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Post by raharris1973 on May 1, 2024 1:39:12 GMT
What if Japan had attacked the Dutch East Indies in 1936, based on lobbying from the Navy to gain the valuable archipelago located at the strategic maritime crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, offering Japan a position outflanking Singapore and Manila Bay, and providing already extensively developed fuel resources to fuel Japan's Navy, Army, and economy under Japanese, rather than foreign control, and coincidentally, offering Naval Admiral, Captains and other officers a chance for glory and promotion?
Considered as a one-on-one struggle, as of 1936, Japan should be completely conflict in its ability to win a near term victory over the Dutch in the East Indies, conquer the territory, and hold it against a Dutch counter-attack, given the distance any Dutch relief force would have to travel.
The archipelago's distance from Japan's land-based airbases would be a serious operational and logistic problem to overcome, and least for the most valuable, populous, and productive western and central islands of the East Indies, although IJN carriers could project limit airpower against most parts of the islands from the beginning. Engaging against enemy land-based air power in the defense with only carrier-based air would be risky and hazardous however.
An operational solution could be found, without stepping on the territory of other powers, like Britain, the USA, or France, by rapid successive sequential operations starting in the easternmost of the Dutch East Indies, where land-based Japanese aircraft (likely naval rather than army, but still land-based) could provide powerful support from bases in the Japanese Micronesian Mandated islands to back up combined Special Naval Landing Forces supported also by carrier-based aircraft and battleship bombardment, to rapidly capture Dutch airfields for Japanese use.
The Japanese, bringing along engineering troops, could follow up each successive island group seizure with rapid repairs of Dutch airfields, forward transport of land-based air, and attack on the next Dutch-owned objectives, in support of the Combined Fleet and landing forces.
A rapid pace of maneuver would be essential to keep defeating the Dutch in detail and prevent defensive consolidation, and reduce time for other powers to consider possible intervention in the bilateral conflict.
Once all the principal islands were secured and the major Dutch forces in the region defeated, their continued occupation would be a fait accompli, and peace treaty and war termination with Netherlands would be a diplomatic formality in all likelihood. The Netherlands, despite being an economic and financial power, were not a vast manufacturing, military, nor territorial power, nor highly populous and thus in a position to undertake a long-distance reconquest of the East Indies.
After establishing occupation, Japan could repair damaged facilities, reorient the oil and food exports to the Japanese imperial market, and theoretically emerge stronger and self-sufficient, having a naval/maritime complement to the Army's Manchukuo project.
Well, that's sounds great, so why didn't Japan do it? What could go wrong?
Wasn't Japan bogged down in a war with China in 1936?
As it turns out, if it was a war, it was not a very hot one at this time. Japan enjoyed control over the Manchukuo and Inner Mongolian (Mengjiang) puppet states north of the Great Wall of China, and had compelled China to keep large parts of Beijing's province of Hopei demilitarized under the He-Umezu truce agreement. For most of 1936 until the Xi'an incident of December, Chiang remained preoccupied with preparing an encirclement and annihilation campaign against the Communists who had survived the Long March in Shaanxi province and ignored calls to push back against Japan. Chiang did not start pushing back against Japan until July 1937, and the Japanese were not getting political signals he might be heading in that direction, until after he paused anti-Communist operations during/after the December 1936 Xi'an incident and increased resistance and unity talk.
What about intervention of other powers, like the USA or Britain, the Philippines, Malaya and Borneo are in between the Dutch East Indies and Japan you know?
The Japanese could quite plausibly calculate by this time, middle or late 1936, that none of these powers would intervene directly or effectively in a Dutch East Indies war, no matter what they said. Such a calculation could quite plausibly be correct. It would give us a pair of equally interesting scenarios if the Japanese calculation turned out to be correct, OR, if it turned out to be incorrect, and another power intervened in the war.
Why should Japan have confidence in non-intervention by outsiders? 1) Outside powers and the League of Nations had not militarily intervened, nor economically sanctioned Japan over the Manchurian invasion of 1931-33, and the adjunct short-term Shanghai invasion, despite diplomatic condemnation. 2) More recently outside powers had not intervened militarily, or sanctioned effectively or persistently, against Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, and ultimately its annexation from 1935-to April 1936, despite condemning it. They tried some sanctions but did not persist. Relevant to Japan's situation, Abyssinia was adjacent to British and French colonies, but still they permitted Italy to expand next to them and to use Suez. This might be explained away by economic or racial factors. Cynically, Abyssinia was poor and hardly exported anything, so maybe it wasn't worth a struggle to London and Paris, but the East Indies produced valuable petroleum and hardwood and limited rubber, rice and coffee exports of greater commercial value. Or perhaps white leaders in London, Paris, Washington could tolerate white Italians conquering black Africans, but not tolerate Asians ousting white Dutch rulers to take control over a large Asian people and Asian land. But other events of the 1930s suggested that weak will in the west and aversion to conflict was about a more general preference than just racial bias: 3) In 1934 (or 1935?) Britain had signed the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, showing a lack of determination to hold its full degree of naval superiority over Germany, even in the North Sea close to home, and 4) In 1936, France (and Britain) failed to resist the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, right upon her border, closer than the metropolitan Netherlands is to France, making any concept of Paris or London extending deterrence out to a distant Dutch *colony* less credible and more of a stretch. 5) All West European powers showed preoccupation from July 1936 onward, with the Spanish Civil War, which was turning out to be a protracted struggle, not a quick coup d'etat. Germany and Italy were intervening directly in support of the Spanish Nationalist rebels. The British were pulling the French into the unsuccessful Non-Intervention Committee and policy, to try to contain the conflict, and not actively countering Italo-German influence or encouraging France to do so (in fact discouraging it). As another bonus from a Japanese point of view, the Spanish Civil War was drawing heavy attention from the Soviet Union and allied ideological movements, leading to deployment of Soviet advisors, weapons and international volunteers, which diverted Soviet attention from northeast Asia and the Manchukuo-Korea frontier.
This accounts well for the alternate preoccupations and likely hesitations of European powers to intervene in the Indies. What about the USA? From a Japanese vantage point, the Roosevelt Administration's first term had been almost exclusively focused on domestic policy, not passing anything like a two-ocean Navy bill, with any naval construction advertised more as a jobs program than a security program. FDR was preoccupied with his reelection. If anything, his foreign policy as shown in the Americas, was one of retrenchment from intervention in neighbors' political affairs. With respect to the Far East, the Americans formally set a timetable for the independence of the Philippines in 1945, through the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1935. Despite some posturing of the US Navy at the tail end of the Hoover Administration during the Shanghai affair, and the failure of any Naval talks in the mid-30s, the relative quiet that had settled on the China-Manchuria front since 1933 had not added any particularly urgent stressors to US-Japanese relations by 1936. America was somewhat economically recovered from its depths of 1933, but hardly looking outward, except for trade opportunities, which it sought with Japan as much as with China and European colonies like the DEI. And in case, should any of these powers, America, Britain, France, the USSR, turn against Japan in the medium term or long-term, the Dutch East Indies would be a great strategic asset for Japan to possess from the beginning of any serious conflict escalation, rather than not to have.
Didn't the Japanese Army, not Navy, run everything in 1930s Japan?
It's more complicated than that. Army officers and societies organized and roamed free making up their own foreign policy as they went along (like the Manchuria incident of 1931, and earlier and later incidents), assassinating politicians and generals they felt insufficiently supportive, and attempting coups d'etat, from the 1928-1936 timeframe. But so did some Navy officer groups and societies. In February 1936 a spiritualist Army faction attempted a coup and made some headway, but was suppressed by an angry court, Army senior command, and Naval forces. The plotters, unlike in previous cases were sternly dealt with, being either executed or forced to commit suicide. The result was sort of a compromise, since the Army coup was stopped, but only with the help of other parts of the Army, with ideas not 100% dissimilar from the plotters. Initiative coups and assassinations of politicians and generals pretty much ceased at this point from military personnel. But people always worried they could happen if top leaders adopted policy broadly unpopular with the Army or Navy. The Army and Navy generally had different priorities, but both got increased funding and their share of personnel and equipment budgets, and policy influence, in the spoils system.
When considering Japanese military factions and their different priorities, and the Japanese Navy and Army and their different priorities and positions, it is important to remember that differences =/= diametrical opposition and differences =/=mutual hatred. Neither service was a monolith, and both Army and Navy contained "Go North" and "Go South" advocates and it is easy to provide quotes from both.
Edward Drea, writing on this era has noted that one of Emperor Hirohito's recurring critiques and lines of questioning toward the Army regarding its course of action in Manchuria and China was whether Japan was overreaching and investing in an unbalanced commitment to the Army in the mainland, and not taking enough care to keep Japan's Navy and Air forces and maritime position adequately strong to deal with possible threats to Japan's interests from the USA or Britain.
So, I could imagine it being plausible that a strong, enterprising Navy-centric group, joined by some Army officers and Civilian officials with similar ideas and economic justifications, could build a powerful case for domination of the Dutch East Indies in the mid-1930s.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 1, 2024 1:40:13 GMT
If Japan did launched this fight in, for example, December 1936, and completed its invasion occupation of the DEI in about 10 weeks or three months, which seems a generous amount of time for Dutch resistance if Japan is focused on this one objective, Britain's Australian Dominion would be the most freaked out. The Empire is already in shock from the abdication crisis, but bold "yellow peril" showing up just to the north makes this look trivial by comparison.
Australia, with its Papua New Guinea Mandate, the Malaya and Borneo colonies, and the Dominion of India would want reassurances from Britain. The Singapore base would be outflanked. The Americans would similarly be disturbed and find the Philippines with Manila Bay, Subic Bay and Clark Airfield surrounded in a Japanese-controlled arc running north, east and south of the islands from Taiwan/Formosa to the Mandates to the East Indies.
In the event of European war or crisis, India, and Australia and New Zealand especially, would have enough home defense worries to make it unlikely they could spare any troops to support the British Empire outside of their home Indo-Pacific region. Australia and New Zealand would probably seek closer diplomatic ties to the USA for their own security, and many in the US Roosevelt Administration, State Department and Navy would like the idea, considering the extra exposure and vulnerability of the Philippines and America's other scattered Pacific possessions, but America's extant defense posture as of 1936 is very weak and the idea of commitments outside the hemisphere is very controversial.
France would be highly concerned for its Indochina colony, but would be able to spare little for it, already struggling to rearm to deal with the growing German threat in Europe, Italian naval competition in the Mediterranean, and trying to prevent spillover from the Spanish Civil War drawing France into war or internal conflict.
The Japanese military and Kempeitai (secret police) and bureaucrats and zaibatsu will have plenty to do in the occupation of the DEI and its restoration to full production. To the degree Tokyo and senior Army staff are turning the dial on pressure with the frontier with China in early 1937, they may not press it as much as historical because of other available adventures and tasks in the Indies. However, the escalation to full-scale war in China in OTL July 1937 was multi-sided. It was not driven only, or even primarily, by Tokyo based Army commanders trying to alter the previous status quo, but by initiatives and overreactions by local Japanese commanders, and by this point, just as important, a Chinese Nationalist side that was determined to demonstrate it was not going to take it lying down anymore. So, any lack of outbreak of Sino-Japanese war in July 1937 would probably be no more than a delay, not total prevention.
The Japanese presence in the DEI would almost certainly stimulate earlier than historical British and American naval building oriented toward Indo-Pacific defense. For Britain, it is likely to make her lean harder into appeasement, if that is somehow possible.
When the probable Sino-Japanese War breaks out, the additional pre-existing Japanese occupation of the East Indies could cut two opposing ways for British and American policy. On the one hand, since the Japanese "cat" is among their colonial "pigeons" more boldly and dangerously placed, the priority on building up defenses of Australia, Malaya, the Philippines, and Japan's obvious ability to lash out may mean London and Washington are more hesitant to aid China and have less to spare. Equally or more likely, they may see supporting the Chinese resistance as a greater imperative than OTL, and do more of it, earlier. In any case, I would expect Soviet support for China to be similar to OTL.
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Post by Max Sinister on May 1, 2024 21:58:50 GMT
The biggest question I'm wondering about: Is this feasible? Even if they had the cooperation of Thailand, which would help? Didn't they need the Philippines as stepstones?
And yes: The League of Nations did nothing about Abyssinia and Spain. But Spain was a civil war, and Abyssinia (sorry) a poor third world country. The Netherlands aren't just an LoN member, but a First World country, and the DEI are oil-rich. Even if the LoN will be impotent, other powers aren't. And the "Reich" isn't ready to attack in the west yet. Hell, they weren't even allies of Japan yet - only since Ribbentrop, ie 1938.
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on May 1, 2024 22:51:06 GMT
The biggest question I'm wondering about: Is this feasible? Even if they had the cooperation of Thailand, which would help? Didn't they need the Philippines as stepstones? And yes: The League of Nations did nothing about Abyssinia and Spain. But Spain was a civil war, and Abyssinia (sorry) a poor third world country. The Netherlands aren't just an LoN member, but a First World country, and the DEI are oil-rich. Even if the LoN will be impotent, other powers aren't. And the "Reich" isn't ready to attack in the west yet. Hell, they weren't even allies of Japan yet - only since Ribbentrop, ie 1938.
Its physically feasible for Japan to conquer the DEI in this time period. The IJN not as strong in 1936 as 5 years later but neither is anywhere else. Japan didn't need to occupy the Philippines as a stepping stone but attacked it as well as other US bases and facilities because they considered war with the US as inevitable [in 1941] and wanted to remove those locations as possible bases for hostile actions by the US against their empire and vital supply lines.
However what the reactions of assorted powers would be is the big question. As you say there's a significant difference given the values in the west especially at the time to an attack on a western power and a 3rd world [albeit that term wasn't in use at the time] nation. Plus with the strategic importance of the region, its mineral wealth and its location isolating FIC and putting an aggressive Japan immediately adjacent to the wealthy Malayan colonies and very close to Australia and India/Burma its going to cause some reaction in the west. Especially since japan has not even the fragment of excuse it had for actions against Manchuria or the adjacent areas of northern China.
Whether that would lead to one or more western nations declaring war on Japan given the circumstances at the time would be difficult to say but your likely to see assorted powers deciding that they must start strengthening their defences at the very least and I also wouldn't rule out attempts at at least economic pressure. This could also backfire on the European Axis as that, especially Germany is very vulnerable at this point as its military is still pretty small and fragile. If such a Japanese move came before the German reoccupation of the Rhineland and the French reacted strongly in a panic say that would force at the very least am humiliating Nazi back-down and quite possibly the fall of the regime, albeit it might be replaced by some sort of military regime, at least in the short term.
War with western powers over the DEI would be risky for both sides but would definitely make for a different world.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 2, 2024 1:40:23 GMT
And the "Reich" isn't ready to attack in the west yet. That is absolutely correct. This Japanese plan is counting Germany and Italy distracting western powers with actual direct war or invasion, just distracting crisis, like Spain. The plan is counting on the war with the Dutch being a bilateral affair. Hell, they weren't even allies of Japan yet Well they had a degree of foreign policy coordination and mutual admiration by this point. They had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, openly against the Comintern, secretly, but also obviously, against the USSR, and they both had dropped out of the League of Nations the same year, in 1933. It is true that Germany's Far East policy was "bigamous" until 1938 and Ribbentrop's rise, because before then Germany was also friendly to Nationalist China in military and economic affairs, and tried even after the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War until Ribbentrop's rise to see if it could broker a compromise, but Japan was seen as foreign asset and potential ally before 1938. In any case, this hypothetical war would not be against Germany's Chinese partner, but against neutral Netherlands, and Germany could easily stay neutral and tell both Tokyo and The Hague what they wanted hear, unless and until circumstances changed, other powers got involved, or Germany's power projection grew and it became sensible for Germany to get involved. Even if they had the cooperation of Thailand, which would help? I do not think they would have the help of Thailand, still called Siam at the time, nor would Siam's help be super useful - its shores on the South China Sea are most directly opposite British Borneo and Malaya, and none of principal Dutch East Indies islands, just a few of the tiniest Natuna islands, nor would it be necessary. Didn't they need the Philippines as stepstones? The Philippines were not any more necessary as stepping stones for Japan to conquer the DEI than Japan's conquest of the Soviet Maritime/Primorye province and Amur province in between Japan, the Sea of Japan, and central and northern Manchuria was necessary for stepping stones to get there. The straightest, shortest distance route wasn't the only way to to get there. stevep is correct that Japan invaded the Philippines in 1941 not because of forever fixed geography but because of its evaluation of American intentions and red lines at that time. Japan didn't need to occupy the Philippines as a stepping stone but attacked it as well as other US bases and facilities because they considered war with the US as inevitable [in 1941] and wanted to remove those locations as possible bases for hostile actions by the US against their empire and vital supply lines.
The basis of Japan's belief in 1941 was America's sanctions/embargo policy, coordinated with the Dutch and British, possible awareness of American-British-Dutch naval exchanges staff talks (another thing indicating inseparability), America's recent reinforcements in the western Pacific and Philippines specifically, its Lend-Lease expansion to China and sending of the American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers) there, permanent movement of PACFLT HQ from San Diego to Hawaii in 1940, and adoption of the two-ocean Navy and conscription in 1940. None of these factors were in effect in 1936. As I remarked in the original post, Japan's League of Nations "South Seas" Mandate in Micronesia provided alternate "stepping stones" to the East Indies: As for basic feasibility, with Japanese technology and tactics as of 1936, I have a lengthier reply: That is a good question: Just what kind of operations are the Japanese services capable of mounting in 1936, in terms of sortie'ing the fleet, conducting battleship bombardments to shore, bombarding targets on land with carrier-based aircraft, destroying foreign naval opposition and air forces, conducting amphibious landings, seizing, repairing, and using formerly enemy held airfields, and so on. They had a certain skill level at this type of thing in early 1942 after years of war in China, and a constantly updated equipment set, and doing some coastal landing operations on a smaller scale than this. We cannot assume with lesser experience, and earlier model equipment, they would demonstrate the same capability in 1936 and 1937 they demonstrated in 1942. And at the same time, we have to ask ourselves, what kinds of assaults are the Dutch forces in the various parts of the East Indies archipelago capable of defending those islands from, and what tools in terms of ground, sea, and air forces do they have on station to meet an assault by an invader with modern weapons, and how much warning do they need to be at all ready? Notably, the Japanese would be lacking the combat experienced they obtained from full-scale Sino-Japanese War from 1937-1941. Japanese experience would be more limited - They would have ground and air experience from the Manchuria war against lesser warlord forces, 1931-1933, and there might have been over-beach operations on the Liaotung peninsula, but maybe not. They would have had landing and urban combat experience and ship to shore and ground to air combat experience from the Shanghai incident of 1932. But they would lack any of the further experience from the 1937 bigger scale Sino-Japanese war. Their higher level officers and senior non-coms could have landing, ground, and technologically primitive air experience dating back to the Siberian intervention of 1918-1922 or the WWI Pacific/China campaigning of 1914, or ground or naval combat from the Russo-Japanese War. Plus, any exercises and maneuvers with more recent technology in the 1920s and 1920s. It is noteworthy that in the 1920s while China and Russia both seemed very weak and hamstrung, the Navy, rather than the Army, was the senior service in Japan, the the Japanese Navy got priority for exercises and maneuvers testing its amphibious landing and island defense concepts in mandates against the top perceived enemy, the USA, over the Army's priority exercises. It was only after the Sino-Soviet border war of summer 1929 that the situation on the mainland began to look threatening enough that the Army regained priority in Japan. Against this, the Dutch had no post-Napoleonic combat experience, except colonial against indigenous rebels. The Japanese would not have items of equipment that they only invented after 1940 like the A6M fighter and G4M bomber. A war starting at the tail end of 1936 would have to be fought more or less with the same naval ships, fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, infantry weapons, light and heavy artillery, infantry vehicles, armored vehicles, logistics, and small arms as Japanese Navy forces and Army forces used in the first year of the Sino-Japanese War starting from July 1937 onward, and this equipment would go up against whatever the Dutch possessed at the time and anything else allies might get in their hands while the fighting goes on. But without intervention by an outside stronger power, I think Japanese victory, Dutch defeat is assured. Consider why from a different angle - Japan can project a significant force to one part of the DEI, the east, and from there, to the rest. It lately demonstrated that amount opf expeditionary capability in Manchuria and Shanghai earlier in the 1930s. Japan also demonstrated expeditionary warfare capability at a much lower technology level than 1942, with its siege of Qingdao from September-November 1914. And Japan's Navy demonstrated its logistic capability to simultaneously seize widely separated, by thousands of miles, enemy island objectives, in the space of a single month, throughout the Pacific, under the relatively low technology conditions of October 1914, with a limited number of radios and reconnaissance aircraft. Japan's starting points towards German Micronesia from the Bonins in 1914 is pretty comparable to its starting point in the Palaus to the Dutch East Indies, and while its 1936-37 forces won't have 1942 levels of aircraft, radio, or other tech, they'll be much more lavishly tech'ed up than the Japanese forces of 1914. To be fair to the Dutch, the main advantage they will have in defense is that they present larger targets with more depth, requiring large invasion forces, and possessing larger garrisons and police forces than German Micronesia had in 1914. But size would be a double-edged thing for the Dutch. Bigger islands mean more potential landing zones to guard. There may be more defenders or more local labor to set to defensive works, but only the Dutch and Eurasians and probably Chinese are truly reliable supporters of the Dutch defense. Most natives will be pretty indifferent.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 2, 2024 1:48:59 GMT
This could also backfire on the European Axis as that, especially Germany is very vulnerable at this point as its military is still pretty small and fragile. If such a Japanese move came before the German reoccupation of the Rhineland and the French reacted strongly in a panic say that would force at the very least am humiliating Nazi back-down and quite possibly the fall of the regime, albeit it might be replaced by some sort of military regime, at least in the short term. Your general point is correct, although the way I am laying this out, this is many months *after* the German reoccupation of Rhineland. I also think Germany (and Italy for that matter) would not launch any additional attacks in Europe, out of mere solidarity with Japan, before they feel damn good and ready. But the way this could be generally true is that a Japanese threat stimulating earlier British and American and French and Dutch war preparedness or coordination, and *especially* and expanding anti-Japanese combined coalition warfare in the Pacific, could have the side effect and leaving their air and other forces and war industries better prepared earlier to match Hitler's Germany in the early phases of WWII in Europe or to call any bluffs (if they were bluffs) beforehand.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 2, 2024 2:10:01 GMT
However what the reactions of assorted powers would be is the big question. As you say there's a significant difference given the values in the west especially at the time to an attack on a western power and a 3rd world [albeit that term wasn't in use at the time] nation. Plus with the strategic importance of the region, its mineral wealth and its location isolating FIC and putting an aggressive Japan immediately adjacent to the wealthy Malayan colonies and very close to Australia and India/Burma its going to cause some reaction in the west. Especially since japan has not even the fragment of excuse it had for actions against Manchuria or the adjacent areas of northern China.
Whether that would lead to one or more western nations declaring war on Japan given the circumstances at the time would be difficult to say but your likely to see assorted powers deciding that they must start strengthening their defences at the very least and I also wouldn't rule out attempts at at least economic pressure. There absolutely will be a western reaction, certainly at least a British and Dominion reaction, in the form of an increased defense build-up in the region around the Dutch East Indies, and probably economic sanctions against Japan, at least for the duration of combat with between the Dutch and Japanese, and quite possibly beyond. The USA would also likely take part in sanctions of whatever duration. To some extent, given the oil richness, food and coffee supplies of the DEI, and potential for other plantation agricultures, like rubber cultivation, economic sanctions against Japan as a retaliatory measure, with further military action to stop the invasion or reverse the occupation, would be a case of "shutting the barn door after the horses have all run free". Japan will have already pulled off the raw material "heist". Continuing the thought of Japan succeeding in its Dutch East Indies land grab of 1936 or 1937, the Japanese pacify and develop the islands, and release Dutch experts as they learn how to run petroleum and other operations. The British and Americans try to boost the Far East defenses, the former in their colonies and especially Dominions. The French try to boost up defenses of French Indochina but can spare almost nothing in terms of revenue or manpower from metropolitan France or other parts of the empire, especially parts exposed to the Mediterranean or Red Sea, so what is done comes from increased taxation and mobilization from within the Indochina colony. Japan, because of Army officer fervor, and because of China's hardening public opinion, forming a United Front, and newfound insistence not to be pushed around, will end up in an escalated full-scale war over the the greater Beijing area and then the Shanghai area, by no later than the summer of 1938. I think the other powers of the world, save Germany and Italy, Japan's partners in the Anti-Comintern Pact, will condemn Japan's invasion, and morally favor China, but not intervene militarily against Japan, nor impose more than possibly limited export controls of selected weapons of war. The Soviet Union will become the most generous provisioner of aid to the Chinese United Front consisting of both the Nationalists and the Communist resisters. It will add to the USSR's global anti-Fascist "street cred" it is gaining from supporting the Spanish Republic in Europe. One consequence of Japan's conquest of the Dutch East Indies is that for the duration of that fight, at least, Dutch merchant cargo shippers, who carried a decent share of Japan's cargo trade, will not service Japanese Empire ports and the Japanese market, and the Dutch government will pressure Royal Dutch Shell to suspend business with Japan. There is a more than even chance that the angry Netherlands would continue these unilateral anti-Japanese embargoes even in the years post-defeat and post-conquest out of anger, unless free commerce is restored via a treaty involving some compensation or promise of it for Netherlands. The loss of this cargo shipping and those oil contracts would compel Japan during the fight to develop native Japanese substitute cargo shipping lines or hire alternative foreign merchant mariners under different flags, American, British, Greek, Panamanian, Italian, Norwegian, Danish, Swedish - probably some eclectic combination, with shortages at first. But I expect between 1937 and 1941 it would sensitize Tokyo to its dependence on foreign merchant bottoms and cause some increase in domestic merchant capacity, not just warship tonnage over that time. There is the chance that, being pragmatic and businesslike, and not wanting to further hurt their economy and revenues for funding their social insurance safety net and home defense during the Depression, the Dutch could sign a treaty with Japan or provisionally resume shipping commerce between their old, now Japanese occupied colony and Japan, in return for the freedom of their civil detainees and PoWs, and further property compensations or the mere promise of it and continued business right now, day to day. There is a Depression after all, and money is hard to come by, and insecurity looms in Europe Regarding the Sino-Japanese War once more, while London, Washington, Paris will all object to Japan's aggression in China as much as Moscow does, they may be stuck prioritizing resources between bolstering defenses of their own colonies, Dominions, Commonwealths in the Asia-Pacific region and aiding China. However, I think that surrogates for these empires in the Asia-Pacific, the Australians and New Zealanders, the command at Singapore, British Raj authorities at Simla, the US team at Manila, the French Governor General at Hanoi, will all be big boosters of the need to provide aid to China and its anti-Japanese resistance in order to tie down and immobilize Japan, and prevent it from having the means to make more conquests further south, east, or west. So, I think by the 1939-1940 timeframe, odds would favor delivery of loans, credits, arms to China from the west via Indochina and Burma. Japan's Army would likely have probes and border clashes with the Soviets and Outer Mongolians, in which the latter would hold their own. It would also have tensions and incidents with western diplomats and western deployed forces and the western concession jurisdictions in occupied China (see Japan's Tianjin incident with Britain, from 1939). Despite the increased apparent threat to the west, especially Britain in the Far East, and the focus that draws, and the possible precocious naval and expeditionary capability development that might cause, to some degree, I do not seeing the march of Fascist powers in Europe, the attempts at appeasement, the eventual end of appeasement, Nazi-Soviet Pact, and WWII, unfolding like OTL, on schedule. The Nazi-Soviet Pact, in an environment where there are frequent Soviet-Japanese border clashes, and the Soviets are a prime supporter of China (indeed a supplier of volunteer pilots), is likely to disappoint Japan and strain Nazi-Japanese relations, as it did in OTL, and slow their coordination of aggressive policies. The endgame of this timeline is that as the USA and UK get sicker of the China War and its territorial extent, they can extend sanctions. Japan can and would opportunistically benefit from German successes, like the fall of France, to occupy French Indochina, and perhaps with their DEI starting point, New Caledonia and New Hebrides. They can puppetize, strong-arm, or occupy Thailand even, while Britain and the USSR are at their weak points, fighting for their imperial Mediterranean lifelines and their capital and industrial heartlands against Axis assaults respectively. The UK would try to add what little it could to earlier defensive precautions to Singapore, and Australia and India, already more fortified than OTL - and may be coming up a bit shorter already in the Mediterranean/North African fight than OTL because of lack of ANZAC or Indian troops there. America would be trying to enhance its western Pacific defenses, and both powers together would be embargoing raw materials to Japan, and in any case would be at the point of hoarding almost all those same materials for their own and Soviet use in the anti-German war effort. The reality and idea of the embargo and the western build up in the Far East, and headiness over visible German advances in Europe by summer 1941 will tempt a few Japanese Navy types, civilian hawks, and one or two Army oddballs into advocating a sweeping surprise attack to drive the US and UK entirely from the Far East, but majority of the Navy staff, the institutional Army, China theater commanders, and Tokyo Cabinet will feel no such urgency and be content to let German victory ripen, or not, while plugging away, trying to wear China down and out. While the western embargo and financial freeze is a pain, and *theoretically* the British and American fleets, *if they one day concentrated them in the South China Sea* could interdict oil import routes between the Japanese East Indies and Japan and China, they show no sign of doing it now, and Tokyo would see it coming - these powers seem very preoccupied in the Atlantic, and Japan is sustaining itself adequately in petroleum. The likely result is with the now Japanese East Indies "under its belt" for almost five years before this timeline's 1941, Japan does not "take the plunge" into Pacific War against the USA or cobelligerency alongside Germany and Italy within the Axis. Your mileage may vary (YMMV), I am in the school of thought inclined to think that the USA and Germany were trending toward full war with each other within about 6 months or so of December 1941, regardless of what Japan did, or did not do. So the more probable timeline ahead from here is that before metereological summertime 1942, Germany has declared war on America or vice versa, the Battle of the Atlantic is a full oceanwide American-German-British surface and undersea naval battle, and with the DoWs, the USA is now not just committed to its prior undeclared naval war, waged de facto since about April 1941, but to full engage its air and ground forces in Africa and Europe to completely defeat Germany until victory. The ending and inevitable result of this would be after three and a half years, combined Allied defeat of Nazi Germany and division of Europe, perhaps with the dividing line slightly east of OTL. But importantly, Japan would steer clear of belligerency in this war, hoping to defeat China in its own, private war that avoids direct allied combat intervention on China's side. By the time the European War ends in late 1944 or 1945, China will not have defeated Japan in any conventional sense. On the other hand, Japan will certainly not have ended all Chinese resistance or pacified China. It may have occupied more parts of China and cut China off from land lines of supply by the west. (for an example of the possibility of late Sino-Japanese War advances, see OTL's Ichigo offensive) or even taken the Chinese capital of Chongqing, or China and Japan may have fought to a stalemate. So, the end of the war in Europe would see a tripolar world instead of a bipolar world like OTL. Not all poles would be equal. Japan would definitely be the third and smallest of the poles, sort of like China could have been counted as the third Cold War pole, but definitely the weakest, in the 60s, 70s, and 80s. America would start off the strongest, the Soviets in second place. With the defeat of Germany, both the USSR and USA would still have a problem with Japan's ongoing aggression/occupation in China, whatever level of resistance in China is ongoing, and they both have mountains of surplus weapons to supply to Chinese resisters. However, both the USA and USSR would *also* have burgeoning problems with *each other* and fears of each other over postwar matters of the fate of Poland, German occupation policy, Greece, the Turkish straits, Iran, control of atomic energy. But although Moscow and Washington would each see each other as the most powerful of their challengers and threats, with a militaristic, heavily armed, and multi-service Japan still a widely active power throughout all East Asia, they would not be each other's only relevant challengers.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 2, 2024 2:20:17 GMT
Whether that would lead to one or more western nations declaring war on Japan given the circumstances at the time would be difficult to say But I also accept that this is a real possibility, and a quite interesting one. The idea of all the other powers standing aside while Japan lifts the East Indies from the Netherlands may turn out to be fatal miscalculation for Japan. Under pressure from imperial interests and Australia, which perhaps threatens to declare itself an independent republic and seek American protection, Britain under the Baldwin Government declares war on Japan - possibly after Japan disregards an ultimatum to halt and reverse its invasion of the Dutch East Indies, well that will make for an interesting medium-sized war at the tail end of 1936 and early 1937. Britain would get itself on a war footing and dispatch fleet units to Singapore, and reinforcements of men, ships and aircraft to Australia and the Pacific. Britain's early exertions in war production, mobilization, and deployment would have growing pains, and more men would be immediately be called to the colors of RN, RAF and Army ranks to fill them out to handle needs of the Far East war and ongoing sores like ongoing Arab Revolt in Palestine. Besides continuing its crackdown there, Britain might accelerate its move to the Arab-appeasing policies of 1939 White Paper to substantially restrict and put a 10 year limit on Jewish immigration and land purchases, foreclosing prospects of a Jewish majority there, to make things more quiet. With prompt action, and the Japanese making their approach through the Dutch East Indies from an east to west axis mainly, the British may be at risk of losing Sarawak and Sabah and Brunei in Borneo, maybe - but not Malaya and Singapore, which the Japanese are unlikely to be able to approach in strength with a combination of land-based AirPower and landing forces in anything like a timely fashion before defenses are prepared and reinforcements arrive. With British assistance, the Dutch should certainly fend off any Japanese attempts to land at Sumatra, and the Dutch and British together could well entirely repulse, or stall, any Japanese invasions of Java. Depending on the tactics and circumstances and locations of battle - proximity to each side's air bases, night fighting versus day fighting, commander skill, luck - each side can suffer some high profile naval losses. The Americans in all likelihood would not rouse themselves to the defense or direct combat assistance of the British, Australians or Dutch, but they would wish for their victory, and before long suspend exports of raw materials and war material to Japan. The Canadians and probably South Africans through would declare war on the Japanese and send forces to help out their Imperial partners. The French would not see the Pacific and Far East as their priority, Europe would remain so. They would not "like" participating in a Far East war or devote major national efforts to it. However, by the same token since they want and feel they *need* Britain's strategic backing in European affairs, they would probably not turn down any direct requests for military assistance or use of French facilities in the Far East in Indochina, New Caledonia, Polynesia, by the British Empire, even if this caused a Japanese declaration of war. Even if this incurred damage to the French Empire in the region, earning reciprocal British obligation to France's security in Europe, and not alienating Britain from such ties, would probably be worth it to Paris. So there is a decent chance France would find itself at war with Japan if Britain does. France also would not mind *the Netherlands* owing it favors possibly redeemable in Europe as well. Overall Japan would be contained early in this war, with a slow rollback, that, without participation of a power like the USSR, is not guaranteed to get Japan out of Manchuria and Korea. Without participation of America, it is not guaranteed to see Japan totally defeated and occupied, merely pushed back from its conquests, some of the China Seas, and Micronesia, after a prolonged submarine campaign. ---Another aspect of any Japanese-Dutch War turning into an Anglo-Japanese War is that it could lead right back to renewed combat in Chinese waters and on Chinese land, with Japan seizing Hong Kong and attacking British forces in the concession areas of China's ports like Shanghai and Tianjin. Chiang might stay neutral if it is appearing to him the British are not offering any revision to treaty port status and seem to be losing, and the Japanese are not spilling over much while they focus on the British, but if the British are offering some reform in the system, and more importantly money and weapons for the long-haul he thinks he can use to reclaim Manchuria, Chiang would become interested in anti-Japanese co-belligerency alongside Britain. Britain would like to make use of the Chinese territory for access to land close enough to bomb the Japanese home islands and inlets in which to hide submarines. It can be a bum costly deal for China though, with the strong Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea lashing out extensively across northern and eastern China in retaliation for China siding with Britain. But, with this type of coalition forming, Stalin in the USSR may think it a good time to avenge the Tsarist defeat of 1905 and attack Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin from the north to demonstrate the new capabilities Socialist Russia has. Lots of possibilities for a different world unfolding here. If the grandest possible anti-Japanese coalition emerges in 1937, the experience of working together there might carry over to a cooperative policy in Europe in Spain by 1938, and in joint support to back Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity that year.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2024 18:36:24 GMT
This could also backfire on the European Axis as that, especially Germany is very vulnerable at this point as its military is still pretty small and fragile. If such a Japanese move came before the German reoccupation of the Rhineland and the French reacted strongly in a panic say that would force at the very least am humiliating Nazi back-down and quite possibly the fall of the regime, albeit it might be replaced by some sort of military regime, at least in the short term. Your general point is correct, although the way I am laying this out, this is many months *after* the German reoccupation of Rhineland. I also think Germany (and Italy for that matter) would not launch any additional attacks in Europe, out of mere solidarity with Japan, before they feel damn good and ready. But the way this could be generally true is that a Japanese threat stimulating earlier British and American and French and Dutch war preparedness or coordination, and *especially* and expanding anti-Japanese combined coalition warfare in the Pacific, could have the side effect and leaving their air and other forces and war industries better prepared earlier to match Hitler's Germany in the early phases of WWII in Europe or to call any bluffs (if they were bluffs) beforehand.
Ah if the Japanese attack is some time after the German re-militarization of the Rhineland then that option of ending the crisis in Europe very quickly has gone.
On the 2nd point that could go either way. British and allied forces would gain experience and military production would be expanded earlier but that production would be of earlier designs so it could impact negatively as well as positively on their military development.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2024 18:58:16 GMT
However what the reactions of assorted powers would be is the big question. As you say there's a significant difference given the values in the west especially at the time to an attack on a western power and a 3rd world [albeit that term wasn't in use at the time] nation. Plus with the strategic importance of the region, its mineral wealth and its location isolating FIC and putting an aggressive Japan immediately adjacent to the wealthy Malayan colonies and very close to Australia and India/Burma its going to cause some reaction in the west. Especially since japan has not even the fragment of excuse it had for actions against Manchuria or the adjacent areas of northern China.
Whether that would lead to one or more western nations declaring war on Japan given the circumstances at the time would be difficult to say but your likely to see assorted powers deciding that they must start strengthening their defences at the very least and I also wouldn't rule out attempts at at least economic pressure. There absolutely will be a western reaction, certainly at least a British and Dominion reaction, in the form of an increased defense build-up in the region around the Dutch East Indies, and probably economic sanctions against Japan, at least for the duration of combat with between the Dutch and Japanese, and quite possibly beyond. The USA would also likely take part in sanctions of whatever duration. To some extent, given the oil richness, food and coffee supplies of the DEI, and potential for other plantation agricultures, like rubber cultivation, economic sanctions against Japan as a retaliatory measure, with further military action to stop the invasion or reverse the occupation, would be a case of "shutting the barn door after the horses have all run free". Japan will have already pulled off the raw material "heist". Continuing the thought of Japan succeeding in its Dutch East Indies land grab of 1936 or 1937, the Japanese pacify and develop the islands, and release Dutch experts as they learn how to run petroleum and other operations. The British and Americans try to boost the Far East defenses, the former in their colonies and especially Dominions. The French try to boost up defenses of French Indochina but can spare almost nothing in terms of revenue or manpower from metropolitan France or other parts of the empire, especially parts exposed to the Mediterranean or Red Sea, so what is done comes from increased taxation and mobilization from within the Indochina colony. Japan, because of Army officer fervor, and because of China's hardening public opinion, forming a United Front, and newfound insistence not to be pushed around, will end up in an escalated full-scale war over the the greater Beijing area and then the Shanghai area, by no later than the summer of 1938. I think the other powers of the world, save Germany and Italy, Japan's partners in the Anti-Comintern Pact, will condemn Japan's invasion, and morally favor China, but not intervene militarily against Japan, nor impose more than possibly limited export controls of selected weapons of war. The Soviet Union will become the most generous provisioner of aid to the Chinese United Front consisting of both the Nationalists and the Communist resisters. It will add to the USSR's global anti-Fascist "street cred" it is gaining from supporting the Spanish Republic in Europe. One consequence of Japan's conquest of the Dutch East Indies is that for the duration of that fight, at least, Dutch merchant cargo shippers, who carried a decent share of Japan's cargo trade, will not service Japanese Empire ports and the Japanese market, and the Dutch government will pressure Royal Dutch Shell to suspend business with Japan. There is a more than even chance that the angry Netherlands would continue these unilateral anti-Japanese embargoes even in the years post-defeat and post-conquest out of anger, unless free commerce is restored via a treaty involving some compensation or promise of it for Netherlands. The loss of this cargo shipping and those oil contracts would compel Japan during the fight to develop native Japanese substitute cargo shipping lines or hire alternative foreign merchant mariners under different flags, American, British, Greek, Panamanian, Italian, Norwegian, Danish, Swedish - probably some eclectic combination, with shortages at first. But I expect between 1937 and 1941 it would sensitize Tokyo to its dependence on foreign merchant bottoms and cause some increase in domestic merchant capacity, not just warship tonnage over that time. There is the chance that, being pragmatic and businesslike, and not wanting to further hurt their economy and revenues for funding their social insurance safety net and home defense during the Depression, the Dutch could sign a treaty with Japan or provisionally resume shipping commerce between their old, now Japanese occupied colony and Japan, in return for the freedom of their civil detainees and PoWs, and further property compensations or the mere promise of it and continued business right now, day to day. There is a Depression after all, and money is hard to come by, and insecurity looms in Europe Regarding the Sino-Japanese War once more, while London, Washington, Paris will all object to Japan's aggression in China as much as Moscow does, they may be stuck prioritizing resources between bolstering defenses of their own colonies, Dominions, Commonwealths in the Asia-Pacific region and aiding China. However, I think that surrogates for these empires in the Asia-Pacific, the Australians and New Zealanders, the command at Singapore, British Raj authorities at Simla, the US team at Manila, the French Governor General at Hanoi, will all be big boosters of the need to provide aid to China and its anti-Japanese resistance in order to tie down and immobilize Japan, and prevent it from having the means to make more conquests further south, east, or west. So, I think by the 1939-1940 timeframe, odds would favor delivery of loans, credits, arms to China from the west via Indochina and Burma. Japan's Army would likely have probes and border clashes with the Soviets and Outer Mongolians, in which the latter would hold their own. It would also have tensions and incidents with western diplomats and western deployed forces and the western concession jurisdictions in occupied China (see Japan's Tianjin incident with Britain, from 1939). Despite the increased apparent threat to the west, especially Britain in the Far East, and the focus that draws, and the possible precocious naval and expeditionary capability development that might cause, to some degree, I do not seeing the march of Fascist powers in Europe, the attempts at appeasement, the eventual end of appeasement, Nazi-Soviet Pact, and WWII, unfolding like OTL, on schedule. The Nazi-Soviet Pact, in an environment where there are frequent Soviet-Japanese border clashes, and the Soviets are a prime supporter of China (indeed a supplier of volunteer pilots), is likely to disappoint Japan and strain Nazi-Japanese relations, as it did in OTL, and slow their coordination of aggressive policies. The endgame of this timeline is that as the USA and UK get sicker of the China War and its territorial extent, they can extend sanctions. Japan can and would opportunistically benefit from German successes, like the fall of France, to occupy French Indochina, and perhaps with their DEI starting point, New Caledonia and New Hebrides. They can puppetize, strong-arm, or occupy Thailand even, while Britain and the USSR are at their weak points, fighting for their imperial Mediterranean lifelines and their capital and industrial heartlands against Axis assaults respectively. The UK would try to add what little it could to earlier defensive precautions to Singapore, and Australia and India, already more fortified than OTL - and may be coming up a bit shorter already in the Mediterranean/North African fight than OTL because of lack of ANZAC or Indian troops there. America would be trying to enhance its western Pacific defenses, and both powers together would be embargoing raw materials to Japan, and in any case would be at the point of hoarding almost all those same materials for their own and Soviet use in the anti-German war effort. The reality and idea of the embargo and the western build up in the Far East, and headiness over visible German advances in Europe by summer 1941 will tempt a few Japanese Navy types, civilian hawks, and one or two Army oddballs into advocating a sweeping surprise attack to drive the US and UK entirely from the Far East, but majority of the Navy staff, the institutional Army, China theater commanders, and Tokyo Cabinet will feel no such urgency and be content to let German victory ripen, or not, while plugging away, trying to wear China down and out. While the western embargo and financial freeze is a pain, and *theoretically* the British and American fleets, *if they one day concentrated them in the South China Sea* could interdict oil import routes between the Japanese East Indies and Japan and China, they show no sign of doing it now, and Tokyo would see it coming - these powers seem very preoccupied in the Atlantic, and Japan is sustaining itself adequately in petroleum. The likely result is with the now Japanese East Indies "under its belt" for almost five years before this timeline's 1941, Japan does not "take the plunge" into Pacific War against the USA or cobelligerency alongside Germany and Italy within the Axis. Your mileage may vary (YMMV), I am in the school of thought inclined to think that the USA and Germany were trending toward full war with each other within about 6 months or so of December 1941, regardless of what Japan did, or did not do. So the more probable timeline ahead from here is that before metereological summertime 1942, Germany has declared war on America or vice versa, the Battle of the Atlantic is a full oceanwide American-German-British surface and undersea naval battle, and with the DoWs, the USA is now not just committed to its prior undeclared naval war, waged de facto since about April 1941, but to full engage its air and ground forces in Africa and Europe to completely defeat Germany until victory. The ending and inevitable result of this would be after three and a half years, combined Allied defeat of Nazi Germany and division of Europe, perhaps with the dividing line slightly east of OTL. But importantly, Japan would steer clear of belligerency in this war, hoping to defeat China in its own, private war that avoids direct allied combat intervention on China's side. By the time the European War ends in late 1944 or 1945, China will not have defeated Japan in any conventional sense. On the other hand, Japan will certainly not have ended all Chinese resistance or pacified China. It may have occupied more parts of China and cut China off from land lines of supply by the west. (for an example of the possibility of late Sino-Japanese War advances, see OTL's Ichigo offensive) or even taken the Chinese capital of Chongqing, or China and Japan may have fought to a stalemate. So, the end of the war in Europe would see a tripolar world instead of a bipolar world like OTL. Not all poles would be equal. Japan would definitely be the third and smallest of the poles, sort of like China could have been counted as the third Cold War pole, but definitely the weakest, in the 60s, 70s, and 80s. America would start off the strongest, the Soviets in second place. With the defeat of Germany, both the USSR and USA would still have a problem with Japan's ongoing aggression/occupation in China, whatever level of resistance in China is ongoing, and they both have mountains of surplus weapons to supply to Chinese resisters. However, both the USA and USSR would *also* have burgeoning problems with *each other* and fears of each other over postwar matters of the fate of Poland, German occupation policy, Greece, the Turkish straits, Iran, control of atomic energy. But although Moscow and Washington would each see each other as the most powerful of their challengers and threats, with a militaristic, heavily armed, and multi-service Japan still a widely active power throughout all East Asia, they would not be each other's only relevant challengers.
I suspect that while the Japanese would crush the Dutch military quickly in a solely Dutch-Japanese war they could have problems developing the new colonies, at least in the medium and longer terms. Having faced Japanese racism and abuse I doubt that many civilians would be willing to help Japan in repairing war damage and getting things going again. Similarly the local population, while initially welcoming the Japanese 'liberators' that's not likely to last long when they realise that they will have even less freedom and more brutal treatment. True their not going to throw out the Japanese or even resist as much as the Chinese were able to but its going to cause a problem and once a wider war starts, you can expect aid to reach such rebels.
I don't think given the expected Japanese follow up into China that they will be involved in a wider war. If not a solely European WWII then both Moscow and London if not Washington will seek to aid the Chinese and once the war in Europe is finished a lot of aid will reach the Chinese and probably unofficially the Indonesian rebels. Competition between the western and communist powers could make them more eager to aid China to obtain its support and at this stage Stalin is probably unlikely to choose the weak CCP over the KMT. Not to mention that with Burma and possibly FIC still in allied hands a lot more aid is going to reach China while the allies are fighting the Germans, especially before the US enters the European war. This coupled with the alliance being formed between the democratic powers is likely to prompt the Japanese to expect even more pressure on them when Germany is defeated. As such there will be a strong incentive for Japan to strike while Germany is strong and the allies are looking weak. Its possible this won't happen and you end up with the tri-polar world your suggesting but even then the duration of Japan as a power beyond the immediate vicinity of Japan-Korea-Manchuria seems unlikely.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2024 19:28:55 GMT
Whether that would lead to one or more western nations declaring war on Japan given the circumstances at the time would be difficult to say But I also accept that this is a real possibility, and a quite interesting one. The idea of all the other powers standing aside while Japan lifts the East Indies from the Netherlands may turn out to be fatal miscalculation for Japan. Under pressure from imperial interests and Australia, which perhaps threatens to declare itself an independent republic and seek American protection, Britain under the Baldwin Government declares war on Japan - possibly after Japan disregards an ultimatum to halt and reverse its invasion of the Dutch East Indies, well that will make for an interesting medium-sized war at the tail end of 1936 and early 1937. Britain would get itself on a war footing and dispatch fleet units to Singapore, and reinforcements of men, ships and aircraft to Australia and the Pacific. Britain's early exertions in war production, mobilization, and deployment would have growing pains, and more men would be immediately be called to the colors of RN, RAF and Army ranks to fill them out to handle needs of the Far East war and ongoing sores like ongoing Arab Revolt in Palestine. Besides continuing its crackdown there, Britain might accelerate its move to the Arab-appeasing policies of 1939 White Paper to substantially restrict and put a 10 year limit on Jewish immigration and land purchases, foreclosing prospects of a Jewish majority there, to make things more quiet. With prompt action, and the Japanese making their approach through the Dutch East Indies from an east to west axis mainly, the British may be at risk of losing Sarawak and Sabah and Brunei in Borneo, maybe - but not Malaya and Singapore, which the Japanese are unlikely to be able to approach in strength with a combination of land-based AirPower and landing forces in anything like a timely fashion before defenses are prepared and reinforcements arrive. With British assistance, the Dutch should certainly fend off any Japanese attempts to land at Sumatra, and the Dutch and British together could well entirely repulse, or stall, any Japanese invasions of Java. Depending on the tactics and circumstances and locations of battle - proximity to each side's air bases, night fighting versus day fighting, commander skill, luck - each side can suffer some high profile naval losses. The Americans in all likelihood would not rouse themselves to the defense or direct combat assistance of the British, Australians or Dutch, but they would wish for their victory, and before long suspend exports of raw materials and war material to Japan. The Canadians and probably South Africans through would declare war on the Japanese and send forces to help out their Imperial partners. The French would not see the Pacific and Far East as their priority, Europe would remain so. They would not "like" participating in a Far East war or devote major national efforts to it. However, by the same token since they want and feel they *need* Britain's strategic backing in European affairs, they would probably not turn down any direct requests for military assistance or use of French facilities in the Far East in Indochina, New Caledonia, Polynesia, by the British Empire, even if this caused a Japanese declaration of war. Even if this incurred damage to the French Empire in the region, earning reciprocal British obligation to France's security in Europe, and not alienating Britain from such ties, would probably be worth it to Paris. So there is a decent chance France would find itself at war with Japan if Britain does. France also would not mind *the Netherlands* owing it favors possibly redeemable in Europe as well. Overall Japan would be contained early in this war, with a slow rollback, that, without participation of a power like the USSR, is not guaranteed to get Japan out of Manchuria and Korea. Without participation of America, it is not guaranteed to see Japan totally defeated and occupied, merely pushed back from its conquests, some of the China Seas, and Micronesia, after a prolonged submarine campaign. ---Another aspect of any Japanese-Dutch War turning into an Anglo-Japanese War is that it could lead right back to renewed combat in Chinese waters and on Chinese land, with Japan seizing Hong Kong and attacking British forces in the concession areas of China's ports like Shanghai and Tianjin. Chiang might stay neutral if it is appearing to him the British are not offering any revision to treaty port status and seem to be losing, and the Japanese are not spilling over much while they focus on the British, but if the British are offering some reform in the system, and more importantly money and weapons for the long-haul he thinks he can use to reclaim Manchuria, Chiang would become interested in anti-Japanese co-belligerency alongside Britain. Britain would like to make use of the Chinese territory for access to land close enough to bomb the Japanese home islands and inlets in which to hide submarines. It can be a bum costly deal for China though, with the strong Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea lashing out extensively across northern and eastern China in retaliation for China siding with Britain. But, with this type of coalition forming, Stalin in the USSR may think it a good time to avenge the Tsarist defeat of 1905 and attack Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin from the north to demonstrate the new capabilities Socialist Russia has. Lots of possibilities for a different world unfolding here. If the grandest possible anti-Japanese coalition emerges in 1937, the experience of working together there might carry over to a cooperative policy in Europe in Spain by 1938, and in joint support to back Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity that year.
Can't really see Australia going the independent republic route and allying with the US, both because of the much closer links between Australia and the UK at this period in just about every way and also that while Britain might be arguing it can't send the amount of aid Australia it will send something and Australia knows if Japan attacks its interest that Britain will fight. A still fairly isolationist US would be a much less reliable protector even if some agreement was made. Given the proposed timing of the attack on the DEI its either running into the final stage of the US Presidential elections or shortly afterwards. A Japanese attack on a European colony is unlikely to get much attention in an isolationist US still largely concerned with its recovery from the depression.
Assuming war with Britain and its allies comes during the Japanese attack on the DEI then as you say it could end up with Britain holding Malaya, Sumatra and part of Java. If so Japan faces a serious problem as while there's some on Borneo the bulk of the DEI oil is on Sumatra and hence outside Japanese control. Also while they might capture Borneo's oil albeit with some repair needed, especially for British Borneo the supply lines between them and Japan are going to be vulnerable to British attacks by sea and to a lesser degree air. As you point out Japanese shipping depends heavily on foreign shipping at this point and few of them are likely to stay available with a major shooting war in the region.
Yes Britain will lose Hong Kong and the base in the north China. Those will be prestige losses and also some economic. Whether Japan attacks the international settlement at Shanghai is a question as that would upset a number of other powers.
You actually have an interesting oddity here as with Hitler's desire to avoid war with Britain he could decide to support China over Japan which would really complicate matters in Europe depending on how rapidly things change in Europe and how much a Britain fighting a major war might take a more cautious approach to German aggression in Europe. If say Chamberlain decides to sign a different Munich agreement or ignore the latter entry into the rump Czech state, which probably leaves France feeling vulnerable despite promises of British support. Could you have no guarantee to Poland which would likely remove the R-M Pact as London especially decides to do what Stalin feared and direct German expansion eastwards against the Soviets? That could really complicate matters.
One other complication of course is that the UK and the Netherlands are allies in a war in the east but if confrontation comes between the western powers it complicates matters for the Hague. I suspect the Dutch in the event of a war between Britain/France and Germany would seek to maintain their neutrality in Europe but its even less likely than OTL to be respected by Germany.
Going through this a British support of the Dutch in 1936-37 would open up a wide range of possible wild cards for war in both hemispheres, which I've only just realised as I was thinking things through.
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Post by Max Sinister on May 4, 2024 0:11:06 GMT
In case you're interested in a twist: WI Nazi Germany joined the war, but against Japan? In that case, they might get the formerly German colonies in the Pacific back. Some at least. (Wehrmacht fighting in the jungles of New Guinea... that must've never done before.)
The LoN didn't outright forbid war, and Japan had left it in 1933 anyway. But they'll certainly look bad (again).
Italy may use the situation that the main powers will be preoccupied, to expand - just to where? Albania, or Yugoslavia even?
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 4, 2024 11:23:29 GMT
In case you're interested in a twist: WI Nazi Germany joined the war, but against Japan? In that case, they might get the formerly German colonies in the Pacific back. Some at least. (Wehrmacht fighting in the jungles of New Guinea... that must've never done before.) The LoN didn't outright forbid war, and Japan had left it in 1933 anyway. But they'll certainly look bad (again). Italy may use the situation that the main powers will be preoccupied, to expand - just to where? Albania, or Yugoslavia even?
Its possible that if Britain and Japan get into a war with Japan also at war with China then Germany might decide on such a step but I suspect its unlikely. Hitler wanted better relations with Britain, despite his policies doing just about everything he could to ruin them but I doubt he would be interested in a war so far away until France and the USSR are subdued. If Britain and Japan are fighting then he's got a lot more freedom of action in Europe unless it prompts a fearful France into acting while their still a lot more powerful than Germany.
If you mean Germany joining China alone - without an Anglo-Japanese war - I think that's even more unlikely. They would struggle to get forces to the theatre and don't have much spare in Europe current, especially if their probably already committed the Condor Legion to the Spanish Civil War which is arguably more in their interests. Plus they won't get New Guinea back as that's an Australian mandate, as are areas like the Solomon's. If they did somehow win such a war the places they might regain from Japan would be the Caroline and Mariana Islands and just possibly their former enclave in N China at Tsingtao, although that would be politically difficult for Chiang to accept. Such gains would be highly vulnerable to either a resurgent Japan or the western powers if [or rather when since we're talking about Hitler] Germany is involved in a major war in Europe.
Italy will play with fire when it can but I can't see it making a bid for Yugoslavia or Greece until the other great powers are at war as OTL. They might move to displace King Zog and annex Albania earlier, especially if Britain is engaged in war with Japan but I doubt more than that. Although could be wrong here if they think that Britain and France are too distracted by Japan and Germany respectively.
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Post by Max Sinister on May 4, 2024 13:40:41 GMT
In case you're interested in a twist: WI Nazi Germany joined the war, but against Japan? In that case, they might get the formerly German colonies in the Pacific back. Some at least. (Wehrmacht fighting in the jungles of New Guinea... that must've never done before.) The LoN didn't outright forbid war, and Japan had left it in 1933 anyway. But they'll certainly look bad (again). Italy may use the situation that the main powers will be preoccupied, to expand - just to where? Albania, or Yugoslavia even?
Its possible that if Britain and Japan get into a war with Japan also at war with China then Germany might decide on such a step but I suspect its unlikely. Hitler wanted better relations with Britain, despite his policies doing just about everything he could to ruin them but I doubt he would be interested in a war so far away until France and the USSR are subdued. If Britain and Japan are fighting then he's got a lot more freedom of action in Europe unless it prompts a fearful France into acting while their still a lot more powerful than Germany. Siding with someone in a war should help, doesn't it? It certainly worked for Sardinia in the Crimean War.
Still doesn't look like a smart move, gaining colonies on the other end of the world. But then, Nazi Germany gave up its wish for colonies only after 1938, because of the not-quite-alliance with Japan.
And even in such an ATL, I don't think France would've started a preventive war. If they didn't IOTL, they'd do it even less if the Empire was distracted by another war.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 8, 2024 2:17:56 GMT
In case you're interested in a twist: WI Nazi Germany joined the war, but against Japan? In that case, they might get the formerly German colonies in the Pacific back. Some at least. (Wehrmacht fighting in the jungles of New Guinea... that must've never done before.) The LoN didn't outright forbid war, and Japan had left it in 1933 anyway. But they'll certainly look bad (again). Italy may use the situation that the main powers will be preoccupied, to expand - just to where? Albania, or Yugoslavia even?
Its possible that if Britain and Japan get into a war with Japan also at war with China then Germany might decide on such a step but I suspect its unlikely. Hitler wanted better relations with Britain, despite his policies doing just about everything he could to ruin them but I doubt he would be interested in a war so far away until France and the USSR are subdued. If Britain and Japan are fighting then he's got a lot more freedom of action in Europe unless it prompts a fearful France into acting while their still a lot more powerful than Germany.
If you mean Germany joining China alone - without an Anglo-Japanese war - I think that's even more unlikely. They would struggle to get forces to the theatre and don't have much spare in Europe current, especially if their probably already committed the Condor Legion to the Spanish Civil War which is arguably more in their interests. Plus they won't get New Guinea back as that's an Australian mandate, as are areas like the Solomon's. If they did somehow win such a war the places they might regain from Japan would be the Caroline and Mariana Islands and just possibly their former enclave in N China at Tsingtao, although that would be politically difficult for Chiang to accept. Such gains would be highly vulnerable to either a resurgent Japan or the western powers if [or rather when since we're talking about Hitler] Germany is involved in a major war in Europe.
Italy will play with fire when it can but I can't see it making a bid for Yugoslavia or Greece until the other great powers are at war as OTL. They might move to displace King Zog and annex Albania earlier, especially if Britain is engaged in war with Japan but I doubt more than that. Although could be wrong here if they think that Britain and France are too distracted by Japan and Germany respectively.
Absolutely agree with this assessment. From the geopolitical priority perspectives of their countries in the 1930s, there just were really good reasons why Germany and Japan did not end up going to war with each other, directly, or by proxy. Their distance from each other largely put them out of the scope of each other's interest, and not targets of one another, obstacles, nor direct competitors for the same places and things. That same distance made close, intimate, collaboration as Allies, difficult as well. To a degree, as allies they mainly gave each other the "gift" of co-belligerency against most enemies, and common distraction of enemies. But not even all the same enemies, and not always with well synchronized timing.
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