miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 10, 2023 17:28:07 GMT
I do not see the connection between Anatolia and the Bursa area. And where did you get the idea that anyone mentioned Anatolia? That is exactly what I said. Obviously; it is what I referred when I scoffed at the dangers of North Atlantic traffic. As to the third point, if you are dying and achieving nothing that damages morale, but if you are running out of ammunition that also ruins the morale.
1) That was what some of the YT leadership was talking about in this period if the straits region and Constantinople fell.
2) For assorted reasons convoying was not implemented until 1917 and barring a major naval defeat for Germany that wasn't likely to change. However ship transportation was a hell of a lot easier and more efficient than even the best railway networks. As I said that's besides the point.
3) Since your proposals mean [much] less supplies to Russia than what is being suggested by a successful Gallipoli operations then that reinforces my point.
1. Then the general stupidity in play was worse than I thought? 2. See 1. Convoy for Americans started the moment war was declared. 3. That does not follow. You don't have the shipping either way. See 1.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 10, 2023 17:42:04 GMT
1) That was what some of the YT leadership was talking about in this period if the straits region and Constantinople fell.
2) For assorted reasons convoying was not implemented until 1917 and barring a major naval defeat for Germany that wasn't likely to change. However ship transportation was a hell of a lot easier and more efficient than even the best railway networks. As I said that's besides the point.
3) Since your proposals mean [much] less supplies to Russia than what is being suggested by a successful Gallipoli operations then that reinforces my point.
1. Then the general stupidity in play was worse than I thought? 2. See 1. Convoy for Americans started the moment war was declared. 3. That does not follow. You don't have the shipping either way. See 1.
1 Well if they don't fight on then there's even less problem.
2) Pity that's a lesson they decided to ignore in WWII.
3) Actually we do. As mentioned in a previous post it needs less shipping that the Persian or Murmansk options you have suggested - at least if moving the amount of good that is being suggested and would be even more difficult going via those routes both by sea then the latter land transit.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 10, 2023 20:24:21 GMT
1. Then the general stupidity in play was worse than I thought? 2. See 1. Convoy for Americans started the moment war was declared. 3. That does not follow. You don't have the shipping either way. See 1. 1 Well if they don't fight on then there's even less problem. 2) Pity that's a lesson they decided to ignore in WWII. 3) Actually we do. As mentioned in a previous post it needs less shipping that the Persian or Murmansk options you have suggested - at least if moving the amount of good that is being suggested and would be even more difficult going via those routes both by sea then the latter land transit.
Reposted here because it involves the same questions with different actors. After this insert, I will address the three comments strictly within the topic of the Dardanelles problem. What if the Soviets invade Turkey and seize the straits as an adjunct to their 1944 Balkans campaign? I am imagining that the Soviets were finding the Turkish straits far closer to powerful combat forces of their own in the late stages of WWII than in any stages of WWI or many other points of Russian history, and Stalin could have found it tempting, while occupying Bulgaria in strength, to cross the border and seize the Turkish straits as well. The Soviets declared war on Bulgaria and invaded it in September 1944, achieving almost instant capitulation. I imagine the Soviet combined ground, air and naval operation to seize the straits, and probably the Kars border region of northeastern Turkey, could be feasibly set up and well-timed for middle or late December 1944, and combined with a Declaration of War, based on supposed hostile Turkish intent, alleged past Turkish unneutral behavior, and hostile troop movements on the border during earlier dangerous points during the Great Patriotic War. [similar to justifications used in declaring war against Bulgaria, and Japan, who had not declared war on the USSR]. A December date would have allowed movement and concentration of Black Sea fleet support, troop echelons and airpower in Bulgaria and the Caucasus, to be able to execute a quick grab of Thrace, Constantinople, the Asian side of the sea of Marmara, Turkey's Aegean islands, and Kars. Politically, this is after the settlement of the western and Soviet occupation zones in Germany in London in September. And after the Balkan 'percentages' agreement in October 1944, which notably - did not address Turkey. It is also after FDR's reelection, and it at a moment where the inevitable bad PR and blowback the Soviets will face in the west is somewhat diluted by the recent British suppression of the Greek Communists being roundly criticized in the US press. It also after nearly all the year's Lend-Lease has been delivered, including just about everything to be used in the January offensive the Soviets intend to use to sweep across Poland to the gates of Berlin, to hopefully break into the city early in the new year. How long will and can the Turks fight for the territorities the Soviets are seizing and keep attempting counterattacks? How will the western powers react to the Soviet fait accompli, and its thin and unconvincing explanation, while the Soviets also press full steam ahead against the Germans in Central Europe and Yugoslavia? Do the Western Allies reshape any of their final operations for the defeat of the Nazis in Europe, terms of acceptance for Nazi surrenders, limit or terminate Lend Lease deliveries, or alter any of the stop lines they are aiming for in Europe? In Yalta, will they still be meeting with the Soviets in person, and seeking their participation in the Pacific War, and offering Lend-Lease in support of that end, or now rethinking that whole idea of extending the partnership eastward? --- Theoretically, the Soviets could initiate action against Turkey even sooner, in late September or October. It would require more advance Soviet planning and preparation and staging of follow-on forces and naval forces, but it would also seem to flow more 'naturalistically' and accidentally from adjacent operations in Bulgaria. It leaves open a branch plan to even cross the border and exert some influence in northeastern Greece on behalf of ELAS if so desired. Politically, it is riskier in that it leaves the Soviets appearing more unilaterally domineering than the British. It may also pose a risk to FDR's reelection and to Lend Lease supplies for the final Berlin campaign and for follow on caampaigns against Japan. What happens if the Soviets hit Turkey on the way through Bulgaria in late September 1944? What if they go one further, and don't agree to percentages or noninterference with the British in Greece, helping ELAS take over and arm up in northern Greece while passing through? Can you show me the logistics and physical lines of communication? I am locked in a discussion similar to this in concept embodying the same area with a different cast of historical characters going after this terrain; to try to overrun Turkey / the Ottoman Empire in a different thread. I do question that the Soviets WITHOUT allied logistic support can operate much past northern Bulgaria, once they hit the mountains. I cite actual history. There should have been no way for Greece to withstand the so called "Soviet Juggernaut", even with British help during the Greek civil war, unless the logistics was not there. It was not there, which is why Stalin tried proxy war. It was the same trick he tried in Korea for the same reason. You have no ability to cross country via truck? You are not going to crash through the Balkan mountains, much less the Caucasus. 1. If the Young Turks do not fight, then other Turks will, because historically other Turks did. The pattern of defense was German led anyway. 2. You can thank the Anglophile, Harold "Betty" Stark, for that stupidity. Our navy knew better. We started convoy in the Pacific immediately after Pearl Harbor. In this thread subject context, we did convoy to Russia in WWI when we shipped supplies to them.3. You make an error in 3 ways: a. You assume you have the shipping in the Mediterranean. You do not. Most of it is scattered in the North Atlantic fetching goods from the Western hemisphere or traveling fanned out upon the world ocean to the British Empire and French Africa bringing in raw materials to be made into British or French means of war for fighting in France. I think it was 3 out of 4 transoceanic merchant bottoms afloat and half the British and French coastwise trade. b. That railroad bypass is like unto a ship unload track it across Bulgaria and load ship and head to Russian Crimea. Bad, but better than the Gallipoli option. The Dardanelles-Bosporus is called a choke-point because it throttles the amount of shipping that can physically flow through that strait. So not only do you not have the hulls, it takes them forever to make it through the straits' traffic jams and unload at the Russian end. c. If you control Murmansk and you control Bandar Abbas, your turnaround time is British slow and not Russian lethargic and incompetent. The only time complaint is that it takes 1 month to get the guns there from New York. Guess what? It still takes that 1 month to get the guns to Sevastopol.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 11, 2023 13:06:31 GMT
1 Well if they don't fight on then there's even less problem. 2) Pity that's a lesson they decided to ignore in WWII. 3) Actually we do. As mentioned in a previous post it needs less shipping that the Persian or Murmansk options you have suggested - at least if moving the amount of good that is being suggested and would be even more difficult going via those routes both by sea then the latter land transit.
Reposted here because it involves the same questions with different actors. After this insert, I will address the three comments strictly within the topic of the Dardanelles problem. Can you show me the logistics and physical lines of communication? I am locked in a discussion similar to this in concept embodying the same area with a different cast of historical characters going after this terrain; to try to overrun Turkey / the Ottoman Empire in a different thread. I do question that the Soviets WITHOUT allied logistic support can operate much past northern Bulgaria, once they hit the mountains. I cite actual history. There should have been no way for Greece to withstand the so called "Soviet Juggernaut", even with British help during the Greek civil war, unless the logistics was not there. It was not there, which is why Stalin tried proxy war. It was the same trick he tried in Korea for the same reason. You have no ability to cross country via truck? You are not going to crash through the Balkan mountains, much less the Caucasus. 1. If the Young Turks do not fight, then other Turks will, because historically other Turks did. The pattern of defense was German led anyway. 2. You can thank the Anglophile, Harold "Betty" Stark, for that stupidity. Our navy knew better. We started convoy in the Pacific immediately after Pearl Harbor. In this thread subject context, we did convoy to Russia in WWI when we shipped supplies to them.3. You make an error in 3 ways: a. You assume you have the shipping in the Mediterranean. You do not. Most of it is scattered in the North Atlantic fetching goods from the Western hemisphere or traveling fanned out upon the world ocean to the British Empire and French Africa bringing in raw materials to be made into British or French means of war for fighting in France. I think it was 3 out of 4 transoceanic merchant bottoms afloat and half the British and French coastwise trade. b. That railroad bypass is like unto a ship unload track it across Bulgaria and load ship and head to Russian Crimea. Bad, but better than the Gallipoli option. The Dardanelles-Bosporus is called a choke-point because it throttles the amount of shipping that can physically flow through that strait. So not only do you not have the hulls, it takes them forever to make it through the straits' traffic jams and unload at the Russian end. c. If you control Murmansk and you control Bandar Abbas, your turnaround time is British slow and not Russian lethargic and incompetent. The only time complaint is that it takes 1 month to get the guns there from New York. Guess what? It still takes that 1 month to get the guns to Sevastopol.
1) Why? The Turks, including many former Young Turks such as Kamal and Envar fought during the war with Greece because they had little real choice. Here the YTs been defeated and either decided to cut their losses or retreat into the interior. The bulk of the rest of the population may see them as nationalists or as bloody nuciences who are getting people killed because of their egos while most simply want peace.
2) Interesting that the USN decided to commit escorts to convoys in a less important theatre but refused repeated requests to do so off their own coastline and in adjacent waters they had taken responsibility for. Doubly so when the IJN give attacks on merchant shipping a very low priority while it was the be-all and end-all of the German war effort at sea.
3a) Doubtful, especially if some of the ships can be taken off the Atlantic route with trade with Russia being available. Plus your talking about needing more shipping going by either the Murnamsk or Persian routes because of the length of distance to travel.
3b) So you have pretty much the same amount of travel by sea [ including shipping demand which your claiming above isn't available ] combined with twice transferring between sea and land - long before containerization remember - and a trip by a limited railway, partly through unfriendly territory added to it. That sounds logical not. Also it assumes a complex invasion of Bulgaria which requires both Greek and Romania to be active with the allies much earlier than they were and Germany and Turkey to do nothing to intervene.
3c) The problem, as your already aware, is the lack of ability to transport materials landed at those isolated locations to the Russian heartland, let alone the front line. Plus again the huge demand for merchant shipping, especially along the southernmost of those routes.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 11, 2023 19:45:05 GMT
1) Why? The Turks, including many former Young Turks such as Kamal and Envar fought during the war with Greece because they had little real choice. Here the YTs been defeated and either decided to cut their losses or retreat into the interior. The bulk of the rest of the population may see them as nationalists or as bloody nuciences who are getting people killed because of their egos while most simply want peace. 1. Not a valid assumption for political and military reasons in this specific case. Since it is German led, this defense, it will be German organized. The Young Turks were irrelevant. 2) Interesting that the USN decided to commit escorts to convoys in a less important theatre but refused repeated requests to do so off their own coastline and in adjacent waters they had taken responsibility for. Doubly so when the IJN give attacks on merchant shipping a very low priority while it was the be-all and end-all of the German war effort at sea. 2. Different war, and off-topic, but blame yourselves. Your navy lied to ours, TWICE in both wars. We concentrated on the worst naval threats, as we found fit and proper in WWI. In that war, it was the U-boat, which you did not handle well. If you want to discuss WWII, that is a new thread. 3a) Doubtful, especially if some of the ships can be taken off the Atlantic route with trade with Russia being available. Plus your talking about needing more shipping going by either the Murnamsk or Persian routes because of the length of distance to travel. 3. You cannot shift bottoms unless you want to starve France and the UK. It does not work. Main force on force, the western front, and the Entente nations behind that front, consumed all the shipping that I mentioned. 3b) So you have pretty much the same amount of travel by sea [ including shipping demand which your claiming above isn't available ] combined with twice transferring between sea and land - long before containerization remember - and a trip by a limited railway, partly through unfriendly territory added to it. That sounds logical not. Also it assumes a complex invasion of Bulgaria which requires both Greek and Romania to be active with the allies much earlier than they were and Germany and Turkey to do nothing to intervene. 4. I did not say you could avoid infrastructure improvements, did I? I mentioned that fact in discussing the Bulgaria sidestep;. 3c) The problem, as your already aware, is the lack of ability to transport materials landed at those isolated locations to the Russian heartland, let alone the front line. Plus again the huge demand for merchant shipping, especially along the southernmost of those routes. 5. See previous remark. If that is the case, as you agree, why be stupid about it and try Gallipoli at all? Go where the traffic flows unimpeded and unload cargo one time without fighting through a kill funnel. Let the Russians figure out how to move it to the front once you get it to them close enough that it can be so moved. That finally is on them.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 12, 2023 12:53:26 GMT
1) Why? The Turks, including many former Young Turks such as Kamal and Envar fought during the war with Greece because they had little real choice. Here the YTs been defeated and either decided to cut their losses or retreat into the interior. The bulk of the rest of the population may see them as nationalists or as bloody nuciences who are getting people killed because of their egos while most simply want peace. 1. Not a valid assumption for political and military reasons in this specific case. Since it is German led, this defense, it will be German organized. The Young Turks were irrelevant. 2) Interesting that the USN decided to commit escorts to convoys in a less important theatre but refused repeated requests to do so off their own coastline and in adjacent waters they had taken responsibility for. Doubly so when the IJN give attacks on merchant shipping a very low priority while it was the be-all and end-all of the German war effort at sea. 2. Different war, and off-topic, but blame yourselves. Your navy lied to ours, TWICE in both wars. We concentrated on the worst naval threats, as we found fit and proper in WWI. In that war, it was the U-boat, which you did not handle well. If you want to discuss WWII, that is a new thread. 3a) Doubtful, especially if some of the ships can be taken off the Atlantic route with trade with Russia being available. Plus your talking about needing more shipping going by either the Murnamsk or Persian routes because of the length of distance to travel. 3. You cannot shift bottoms unless you want to starve France and the UK. It does not work. Main force on force, the western front, and the Entente nations behind that front, consumed all the shipping that I mentioned. 3b) So you have pretty much the same amount of travel by sea [ including shipping demand which your claiming above isn't available ] combined with twice transferring between sea and land - long before containerization remember - and a trip by a limited railway, partly through unfriendly territory added to it. That sounds logical not. Also it assumes a complex invasion of Bulgaria which requires both Greek and Romania to be active with the allies much earlier than they were and Germany and Turkey to do nothing to intervene. 4. I did not say you could avoid infrastructure improvements, did I? I mentioned that fact in discussing the Bulgaria sidestep;. 3c) The problem, as your already aware, is the lack of ability to transport materials landed at those isolated locations to the Russian heartland, let alone the front line. Plus again the huge demand for merchant shipping, especially along the southernmost of those routes. 5. See previous remark. If that is the case, as you agree, why be stupid about it and try Gallipoli at all? Go where the traffic flows unimpeded and unload cargo one time without fighting through a kill funnel. Let the Russians figure out how to move it to the front once you get it to them close enough that it can be so moved. That finally is on them.
1) Wrong. At this point Germany had very little capacity to aid the Turks and there is no direct link between Germany and the Ottoman empire that doesn't involve hostile or neutral territory. To get this Germany OTL has to persuade Bulgaria to join the central powers and then with their aid crush Serbia. Single German officers can reach Constantinople but German units [other than Goeben and Breslau] can't nor can masses of military supplies.
2) Untrue. The US repeatedly tried to breach agreements because it was obsessed with getting men into Britain without bothering how to feed them, or the local population. I remember I responded on another site to a discussion on this issue that the primary use of GIs arriving in 42.43 if the US had gotten its way would have been as rations for the British population and while somewhat hyperbolic this was the general trend of how unrealistic the US attitude was. They totally ignored any advice they didn't want to listen to with considerable allied [including US] losses and wasting of resources.
3) Again totally wrong. How the hell did the allies get considerable amounts to Murmansk and Persia OTL? There wasn't massive shortages in Britain or France. Plus this also involved a lot of shipping tied down on supporting operations across the world to get such supplies to those locations and to support forces engaged against the Turks which could be massively reduced if the Turks are defeated even if relatively weak forces are continuing resistance deep in Anatolia.
4) No your just hand-waving them away and assuming that railway links, even if only single track can be built markedly faster than OTL. Also hand-waving with the idea of getting both Greece and Romania onto the allied side 2+ years earlier and invading and conquering Bulgaria while the CPs do nothing to interfere with your plans. Your also continuing denying that transport by ship is a lot more efficient that a ship - rudimentary railway - ship route through occupied Bulgaria.
5) As pointed out previous supplies delivered to Black Sea ports are not only much closer to the eastern front than either Murmansk or Persia but also there are good ports and railways there because before the war this region handled a lot of Russian bulk trade.
I see no point in continuing with this until you actually address some of the points raised with your suggestions.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 14, 2023 22:48:39 GMT
Wrong. At this point Germany had very little capacity to aid the Turks and there is no direct link between Germany and the Ottoman empire that doesn't involve hostile or neutral territory. To get this Germany OTL has to persuade Bulgaria to join the central powers and then with their aid crush Serbia. Single German officers can reach Constantinople but German units [other than Goeben and Breslau] can't nor can masses of military supplies. Then explain how Germans (Otto von Sanders and Erich Weber) got there and organized those defenses? 2) Untrue. The US repeatedly tried to breach agreements because it was obsessed with getting men into Britain without bothering how to feed them, or the local population. I remember I responded on another site to a discussion on this issue that the primary use of GIs arriving in 42.43 if the US had gotten its way would have been as rations for the British population and while somewhat hyperbolic this was the general trend of how unrealistic the US attitude was. They totally ignored any advice they didn't want to listen to with considerable allied [including US] losses and wasting of resources. Really? All that FOOD we sent to Great Britain in both world wars was because we wanted the British to feed our troops in WWII? Specifically in WWI, though, how were we sending troops to the UK when the fighting was in FRANCE, the convoys were headed to FRANCE and the FRENCH were happy to feed and arm their guests, because we "broke our agreements" and what has that to do with this thread subject or the fact that the RN LIED to the American navy, officially government to government and navy to navy in both wars? Again totally wrong. How the hell did the allies get considerable amounts to Murmansk and Persia OTL? There wasn't massive shortages in Britain or France. Plus this also involved a lot of shipping tied down on supporting operations across the world to get such supplies to those locations and to support forces engaged against the Turks which could be massively reduced if the Turks are defeated even if relatively weak forces are continuing resistance deep in Anatolia. Ahm, you do realize that you confuse two wars? No your just hand-waving them away and assuming that railway links, even if only single track can be built markedly faster than OTL. Also hand-waving with the idea of getting both Greece and Romania onto the allied side 2+ years earlier and invading and conquering Bulgaria while the CPs do nothing to interfere with your plans. Your also continuing denying that transport by ship is a lot more efficient that a ship - rudimentary railway - ship route through occupied Bulgaria. I am denying the capacity and competence to conduct this kine of operation by the people who did not get Greece onside before they tried it and who assumed you could cross the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus with the means they had allotted, the assumptions they made, and the actual campaign they conducted. They were incredibly inept and amateurish in this operation. I do not mean the French. As pointed out previous supplies delivered to Black Sea ports are not only much closer to the eastern front than either Murmansk or Persia but also there are good ports and railways there because before the war this region handled a lot of Russian bulk trade. Really? How many usable railroads do you count? I count ONE.
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oscssw
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Post by oscssw on Jun 2, 2023 2:39:54 GMT
Good discussion. I happen to agree with Simon Darkshade. The Brits and French hit the wrong landing area. I'm no Strategist but I can read a chart/Map. When Simon wrote "Where is the peninsula at its narrowest? Right at the neck, at the Gulf of Saros. Take that narrow and the Turkish forces behind it in the peninsula wither on the vine." He had the Turks right by the Gonads and all the Allies had to do was squeeze. From a purely tactical perspective, something I have some small competence in,the fleet does not have to funnel through a series of choke points that were very easily defended by mine fields and coast artillery. Then they get to take the Turk ground forces from the rear. Only then do the navies have to administratively clear the mines without being shot to pieces. Then they transit into the Black Sea and using their total sea control in that area carry out a series of amphibious landings that allow them to maintain the tactical initiative to support the main strategy which is WHEAT.
Or so argues Nicholas Lambert in "The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster". His basic premise is the Dardenals Campaign wasn’t just about Churchill—and it wasn’t any sort of strategic alternative to escape the stalemate on the Western Front. Rather, Gallipoli was all about wheat. More specifically, Russian wheat—grain that Moscow needed to export to earn hard currency to stay in the war and food that British leaders felt they desperately needed as the world (and their island nation) faced skyrocketing prices and fears of scarcity. Ever since the Ottoman Empire had joined Germany and Austria-Hungary as part of the Central Powers late in 1914, the Ottoman-controlled Turkish Straits had been closed to commercial shipping. The Russian Empire, which had become one of the biggest suppliers of wheat to the global market (and to Britain) in the years before the war, was suddenly stuck without an outlet.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 2, 2023 13:26:33 GMT
Or so argues Nicholas Lambert in "The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster". His basic premise is the Dardenals Campaign wasn’t just about Churchill—and it wasn’t any sort of strategic alternative to escape the stalemate on the Western Front. Rather, Gallipoli was all about wheat. More specifically, Russian wheat—grain that Moscow needed to export to earn hard currency to stay in the war and food that British leaders felt they desperately needed as the world (and their island nation) faced skyrocketing prices and fears of scarcity. Ever since the Ottoman Empire had joined Germany and Austria-Hungary as part of the Central Powers late in 1914, the Ottoman-controlled Turkish Straits had been closed to commercial shipping. The Russian Empire, which had become one of the biggest suppliers of wheat to the global market (and to Britain) in the years before the war, was suddenly stuck without an outlet. I think the terrain adjutting the Gulf of Saros is worse than the beaches selected in the original landing disaster. You still have to blast your way through the forts and hills to the immediate west of Istanbul, too. And of course you get shelled on three sides and mined into the bargain, not through a kill funnel, but in a kill-bag.
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oscssw
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Post by oscssw on Jun 3, 2023 11:25:12 GMT
Aha, You Know something my friend Miletus12?
You spoil everything! [/b] I know some people who might be able to give the Gulf of Saros landing a real chance of succeeding.
After all they cut their teeth invading Nassau, against the Super Power of it's day and the Ruler of the waves to boot. during the American revolution These guys would gladly spear head the landing if HM government asked real nicely!
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Post by simon darkshade on Jun 3, 2023 12:43:12 GMT
From my ‘reading’, the Gulf of Saros is flat as fudge, with the issue not being terrain, but the presence of the strat reserve in the region. The issue is decidedly not the terrain close to Constantinople.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 3, 2023 14:38:16 GMT
From my ‘reading’, the Gulf of Saros is flat as fudge, with the issue not being terrain, but the presence of the strat reserve in the region. The issue is decidedly not the terrain close to Constantinople. The south shore is flattish. The north is not. And as you proceed east from the beaches... You can probably do it if you were a marine or ANZAC in 1943. In 1916? It is disputable.
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Post by simon darkshade on Jun 4, 2023 7:59:26 GMT
Shifting the goalposts a fair bit.
The proposition was to land on the southern shore, not the north, and then head south across the narrow neck to the Sea of Marmara. From there, the forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula are cut off and can be reduced until utterly defeated. The push is on Bulair, not to the east.
At that point, the Gulf of Saros is ~7.5 miles across, or greater than the range of the Krupp 15cm howitzer, the Krupp 10.5cm gun, the Krupp 87mm field gun and the Krupp 75mm gun. This would suggest that the Turks aren’t going to be shelling from the north. Scratch one of the sides of the fearsome crossfire. Given that the next nearest artillery to Bulair to the west is at Gallipoli, they aren’t going to be shelling from the west. There aren’t any artillery units within quick deployment range to the east, either. Scratch those two sides. There are the Bulair based forces, amounting to 16 x 75mm. How are the Turks going to mine the Allies into the Gulf of Saros? Slip some minelayers out through the Dardanelles and hope they won’t be noticed?
It would be bloody, but comparatively easier than Cape Helles and Anzac Cove, and not, I would contend, confined to WW2 troops. The advances by the Kiwis in the initial push, for example. The advantage is that it is a limited attack that masses/concentrates force in pursuit of much more achievable objectives of 3.75 miles.
What follows is not a landward drive on Constantinople. That has only been suggested by you, in what could be characterised as inadvertently defining the other side out of the debate. The original post outlines a quite detailed list of steps, none of which include a land advance along the northern coast of the Sea of Marmara.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 4, 2023 8:55:31 GMT
If you land, you still have to head east The beachhead is easy. They did that at Gallipoli. At Saros, you land and still go nowhere. The Turks have more time and terrain space to react and defend faster than the same presumed incompetents who mishandled the original landing could build up. As for mining. That is easy. You do what the Americans did in their Civil War. You swim the mines out or set them adrift as wild mines. Finally, if your objective is to move goods into the Black Sea from the Mediterranean, you still need to clear the Bosporus or port to port overland. So; where do you want to go? North? That bypass, which I examined as a planning option, I previously covered and rejected because of the terrain, weather and a new enemy, the Bulgarians. I think where we part company is that you do not think of the entirety of the necessary campaign to make the landings worthwhile in the first place. This is an infantry brawl over terrible defensive advantage terrain that favors the Turks. In WWI terms, you have no tanks, your mortars are not present in enough numbers or in enough throw mass to make up for the lack of tanks, your sapper or assault teams do not have the 1917 French training and experience yet, Your naval gunfire support is flat trajectory and ineffective beyond seven kilometers practical and is wildly inaccurate anyway. And these are Turks on their home ground. They are not the same as the out of supply and water Turks Allenby will trounce in Palestine in another year. Different terrain, different logistics and British cavalry could operate there. Here, it is west front conditions in worse terrain for infantry attacks. The defensive troop density per meter front is 6x higher. And there are Turk LLOC to the Germans, so ammunition and machine guns and needed artillery will be plentifully delivered via the Orient Express. Maybe the Kiwis can make 7 kilometers from the south shore, but in whatever direction they travel, they have to advance 150 kilometers at a minimum. That did not happen, once a trench system went in anywhere until 1918. And even NOT THEN.
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Post by simon darkshade on Jun 4, 2023 9:47:56 GMT
The purpose of the landing is to cut off the Gallipoli Peninsula. You are definitely shifting the goalposts here to create your own irrelevancies. Again, the purpose is to cut off the peninsula, pocket the cut off Turkish forces there, then occupy said peninsula. He who holds the northern shore controls the narrows. The Turks don’t have time or space; they are being hit with a surprise blow in a confined area, without space to move by the very definition. You then proceed to post two utterly irrelevant pictures. Swimming out mines? Letting them loose? That simply isn’t going to achieve anywhere near the necessary concentration. This is simply grasping at straws. Then we shift the goalposts once again, this time from the thread topic to your completely separate Bulgarian divergence. Your largest paragraph is full of unfortunately typical shotgun arguments. Breaking it down: - No, I work within the bounds of the OP rather than trying to twist a discussion to particular hobby horses. - It is an infantry fight, but not over ‘terrible defensive terrain’ by any stretch of the imagination. - Tanks, mortars etc are all irrelevant - The neck of the peninsula is a little over 6km and is within the limited range of naval gunfire - They are on their home ground, but they are limited in numbers, firepower and cover and the Bulair division isn’t even their best one in the area. Home ground advantage isn’t some magical thing. Indeed, they lost a battle there two years previous en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bulair- This patently isn’t Western Front conditions. This goes beyond hyperbole into outright falsification. www.geliboluyunusemlak.com/portfoy-goster/satilik-arsa-araziler/canakkale-gelibolu-bolayir-da-7-480m2-imarli-arsaThat is not worse terrain than Paschendaele, Arras, the Somme or elsewhere. Good heavens - The Turks have a division of ~12000 to cover a 5 mile front of open beach - The Orient Express goes to Constantinople, not Bulair, and is a passenger service. Considering that you are talking about the 1700 mile railway, though, at 30mph gives us ~56.67 hours for a fortuitously preloaded train to make it from Berlin to Constantinople. The better part of two and a half days, in the most unrealistic of circumstances. In that time, the landings will be over and done with and, based on the correlation of forces, firepower and terrain, the terrain seized. Your point here verges upon the nonsensical. They don’t have to go 100 miles in either direction. That isn’t what was proposed. I am not talking about a march on Constantinople, nor was the OP. This is shifting the goalposts breathtakingly.
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