WWII- Whenever driven from Libya in defeat, would Axis forces have always retreated to & occupied Tu
Oct 21, 2022 1:21:30 GMT
stevep likes this
Post by raharris1973 on Oct 21, 2022 1:21:30 GMT
In any WWII scenario, whenever circumstances ultimately drive Axis forces, combined German-Italian or solo Italiano from Libya in defeat, would Axis forces have always retreated to & occupied Tunisia?
In OTL, Axis forces were driven from Libya by the British 8th Army in Jan 1943 (or retreated ahead of the British 8th Army's advance, however you want to slice it). Various popular scenarios have been mentioned that have envisioned as possibly leading to an earlier British victory on this scale earlier in the war. These include:
a) The British not diverting any forces to Greece in spring 1941 and keeping forces focused on the desert campaign
&
b) The British not getting attacked by the Japanese in December 1941 and sustaining a string of Far Eastern defeats that diverted the flow of potential reinforcement and supplies from the desert campaign to the Far East
&
c) The British being stingier with some Lend-Lease allocations to the Soviet Union & routing that support to the forces on the Egyptian-Libyan front instead
Even supposing adjustments like any of the above are enough to drive the Italians or the Afrika Korps back entirely out of Libya, as some have suggested, I have always had a follow-up question to the implication that this means it is 'game-over' in North Africa.
Namely, why wouldn't in spring 1941, or the summer of 1941, or the winter of 1941-42, the Axis forces just retreat into Tunisia, and why wouldn't Hitler and Mussolini send in a reinforcing rescue force to occupy Tunisia?
Could the Allies really just have the luck of Axis forces in western Libya simply mass surrendering in these early defeat scenarios, rather than retreating to fight on, or at least escape?
Would the Axis be satisfied with a mere desperate evacuation of all the Afrika Korps men and aircraft it could, leaving behind equipment, and leaving Vichy territory alone?
If there are reasons why Germany & Italy would have tread lightly in Tunisia and Vichy Africa during a 1941 emergency or an early 1942 emergency, but would had gotten bolder by the time of second El Alamein and Operation Torch, I would like to know what those reasons were.
If, on the other hand, the Axis would always have reacted to losing Libya by retreat to and occupation of Tunisia, it raises the next question. Once Italy and Germany have 'broken the seal' by occupying a formerly formally neutral French colony of Tunisia, why not occupy the rest of French North Africa? I mean there's limits to available forces. But violating Tunisia, and quite possibly metro France, has probably outraged Vichy commanders in the whole region and made them more prone to defection, and safeguarding Moroccan and Algerian and Moroccan shores against a Free French rising, Allied landing, or both, would seem to make sense from an Axis POV.
If Germans and Italians and Luftwaffe are on those northwest African beaches *ahead* of any landing, well Operation Torch has just become a great deal riskier than against potentially non-resisting or weakly resisting Vichy forces alone.
Looking at a specific scenario - say British non-involvement with Greece in March-April makes for a British route of the Italians in Libya by the beginning of May 1941. Concerned about the Italian collapse and possibly the collapse of last minute arrived German forces, and what idle British hands might do, Hitler could easily order the occupation of Tunisia and consolidation of Axis defenses there, and branch out from that occcupation to occupy the coastal ports of Algeria and French Morocco, to safeguard against a Free French revolt or British invasion. It is not likely at this time that Britain has the forces and shipping to mount any successful amphibious landing on any of the northwest African coasts. Suez is safe for now, and has plenty of buffer space, but the North African front is by no means over, and in fact the threat to Malta and Gibraltar has just tightened up a bit.
In OTL, Axis forces were driven from Libya by the British 8th Army in Jan 1943 (or retreated ahead of the British 8th Army's advance, however you want to slice it). Various popular scenarios have been mentioned that have envisioned as possibly leading to an earlier British victory on this scale earlier in the war. These include:
a) The British not diverting any forces to Greece in spring 1941 and keeping forces focused on the desert campaign
&
b) The British not getting attacked by the Japanese in December 1941 and sustaining a string of Far Eastern defeats that diverted the flow of potential reinforcement and supplies from the desert campaign to the Far East
&
c) The British being stingier with some Lend-Lease allocations to the Soviet Union & routing that support to the forces on the Egyptian-Libyan front instead
Even supposing adjustments like any of the above are enough to drive the Italians or the Afrika Korps back entirely out of Libya, as some have suggested, I have always had a follow-up question to the implication that this means it is 'game-over' in North Africa.
Namely, why wouldn't in spring 1941, or the summer of 1941, or the winter of 1941-42, the Axis forces just retreat into Tunisia, and why wouldn't Hitler and Mussolini send in a reinforcing rescue force to occupy Tunisia?
Could the Allies really just have the luck of Axis forces in western Libya simply mass surrendering in these early defeat scenarios, rather than retreating to fight on, or at least escape?
Would the Axis be satisfied with a mere desperate evacuation of all the Afrika Korps men and aircraft it could, leaving behind equipment, and leaving Vichy territory alone?
If there are reasons why Germany & Italy would have tread lightly in Tunisia and Vichy Africa during a 1941 emergency or an early 1942 emergency, but would had gotten bolder by the time of second El Alamein and Operation Torch, I would like to know what those reasons were.
If, on the other hand, the Axis would always have reacted to losing Libya by retreat to and occupation of Tunisia, it raises the next question. Once Italy and Germany have 'broken the seal' by occupying a formerly formally neutral French colony of Tunisia, why not occupy the rest of French North Africa? I mean there's limits to available forces. But violating Tunisia, and quite possibly metro France, has probably outraged Vichy commanders in the whole region and made them more prone to defection, and safeguarding Moroccan and Algerian and Moroccan shores against a Free French rising, Allied landing, or both, would seem to make sense from an Axis POV.
If Germans and Italians and Luftwaffe are on those northwest African beaches *ahead* of any landing, well Operation Torch has just become a great deal riskier than against potentially non-resisting or weakly resisting Vichy forces alone.
Looking at a specific scenario - say British non-involvement with Greece in March-April makes for a British route of the Italians in Libya by the beginning of May 1941. Concerned about the Italian collapse and possibly the collapse of last minute arrived German forces, and what idle British hands might do, Hitler could easily order the occupation of Tunisia and consolidation of Axis defenses there, and branch out from that occcupation to occupy the coastal ports of Algeria and French Morocco, to safeguard against a Free French revolt or British invasion. It is not likely at this time that Britain has the forces and shipping to mount any successful amphibious landing on any of the northwest African coasts. Suez is safe for now, and has plenty of buffer space, but the North African front is by no means over, and in fact the threat to Malta and Gibraltar has just tightened up a bit.
