The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

March 11th 1898

United States - Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief Of The Bureau Of Navigation, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

March 11, 1898.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

The following dispatch has just been received from the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Naval Force on the Asiatic Station:

For squadron to operate in Philippine Islands, it is desirable that ammunition and coal should be sent from San Francisco immediately. Other Government has bought all good coal.

(Sig) DEWEY2

In view of the foregoing message, immediate steps should be taken to send the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station a full supply of coal.

I understand from the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment that there is no good coal available on our Pacific Coast that could be dispatched to China. I therefore think it would be good policy to charter immediately a large steamer in England, capable of carrying 5000 tons, have it loaded with coal in England, and send it at once to Hong Kong, or such other port as Commodore Dewey might designate. I do not think the Government would lose any money by such a transaction, even if it should be found, upon the arrival of the steamer in China, that our squadron did not need the coal, as there is always a demand in China for good coal, and any surplus that was not used by our ships could be readily disposed of in open market. I cannot too strongly urge upon the Department that this step be taken without further delay.

A.S. Crowninshield

Chief of Bureau

United States - Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, Commander, North Atlantic Station To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S. Flagship, New York, 1st Rate,

Key West, Florida,

March 11th, 1898.

Sir:-

1. I find on examining the list of Spanish vessels of war on the coast of Cuba or soon to be there, that there are

4 Torpedo Boat Destroyers, 400 tons and 30 knots speed.

2. Torpedo Boat Destroyers, 370 tons and 25 knots speed.

4. 1st class Torpedo Boats of from 97 to 108 tons and 24 to 26 knots speed

6 Torpedo vessels from 456 to 747 tons and 20 knots speed.

2. On our side we have no destroyers and only six (6) torpedo boats from 125 to 105 tons and 21 to 30 knots speed.

3. I would suggest that in case of hostilities we ought to have some destroyers and more boats and therefore recommend that some of each of these classes be purchased - say at first eight destroyers and four additional boats. When the blockade of the coast of Cuba is ultimately established it is probable that more of each kind would be needed.

Very Respectfully,

Montgomery Sicard

Rear Admiral, Comdr.-in-Chief,

U.S. Naval Force on North Atlantic Station.

Philippines - United States Consul At Manila Oscar F. Williams To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

Manila Philippine Islands, Mar. 11-1898.

Honored Sir:

You cabled in cipher asking if I had read a certain letter. I cabled you in care of U.S. Consul-General that no such letter had been read by me. The cipher cables excited the gravest suspicions here and filled the air with war rumors: And cables from Spain to the Gov. Genl. here are reported that because of expected attack on Manila by seven U.S. battle ships, that two more ships of war had been sent from Spain to aid her four now in Manila Bay. Reports also of my having visited the Admiral Etc. Etc. Well I have not so visited the Admiral, and if seven or any other number of U.S. ships plan an attack on Manila I have never read a word of information of such plan and hence I refuse to credit the reports above referred to.

You wrote asking my opinion of having one U.S. warship make a friendly call here, exchange salutes, visit, Etc. Etc. and I replied I worry such a visit and under the peculiar conditions existing because of claimed pacification and departure of the popular Gov. Genl. this month for Spain. I suggested that I visit him and obtain his opinion.

Thus much for what has passed. If a visit for peace be made we will cooperate to make it successful. But if war comes of which I know nothing and which we both will deplore, you may command me for any service in my power as I am as patriotic an American as I am capable of being.

It may be best for me to visit Hong Kong on account of intense suspicion existing here because of cipher cables Etc. and if you wish me to visit you. so cable and I will start with first steamer.

My relations with officials here are very cordial and as my Madrid Exequatur came yesterday. I would now promptly make my official calls were it not for the war rumors afloat.

As Consul here and a stranger you know I desire quiet and friendly relations with all, but my duty remains to keep you as fully informed as your greater knowledge of conditions between our own nation and Spain may require.

Two Spanish battle ships anchored in the Bay have lately lowered their mast and I am told are fully manned, as if expecting action. You know all conditions - I have not read by cable or letter any instructions from U.S. Govt. and hence discredit nearly all I hear as to trouble between U.S. and Spain,

The cable is now cut in three places in three places as I am informed and if war reports be true our correspondence either by cable or letter may be stopped.

I shall be vigilant, brave and quick to answer, so if you fail to receive prompt answers to any cable or letter you may conclude that the authorities here interfere, for I am every hour at my post and shall neither neglect nor delay reply to any cable or letter.

Since writing the above information comes to me of another insurgent uprising on the Coast of Luzon so formidable that two regiments of soldiers have been sent overland and the warship “Don Juan de Austria” dispatched to the scene to co-operate with the land forces.

This long communication will fully explain my position.

Your obedient servant.

O.F. Williams

U.S. Consul.

Manila

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

COPY FAX

Hong Kong, March 11, 1898.

To Secretary of the Navy:

For the squadron to operate in the Philippine Islands it is desirable that ammunition and coal should be sent from San Francisco immediately. Other governments have bought all good coal.

Dewey.

March 14th 1898

Cadiz, Spain

The Spanish Navy's Atlantic Squadron, commanded by Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, leaves the Spanish port of Cadiz for the Canary Islands and then the Portuguese-held Cape Verde Islands to position itself for a dash to the West Indies in the event of war. Admiral Cervera has orders to destroy Key West and blockade the East Coast of the United States, but knows that his navy is in disrepair, has no ship repair facilities in the Americas, is ill-trained, and is significantly weaker than the US Navy. He advocates a defensive strategy, but is ignored.

United States

While the United States Naval leadership was unconcerned with the prospect of a Spanish attack on the East Coast and believed a Spanish attack on the Pacific coast to be almost impossible. They more worried that popular demands for protection would compromise the Navy’s ability to go on the offensive. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt wrote to future Naval War Board member, Capt. Alfred T. Mahan:

I further agree with you with all my heart about local coast defense. I shall urge, and have urged, the President and the Secretary to pay absolutely no heed to the outcries for protection from Spanish raids. Take the worst--a bombardment of New York. It would amount to absolutely nothing, as affecting the course of a war, or damaging permanently the prosperity of the country.

Philippines - United States Consul At Manila Oscar F. Williams To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

O. F. Williams

Consul

Consulate

Of the United States of America

Manila, Philippine Island, Mar. 14- 1898.

Commodore George Dewey.

U.S. Navy, Hong Kong

Honored sir:

Your favor by messenger of Br. Consulate (1) reached me this hour. Tomorrow by an American bound for Hong Kong I can send reply without having it run the gauntlet of the suspicious officials of Spain.

By letters to you- known to my Spanish Clerk- and by others sent without his knowledge. By a letter of length to your Mr. Caldwell and in direct and indirect ways I have striven to inform you.

1- no recent strength has been added to the defenses of either Manila or Cavite.

2d Am informed there are neither torpedoes nor mines protecting Cavite or Manila or her Channels to the sea.

3d I have inspected the forts- the old wall forts are beneath consideration a few old rusty guns of small calibre- brass and about 100 yrs old.- no care taken of anything. Within the walls a large quantity of shell & ball with many large cannon dismounted.

4th The fort at entrance to Pasig river, head of Breakwater, has three or four small guns. I believe it below consideration as defense.

5th Along the Bay front of walled Manila, beyond the walls, and at Mulate about two miles from the Entrance to Pasig are a line of forts- guns much larger- and apparently manned ready for action. Those are formidable- none other to be feared.

6th For sometime we have had in Philippine waters four Spanish warships- of the power of which you will know if named as follows, “Don Juan de Austria” “Isla de Cuba” “Reina Christina” and “Castilla”- one has been down to Iloilo- and last week. Wed. I believe, the “Don Juan de Austria” was dispatched north about 300 miles to cooperate with two regiments sent over land to suppress an uprising of rebels.

I cannot tell the period of ships absence, her going confesses a dangerous condition for Spain and one which demands all forces now here- Revolution is rampant and a jubilee would be held if you would capture Manila. Even the Spanish are disgusted as priests rule with inquisitorial hands.

Reports are filling the air. Seven U.S. battle ships are reported, by cable from Spain to be coming here from Hong Kong, Last night I was confidentially informed that three US. battle ships were near Manila, Etc. Etc.

I listen, collect reports and write all to you. I am not an expert, but believe Manila very weak except it be for warships and that you know all about. I believe the Commercial and Church interests would demand and obtain surrender to you if only you throw a few shot and shell into the walled city, the official center of church & state. and into the dock portion of New Manila. where are exclusive warehouses- Yesterday, so as to inform you- I counted 604- craft- steamers, ships [tugs] - Cascoes- (2) Etc. in river and slips- You can understand how pressure would be exerted for surrender if your ships [jeopardized] life & property. Especially when all these merchant and shipping interests are disgusted with spain and her laws and inability to stop the war, Little loyalty- here.

I believe you will get other letters before this. The cable is promised for use tomorrow. Your cipher & my reply excited gravest suspicions and were the talk of the city. three spies reported on my track- one [located] at my table- and I am satisfied my room and consulate have both been entered. Tis difficult to act wisely- but if loyalty to our flag be wisdom I shall eclipse Solomon,

Your obedient servant

O.F. Williams, Consul

Footnote 1: British Consul at Manila was Edward Henry Rawson-Walker.

Footnote 2: Williams attempts to make plural the Spanish word “Casco.” A Casco is a style of square, flat bottomed boat from the Philippines used to bring good from shore to ships.

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore John A. Howell, Commander, European Station

Translation

Washington, March 14, 1898.

Howell, Lisbon, Portugal.

Proceed at once to New Castle-upon the Tyne. Upon arrival communicate immediately with the United States Naval Attache at London. Hoist United States flag upon Amazonas and Arbueall. appoint Reno Nazro to the command of Amazonas with former commander Nazro sufficient officers and men from crew of the San Francisco to bring her Proceed to New York. San Francisco to assist convoy. Utilize your staff for watch duty.

Long

March 17th 1898

United States

Senator Redfield Proctor (R-Vt.) influences Congress and US business community in favor of war with Spain.

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, Commander, North Atlantic Station

[Washington, D.C.] March 17, 1898.

Sir:

The Department herby directs the formation of division SQUADRON of the North Atlantic Squadron FLEET (1) to be assembled, without delay, in Hampton Roads, Virginia. This division SQUADRON will consist of the following named vessels:

TEXAS, MASSACHUSETTS, MINNEAPOLIS, COLUMBIA and BROOKLYN.

Other vessels may be added to this division SQUADRON later.

You will be ordered, by telegraph, today, to send the TEXAS and MASSACHUSETTS to Hampton Roads. It is proposed that this division SQUADRON of your squadron FLEET shall be commanded by a Flag Officer; you will be informed who this officer is as soon as he has been selected.

Very respectfully,

John D. Long

Secretary.

Footnote 1: Someone crossed through “Squadron” and hand wrote “FLEET” as an interlineation above the line. That individual did the same for the other cross through/interlineations found throughout the letter.

March 21st 1898

United States

Captain Sampson as president of the Naval Board of Inquiry ("the Sampson Board") and Lieutenant-Commander Marix as judge advocate deliver to President McKinley their results into the sinking of USS Maine on February 1898 (see below):  

Report Of The Naval Court Of Inquiry Upon The Destruction Of The United States Battleship Maine In Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898

TWENTY-THIRD DAY.

U.S.S. Iowa (1st rate),

Key West, Fla., Monday, March 21, 1898—10 a.m (1).

The court met pursuant to the adjournment of yesterday.

Present: All the members and the judge-advocate (2).

The record of last day’s proceedings was read over and approved.

The court was then cleared for deliberation.

After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the court finds as follows:

1. That the United States battle ship Maine arrived in the harbor of Habana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from 5½ to 6 fathoms of water by the regular Government pilot.

The United States consul-general at Havana (3) had notified the authorities at that place, the previous evening, of the intended arrival of the Maine.

2. The state of discipline on board the Maine was excellent,

and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly carried out.

All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed

instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled.

Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there.

The magazines and shell rooms were always locked after having been opened, and after the destruction of the Maine the keys were found in their proper place in the captain’s cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening at 8 p.m.

The temperatures of the magazines and shell rooms were taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after 10-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the Maine was destroyed.

The torpedo war heads were all stowed in the after part of the ship, under the ward room, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the Maine.

The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft, and remote from the scene of the explosion.

Waste was carefully looked after on board the Maine to obviate danger. Special orders in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer.

Varnishes, driers, alcohol, and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the Maine.

The medical stores were stowed aft, under the ward room, and remote from the scene of the explosion.

No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other storerooms.

The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the forward magazines and shell rooms four were empty, namely: B3, B4, B5, B6. A15 had been in use that day, and A16 was full of New River coal.4 This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth side at this time on account of bunkers B4 and B6 being empty. This bunker, A16, had been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty.

The fire alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the Maine.

The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable watch.

These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the divers, and are in a fair condition.

On the night of the destruction of the Maine everything had been reported secure for the night at 8 p.m. by reliable persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the Maine was destroyed the ship was quiet, and, therefore, least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board.

EXPLOSIONS.

3. The destruction of the Maine occurred at 9.40 p.m. on the 15th day of February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Maine.

CONDITION OF THE WRECK.

4. The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of the forward part.

The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however, established by the testimony:

A portion of the port side of the protective deck, which extends from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and over to port. The main deck, from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and slightly over to starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after part.

This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by a partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Maine.

5. At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point 11½ feet from the middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured.

The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V shape (Ʌ), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 32 feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating, extending forward.

At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about 6 feet below the surface of the water, and about 30 feet above its normal position.

In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship.

6. The court finds that the loss of the Maine on the occasion named was not in any respect due to fault of negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel.

7. In the opinion of the court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines.

8. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons.

W.T. Sampson,

Captain, U.S.N., President.

a. Marix,

Lieut.Com., U.S.N., Judge-Advocate.

The court having finished the inquiry it was ordered to make, adjourned at 11 a.m., to await the action of the convening authority.

U.S. Flagship, New York

Off Key West, Fla., March 21, 1898.

The proceedings and finding of the court of inquiry in the above case are approved.

M. Sicard,

Rear Admiral, Commander in Chief of the United States Naval force on the North Atlantic Station.

Footnote 1: While the report was issued from Key West, the board had conducted much of the hearing in Havana Harbor aboard the Light House Tender Mangrove.

Footnote 2: The members of the Court were: Capt. William T. Sampson, president; Capt. French E. Chadwick; and Lt. Cmdr. William P. Potter. The judge advocate was Lt. Cmdr. Adolph Marix. On 19 March, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long sent a cable informing the board members’ superior officer, RAdm. Montgomery Sicard, that President William McKinley wanted that “the findings of the Court should cover all points contained in the order of inquiry, as far as possible.” 

Footnote 3: United States Consul in Havana Fitzhugh Lee.

Footnote 4: That is, bituminous coal from mines in the New River Gorge region of West Virginia.

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

Washington, March 21, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

The Baltimore has been ordered to proceed to Hongkong, upon the arrival of the Mohican at Honolulu, with ammunition for the Asiatic Station.

Long.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Copy Fax

Hong Kong, March 21, 1898.

Secretary of the Navy:

So as to make arrangements for buying coal, I request to be informed when is the Baltimore expected to arrive at Yokohama or Hong Kong.

Dewey.

March 23rd 1898

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commander Horace Elmer

[Washington, D.C.] March 23, 1898.

Sir: You are hereby directed to prepare, with all possible dispatch, a scheme for utilizing the available resources of our Atlantic ports in the formation of a mosquito flotilla in general accordance with the methods proposed by the Naval War College.

You will suggest for each important locality the names of suitable vessels, in such numbers as you may think proper, and fitted as improvised gun vessels, rams, or torpedo boats, their armament, if any, how and where obtained and mounted, how their captains and crews may be secured from the merchant service or Naval Militia, the proposed appointments as volunteer officers, or ratings as enlisted men, and you will prepare an organization for the whole coast, and rules for the government of each local division.

The Department confines itself to indicating the outlines of what it desires, leaving the details to your discretion. It reminds you that promptness, efficiency, and economy are necessary.

You will submit, as soon as possible, a résumé of your scheme, which must be so perfected that it can be put into instant execution on the issuing of orders from the Department.

You are authorized to perform such travel as may be needed, and directed to report from time to time your movements.

It is suggested that you make New York your headquarters. In that event, the commandant of the navy-yard at that place will give you such clerical aid as you may require. The demand for officers is so great that it is impossible to assign you other assistants. You are hereby detached from present duties

March 25th 1898

Hawaii

The protected cruiser USS Baltimore departs Hawaii for Hong Kong where she will join the US Navy's Asiatic Squadron.

Philippines - United States Consul At Manila Oscar F. Williams To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

U.S. Consulate, Manila, Ph, Isls, Mar. 25-’98.

Commodore George Dewey,

U.S. Flagship “Olympia”

Hong Kong

Honored sir:

Per “Esmeralda” (1) I hope to send this without danger of its falling into Spanish hands. And as today is a holiday here I am holding the fort alone.

Little new as to international trouble but great anxiety pervades all classes over the insurrection.

Hospitals are filling up, prisoners shot and reports of attempts to take Manila fill the air.

At a meeting of revolutionists Wed. night it was decided to attack the City today and burn and kill. but Thursday AM. the attack was postponed awaiting arrival of recruits from inland district.

My detectives are active and last night agreed on several points.

1- Last Sun. eve. at Theater Lorillo a comical affair occurred. The audience was mainly Spaniards and soldiers- From some accident the electric lights suddenly went out- when, as if under command, the men all squatted behind the seats so as to escape expected volleys of bullets from the natives who, it was believed, cut the wires. The bravery(!) of the Dons and military has become the laughing stock of foreigners.

2- The Spaniards are building a Cordon of minor forts along the city’s outskirts to guard against surprises by natives. In this much activity is shown- I have visited two and my detectives have visited three. These are of stone- small but safe against rifle balls.

3. The laying of torpedoes (2) not yet done- perhaps not yet actually begun for yesterday an electrician connected with the Spanish force here- went to the Electric Light Co’s plant to obtain cable proper for connecting Corregidor Island with Channel torpedoes. he did not get supplied and went to seek elsewhere.

4- About a dozen badly wounded Spaniards were brought to the hospitals yesterday- This is a daily affair.

5- Yesterday a native regiment at Cavite was ordered to attack the insurgents and refused to fight their friends- told their superior officers that they would fight the enemies of Spain abroad but not here. They were threatened with death. Still they refused. Then Eight corporals were selected and shot to death in presence of the regiment. After which orders were again issued- The survivors said they would all die rather than make further war upon their friends. So the matter rested over night.

6- Spaniards here sneer at U.S. say we are cowards. dare not fight with Spain, Etc. Etc.

I hear nothing of activity on the forts- ie- the large bay forts- only the torpedo affair noted. All seems in suspense. Europeans other than Spaniards praise U.S. and deem war chances very small. And a few business Spaniards- broader in view- say the peace chances are improving.

I see and hear, with detectives learn all possible for purpose of informing you- but being on switch of creation I know officially almost nothing of events transpiring between US. and Spain.

Wed. eve. “El Commercio” (3) published as telegraph news- a long column dated New York Feb. 5-’98. The date was overlooked and the contents- “That U.S. desired peace” was universally talked as a back down by U.S. I laughed at those who came to me- showed them the date and so laugh was turned.

You doubtless have better information as to the uprising at Bolinao from Commander (4) of “Edgar” than I am able to give.

I write this as I have leisure- and should my men bring news tonight I will post script before I board “Esmeralda” to personally entrust the letter to Capt. Taylor.

Your obedient servant

O.F. Williams

Consul.

Footnote 1: Esmeralda is a British merchant steamer.

Footnote 2: During the late 19th and early 20th century the words torpedoes and mines were often used interchangeably. In this case Williams is referring to the possible installations of electrically detonated mines in the channels of Manila Bay.

Footnote 3: El Commercio is a newspaper in Manila.

Footnote 4: Royal Navy Capt. Robert C. Sparkes is Commanding Officer of the protected cruiser HMS Edgar.

United States - Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief Of The Bureau Of Navigation, To Chiefs Of The Navy Bureaus

March 25, 1898

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BUREAUS AND OFFICERS OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT:

The following vessels compose the North Atlantic Squadron:

The NEW YORK, IOWA, INDIANA, MIANTONOMOH, TERROR, PURITAN, CINCINNATI, MARBLEHEAD, MONTGOMERY, DETROIT, CASTINE, NASHVILLE, HELENA, WILMINGTON, FERN, VESUVIUS: torpedo boats FOOTE, DU PONT, ERICSSON, CUSHING, PORTER, WINSLOW; tugs LEYDEN, SAMOSET.

The following vessels compose the Flying Squadron:

The BROOKLYN, MASSACHUSETTS, TEXAS, MINNEAPOLIS, COLUMBIA.

A.S. Crowninshield

Chief of Bureau.

The United States Navy hated that Elswick cruiser.

Mostly, purchased to keep her out of Spanish Armada service, the USS New Orleans arrived with her Brazilian mandated fit-out in ship's gear and armament. This was not supposed to be a major problem, but those 6 inch and 4.7 inch guns were Armstrong pattern and were garbage guns.



The history of those guns was that like the French 5.5 inch model guns the Spaniards used, shell cases tended to jam in the breech. Also the British powders used in the casings was unstable. It tended to explode rather than deflagrate which made the guns a hazard to rapid fire. The guns were landed and passed off to the American army as soon as the American navy had developed a good rapid fire replacement for these oddballs.

As for the ships, berthing and mess arrangements were "British" to the point of barely endurable in extended deployment conditions. This was not "acceptable" in USN service, for obvious morale and ship handling reasons. Sailors could and should not be housed in such appalling conditions when a patrol could last months.