BURNISHED ROWS OF STEEL: The Great North American War, 1861-

Historically; the RN lost four commissioned warships at Lake Champlain in 1814 to the Americans, three to the Chinese at the Taku Forts in 1859, and two to the Germans at Coronel in 1914. Champlain and Coronel were both squadron actions; 2nd Taku was a British squadron against shore defenses, the results of which call many of the "steam past the defenses and bombard the city" memes that are so common in writing about this era into question.

In BROS, of course, losses have been higher all around...

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The USN in the Pacific could do two things, defend San Francisco Bay and arm and dispatch commerce raiders; the forces outlined above on both sides are, historically, what each had in the Pacific in the winter of 1862. I would expect additional action on the Pacific Coast...

Hawaii is an obvious strategic point between the Western Pacific and the West Coast of North America; just like the Isthmus of Panama, the importance of the position to the British in an Anglo-American conflict is obvious. What might happen after such a conflict is presumably equally obvious, and the reality is the future of these positions would likely become a point of contention in the "future" sketched out in BROS.

As always, thanks for commenting. It is appreciated.

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The Mare Island Navy Yard (inner San Francisco Bay) had a limited capacity for building small vessels; a side wheel gunboat, USS Saginaw, had been built there for service in China. In addition, the civilian shipyards in San Francisco (notably, Union Iron Works) had some capacity as well. Both complexes were quite capable of repairing and refitting warships and merchant vessels, and the Army's Benicia Arsenal was a fairly extensive facility for the day. In both cases, probably the closest similar capabilities in British hands would have been in India.

Basically, the Pacific in the event of an Anglo-American conflict in 1862 is a come as you are sort of theater. Given that, absent a major reinforcement and sustainment effort of the British by way of the South Atlantic, Indian, and western Pacific, stalemate after the initial battles is likely; in many ways, not unlike the situation in 1854-55.

As always, appreciate the read and the questions. Mind if I repost on Warships1? Might prompt some further discussion. Thanks.

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Many thanks

Correct. At this point (summer, 1862) the RN has lifted the USN's blockade of the rebel states, so the US would be limited to overland and riverine operations.

The USN can certainly do its part to defend against the RN's attempts at blockading US ports, and raid commerce to and from the rebel ports; the USN is also far better placed then the rebels or the British, for that matter, to control the western rivers and the Great Lakes and Upper St. Lawrence.

Sea power had a limited impact on peer competitors in continental warfare in this period; French sea power was useless against the Germans in -870-71, and the Austrians actually won the only fleet action in European waters in this era and still lost their war.

There's also the question of what, exactly, southern cotton would buy in a saturated market that (historically) led the Europeans to develop alternate sources...

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Definitely something one would expect, which is part of where I was going with the Battle of Alewife Brook section, with Meagher' reinforced brigade facing a British infantry brigade on Cape Elizabeth. It was also something the British themselves were concerned about (historically) during the 1861 crisis, according to KF Bourne. THe passage is below:

1 Newcastle to Palmerston, private, 30 Aug. and 3 Sept., Broadlands papers: part of the second letter is printed in John Martineau, Life of Henry Pelham, 5th. Duke of New- castle (London, 1908), pp. 302-3; Palmerston to Newcastle, private, I Sept. and 7 Nov., Palmerston letter-books, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 48582; Palmerston to Russell, private, 17 Sept., Russell papers, P.R.O. 30/22/21. The importance of the argument about desertion is an interesting reflection upon the difficulties under which the British laboured as a result of their prejudice against conscript forces. It served not only to hold up the reinforcements but also to affect the distribution of those that did go. Williams, who at first had intended to station the 3oth regiment at Quebec and the 4th bn. 6oth Rifles at Toronto, comparatively close to the frontier, later reversed his decision because the latter, being mostly composed of young men, would be more likely to desert. And much of the only local regular regiment, the Royal Canadian Rifles, had to be used in small detachments to prevent desertion from the British units. (Williams to Cambridge, private, 24 June and 12 July, duke of Cambridge's papers in the Royal Archives, Windsor. I have to acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to make use of material from the Royal Archives.) Special problems of a similar kind were presented by the negro West Indian and the Irish regiments, both of whom were considered unreliable against the North. (Memorandum by de Grey, 3 Dec., Lewis papers in the National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth, Harpton Court papers 2948; Palmerston to Herbert, private, 4 June, Palmerston
letter-books, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 48582.)

Source is British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862 Author(s): Kenneth Bourne Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (Oct., 1961), pp. 600-632

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