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Post by raharris1973 on Nov 13, 2024 1:12:29 GMT
.. and Britains possible reaction to a french incursion into Belgium (perhaps still in 1914? ... some point in Septemvber or Oktober? ... after the attack into Lorraine has miserably failed?) is one of T H E B I G bone of comtemptiuon in every AH-community If Britain is not totally debilitated by the Irish question blowing up..... ...and who is to say for sure it would be? Or that even if it escalates that Britain could not 'walk and chew gum' at the same time'? Could you imagine a scenario where the French incursion into Belgium in 1914, in October perhaps, after initial Lorraine disappointments, and the British DoW the Germans anyway, over Entente commitments, and paper over justifications with alternate excuses besides the 'poor little Belgium' justification, emphasizing the German ambition, German industrial commercial menace, German fleet menace, Austria is a catspaw for Germany, and 'even if Austria is right to be angry at Serbia, Austria is being to brutal now to the Serb civilians in Serbia and Bosnia now', and 'the Germans are being too brutal to the Russian Poles now', and the 'we cannot let France lose' arguments to justify belligerence and BEF deployment to France and Belgium to oppose the Germans? In the first two years of the war, the results of this is that it loosens the German grip on Alsace-Lorraine, and eventually on all the locations in Belgium and Luxembourg that the Germans are able to mount a forward defense in for many months, but the British and French cannot get into the Saarland or broader Rhineland. Meanwhile, the Germans, economically using their forces, defend the Rhineland after a prolonged fighting retreat from from central and eastern Belgium where they encounter invading Frenchmen (whether the Belgians side with the Germans, or more likely, the French, or no-one) and Alsace-Lorraine, and use their other reserves to batter the Russians out of Congress Poland, Lithuania and Galicia, while Austria-Hungary smashes Serbia, by the end with Bulgarian help, and the Ottomans likely attack Russia, or not. Meanwhile, the British (with Dominions), French and Japanese snap up the German colonial empire, largely completing the task by early to mid 1915. However, by late 1915 losses to France especially are massive, and to British forces are unprecedented, quite large, killed off much of the old army, require new mass volunteer levies and consideration of conscription. The French ardor for the war is only slightly diminished for having won the recovery and revanche of Alsace-Lorraine and the sadness of mass casualties - the French political class wants to press on to get into damage and punish Germany in Saar and Rhineland on its own territory and gain buffer space, and preserve its Russian alliance by getting the Central Powers off Russia's back. However, the French are increasingly demanding more and more British men to help do it. The Belgians meanwhile, for what they are worth, if on the Allied side, are ready to quit active fighting if they have their land clear of Germans. And the British, blockade in effect, having more than secured the survival of France (aided in its territorial revival in fact), and grabbed colonial trinkets around the globe for itself, its Dominions and its French and Japanese allies, and driven German commerce out of global markets, and not really caring at all about the fate of Serbia, or how many acres of Poland the Romanovs rule or not, and sick of the ghastly losses and expense, and not having the righteous cause of freeing plucky little Belgium or the occupied Frenchmen to fight for, and not wanting to impose conscription, and the lack of the righteous cause and wonder why the war maybe shouldn't be over causing hesitation about volunteering, maybe just leads to Britain telling its own Allies and the Central Powers, "we can keep going on to crush you eventually, but ready to make peace along the battle lines we have today and save everyone the trouble today, if you are ready for that as well old chap."?
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 13, 2024 18:11:12 GMT
.. and Britains possible reaction to a french incursion into Belgium (perhaps still in 1914? ... some point in Septemvber or Oktober? ... after the attack into Lorraine has miserably failed?) is one of T H E B I G bone of comtemptiuon in every AH-community If Britain is not totally debilitated by the Irish question blowing up..... ...and who is to say for sure it would be? Or that even if it escalates that Britain could not 'walk and chew gum' at the same time'? Could you imagine a scenario where the French incursion into Belgium in 1914, in October perhaps, after initial Lorraine disappointments, and the British DoW the Germans anyway, over Entente commitments, and paper over justifications with alternate excuses besides the 'poor little Belgium' justification, emphasizing the German ambition, German industrial commercial menace, German fleet menace, Austria is a catspaw for Germany, and 'even if Austria is right to be angry at Serbia, Austria is being to brutal now to the Serb civilians in Serbia and Bosnia now', and 'the Germans are being too brutal to the Russian Poles now', and the 'we cannot let France lose' arguments to justify belligerence and BEF deployment to France and Belgium to oppose the Germans? In the first two years of the war, the results of this is that it loosens the German grip on Alsace-Lorraine, and eventually on all the locations in Belgium and Luxembourg that the Germans are able to mount a forward defense in for many months, but the British and French cannot get into the Saarland or broader Rhineland. Meanwhile, the Germans, economically using their forces, defend the Rhineland after a prolonged fighting retreat from from central and eastern Belgium where they encounter invading Frenchmen (whether the Belgians side with the Germans, or more likely, the French, or no-one) and Alsace-Lorraine, and use their other reserves to batter the Russians out of Congress Poland, Lithuania and Galicia, while Austria-Hungary smashes Serbia, by the end with Bulgarian help, and the Ottomans likely attack Russia, or not. Meanwhile, the British (with Dominions), French and Japanese snap up the German colonial empire, largely completing the task by early to mid 1915. However, by late 1915 losses to France especially are massive, and to British forces are unprecedented, quite large, killed off much of the old army, require new mass volunteer levies and consideration of conscription. The French ardor for the war is only slightly diminished for having won the recovery and revanche of Alsace-Lorraine and the sadness of mass casualties - the French political class wants to press on to get into damage and punish Germany in Saar and Rhineland on its own territory and gain buffer space, and preserve its Russian alliance by getting the Central Powers off Russia's back. However, the French are increasingly demanding more and more British men to help do it. The Belgians meanwhile, for what they are worth, if on the Allied side, are ready to quit active fighting if they have their land clear of Germans. And the British, blockade in effect, having more than secured the survival of France (aided in its territorial revival in fact), and grabbed colonial trinkets around the globe for itself, its Dominions and its French and Japanese allies, and driven German commerce out of global markets, and not really caring at all about the fate of Serbia, or how many acres of Poland the Romanovs rule or not, and sick of the ghastly losses and expense, and not having the righteous cause of freeing plucky little Belgium or the occupied Frenchmen to fight for, and not wanting to impose conscription, and the lack of the righteous cause and wonder why the war maybe shouldn't be over causing hesitation about volunteering, maybe just leads to Britain telling its own Allies and the Central Powers, "we can keep going on to crush you eventually, but ready to make peace along the battle lines we have today and save everyone the trouble today, if you are ready for that as well old chap."?
I think if France invaded Belgium its unlikely that Britain would declare war on Germany, at least in the near term. Given how heated the discussion about a dow on Germany was OTL its going to be very difficult for the Liberal government to make such a move without probably prompting a schism which is likely to force a general election. If things go very well for the CPs and they look like their going to end up overwhelmingly dominant in Europe that could be a different issue.
A lot would also depend on what happens in the east. Russia could be under serious pressure here but that could also strain German logistics and prompt a stronger national resistance in Russia - in the defence of the motherland.
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Post by raharris1973 on Nov 14, 2024 3:37:46 GMT
Before getting into British considerations stevep, what do you think about my claims regarding the Belgians - that they probably would not fight the French? Do you think that's wrong, that if the French were the first to violate their neutrality, they would reverse their defense policy to fit the reverse circumstances exactly and cooperate with Germans to defend their country from the French invaders. Hmm, if that happened, is their any chance the Dutch would join the Belgians and Germans in that defense? Given how heated the discussion about a dow on Germany was OTL its going to be very difficult for the Liberal government to make such a move without probably prompting a schism which is likely to force a general election. How is war decided in the Westminster system as of summer 1914? Majority of Cabinet approves? Absolute consensus of Cabinet? What does it take to crash a Cabinet, bring it tumbling down, and force new elections? Can dissenting members of Cabinet alone bring this about, or do things need to be referred to Parliament, in session, to call a vote of no confidence? In other words, could domineering figures in a Cabinet led by a PM and backed by a Cabinet majority, declare war on behalf of the country before the country registers the significance of dissenting Ministers resigning in protest? Parliament gets no choice at all, except to fund the war that is declared and now being fought....which is hardly a choice at all? Word like 'heated' and 'difficult' matter when politicians defer to each other and to the public beyond the letter of any explicitly written constitutional authorities - I guess a necessity for a country with an unwritten constitution. In my country, the politicians' rule is no deference to anyone, that is for sissies and losers. Do what you want up to the very limit of constitutional authority and legality without regard to decorum or custom or norms, only losing a scheduled a election or losing court judgment and having it enforced is there to stop you....so I don't quite understand Parliamentarism when it functions in a way it is supposed to. If things go very well for the CPs and they look like their going to end up overwhelmingly dominant in Europe that could be a different issue. What constitutes the CP 'doing very well' and 'overwhelmingly dominant in Europe' in British public opinion, British press organs, among British politicians and leaders? I would imagine peace settlements involving CP annexations of double-digit percentages of French and Russian territory in Europe, or charging of indemnities to them beyond finite damages similar to civil property cases, or annexations of colonial territories or permanent blanket disarmament provisions of France or Russia would all trend in that direction. But how close to that scenario is too close? Does Britain need to make sure that Serbia survives, and that all of Congress Poland remains Russian, to preserve 'Russia's Great Power status', and 'a balance of power allowing France to survive independently? If the Germans are killing double the number of Frenchmen or half again as many Frenchmen as the other way around, do the British feel compelled to intervene on behalf of the French to help even things out by making sure more Germans die so Germany does not get overwhelmingly dominant down the line. In what I was laying out, where Belgium does not resist the French, and the British siding relatively early with the Entente the Germans were getting pushed back in the west, but making slow, steady, and modest (compared to the size of the Russian Empire) gains in the east. If Britain is not in the fight on the French side, but France is violating Belgium to outflank its early failures on the Alsace-Lorraine front, where is the battle line likely stabilizing between the French and the Germans by winter 1914-15, or spring 1915? The French have lost a bunch of men in failed Alsace-Lorraine attacks at the beginning of the war, and then they've lost more in encounter battles with the Germans in Belgium. But they are better off in several ways than OTL, with their home territory, its fields, mines, factories, and towns and villages for recruitment free of enemy occupation and ready to serve the war effort and mobilized to join and supply the Army. And the French probably have control over half or a third or two-thirds of Belgian territory also, instead of a mere sliver. And maybe their flanking through Belgium would force some German retrenchments in Luxemburg and Lorraine. So, if the French have all their home ground, little bits of Alsace and Lorraine, and half of Belgium, but then German counter-attack mean, they get back all Alsace-Lorraine and two-thirds of Belgium, is that Germany 'getting too dominant' and France losing 'too much' to Britain? Or does France have to start losing pre-war territory for Britain to worry about its fate going forward? A lot would also depend on what happens in the east. Indeed so. Russia could be under serious pressure here but that could also strain German logistics and prompt a stronger national resistance in Russia - in the defence of the motherland. If the Germans are going east first, and they do not have to actually declare war on any borders or even declare war on Russia right away, their main task is to reinforce the east enough to defend their own border and have enough forces to help the Austro-Hungarians beat back any Russian attacks, while the Austro-Hungarians can send other armies south to 'go ham' on Serbia. For a couple days, theoretically, that gives Russia an 'out' if they don't carry out their threats against Austria and Germany. But if they attack Austria the Austrians will defend themselves and the Germans can help them on their soil, and that will spill across their mutual borders, all the faster if the Russians attack East Prussia. Superior tactics, equipment, mobility of Germans and Austrians working together would probably shove the Russians out of Congress Poland in stages, as well as Lithuania, and any of Galicia they might briefly grab. So to Russians is may fairly soon appear like a defense of the motherland, but not very deep into the motherland. The war would start over the Balkans and at the frontiers, batter back gradually from the frontiers, and not really reach ethnic Russian land, so, although it will involve millions more men in battle, it will geographically resemble the more border-ish wars of the Russo-Japanese, Russo-Turkish, and Crimean more than the drama and great chase of Napoleon invading the Russian heartland from Borodino to Minsk to Smolensk to Moscow and getting chased back out.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 14, 2024 9:35:05 GMT
Before getting into British considerations stevep , what do you think about my claims regarding the Belgians - that they probably would not fight the French? Do you think that's wrong, that if the French were the first to violate their neutrality, they would reverse their defense policy to fit the reverse circumstances exactly and cooperate with Germans to defend their country from the French invaders. Hmm, if that happened, is their any chance the Dutch would join the Belgians and Germans in that defense? Given how heated the discussion about a dow on Germany was OTL its going to be very difficult for the Liberal government to make such a move without probably prompting a schism which is likely to force a general election. How is war decided in the Westminster system as of summer 1914? Majority of Cabinet approves? Absolute consensus of Cabinet? What does it take to crash a Cabinet, bring it tumbling down, and force new elections? Can dissenting members of Cabinet alone bring this about, or do things need to be referred to Parliament, in session, to call a vote of no confidence? In other words, could domineering figures in a Cabinet led by a PM and backed by a Cabinet majority, declare war on behalf of the country before the country registers the significance of dissenting Ministers resigning in protest? Parliament gets no choice at all, except to fund the war that is declared and now being fought....which is hardly a choice at all? Word like 'heated' and 'difficult' matter when politicians defer to each other and to the public beyond the letter of any explicitly written constitutional authorities - I guess a necessity for a country with an unwritten constitution. In my country, the politicians' rule is no deference to anyone, that is for sissies and losers. Do what you want up to the very limit of constitutional authority and legality without regard to decorum or custom or norms, only losing a scheduled a election or losing court judgment and having it enforced is there to stop you....so I don't quite understand Parliamentarism when it functions in a way it is supposed to. If things go very well for the CPs and they look like their going to end up overwhelmingly dominant in Europe that could be a different issue. What constitutes the CP 'doing very well' and 'overwhelmingly dominant in Europe' in British public opinion, British press organs, among British politicians and leaders? I would imagine peace settlements involving CP annexations of double-digit percentages of French and Russian territory in Europe, or charging of indemnities to them beyond finite damages similar to civil property cases, or annexations of colonial territories or permanent blanket disarmament provisions of France or Russia would all trend in that direction. But how close to that scenario is too close? Does Britain need to make sure that Serbia survives, and that all of Congress Poland remains Russian, to preserve 'Russia's Great Power status', and 'a balance of power allowing France to survive independently? If the Germans are killing double the number of Frenchmen or half again as many Frenchmen as the other way around, do the British feel compelled to intervene on behalf of the French to help even things out by making sure more Germans die so Germany does not get overwhelmingly dominant down the line. In what I was laying out, where Belgium does not resist the French, and the British siding relatively early with the Entente the Germans were getting pushed back in the west, but making slow, steady, and modest (compared to the size of the Russian Empire) gains in the east. If Britain is not in the fight on the French side, but France is violating Belgium to outflank its early failures on the Alsace-Lorraine front, where is the battle line likely stabilizing between the French and the Germans by winter 1914-15, or spring 1915? The French have lost a bunch of men in failed Alsace-Lorraine attacks at the beginning of the war, and then they've lost more in encounter battles with the Germans in Belgium. But they are better off in several ways than OTL, with their home territory, its fields, mines, factories, and towns and villages for recruitment free of enemy occupation and ready to serve the war effort and mobilized to join and supply the Army. And the French probably have control over half or a third or two-thirds of Belgian territory also, instead of a mere sliver. And maybe their flanking through Belgium would force some German retrenchments in Luxemburg and Lorraine. So, if the French have all their home ground, little bits of Alsace and Lorraine, and half of Belgium, but then German counter-attack mean, they get back all Alsace-Lorraine and two-thirds of Belgium, is that Germany 'getting too dominant' and France losing 'too much' to Britain? Or does France have to start losing pre-war territory for Britain to worry about its fate going forward? A lot would also depend on what happens in the east. Indeed so. Russia could be under serious pressure here but that could also strain German logistics and prompt a stronger national resistance in Russia - in the defence of the motherland. If the Germans are going east first, and they do not have to actually declare war on any borders or even declare war on Russia right away, their main task is to reinforce the east enough to defend their own border and have enough forces to help the Austro-Hungarians beat back any Russian attacks, while the Austro-Hungarians can send other armies south to 'go ham' on Serbia. For a couple days, theoretically, that gives Russia an 'out' if they don't carry out their threats against Austria and Germany. But if they attack Austria the Austrians will defend themselves and the Germans can help them on their soil, and that will spill across their mutual borders, all the faster if the Russians attack East Prussia. Superior tactics, equipment, mobility of Germans and Austrians working together would probably shove the Russians out of Congress Poland in stages, as well as Lithuania, and any of Galicia they might briefly grab. So to Russians is may fairly soon appear like a defense of the motherland, but not very deep into the motherland. The war would start over the Balkans and at the frontiers, batter back gradually from the frontiers, and not really reach ethnic Russian land, so, although it will involve millions more men in battle, it will geographically resemble the more border-ish wars of the Russo-Japanese, Russo-Turkish, and Crimean more than the drama and great chase of Napoleon invading the Russian heartland from Borodino to Minsk to Smolensk to Moscow and getting chased back out.
Going to work shortly so a brief response. a) I think that the Belgians would fight. They seemed to have valued their neutrality highly and this would have been seriously undermined if they did not resist it being breached. If they were willing to face the bulk of the German army I think they would have opposed the French army. Especially since regardless of the result of this war Germany is going to be a more populous and industrial power than France and hence not a power to upset by allowing the French free passage. Which would have been reinforced by the early French defeats in A-L and probable starts of German successes in the east, making a French victory look less than certain.
b) Well while the monarch is the titular head of state the decisions are made by the government. At this point there is a Liberal government, supported by Irish Nationalists as they don't have a majority in the Commons. The party had initially been opposed to the naval race with Germany and sought to reduce military spending but had been driven by circumstances to respond to the aggressive actions by the German government. Even so there was a reluctance to go to war and given the much easier decision OTL IIRC two ministers resigned from the government over the decision to go to war in defence of Belgium.
As such if France invaded Belgium and the government then decided to declare war on Germany, i.e. supporting the French breach of Belgium neutrality there's going to be a lot more discontent. Probably a fair number more resignations, quite possibly including some bigger names. I suspect the Irish nationalists would be opposed to such a move, OTL there being a lot of support in them for the defence of 'tiny little Belgium' against aggression plus as OTL a dow would take attention away from Irish Home Rule. A lot would depend on the views of the Conservatives, as they were more belligerent, which might mean they support a dow on Germany - possibly leading to an earlier coalition but likely with the Tories in a dominant position - or they might play party politics and demand a general election. You could end up with a Liberal split between Asquith and Lloyd George but with the latter leading a break-away from a Tory dominated coalition.
Anyway out of time so will reply further later.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 14, 2024 15:51:54 GMT
Right back from work c) What I would define as very well would be either forcing Russia to an harsh peace or driving them back quite a way then turning west and occupying Belgium and starting to drive into France with signs of a draconian peace probably being intended. This would remove any real counter to Germany on the continent and as such would be a grave threat to British security. In those circumstances Britain depending on the circumstances would either move directly to supporting the French to maintain them as a counter to Germany in western Europe or possibly doing so after Germany refuses British offers of negotiations intended in part to limit German dominance.
In those circumstances, unless the war has been long enough to seriously strain Germany especially I think there would be a very strong pressure on Britain to intervene.
d) In terms of how Russia might hang on, with very limited motorization and poor infrastructure in much of the Russian empire IF Russia was determined not to make peace then it could be costly and possibly dangerous for the CPs to try and force Russia to make terms. The Russian government may decide to accept loss of western territories, along with some in the south as the Ottomans will undoubted join the CPs, rather than deciding to fight to the bitter end.
Of course if they do decide to fight then Germany could decide to move on the defensive in the east having secured say Poland, the southern Baltic states and parts of western Ukraine and then turning the bulk of their forces against France. This could still be costly as they would have to maintain substantial forces in the east while fighting through probably formidable French defensive positions in the west. However this might force the Russians to try and take the offensive again.
It could go any number of ways. Most likely is some sort of CP victory but if they seek to push for harsh terms and Russian feeling responds it could be very costly and end in a peace of mutual exhaustion.
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nomommsen
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Post by nomommsen on Nov 16, 2024 9:32:17 GMT
... damn ... Real Life sucks ... you guys have alreagy moved on I have troubles to 'catch' up ... however: it always starts with a first step ... and still struggling with 'functions' of the borad ...If Britain is not totally debilitated by the Irish question blowing up..... ...and who is to say for sure it would be? Or that even if it escalates that Britain could not 'walk and chew gum' at the same time'? about the first part: Noone can say for sure, granted ... but given the development of the question and still during the early days of "war" for Britain (like the talks between Redmond and Carson until 5th/6th August) the chances for some major blow-up - far major than Bachelors walk - are rather high. - Carson admitted at some point being more the driven than the driver reagrding the UVF preparations and want for 'action'
- Redmonde despite having 'won' some administrative 'victory' reg. control of the IV had already lost the more ... 'radical' parts leaning if not controled by the IRB once becomming the IRA
- The 'call to the arms for Britain' as i.e. Redmond propagated answering Greys speech at the Commons on 3rd August would ITTL very likely not come. ... or turn back against Redmond in Ireland and his control over the IV even more than IOTL.
Also not to forget: the 'Irish Question' was far from solved on 4th to 5th August. It still took until midth of September to find its 'solution' in the postponement after a LOT of not too easy or even friendly behind the curtains bargaining.
The 'Curragh-Incident' allegedly incapacitating any possibility or using the army as a force in that conflict is IMHO rather exaggerated. It encompassed only a number of officers of the there stationed cavalry (not even all of them). From the majoritiy of troops including their officers - the infantry - none joined them in their 'protest'/'mutiny'. Its commanding officer - I don't have his name at hand atm - stated during this crisis that ofc his forces would follow whatever by the goverment given orders.
about the second part: IMHO : no - 'Britain' or the british goverment would have to foster its forces for the case of their need in Ireland and couldn't afford to sent them abroad.
- 'Britain' or the british populace was MUCH lesser interested in the war
and esp. in warring esp Germany no matter what than often from todays ... 'friends of the Entente' seemingly alleged and almost as a fact stated.
Before such interests there were topics like: All of these and in their combination even more might have been of greater importance to the populace than 'crazy continentals quarrels'. Together with incomming stories of the bloodshed esp. the french troops encountering on their 'attack a outrance' against german defensive positions ... I don't see war participation becomming popular.
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nomommsen
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Post by nomommsen on Nov 16, 2024 9:47:35 GMT
Could you imagine a scenario where the French incursion into Belgium in 1914, in October perhaps, after initial Lorraine disappointments, and the British DoW the Germans anyway, over Entente commitments, and paper over justifications with alternate excuses besides the 'poor little Belgium' justification, emphasizing the German ambition, German industrial commercial menace, German fleet menace, Austria is a catspaw for Germany, and 'even if Austria is right to be angry at Serbia, Austria is being to brutal now to the Serb civilians in Serbia and Bosnia now', and 'the Germans are being too brutal to the Russian Poles now', and the 'we cannot let France lose' arguments to justify belligerence and BEF deployment to France and Belgium to oppose the Germans? simply answered: no As the named arguments maybe some ... 'motivation' and reason for some uneasyness even some kinds 'hostiility' of a part of the british populace ( as well as only a part of the british political establishment far from a majority esp. 'none overwhealming' as the Northcliff press tried to frame the speech of Grey it wasn't [see the discussion of in the evening here and here]) and as on uncounted occasions framed by todays hindsighteering anti-german-war proponents as some 'cause-of-war' .. as already said above: this wasn't the case at the time within the british populace as well as the goverment.
These are no viable reasons no 'proper casus belli' at all as it was needed at these time for some major military effort. ... and an effort to 'heat' public opinion up enough for whatever minor or faked incident (alike Tonking-incident) with such topics would need time in their fight against above said topics wich would likely been pushed by the liberal as well as labour leaning press. ... too much time for not in Ireland or some miners region (union strikes) or elswhere on the british isles the shit hitting the fan.
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nomommsen
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Post by nomommsen on Nov 16, 2024 10:04:19 GMT
In the first two years of the war, the results of this is that it loosens the German grip on Alsace-Lorraine, and eventually on all the locations in Belgium and Luxembourg that the Germans are able to mount a forward defense in for many months, but the British and French cannot get into the Saarland or broader Rhineland. Meanwhile, the Germans, economically using their forces, defend the Rhineland after a prolonged fighting retreat from from central and eastern Belgium where they encounter invading Frenchmen (whether the Belgians side with the Germans, or more likely, the French, or no-one) and Alsace-Lorraine, and use their other reserves to batter the Russians out of Congress Poland, Lithuania and Galicia, while Austria-Hungary smashes Serbia, by the end with Bulgarian help, and the Ottomans likely attack Russia, or not. Meanwhile, the British (with Dominions), French and Japanese snap up the German colonial empire, largely completing the task by early to mid 1915. However, by late 1915 losses to France especially are massive, and to British forces are unprecedented, quite large, killed off much of the old army, require new mass volunteer levies and consideration of conscription. The French ardor for the war is only slightly diminished for having won the recovery and revanche of Alsace-Lorraine and the sadness of mass casualties - the French political class wants to press on to get into damage and punish Germany in Saar and Rhineland on its own territory and gain buffer space, and preserve its Russian alliance by getting the Central Powers off Russia's back. However, the French are increasingly demanding more and more British men to help do it. The Belgians meanwhile, for what they are worth, if on the Allied side, are ready to quit active fighting if they have their land clear of Germans. And the British, blockade in effect, having more than secured the survival of France (aided in its territorial revival in fact), and grabbed colonial trinkets around the globe for itself, its Dominions and its French and Japanese allies, and driven German commerce out of global markets, and not really caring at all about the fate of Serbia, or how many acres of Poland the Romanovs rule or not, and sick of the ghastly losses and expense, and not having the righteous cause of freeing plucky little Belgium or the occupied Frenchmen to fight for, and not wanting to impose conscription, and the lack of the righteous cause and wonder why the war maybe shouldn't be over causing hesitation about volunteering, maybe just leads to Britain telling its own Allies and the Central Powers, "we can keep going on to crush you eventually, but ready to make peace along the battle lines we have today and save everyone the trouble today, if you are ready for that as well old chap."? ... this military outlookm sketched ... sry but: not gonna happen at all.
The advances of the french and british forces envisaged ... IOTL they would have - and probably did so - been dreamed of by every Entente commander. It is IMHO questionable - esp. with having choosen Belgium as battleground - if they would have even come into artillery range of Aachen. ... not to speak of the Rhinland or the Rhine at all. Just look at of how long the german army fought off the Ententes attempts to move the front line with the germans staying in foreign country with still well under par a logistical network they would and could sport near the border. Same counts for Alsac and even more for Lorraine with a geography near to wet dreams of a defensive tactician. ... and we all should have learned how superior the defensive position in WW 1 esp. on the rather 'narrow' western front was.
And as stevep I'm also seeing the belgian army fighting the french invaders. Probably first conducting their planned und prepared retreat to their Redout - probably 'keeping' contact with the french advance by some reconnaisance troops - but later on from there starting a maybe slow advance on the french standing south of Meuse and Sambre. Not necessarily 'joining' the CP by treaty/written agreement but acting as co-belligerents. And I quite convinced the dutch goverment would NOT join the frail to at all. ... as long as noone infringes its territory (RN Marines 'trying' something heroically reg. the Schelde ?).
Aside fringe parts of maybe Alsac (as IOTL), with several counteroffensives thrown out of Lorraine at all and german boots standing probably - if only a few kilometers into - on french soil.
I agree that - in case the British Empire engages as IOTL or near OTLs timeframes - the colonial war would run quite as OTL.
... to sum it up: Regarding the european continental war you imaginate an about 3 years faster (compared to late 1918 IOTL) much more further advanced (Entente staying deeply on german soil) (compared to late 1918 IOTL) military achievements of the Entente without the US of A support (post its DoW against the CP esp.) substantial IOTL. Sry ... don't see it at all.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 16, 2024 11:07:53 GMT
... damn ... Real Life sucks ... you guys have alreagy moved on I have troubles to 'catch' up ... however: it always starts with a first step ... and still struggling with 'functions' of the borad ...If Britain is not totally debilitated by the Irish question blowing up..... ...and who is to say for sure it would be? Or that even if it escalates that Britain could not 'walk and chew gum' at the same time'? about the first part: Noone can say for sure, granted ... but given the development of the question and still during the early days of "war" for Britain (like the talks between Redmond and Carson until 5th/6th August) the chances for some major blow-up - far major than Bachelors walk - are rather high. - Carson admitted at some point being more the driven than the driver reagrding the UVF preparations and want for 'action'
- Redmonde despite having 'won' some administrative 'victory' reg. control of the IV had already lost the more ... 'radical' parts leaning if not controled by the IRB once becomming the IRA
- The 'call to the arms for Britain' as i.e. Redmond propagated answering Greys speech at the Commons on 3rd August would ITTL very likely not come. ... or turn back against Redmond in Ireland and his control over the IV even more than IOTL.
Also not to forget: the 'Irish Question' was far from solved on 4th to 5th August. It still took until midth of September to find its 'solution' in the postponement after a LOT of not too easy or even friendly behind the curtains bargaining.
The 'Curragh-Incident' allegedly incapacitating any possibility or using the army as a force in that conflict is IMHO rather exaggerated. It encompassed only a number of officers of the there stationed cavalry (not even all of them). From the majoritiy of troops including their officers - the infantry - none joined them in their 'protest'/'mutiny'. Its commanding officer - I don't have his name at hand atm - stated during this crisis that ofc his forces would follow whatever by the goverment given orders.
about the second part: IMHO : no - 'Britain' or the british goverment would have to foster its forces for the case of their need in Ireland and couldn't afford to sent them abroad.
- 'Britain' or the british populace was MUCH lesser interested in the war
and esp. in warring esp Germany no matter what than often from todays ... 'friends of the Entente' seemingly alleged and almost as a fact stated.
Before such interests there were topics like: All of these and in their combination even more might have been of greater importance to the populace than 'crazy continentals quarrels'. Together with incomming stories of the bloodshed esp. the french troops encountering on their 'attack a outrance' against german defensive positions ... I don't see war participation becomming popular.
There are definitely concerns about German hostile intents to Britain, especially the naval threat and some of the more extreme rants from the Kaiser and Tirpitz so its not a subject of no interest to people in Britain. However if Germany doesn't invade Belgium and the French do there will be a lot less willingness to go to war.
The Irish issue is a big one and while Redmond could provide a moderate solution even he was committed to including the north whether or not it wanted that while there were more extreme groups on both sides so its definitely a concern. Whether it blew up and under what circumstances. i.e. whether its Ulster Unionists or Irish extremists that go for violence 1st and in what ways would decide who the bulk of the British population saw as the problem and probably how they reacted IF things did explode.
Otherwise agree with your comments here and elsewhere about the Belgians fighting any breach of their neutrality and Britain being unlikely to enter the war militarily unless it looked like ones side, proabbly the CPs were going to win big and create a major imbalance of power.
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