accept the 1914 borders, albeit with probably some changes and a plebisect in Poland as to whether it would under Russian sovereignty or not. This was in contradiction to much harsher terms for conquests in the east by other German negotiators at this point. Also Erzberger's terms were offer in the hope of getting a separate peace in the east so they could win in the west and the PG refused such a deal.
On the "betrayal" I took your blanket statement as a rejection of Austria signing a separate peace, not of it being forced to attack Germany, which I had already mentioned was stupid and not something I could see the allies even suggesting, let alone the Austrians accepting. Accept that you were talking about the latter but given the background I think you can understand I thought otherwise.
We will have to disagree about the viability of a democratic government in Russia if it didn't immediately sue for peace. Not to mention its pretty clear if they had done that the terms, while probably not as extreme as the 1918 Brest-Litovsk would very likely have been harsh and hence unpopular in themselves. Very likely if the new government had refrained from attacking for a while but made clear it would defend the country against further German attacks you would have had much more cohesion in the armed forces. It would have helped if the government itself had been more united over what it needed and Kerensky's decision to look for support from the pro-Bolshevik Soviets proved disastrous but if Lenin hadn't been about to push for hard line attempts to overthrown the government or had been arrested or killed in some incident. Or if the OTL summer offensive had been better organised and more successful, as it might have been in TTL as the forces initially fought well. It was the failure of that operation and the lack of clear leadership in Petrograd that was fatal to the regime.
You are factually wrong in saying Serbia, i.e. the government was responsible for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. The leader of the terrorist group responsible was actually an opponent of the Serbian government because it wasn't supporting such actions. Yes there is an argument that if Austria, while the continent was reeling in shock at the assassination, had immediately attacked Serbia they might well have got away with it - although they might well have failed militarily at 1st, which would have given time for more rational attitudes to prevail. However the decision to go to war in cold blood, regardless of the reaction of the Serbian government after emotions had cooled elsewhere was a serious mistake.
Returning to the failure of the peace attempts the section headed "Explaining the Failure of Peace Initiatives: Perceptions of the Cost of Defeat" makes clear that as well as the confusion caused by multiple peace feelers there was a fundamental mismatch between the aims of Germany's leaders and those of their opponents. If the latter wanted any security they must at the very least gain a return to the pre-war status quo and preferably weaken Germany's military strength so it couldn't be such a threat in the future. The aim of the German leadership was to establish Germany military dominance so that it could never be rivaled again and everybody else would be vulnerable to it. Note this is an important reason why the PG refused to consider a separate peace with Germany in 1917.
It says that the tragedy for Austria was that Karl and his government thought they were tied too much to Germany and couldn't risk a separate peace. Although it also seems to suggest in the Sixtus talks he was willing to consider this but the allies backed out because of Italian opposition. We will never know but obviously the path of not making peace was a disaster for the empire and its people, both in the short term and the longer. Frankly while it would have broken agreements with Italy, with the advantage of hindsight I [in say Lloyd-George's position] would have pushed for accepting the Sixtus agreement, because it would have greatly reduce the deaths and destruction, both in the next couple of years and the longer term. Harsh on Italy but they could have been offered compensation elsewhere, such as an enlarged sphere of influence in Anatolia and say shares of colonies in Africa and elsewhere and it would have been a hell of a lot cheaper, especially in human life. You might still have had resentment and unrest, probably leading to a dictator like Mussolini arising but with a more stable peace in Europe that is likely to be a lot less dangerous.
Steve
Hi, as suggested - if you are uncertain what i mean - ask me. I have no troubles with that, because english isn´t my mother language. I think i made clear what i meant - if austria think hard about accepting the offer to attack germany they end in a VERY bad situation. If they make peace with security to the german borders they would actually HELP the germans. Austria was a net drain - esp. in logistics and military aid. i once read a book about the logistics (Eisenbahner des 1. Weltkrieges or similar), that was an eyeopener.. in a library. Without the austrians to feed and supply the germans gain a lot of their rolling stock back - the numbers aren´t set in stone, my feeling about that (in the book) was around 20-25% of the whole german rolling stock. That is important because germany run on rails and the break down of the civil supply system - that caused finally the revolution in russia was also a major point in germany. All caused by the galizia desaster of Conrad von H., who won the war for the entente by this. More as 60% of the rolling stock got lost, so austria needed from 1915 massive german support in this, causing the thin stretched german eisenbahner system to overdue -> with the negative consequences of wear and tear later on. About serbia - we completly disagree. Serbia was the most brutal, criminal and problematic state in europe in 1914. They slaughtered nonserbians in their new conquered areas in "nazi-similar" methods, they financed the anti-austrian propaganda, had financed MANY groups who planned to destabilize austria-hungaria. The group who killed the heir of the throne was only one of them. No, a failed state that only acted that way because they had a blanc check by russia, who tried to dissolve austria-hungaria to get their grip on all "serbians". About poland - sorry, there existed allready a kindom of poland, basically in the borders of russian-poland. Here very detailed (but in german) de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regentschaftsk%C3%B6nigreich_PolenOberost dreamed about an enlarged german empire - the bad influence of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, but the politicans had no interest in this. I bet the germans would betray this kingdom of poland, if it suits em, but with a plot in 1917 this country "existed" and was also part of the interest of austria-hungaria. Yes, the website is nice - it gives interesting informations who often are collected in "some peace negotiations were tried". But i think it make clear that the idea wasn´t thought through. The problem for the Entente - generally - was that their war goal was the dismantling of germany (france), enlarging their empire (russia), removing the stronger economic enemy (UK). It was true a fight for survival for the germans - they had incredible luck that a.) red russia was seen as a problem b.) the fear that germany turn red was to big c.) generally the war was so bloody that no soldier wanted to fight anymore. Otherwise the french and russians had teared appart germany, the french had propably enslaved or expulsed the ruhr-germans, maybe more. Ironically the most deadly enemy of germany (who caused the most crimes against em), UK was the one who wanted to use the germans for their interests. From a hindsightpoint a big failure. The german army - and the politicans - wanted to remove the thread against germany. That is not hegemonial interests, otherwise the germans had crashed the french in 1905. It is just (british) propaganda lies who painted the germans as agressors. They were no saints, never! But they were quite peaceful, they had no interest in the war. But the moment the war was no longer avoidable, they pushed for the "best method" to win it. This is not world domination, as the british tried in the 19th century. The germans also never did something like Kopenhagen a fleet (or in Dakar).-.. they weren´t as ruthless and brutal. But with the nazis as follow up it is easier to paint the germans of ww1 as "Nazis with different moustache". The same with the september-program. That is as realistic and possible as the ww2-Kaufmann-plan, but as "evidence for german evilness" it is suitable for many. Even if bullshit. Don´t get me wrong, the germans wouldn´t be nice guys - they would use their economic power to "rule", but with the own population absolutly not interested in a war (as was seen in ww2) they could not have done. Yes, the british empire would fail earlier, because the opposition with germany is something different to OTL, but you avoid the nazis and propably in the civil war in russia the germans supply the whites enough to bring the reds down. About russia - we disagree - because russia was ruined in econimic terms from 1915 on. They delayed the inevitable, but if you have nothing to eat (because you cannot move the stuff) you get sometimes the people starting troubles. OTL in 1917 the russians ONLY wanted peace. If the white government gives that, they could survive (or not), but anything else mean they will fail. The germans in early 17 would be very leninent in peace conditions, as often ignored (propably because of the nazis and Barbarossa), germany and russia were on very good terms before ww1. Even OTL they basically gave good conditions (hard? yes... but compared to OTL very mild and - very important - no russian areas would be demanded) and only with the communists playing on time the germans countered that. (Forget some individuals dreaming about a greater reich, such people existed, just like some massacres in poland, some protonazis killed jews in polish villiages, but that is nothing compared to 100.000 or more dead jews in the retreat of 1915 caused by the russian army - they blamed the jews for beeing german spies) So, the imperial germans would be hard, esp. if you try to blow things up, but if you get a treaty and keep peaceful you don´t suffer. Finnland stay russian, only half of the baltics get lost, the ukraine could propably kept (with some border corrections).. But for the entente this mean the germans will come early... and that mean the war ends in late 1917.
Steffen
No! That is the excuse of the militarists. As the link you posted before pointed out WWI made clear the basic difference in viewpoint that made a negotiated peace was that Germany wanted undisputed military dominance of Europe and the French and British especially opposed that as it would be fatal to their independence. Similarly it pointed out that the PG in Russia refused to make peace with Germany because they knew the Germans wanted to separate them from the western allies and expected that after they were defeated would turn on Russia. The threat against Germany as it was perceived was the simple existence of nations capable of being independent of Germany domination. That wasn't 'British lies' as you put it but simple reality. The war could only end with a clear German military domination of Europe or of a Germany with a reduced military capacity so other powers have a chance to live in peace. Unfortunately because the latter wasn't done completely and because Russia ended up as a crippled pariah this meant that WWII was always a possibility.
You can see that as well in its approach to Belgium, planning on preventing it regaining any real independence even after the planned German victory that would provide total security by breaking every other power in Europe to subordinate nature.
The basic problem was that, possibly in part because of misreading Bismarck's success the German leadership too the view that war was the answer to any perceived problem. That's why they built up the alliance that eventually defeated them. Because they were unwilling to accept that other powers have valid interests.
As long as you assume that everybody who rejects such domination were some evil fanatics who wished to destroy Germany you will never understand what was actually going on.
Steve
Steve
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that is a fun scenario. Because this happens in summer 1917...