The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

President McKinley tried his best to not go to war, but the American newspapers had other ideas.

Propaganda of the Spanish–American War

February 18th 1898

United States

Spanish cruiser Vizcaya arrives in New York in reciprocal visit for the USS Maine, unaware that the Maine had been lost.

New York Times article, February 18th 1898

Analysis Of The Destruction Of The U.S.S. Maine

EXPLOSIONS OF MAGAZINES

Fires in the Coal Bunkers the Most Common Cause—Precautions of Other Governments to Pre- vent Such Disasters

WASHINGTON, Feb. 18— The opinion of one of the leading naval experts in the use of high explosives, Prof. Alger of the Ordnance Bureau, as to the cause of the explosion on the Maine is as follows:

“As to the question of the cause of the Maine’s explosion, we know no torpedo such as is known to modern warfare can of itself cause an explosion of the character of that on board the Maine. We know of no instances where the explosion of a torpedo or mine under a ship’s bottom has exploded the magazine within. It has simply torn a great hole in the side or bottom, through which water entered, and in consequence of which the ship sank. Magazine explosions, on the contrary, produce effects exactly similar to the effects of the explosion on board the Maine.

“When it comes to seeking the cause of the explosion of the Maine’s magazine, we should naturally look, not for improbable or unusual causes, but those against which we have had to guard in the past. The most common of these is through fire in the bunkers. Many of our ships have been in danger at various times from this cause, and not long ago a fire in the Cincinnati’s bunkers actually set fire to fittings, wooden boxes, &c., within the magazine, and had it not been discovered at the time it would doubtless have resulted in a catastrophe on board that ship similar to the one on the Maine.

I shall again emphasize the fact that no torpedo exploded without a ship has ever produced, or, according to our knowledge, can it produce, an explosion of a magazine within.”

Precautions of Other Governments.

Lieut. Commander Wainwright, the executive officer of the Maine, as his last important work prior to his detail to the Maine, prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, setting forth the precautions taken by other Governments to protect their men-of-war against just such calamities. This memorandum, which is lying upon the table of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, suggested the appointment of a board of officers to investigate the subject, and make recommendations for the use of the Bureau of Construction in designing future cruisers and battleships.

Mr. Wainwright’s memorandum shows that England protects the magazines of her ships from heat by linings of asbestos, by air spaces between the walls, which are packed with silicate of cotton and other non-combustible and non-conducting substances, and by the use of ventilating fans and ammonia.

France uses refrigerating machines, double floors and walls and asbestos linings. The French experts declare that it is not only necessary to discharge cold air into the magazines but to have the chambers between their walls and floors so arranged that it can pass over and around them.

In the German ships there are ventilating conduits to pump cold air into the magazines and expel the warm air from them. They have also special cooling machines for the purpose of protecting the coal bunkers against spontaneous combustion.

The Italian Navy constructors provide particularly for the escape of the gas that is apt to generate in air-tight chamber in which explosives are kept. They also have refrigerating machines, and recommend that the air to magazines cannot be changed too frequently. Both the Italian and the French constructors describe the danger from the juxtaposition of coal bunkers, and advise that chambers packed with silicate of cotton, asbestos, and other non-combustible material should be placed between the coal bunkers and the magazines.

Danger from the Coal Bunkers.

Serious fires occurred some time ago, as is well known, on the New York and the Cincinnati from spontaneous combustion of coal, and two weeks ago a board appointed to investigate this new danger to United States warships made a report recommending a radical reconstruction of the coal bunkers of the ships of the navy. The board contends that all bituminous and soft coal is subject to this danger, especially when it is “fat” and that condition for combustion are a high external temperature, a broken condition of coal, affording surfaces for absorbing oxygen, a supply of air sufficient to penetrate to the coal pile, but not adequate to carry off the heat, and the presence of volatile combustible matter in the fuel.

In former years, in the old-fashioned ships, before there was so much machinery and so many compartments, spontaneous combustion, said the board, was unknown, but in modern war vessels all the conditions are changed, and a sufficiently high external temperature will cause spontaneous ignition at any time.

The board reported that “there are some bunkers in which the fire will involve great danger-namely, those adjacent to magazines. On the New York and Cincinnati there were fires in bunkers next to the magazines which caused a charring of the woodwork in the latter, and if they fortunately had not been discovered in time there might have been in each a terrible disaster. For such cases we consider structural provision an absolute necessity, and no magazine should ever be separated from a coal bunker by a single bulkhead only. In all such cases there should be a double bulkhead, with at least four inches between the walls of the bunkers and the magazine, and with provision for a good circulation of air to carry off any hear that may come from the bunker.”

The report said that the Chief Constructor of the navy informed the board that he had anticipated this important point and had made provision in the new battleships on the plan recommended and had taken steps for the alteration of the bunkers in the flagship New York wherever they were adjacent to magazines.

Among other recommendations the board suggested that precautions should be taken to prevent waste or oil from getting into the bunkers, and that old coal should be used before that recently received. The board also recommended that particular care should be taken in ships stationed at Key West, Honolulu, and other places in the tropics.

United States - Captain Francis J. Higginson To Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, Commander, North Atlantic Station

U.S.S. Massachusetts, (1st Rate),

Dry Tortugas Harbor, Florida,

February 18, 1898.

Sir:-

1. If it should become the opinion that hostilities might be imminent I respectfully submit the following consideration in regard to the protection of our Battleships from night attacks by torpedo boats.

2. The present position of our Battleships lying in Tortugas Harbor in what is practically an open roadstead susceptible upon nearly every side to a torpedo boat attack, seems to me to be a very unsafe one and in my opinion measures to render it more secure would be advisable in anticipation of the arrival of an enemies torpedo boats and before declaration of war would render it too late. A Battleship without an attendant cordon of small vessels is like an army without Cavalry or scouts and is liable to surprise by the enemy at any moment. Her chief defense against torpedo boat attacks lies in her rapid fire guns and quick discovery of the approaching enemy. Both officers and crew must be kept upon a strain which would in a short time wear them out and unfit them for their proper work in the line of battle.

3. I think they should be relieved from this sort of nightly strain and allowed to take rest preparatory for action in the same way that Infantry of an Army sleeps under protection of Cavalry, scouts and pickets.

4. The Battleships should in my opinion be surrounded by a mosquito fleet of small steamers which would give them timely warning and possibly prevent the approach of a torpedo boat. For this purpose I would respectfully suggest the employment of such tugs and small vessels as may be found in abundance in the ports of the U.S. and these vessels should be fitted with at least one and if possible two machine guns, and a small search light and dynamo and one light rapid fire gun for signal or other purposes.

5. They would be invaluable in discovering th[e] approach of an enemy and in giving timely warning to the Battleships and, if fortunate with their machine guns, could totally disable the machinery of a torpedo boat.

6. These picket vessels or scouts could be indefinitely multiplied and they would be cheap at any price compared with the loss of a Battleship.

7. Without either nets or booms, Battleships at anchor in an open roadstead are comparatively helpless against torpedo boat attacks and for the purpose of discovery and alarm the vessels above mentioned would in my opinion be preferable even to using our own torpedo boats, of which we have at present only a limited number and which would be more useful in other and more legitimate work.

Very respectfully,

Francis Higginson

Captain, U.S. Navy

Commanding.

February 20th 1898

United States - Captain William Sherman Vanaman To His Family

[Extract]

AT SEA Feb. 20, 1898.

Dear Mother, Son and Daughter:

I am 300 miles from Havana, on my way to Sabine Pass, and it is 9 P.M. and the vessel is rolling merrily along. We have come 300 miles in thirty-six hours.

I am in my underwear and socks, and with all windows and doors open. The thermometer registers eighty-five. Wish you were all here.

But I expect to see some warm times around the Island of Cuba before I come North again. I expect there is great excitement there, about the Blowing up of the MAINE, and I expect to hear that War is declared, when I arrive— there was not a man in Havana that I talked with but what believes the Spanish did it.

I was laying close to the MAINE, anchored, when it happened at ten P.M., and the night before I had spent the evening with some of the Officers and some other Captains at the Hotel Inglatasa (1).

As soon as I got on deck the night of the explosion, I thought it was the Spanish War ship, at first (2) I had just gone to bed, but I got out our boat and before I got to the wreck, I knew it was the MAINE.

The Officers would not let the Spanish ship’s boats assist them. I was there when the Capt. left the [indecipherable] (3) and a great many were in their night clothes and bodies were floating all around in places. One we towed ashore had both legs blown off at the hips and one was blown clear over into the City.

There was’nt an American or Englishman there, but what wanted to fight. The TORPEDO struck forward. That is what every one believes that did it. There was a Spanish War Ship laying as close to the MAINE, as from our house to the woods, down the road, and we heard the buglar calling to quarters fifteen minutes before the explosion.

If the U.S. don’t fight over this, the whole country ought to be blown up. I could not write much in Havana, as all letters had to be examined and what I received there had been opened.

I am in hopes of being able to carry supplies to the U.S. army in Spanish territory inside of three months. One American is as good as five Spaniards, in a fight. . . .

Footnote 1: That is, the Hotel Inglaterra.

Footnote 2: Spanish Navy cruiser Alphonso XII.

Footnote 3: Capt. Sigsbee was taken to the steamer City of Washington.

United States - Journal Of Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

[Extract]

Wednesday evening, Feby. 20th, 1898.

. . . There is an intense difference of opinion as to the cause of the blowing up of the Maine. In this, as in everything else, the opinion of the individual is determined by his original bias. If he is a conservative, he is sure that it was an accident; if he is a jingo, he is equally sure that it was by design. The former is sure that no design could have been carried out without discovery; the latter is equally sure that no accident could have happened in view of the precautions which were taken. My own judgment is, so far as any information has been received, that it was the result of an accident, such as every ship of war, with the tremendously high and powerful explosives which we now have on board, is liable to encounter. The best way, however, seems to suspend judgment until more information shall be had.

The occurrence suggests one important thing, and that is the frightful destruction of life and property which will hereafter accompany any naval or military engagement. In the old days a war vessel could be peppered all day long, with comparatively little damage to ship or to crew. Now, a battleship with five hundred men on board, fairly struck by one of the great projectiles, will probably go to the bottom and every life be lost. This reflection ought to have weight with those who talk lightly of going to war. The illustration now afforded by this accident to the Maine gives food for sober reflection.

The saddest thing of all is the constant coming of telegrams from some sailors humble home, or kinspeople, inquiring whether he is saved, or asking that, if dead, his body may be sent home.

February 22nd 1898

United States

The U.S. Senate passes the Hawley Artillery Bill. The Bill which will need to be approved by the House will see two regiments of artillery, urgently needed to man the coast defenses added to the U.S. Army.

Cuba - United States Consul At Havana Fitzhugh Lee To Assistant Secretary Of State William R. Day

Havana [Cuba], Feb 22

Copper cases ammunition found intact in ten inch forward magazine starboard side this morning (1). Seems to show that magazine not exploded. Evidence beginning to prove explosion forward on port side by torpedo (2).

Footnote 1: As part of the investigation, the U.S. Navy had sent divers to investigate the wreck of Maine.

Footnote 2: By “torpedo,” Lee means mine.

Hong Kong

Photo: USS Olympia fires a salute honoring George Washington during the celebration of his birthday while at Hong Kong, 22 February 1898

February 26th 1898

Spain

The Spanish Cortes (English: Spanish Parliament) is dissolved after they vote for a additional 1 million pesetas for the Spanish Navy.

New York Times article, February 26th 1898

THE Maine DISASTER

Its Cause Not Yet Discovered, and Nothing to Be Done Until It Is.

THE PRESIDENT WAITING, BUT PREPARING TO ACT.

Evidences of a Determination to Adopt Stern Measures if Necessary

Senor du Bosc, Spain’s Charge d’Af faires, Says There Are No Mines in Havana Harbor.

The policy of President McKinley and his official advisers respecting the action to follow the investigation of the Maine disaster is declared to be dependent entirely upon the findings of the naval court of inquiry. It is said, on the authority of men intimately associated with the Administration, that no news bearing upon the cause of the explosion in the harbor of Havana has been received which has not been communicated to the public, and that the President and the members of the Cabinet are as much in the dark as everybody else.

The only course for the Administration to pursue, it is said, is to await the presentation of the report of the court of inquiry, and then to act promptly in the direction suggested by the evidence gathered by the court. While it is insisted that this position will be maintained to the letter, evidences multiply that the War and Navy Departments are pushing the preparations in every direction for the adoption of vigorous measure in case it should be necessary to employ force to carry into effect the policy to be determined upon as the result of the naval inquiry.

One of the most interesting contributions made yesterday to the small sum of information thus far gathered respecting the cause of the disaster to the Maine was an emphatic denial by Señor du Bosc, Chargé d’Affaires of the Spanish Legation in Washington, of the published reports that the bed of the harbor of Havana is covered with mines placed there long ago by the Spanish authorities in anticipation of the possible appearance of a hostile fleet. The denial is couched in the most explicit terms, ending with the declaration that the suggestion is regarded as “an insult to Spain,” and, unless disproved by the official investigation now in progress, removes from consideration one of the theories of the disaster which has been advanced in many quarters.

The court of inquiry continued its work in Havana yesterday, and it is announced that its members will leave for Key West to-night, at the latest. The work of the divers and wreckers in the hull of the Maine is proceeding slowly under unfavorable conditions. The Paymaster’s safe, containing money and valuable papers, was brought to the surface yesterday. No more bodies have been recovered.

The wounded men in the hospital at Havana are all progressing favorably with the exception of Fred Holzer of this city, whose condition is still critical.

Hong Kong - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

From Secretary of the Navy.

To COM’D’R-IN-CHIEF

Date February 26, 1898.

Subject Assemble Squadron

at Hongkong.

Prepare for war.

Secret and confidential.

Order the Squadron except Monocacy (1) to Hongkong.

Keep full of coal.

In the event of declaration of war Spain, it will be your duty to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave Asiatic coast and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands.

Keep the Olympia until further orders.

(Signed Roosevelt).

Footnote 1: The Monocacy is a side-wheel gun-boat built during the Civil War. Though it has a long career in Asia, serving as one of the ships that enforced the opening of trade with Japan, by 1898 it is considered only fit for service in the rivers of coastal China and was given the nickname “Jinricksha of the Navy.”

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

Washington, February 26, 1898

Dewey, Hongkong:

Keep full of coal - the best that can be had.

United States - Journal Of Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Washington, D.C., Saturday, February 26th, 1898

- : -

I had a splendid night last night, and return to the office, both because I feel so much better, and because during my short absence I find that Roosevelt in his precipitate way, has come very near causing more of an explosion than what happened to the Maine. His wife is very ill his little boy is just recovering from a long and dangerous illness, so that his natural nervousness is so much accentuated that I really think he is hardly fit to be entrusted with the responsibility of the Department at this critical time. He is full of suggestions; many of which are of great value to me, and his spirited and forceful habit is a good tonic for one who is disposed to be as conservative and careful as I am. He means to be thoroughly loyal, but the very devil seemed to possess him yesterday afternoon. Having the authority for that time of Acting Secretary, he immediately began to launch peremptory orders, distributing ships, (1) ordering ammunition, which there is no means to have move, to places where there is no means to store it; sending for Captain Barker to come on about the guns of the Vesuvius, which is a matter that might have been perfectly arranged by correspondence; sending messages to Congress for immediate legislation, authorizing the enlistment of an unlimited number of seamen, and order guns from the Navy Yard at Washington to New York, with a view to arming auxiliary cruisers which are now in peaceful commercial pursuit. The only effect of this last order would be to take guns which are now carefully stored, ready for shipment any moment, and which could be shipped before they could possibly be tomorrow to be put on any vessel, and to dump them in the open weather in the New York Navy Yard, where they would be only in the way and under no proper care. He has gone at things like a bull in a china shop, and with the best purposes in the world, has really taken what, if he could have thought, he would not have for a moment have taken, and that is the one course which is most discourteous to me, because it suggest that there had been a lack of attention which he was supplying. which It should show the best fellow in the world and with splendid capacities is worse that of no use if he lack a cool head and careful discretion.

This afternoon go to the mechanical massage, and call on the President.5 Stroll about the streets and, after call with Agnes to inquire for Mrs. Roosevelt, and leave some letters and invitations to the Members of Congress from Massachusetts for an afternoon tea which Agnes is going to give on Monday to Charley Allen and his wife who are here from Lowell, and who served with me in Congress.

Footnote 1:  One of the orders Roosevelt issued was for Commo. George Dewey to keep Olympia at the Asiatic Station, to consolidate his fleet, and prepare an attack on the Philippines. See: message above called Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station.