What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s.

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World War II

miletus12
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What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s. Jan 9, 2022 1:14:11 GMT

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Post by miletus12 on Jan 9, 2022 1:14:11 GMT

Snorkels and American submarines.

Snorkel Part 1.

Histories of the Battle of the Atlantic universally fail to appreciate the impact that the introduction of the snorkel had on the evolutionary shift in U-boat operations at the end of the war.

German U-boat histories of the Second World War are dominated by the period 1940–43 and written by, or about, veterans that never saw a single operational patrol in a snorkel-equipped U-boat. Out of the top twenty-five U-boat aces of the war, only one – Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock – commanded an operational snorkel-equipped U-boat. However, he did not take part in the inshore campaign during this cruise. Well-known U-boat commanders including Kretschmer, Lüth, Topp, Merten, Prien, Schepke, Witt and Lemp never experienced a patrol on a snorkel-equipped U-boat nor had any understanding of its potential.

Lothar-Günther Buchheim, author of the popular anti-war book Das Boot, never sailed on a snorkel-equipped U-boat. Yet he disparaged the device in his follow-on 1976 book Der U-Boot Krieg, even though he admitted ‘it was a life saver’. The U-boat force was given an ‘orthopedic contraption’, Buchheim stated colourfully, by leadership that called it an ‘epochmaking invention’. While Dönitz gave the snorkel device due credit in his post-war memoir, he also had no practical experience with the snorkel and spent only about twenty pages covering the period of the U-boat war from 1944–45. He longed only for the day his ‘wolves’ could return to the heyday of convoy warfare.

The problem in German U-boat veteran historiography is that no one grasped how the snorkel fundamentally altered the nature of submarine warfare. The potential resumption of anti-convoy operations remained paramount in the minds of Dönitz and his U-boat men because it recalled the heyday of success and brought meaning to the force’s sacrifices. However, there was never going to be a resumption of such operations because the challenge of submerged communications was never overcome during the war. Not even the introduction of the Type XXI ‘wonder weapon’ was going to change that fact. There was never a post-war survey by German naval historians of the impact of the snorkel within the U-boat fleet, leaving the broader understanding of the Battle of the Atlantic overwhelmingly distorted towards the earlier period of convoy battles.

Most British and American authors remain content to view the Battle of the Atlantic through the narrow optic of convoy warfare, and within that limited view argue that the U-boat as a weapon system was defeated in May 1943. Many opine that continued resistance by the U-boat force after May 1943 was folly, despite any wartime technical developments.

As an example, Ed Offley’s 2011 work, Turning the Tide: How a Small Band of Allied Sailors Defeated the U-Boats and Won the Battle of the Atlantic, argues the well-worn thesis that the U-boat was defeated in May 1943 and forced to withdraw from the Atlantic. His view of the U-boat’s continued deployment during the following two years was that they served little purpose beyond ‘cannon fodder’. While he briefly discusses Dönitz’s actions to restore the U-boat force, he cites only the future development of the high-speed Electro-boats and Walter turbines, never once mentioning the snorkel. Offley, like many authors, is content to interpret the remaining years of the Battle of the Atlantic through the balance sheet of tonnage sunk versus U-boats destroyed.4 It is a victor’s perspective that offers little historical value.

Arguably, one of the most audacious attempts at solidifying the victor’s perspective of the Battle of the Atlantic came from former Second World War US Submarine veteran Clay Blair, who took a direct attack in his assessment of both the U-boat and its technology. He was determined to counter what he believed was a growing U-boat ‘mythos’ in the late 1980s and early ’90s, fuelled in popular literature by scores of U-boat veteran memoirs and movies such as Das Boot that found eager audiences in Great Britain and the United States. Blair published his two-volume history Hitler’s U-Boat War starting with Volume 1 in 1996 and continuing with Volume 2 in 1998. His scope was the U-boat itself and not just the convoy battles of the mid-Atlantic. In the foreword of his first volume he set a contrary tone regarding wartime technological advances in the U-boat force by dismissing any evolutionary value of the Type XXI offhandedly, despite the known benefits of its hull form and internal mechanics widely copied after the war by all major navies. He specifically dissected its snorkel apparatus into ‘imperfect’, ‘hazardous’ and ‘nightmarish’. In his second volume he addressed the introduction of the snorkel across the U-boat diesel force in counterfactual terms. He stated that the snorkel was ‘technically primitive’; only employed for one to four hours a day; a snorkelling U-boat was completely ‘deaf’ and could not use its radio receivers or hydrophones; a U-boat that snorkelled could not use its periscope; snorkels were prone to emit exhaust smoke; snorkels leaked carbon monoxide into the pressure hull; a snorkelling U-boat had no way to get rid of its waste; and arguably the most erroneous statement that ‘almost without exception, U-boat crews distrusted snorts and hated to use them’. All of Blair’s statements are gross exaggerations or counterfactual when compared against period primary documents. In Blair’s desire to diminish the evolutionary contribution to modern submarine development made by German wartime engineers, he asserted that the US Navy advanced into the nuclear-powered submarine age with such sophistication as to leave behind all ‘hopelessly archaic’ German technical innovations, like the snorkel. His amateurish historical assertions are contradicted by official US Navy technical assessments.

The criticisms I have of Blair's treatment is that he is biases and somewhat USN centric. HOWEVER, the German U-boat Weapon was not well built, the press-ganged coal miners who formed most of the crews sent to sea in those death traps were not blue-water trained and were clueless about marine engineering. The boats, themselves, were ergonomic disasters and mankillers and finally Blair was correct about the uselessness of the snort as an offensive combat weapon in the deep blue sea.

In the earliest published work on the last year of the Battle of the Atlantic, British naval historian V E Tarrant, writing in his 1994 book The Last Year of the Kriegsmarine, May 1944–May 1945, stated that the snorkel ‘was never welcomed by the majority of the U-boat crews’. His work on this critical, transformative period of the Battle of the Atlantic only focused on the building programmes related to the new Electro-boats and ignored the evolution of tactics and operations brought on by the snorkel. While American authors might be excused from understanding the snorkel’s impact, as snorkel-equipped U-boats only made an appearance off the US East Coast in the waning months of the war, the British, and to a lesser extent the Canadians, dealt with them for an entire year during the inshore campaign.

The point of view that the diesel U-boat was defeated in May 1943 as a weapon system and that the snorkel, unwelcome by U-boat crews, had little or no impact during the war is not corroborated by wartime or post-war primary documents. The diesel U-boat as a weapon system was not defeated in May 1943, only the surface-based Wolfpack tactics it employed against mid-Atlantic convoys. The U-boat survived, and even thrived with the introduction of the snorkel, as the Western Allies struggled to overcome the resurgent menace it had once thought defeated. While it is true that defeating the Wolfpack alleviated the single greatest threat to Great Britain’s survival and thus the Allied war effort, the introduction of the snorkel and shallow-water tactics diminished Ultra’s impact and continued to strain Allied resources. The idea of snorkel-equipped Type XXIs returning to the mid-Atlantic to reignite convoy warfare certainly was a threat that the Allies remained concerned about until the end of the war, but the reality was that BdU planned to send them individually to the coasts of North America and the United Kingdom to operate continually submerged close to Allied ports and within narrow channels and waterways. Surface-based Wolfpack tactics were gone forever.

Canadian maritime historian and former Wilfrid Laurier University professor Roger Sarty is one of the very few historians of the period who viewed the last twelve months of the Battle of the Atlantic through the filter of the snorkel’s impact. He wrote in his 1997 article ‘The Limits of Ultra: The Schnorchel U-boat Offensive Against North America, November 1944–January 1945’ that the:

Schnorchel caused profound difficulties for the Allied anti-submarine forces because of the change in U-boat tactics that the new equipment made possible. Submarines that neither signalled nor surfaced were safe from the radar-equipped aircraft that had long been the basis of the successful, economical defence of coastal waters … It soon became clear that protection of shipping against a single schnorchel boat well-situated in coastal waters required fully as many warships and even more aircraft than an active defence of a large convoy at mid-ocean against dozen of submarines.

Sarty was closer to historical reality than most authors writing of this period.

Except that these shallow water tactics were already tried by a much better navy and were proven ineffective, if the slow on the battery submarines could not get out from under the hunting enemy surface ships searching with active sonar. It was the experience of the Americans fighting in Lingayan Gulf in 1941. The Germans duplicated this exercise in futility off Norway and the northern coast of France in 1944. All the snort did was allow battery recharge at the cost of crew health in those days. The snorts down to the present have a feature and a defect called the "slam effect". The snort has a valve that slams shut to prevent water intake. The diesels running on the snort suck the air from inside the boat and the crew has their ears popped or in a bad event lungs sucked empty. There is a device on a modern snort called a sneeze box to clear the intake of influxed water and prevent or at least mitigate the slam effect. Most snort use is at slow below 5 knot speeds and with the intake well up to prevent the slam effect. Even the vaunted electro-boats had and HAVE this limitation. Being hard to find and kill is not the same as being able to maneuver and attack a fast moving freighter or warship. The snort is very limited.

Wartime View

No Allied power endured the struggle against the German U-boat in the mid-Atlantic and along their coast more than Great Britain. In November 1944 Royal Navy Captain Clarence Howard-Johnson, who served as the Royal Navy’s Director of the Anti-U-boat Division, declared during the resurgent U-boat’s inshore campaign that:

The snorkel has had such far-reaching results that the whole character of the U-boat war has been altered in the enemy’s favour. Frequently he has managed to penetrate to and remain on our convoy routes in focal areas with impunity in spite of intensive air and surface patrols. With more experience in training and with the confidence engendered by his present immunity from air, and often from surface attack, he is likely, in the future, to do us more real harm than he has up to the present.

What harm?

This was a sentiment echoed by Royal Navy Admiral Submarines Sir George Creasy, who directed British submarines to adopt the snorkel during the war on a limited trial basis in order to understand this innovation and how to counter the emerging threat. He soon recognised that there was no longer a future for the surface-bound submersible as the age of the true submarine was within technological sight.

The performance of the snorkel in the latter half of 1944 was so successful that the Ministry of Propaganda decided to capitalise on the technical innovation. The following radio broadcast aired on 22 March 1945 in conjunction with the release of Die Deutsche Wochenschau, which showed newsreel footage of the new snorkel-equipped U-boats. The snorkel was considered a ‘secret’ development for nearly a year and was now unveiled to the German public for the first time. It is a surprisingly accurate account of the Battle of the Atlantic:

The German public has learned about the new technical development of U-boat warfare for the first time from the report concerning the air mast of the U-boat, which appeared in the High Command communiqué. The facts now published were apparent already in the news of the past few weeks. When a number of U-boat commanders were decorated with the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross it was emphasised that they had won it in particularly difficult areas and on their first operational trip. Furthermore, on recommendation of Grand Admiral Dönitz, the Führer awarded the Knight’s Cross with Swords to Prof. Hellmuth Walter for his special merits in the technical development of the German U-boats. Lastly, the monthly declarations of Roosevelt and Churchill on the U-boat campaign as well as the speeches of Canadian and North American ministers of which we have given reports in our service, showed the enemy’s considerable anxiety about this steady increase of German U-boat successes …

It has been emphasised in the German reports that the latest successes were achieved not by an entirely new type of U-boat, but by boats of the type which have proved efficient during the period of 1941–1943, and which were fitted with the air mast to enable them to proceed continuously submerged …

(That was a lie.)

"Now also the U-boat crews, in spite of being severely strained physically by long months of submerged travelling, are effectively using their new technical equipment, above all in the most dangerous areas close to the enemy ports. In the shallow waters a U-boat, once discovered by the enemy, finds himself in a most difficult situation. But the men of the U-boats take upon themselves these dangers and losses because of the better chances of successes as at this stage every sinking of an enemy ship is particularly important. It is by no means intended to speak now prematurely of a ‘new large-scale U-boat offensive’. The reports on the air mast show, however, that important technical inventions have been made, with which we again overtake the enemy’s U-boat defence."

(An even bigger lie.)

Compare the above propaganda broadcast to the actual Top Secret intelligence assessment by OP-20-G released just one month later on 20 April 1945 that stated plainly: ‘The last 46 days has seen a marked increase of U-boat pressure against allied shipping, despite the desperate situation in the Homeland and in the Baltic …’ This intelligence assessment issued just weeks before the end of the war in Europe is a clear testament to the fact that the U-boat was not a defeated weapon system. It had survived the ‘Black May’ of 1943 and remained a tactical, if not strategic, concern for the Allies.

Enigma ciphers were ordered changed as concern grew in BdU of their possible compromise. While some Enigma ciphers required days to break, significantly diminishing their value, others still had to be broken. Kurier – the new flash transmission system that could not be read by Allied cryptologists – was being increasingly employed.

Kurier was a compressed time transmission system. The message was recorded, speeded up, and played back at high speed and then transmitted to reduce time on the air so that radio direction finders had less time to triangulate the signal source. By no means was the message itself secure, once the British understood the compression trick involved.

Operational U-boat deployments increased to the highest level in more than a year. Allied ship sinkings were up and there was continued concern about the potential deployment of the Type XXIs. The largest concentration of U-boats in nearly three years arrived off the North American coast despite the knowledge of their movement through Ultra and the deployment of the single greatest anti-submarine screen employed by the US Navy in its history. What hampered the U-boat’s success continued to be the ability, though reduced, of Allied cryptologists to ascertain U-boat deployments and re-route convoys.

The final situation update of the U-boat force was written by OP-20-G’s Navy Reserve Lieutenant W V Quine on 2 May, just days before the end of the war. He noted that there were 192 U-boats in the Atlantic and Arctic, with 118 at sea and seventy-four in port. This was an increase of seven over the previous week. He assessed that:

As yet there is no sign of any serious break-up in the German naval organisation in the Baltic. The situation is still quite confused because of the continual transferring of [U-boats] out of the enemy’s reach in the rush to get [U-boats] finished for frontline operations. Orders, however, seem to be carried out effectively and the loss of [U-boats] appears to be relatively small.

Quine’s final assessment contained one of the last Ultra intercepts of the war that noted the singular importance of the snorkel. On 24 April a wireless message was intercepted that read ‘complete repairs, including installation of snorkel, in Rostock on 6 Type XXIII and in Wismar on 3 Type XXIII was assured’. With the Soviet Army surrounding Berlin, the US Army on the Elbe River and the British advancing on the main U-boat production facilities in north-west Germany, the U-boat force remained potent and organised. The installation of the snorkel remained one of the highest priorities for BdU, even in the last days of the war.

The author writes like a wehraboo.

What a snorkel-equipped U-boat demonstrated during the war, too often lost on period historians, was that a submarine that didn’t surface and didn’t transmit by radio was almost impossible to track, find and destroy. It was a situation that foreshadowed the future of ‘Total Undersea Warfare’ in the atomic and nuclear age.

What the snorkel demonstrated was nothing of the kind. Once on its diesels; a U-boat semi-submerged with its snort up, had a pole sticking up for a radar to paint, put enough noise into the water to render its sonar and hydrophones useless, was limited to a WWII speed of 5 knots, exposed the U-boat crew to slam events, carbon monoxide poisoning and unexpected Allied attack, because their warning systems were nullified.

Clay Blair got those technical details right.

THAT is why the USN looked at snorts in the 1930s and thought the devices were a bad idea. Most every other navy, including the Germans and the Italians (Who invented a very good snort, the Ferreti Device.), came to the same conclusion.

If one wants an immobile coast defense boat that acts as a slow mobile minefield, one adopts snorts. If one needs underwater and surface speed; one builds huge banks of batteries into one's boats. The American and British boats had huge battery banks and the Americans had unusually powerful electric motors for dash speeds. The Axis and Russian boats did not. Guess why?

miletus12 Squadron vice admiral To get yourself lost, just follow the signs. Posts: 7,470 Likes: 4,295	What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s. Jan 11, 2022 9:57:38 GMT Quote Select Post Deselect Post Link to Post Member Give Gift Back to Top Post by miletus12 on Jan 11, 2022 9:57:38 GMT One will be appalled at the complications of the US torpedo fusing designs.

miletus12 Squadron vice admiral To get yourself lost, just follow the signs. Posts: 7,470 Likes: 4,295	What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s. Jan 15, 2022 2:40:49 GMT Quote Select Post Deselect Post Link to Post Member Give Gift Back to Top Post by miletus12 on Jan 15, 2022 2:40:49 GMT The T5 tank. What a disaster.

miletus12
Squadron vice admiral

To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.

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What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s. Jan 16, 2022 2:55:01 GMT

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Post by miletus12 on Jan 16, 2022 2:55:01 GMT

And with disasters as the guiding principle of "waste, fraud, and abuse" try this debacle on for fit. These articles will be posted daily, so one gets a feel for how things happened to the US Army in WWII.

The Chieftain's Hatch: Equipping the Force, Pt1 09/05/2015 The Chieftain's Hatch

For those of you wondering about what was going through the minds of the folks in charge of deciding what equipment should be developed and fielded, I'm digging into Army Ground Force's archives. AGF was the service component responsible for training and equipping the force. We're going to dig into AGF's archives a couple of times, and we'll start with this general overview of the policies which framed AGF's process. The following is directly from AGF.

DEVELOPMENT DIVISION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Equipment of the Army in March 1942 was, with a few minor exceptions, generally obsolescent in quality and in quantity totally insufficient. A glance at any Table of Basic Allowances even for the troops then engaged in the Battle of Bataan discloses 1903 rifles, 1897 and 1918 field artillery, 1918 helmets, 1918 haversacks and pack carriers, 1917 machine guns. The latest tanks were already antiquated by modern standards. Radar, a word known to only a few, was still under initial experiment at Hawaii when Pearl Harbor was attacked. The same held true through all categories of equipment with exception of wheeled motor vehicles.

It was patent that enormous quantities of new equipment would be needed for the rapidly expanding army. This equipment had to be the best that American industrial ingenuity could produce to enable our army to meet on equal terms the forces of Germany and Japan in global warfare.

The time available for the industrial effort required could be only surmised, but the planners knew it was not long -- certainly not more than two years if the military establishment was to be equipped concurrently with organization and training.

Reduced to its simplest terms, the problem was to determine the kinds of equipment which would be needed most and could be manufactured in the required hundreds, thousands or millions in time to be of use.

The responsibility which fell to the Developments Division, Army Ground Forces, was threefold: To determine the kinds of equipment needed by the Army Ground Forces, to select the equipment best suited to these needs, and to make certain that the equipment so adopted was the best obtainable. The determination of ground force needs was effected through its power to prepare military characteristics for such equipment. The selection of equipment was accomplished through recommendations for appropriate classification. The Division’s duty to insure the suitability and quality of equipment was exercised through control of testing by the service boards of the Army Ground Forces. Thorough testing was regarded as of primary importance, for on the suitability and workability of the selected items depended the success or failure of the Division’s mission.

Amid interests concerned with equipment in the technical services, the producers of war goods, advocates of radical changes within and outside the War Department, enthusiasts with novel designs, Army Ground Forces was the constituted representative of the ground commanders and soldiers whose lives and fighting power depended on the reliability and battle effectiveness of the equipment given them.

In the urgent crisis faced by the nation, the pressure to go ahead with extensive procurements without adequate study, tests, and evaluation was tremendous, and the position of Army Ground Forces was difficult in the extreme. In the fulfillment of its special mission to prepare military characteristics it had to exercise imagination; to best serve the combat ground soldier and his commanders, it had to temper imagination with realism and discipline. The measure of its success lies in the qualitative selection of equipment is found in the general acknowledgment that with few exceptions the equipment of the US Ground troops was unequalled both in quality and quantity, particularly in durability and reliable performance.

Army Ground Forces established two general criteria for the development and approval of new equipment. The first was genuine battle need. It was reluctant to initiate development of any equipment not considered essential to increase combat efficiency. It tended to oppose development of new equipment which, though desired by men in the field, was not absolutely essential and might prove to be simply a luxury or excess baggage. This was a clear-cut policy of General McNair, one which he often emphasized. It was eventually adopted formally as War Department policy. The second criterion was reliable performance in combat. This standard (sometimes referred to as "battleworthiness”) meant that the equipment, having been proved capable of performing the function for which it was designed, was sufficiently rugged and reliable to withstand the rigors of combat service without imposing excessive problems of maintenance.

These aims--battle need and battle-worthiness--were not always realized in the same way or to the same degree. The distinction between what was essential and what was purely luxury was not easy to draw, and its application varied greatly even among officers in the Development Division. In the same manner there were differing theories as to what agency should determine the suitability of equipment. Some favored leaving to theater commanders the decision as to whether equipment was required and its suitability for combat use; others believed that such decisions could and should be the sole responsibility of Army Ground Forces. The latter took the position that the theater commanders might be too strongly influenced by the limiting local conditions of their own tactical situation to exercise the proper overall judgement. They also believed that theater recommendations were colored by the combat soldiers' natural attachment to reliable equipment with which they were familiar.

The War Department favored a policy of including new items of equipinent in Tables of Organization and Equipment only after concurrence had been obtained of the theater commanders. General McNair, while Commanding General; Army Ground Forces, shared this view at least with respect to major items of equipment. Always economical of both men and equipment, he was loath to make changes in tables and to add new equipment unless commanders in the field expressed a desire for the new item.

One principle the Division consistently emphasized throughout the war: It insisted that no new equipment be issued to the theaters for combat use or test until it had been thoroughly tested in the Zone of Interior and found suitable for combat use (battleworthy). Even if submitted to the theaters for final determination of acceptability or need, it must first have been service tested in this country, where it was subjected to conditions as closely approximating combat as possible, and found suitable for combat employment. The Developments Division was unwilling that the ground soldier be exposed to the unnecessary hazard of using unproved equipment, however promising it might look. This, too, later became a formal policy of the War Department.

Although opposed, for reasons of economy, to large-scale procurement until Service tests had indicated potential suitability, the Developments Division frequently, in the earlier stages of the war, approved, and even urged such procurement before service tests because of the urgent need and the time lag incident to mass production. Throughout 1942 and 1943 examples of this policy were apparent. The course was followed with respect to the 76mm Gun Motor Carriage M18, the Cargo Carrier M29C, the 3” Gun Motor carriage M10, and others. Service tests were conducted concurrently with production, and as far as possible necessary modifications were incorporated into the assembly line. In this way the time for service tests was telescoped into the time required for production. But in none of these cases is there any indication that Army Ground Forces approved an item for combat use until satisfied that the equipment was suitable for such employment.

As the war progressed, and the need for new items of equipment grew less urgent, Army Ground Forces became more insistent upon proof by service tests before large-scale procurements were undertaken. If suitable equipment was already in the hands of troops, its reluctance to undertake additional programs for improved items increased. Such was the case of the T26 tank. [Chieftain:- I have already covered Ordnance Branch’s view of the T26's development in past articles, we’ll go over AGF’s side of the story in a future article]

The criterion of battleworthiness was a minimum requirement. Army Ground Forces, when necessary to satisfy urgent demands, approved procurement and issue of equipment which it recognized as relatively inferior if the item was usable and was all that was available. Army Ground Forces approved shipment until the item desired could be developed and. procured. This was simply making the most of what was to be had. The 75mm Howitzer Motor Carriage T30 and the 75mm Gun Motor Carriage M3 are examples of this kind of expedient. Both were used only until the preferred 76mm Gun Motor carriage M18 could be developed and procured.

The degree of testing required by Army Ground Forces to prove combat suitability was not fixed or arbitrary. Again, the general principle of thorough testing was tempered by the pertinent facts in each situation. In many cases the probable suitability of an item could be determined without a formal test, and all that was required was a check test to insure that nothing had been overlooked. Such a test might, for example, be directed when only minor modifications had been introduced. Or a test might be made solely to determine whether a possible requirement for the equipment existed. Such tests were applied to suggestions and inventions submitted to the War Department by soldiers or civilians. These tests were actually equipment studies to determine possible need and determine the justification for a formal development project. Definite conclusions based on tests were substituted as far as was possible, for arbitrary decisions based only on personal judgment.

The AGF test policy and the War Department policy of adopting major items of equipment only on recommendation of theater commanders were integrated through the medium of limited procurement articles. After Army Ground Forces had tested a new item of equipment, a number of production models would normally be procured as limited-procurement types. While still not declared standard, they were suitable for extended field service tests. These models could be issued to the theaters for study, tests and combat use. On the decision of the theater commanders would depend the final adoption of the equipment and its possible inclusion in Tables of Organization and Equipment.

And thus ends the lesson. We'll be back to AGF's positions in a week or two.

McNair was both a blessing and a curse. The USAF bombed him out of existence during Operation COBRA. Some US soldiers thought that was a good thing.

miletus12
Squadron vice admiral

To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.

Posts: 7,470

Likes: 4,295

What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s. Jan 16, 2022 8:18:12 GMT

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Post by miletus12 on Jan 16, 2022 8:18:12 GMT

The Chieftain's Hatch: Equipping the Force, Pt2 12/12/2015 The Chieftain's Hatch

Some time ago, I put out Army Ground Force’s philosophy behind how it decided what equipment it needed to be built, procured, and sent overseas. That was a more general view.

I’m now going to delve down a little bit, with a series of articles about the AGF’s position and influence on tanks in particular.

So, I go back to AGF’s historian, as he focuses on the heavy tank program. (At the time AGF was founded, remember, Sherman was already in production, so any further developments related to Pershing and bigger). Again, this is the truth as far as AGF saw it.

_______________________________________________________________________

Situation in March 1942

When Army Ground Forces was established, many of the basic decisions for the tank program had already been made by other agencies of the War Department and the Ordnance Department. At this time, the Armored Force was a semi-autonomous command which played an important part in developing its equipment. Although it came nominally under the control of Army Ground Forces, it continued to exercise many of its powers by direct contact with the Tank Automotive Center in Detroit.

The M3 medium tank was in current use, the M4 medium tank was in production but had yet to see a battlefield. Development of the Medium Tank M7 was also well under way. This had been conceived in 1941 as a 16-ton vehicle, mounting a 37mm gun, and was classified as a light tank. Successive changes requested by the Armored Force had resulted in a tank of 25 tons, mounting a 75mm gun, which thus approached the weight class of the M4 (33 tons) and was reclassified as a medium tank. During 1942 Armored Force enthusiasm for the M7 tank was quite pronounced.

All of these tanks had been developed primarily for the purpose of exploiting break-throughs and conducting operations in the traditional cavalry manner. First of all, their sponsors wanted speed and mobility, with mechanical reliability a necessary corollary. Sufficient fire power was only needed to subdue enemy infantry and minor strong points, and armor was required only to withstand enemy small arms. These tanks had narrow, high-speed treads. Unit ground pressure was not a serious factor because it was contemplated that slashing tank tactics then advocated would not be possible through soft, marshy terrain. [Chieftain’s Note: As you will recall, Armored Force, not AGF, are the folks who created tank doctrine and tank manuals, we’ve gone over in the past the position of Devers and AF on the matter of what they expected medium tanks to do against tanks. That AGF had this interpretation need not be an accurate reflection of what AF thought]

The ascendancy of this concept of tank employment had been supported by the phenomenal success of German armor in Poland, Belgium and France, where it ran rampant through the enemy lines of communication, and operated over dry, favorable terrain with little fear of encountering enemy armor or dangerous anti-tank guns.

Although these principles had guided the tank development program, they were not accorded universal support. There were those, for example, who favored tanks designed primarily to support the infantry advance directly by providing additional shock and firepower. This was a doctrine in the tradition of World War I. It called for tanks with lower ground pressure, heavier armor and fire power sufficient to overcome enemy pillboxes and fortifications. Some speed and maneuverability could be sacrificed to achieve these characteristics.

Heavy Tank M6

Although emphasis had been placed on the development of medium tanks M3, M4 and M7, Ordnance at the same time had produced a heavy tank weighing about 60 tons and mounting a 3-inch gun. Several variations of this tank were developed. One employed a radial air-cooled engine and a torque converter fluid drive, with mechanical transmission added. Armor was from 3-3 ½ inches thick and included armored skirts to protect the suspension. This was standardized as the Heavy Tank M6 in February 1942. Another version, the T1E1, incorporated a new electric drive by which each track was independently operated through an electric traction motor. The tracks could be reversed independently so that the tank was able to turn in its own length.

T6. What a disaster this tank was.

T1E1 cutaway

Initial tests of these vehicles during 1942 indicated that they were mechanically unreliable and that the fire power of the 3-inch gun and armor protection afforded did not justify a vehicle of such tremendous weight. At the time, tank warfare was restricted to North Africa and Russia, and it was believed that the speed and mobility of the medium tanks were greater assets than the heavier armor of the M6. By the end of the year, the War Department decided to provide for only one heavy tank company and authorized production of only forty of these tanks.

Tests of both the M6 heavy tank and the T1E1 heavy tank were continued by the Armored Board and the initial conclusion of Army Ground Forces was entirely supported by evidence from these tests. The M6 proved to be entirely unsatisfactory. The T1E1 was dropped from consideration, even before being thoroughly tested, because of its excessive maintenance requirements [Chieftain’s note: The parallel with the contemporary German program, the VK 45.01 (P) (Porsche Tiger) is noteworthy]. Indeed, the Board was unable to keep it in operation long enough to provide a suitable test. Furthermore, except for the electric drive, it was identical with the M6 which had been found unsatisfactory on a number of other counts.

T20 Series of Tanks.

The British, unlike US tank officers, desired heavier armor in medium tanks, and Aberdeen Proving Ground started design studies on an improved medium tank in the fall of 1941. They proposed a tank carrying four inches of armor, and using a 24-inch track (Would would give a unit ground pressure of 10lbs with a 45-ton weight). The armament was to be the 75mm gun used in the M4 tank. This tank (denoted the T14 assault tank) was intended only for possible use by the British.

In the fall of 1942, the Ordnance Department started development of the T20, which would conform more closely to American tactical doctrine. This tank was to weigh approximately 30 tons, would carry 4-inch armor, and operate at 35 miles an hour. It was contemplated using a new horizontal volute suspension in this tank and a box-type hull which would provide a lower silhouette than the sponson type hull used in the M4. Six pilots were to be made, two with the new 76mm gun, two with an automatic 75mm cannon, and two with the standard 3-inch gun. The transmission would be similar to that used in the M6 tank. Power was to be supplied by the new 500-horsepower Ford V8 engine, used also in the M4A3 medium and T14 assault tanks. Shortly thereafter the program was expanded to include the same types of tanks provided with mechanical transmissions (T22) and electric drive (T23).

At the request of Armored Force it was decided to provide one model of the T20 series with torsion bar suspension, which had been developed by the Ordnance Department at the insistence of the Armored Force, and appeared to give greater promise than the conventional volute suspension. This tank was designated T20E3. None of these tanks except the T23 series was destined to be given any real consideration by Army Ground Forces.

The T23 Controversy.

The T23 incorporated an electric drive. The gasoline motor was connected to an electric generator which provided current to operate traction motors connected to the final drive sprockets. Unlike the M3 and M4 all of the T20 series were rear-drive tanks. A system of hand controls enabled the driver to operate each track independently through infinite speed variations. Independent operation of the tracks gave the vehicle a great deal of flexibility. The electric drive installation, however, added approximately 3,800 pounds to the weight of the tank.

The first hand-made pilot model of the T23 was exhibited to high-ranking officers, including Generals Marshall, McNair, Somervell and Devers (then commanding Armored Force) in April of 1943. The exhibition was not in the nature of a service test, but strictly a demonstration. The observers were very much impressed with the flexibility of this tank.

The Ordnance Department was enthusiastic in its praise and intimated that the tank was ready for quantity production. This in spite of the fact that the tank had not been service tested and that the hand-made model would not be completely representative of mass production. It was informally agreed at that time (without test) to procure 250 of these vehicles. A second pilot model was to be made and sent to the Armored Board for test.

One necessary change was agreed by Ordnance. The first model, instead of carrying a horizontal volute suspension as originally planned, had been supplied with the vertical volute suspension of the M4 tank. The horizontal volute springs were not yet in production, and Ordnance had believed it desirable to complete the pilot model of the T23 without incorporation of the preferred suspension. It was agreed that a development model should be made with torsion bar suspension (to be designated the T23E3).

Initial enthusiasm for the T23 could have been due, in part, to the failure of the M7 medium tank during tests in 1943. It was found that the power train of the M7 was incapable of providing the requisite cross-country mobility, and although improvements were incorporated, the tank was never approved for combat use. It was made limited standard in July 1943 and declared obsolete in December.

At the same time, the using arms desired development of this type of vehicle to continue with heavier armor and a 90mm gun. Two types were contemplated. One with slightly heavier armor than the T23 would weigh 36 tons and carry a 90mm gun. This was the T25 tank, forty were authorized. The T26 tank, weighing 40 tons and carrying a 90mm gun, was to carry armor equivalent to that of the new German Panther and Tiger tanks which had appeared on the battlefield the previous fall. Ten T26s were to be made. All of these tanks would use torsion bar suspension, the T25 with 19-inch tracks and the T26 with 24-inch tracks.

The initial report of the Armored Board on the T23 tank was extremely disappointing. Numerous defects were uncovered, the principal ones being an inadequate cooling system, excessive maintenance required by the electric drive, high unit ground pressure caused by the additional weight of the electric drive mechanism, poor stowage arrangements, and a host of minor deficiencies, all of which prevented the tank from being battleworthy.

The failure of the electric drive in the T23 tank and the already high ground pressure in the T25 and T26 indicated to Army Ground Forces the desireability of using a torquematic transmission in the latter tanks. This transmission system utilized a fluid torque converter and a planetary transmission with manual gear selection. These tanks were informally redesignated the T25E1 and T26E1.

_________________________________________

I’m going to break here for a bit, before coming back more in detail for the events of late ‘43/early ’44, particularly with reference to Pershing.

When one goes into the disastrous chain of events that led to the delayed introduction of the M26 Pershing, one must understand that US army tank development had stumbled from the M2 light tank to the M2 medium tank and thence to the stopgap M3 medium "coffin for seven brothers" as nobody in the US army had sat down and designed a gun turret for a howitzer, much less a 3 inch gun. The naval gun which was stuffed into the T6/M6 heavy tank required two loaders and separate shell and bag charges for the main gun. The 1.5 inch coax gun did not help matters. That was the only tank turret for a larger gun that Rock Island had designed. It was... not too good in layout, workability or crew efficiency.

The Americans were embarrassed to discover that the Canadians had taken their own path to a tank, The "Ram" or Canadian Cruiser Mark I. In sum the Canadians took the M3 Lee and cut it down, got rid of the side sponson howitzer and mounted a British style turret on it with first the two pounder and then the six pounder high velocity gun. The turrets worked better than anything the US army concocted. However, with the 1939-1940 experiences the British sent over to the Americans and with the help of experts from the United States Navy Gun Factory, the army engineers were able to take the ubiquitous American copy of the French Model 1898 75mm gun and design a turret for that piece, put a coax machine gun alongside and duplicate the "German style" three-man turret. The unit round cartridged shell reduced the loaders to one, freeing up space and reducing crew.

That was the Sherman. There was nothing to be done about the front mounted transmission since no-one had figured out the concept of the engine pack, yet. The original Continental radial engine meant a high PTO to the front drive sprockets and thus a TALL tank. This would be a design defect in the entire Sherman line.

There was a chance to fix this mistake along with the others, assuming the tank-automotive crew at Rock Island would look at a British Infantry Tank Mark III and accept that maybe the British built lousy tanks, but that they had learned at least how to build a "medium universal" in layout format.

That is a Valentine. The criticisms briefly are:

a. unacceptable over complicated suspension and track.
b. unreliable engine and transmission.
c. two man fighting compartment was too cramped to work in.
d. main gun was single use instead of dual purpose.
e. hull was armored plates on a mild steel frame.
f. hull armor shattered like glass under Munroe Effect.
g. British radios.
h. non-standardized assemblies and no inter-changeable parts. If it broke down, it stayed broke down until the mechanics could shape and fit the replacements to adapt to the existent tank.

On the other hand, the driver was center front, the fighting compartment was a self-contained compartment and the tank engine was in the rear as was the transmission. Plus: the Valentine had Wilson epicyclic steering, which meant that the tank could pivot on its tracks or back up in a hurry if the tank commander wanted to pivot in place or get out of Dodge because he blundered into a line of German 88s.

A lousy tank with some good ideas that the Americans should have stolen on their way to the T23/M27.

Last Edit: Jan 16, 2022 9:09:49 GMT by miletus12

miletus12
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What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s. Jan 17, 2022 3:27:34 GMT stevep likes this

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Post by miletus12 on Jan 17, 2022 3:27:34 GMT

The Chieftain's Hatch: Equipping the Force Pt3 26/12/2015

More headaches with the T23 / M27. Will they ever get it right?

I move now to part 3 of Army Ground Force’s activities with respect to tank procurement. Last time around we covered the period of about a year from autumn 1942, we move now to 1943. Part 1, a more general overview of how AGF did business, is here. I return us now to the AGF historian.

____________________________________________

Determining Production Policy: Fall of 1943

For the time being, emphasis was now placed on the modified T25 and T26 series of tanks, pilot models of which were nearing completion in the fall of 1943. The T23 had not passed from the picture, however, as later developments will indicate.

In November of 1943, ETO (European Theater of Operations) requested the highest priority be given development of the T26E1 tank, mounting a 90mm gun. General Devers, then Commanding General of ETO, requested production of 250 of these tanks on the basis of providing one for each five M4s. Ordnance Technical Division concurred in this recommendation, but also recommended production of at least 1,000 of the T23 tanks. The War Department submitted these proposals to Army Ground Forces for comment. Both the Ground Requirements and Ground Engineer Section urged General McNair not to concur in the proposed T26E1 production. They believed that service tests of this tank should be made, and also that the tank should not be used until suitable tactical bridging was available – which would not be at an early date. General McNair repeated his earlier position that we should defeat Germany by use of the M4 series of tanks and that a suitable tank destroyer was the logical answer to the heavier German tanks.

The Army Ground Forces’ reply to the War Department was contained in two papers. Both of these emphasized the suitability of the M4 series, particularly when improved by new center-guide tracks. The Army Ground Forces again rejected the T23 tank and electric drive until that drive had proved itself at least equal to other power trains. It was recommended that the T26E1 be continued as a development type only, since in the opinion of General McNair, battle experience had demonstrated that the anti-tank gun in suitable numbers and disposed properly were master of the tank.

I did write that General McNair was American feast or famine. He could make some wrong calls that would frustrate the drive to Montgomery's "universal tank" which for all practical purposes the M4 Sherman tank had become for the Western Allies by this time.

General Devers’ position on the T26E1 was not shared by General Eisenhower, then Commanding General of NATO (North African Theater of Operations), who did not want it because of its “excessive weight” and did not believe that the increased armor was justified in view of this increased weight and lack of maneuverability. Army Service Forces [Chieftain’s note: The guys who develop and buy the equipment] asked that the War Department reconcile these divergent opinions. When General Devers repeated his request for production of the T26E1, the War Department issued a directive to Army Service Forces to produce the tanks to fill this operational requirement. It was recommended to General McNair by the Requirements Section that Army Ground Forces’ objections be repeated and brought to the attention of the War Department. General W.F. Dean pointed out that no vehicle of the type had ever been found satisfactory in the pilot model, and that in addition torsion bar suspension had never been used on vehicles even half as heavy as the T26 [Chieftain's note: Obviously Panther and Tiger are the lie to that statement, but he probably referred to US knowledge and experience, which was more relevant]. The adequacy of the power plant was questioned since the Germans used greater horsepower on any vehicle over 40 tons. The torquematic transmission proposed for the tank was just then proving satisfactory on vehicles less than half the weight of this tank (76mm M18 Tank Destroyer and T24 Light Tank). General McNair, in a characteristic memorandum, refused to continue the controversy. He believed that Army Ground Forces had stated all these objections before and that higher authority had ruled against them. He was willing to accept the decision of his superiors in the spirit of the soldier. He personally preferred merely to keep production facilities open and would not object to manufacture of a sufficient number to achieve this purpose, but would take no further stand to press his views. Accordingly, a production schedule was established for the completion of the 250 tanks by April 1945. [Chieftain's note: This was done in January 1944. For a review of the Pershing's development timeline, I refer you to Producing T26, Pt 1., and Ordnance's side of the story is found in Producing Pershing Part2.]

I will provide these articles in a future update. For the present, Jacob Devers, a very underrated American general, was concerned with intelligence reports from the Russian front about Russian experience with German tanks, especially after the true nature of the Russian fiasco at Kursk came in. For the same reason the Russians were rushing the fielding of the T-34/85 to replace the still predominant T34/76, Devers wanted the 90mm/50 gun to show up in something tanklike to deal with the new Panthers. McNair was about one intelligence cycle behind in his estimates and was invested in the antitank gun as his cure for tanks. Maybe it was his artillery bias? Whatever the reason, McNair had cooked the result of US Army maneuvers in the Carolinas and East Texas / Louisiana to "prove" anti-tank guns worked. He also misinterpreted reports out of North Africa to prove that his notions were correct, though Patton, after the battle of El Guettar could have told him that he, McNair, was dead wrong.

To a large extent, the further complaints, by Eisenhower, Bradley and even Patton, were field commander complaints that they did not want added logistics hassles, troop training problems, maintenance issues. transportation difficulties and other kerfuffle, if the current force mix and equipment worked. These arguments had considerable merit. Delays to learn the new machine's quirks and how to use it, and move it, delayed the present urgent business of fighting Germans and it was just one new item of worry in over 1,000 weapons that combined together, were winning the war.

That was North Africa and Italy talking. Come 1944 France and the combat commanders, except Patton who told his men, "Shoot them from the side or ram them if you have to.", screamed for something with a 90 mm/50 to shoot holes in the Panthers and the "occasional" Tiger encountered. The British, being British, "put a 17 pounder into a Sherman and got on with the job."

The Ordnance Department followed this authorization by recommending that five of the production models of the T25E1 and one T26E1 be sent to NATO for “battle evaluation”, accompanied by introductory teams of specialists. They also revived the T23 question and asked that five tanks also be sent overseas for battle evaluation. Army Ground Forces would not concur in these proposals. It pointed out that these tanks had not been service tested and that the combat zone was not suitable for such testing. The activities of introductory teams, in the opinion of Army Ground Forces, should be limited to demonstration of the tanks and conferences with officers and soldiers who had been in combat. For the time being, this project was set aside.

McNair again. He was Army Ground Forces.

T25E1 versus T26E1

As between the T25E1 and T26E1 Army Ground Forces preferred the lighter T25E1, believing it would have mobility almost equal to that of the M4 and would provide the necessary fire power (90mm gun). These tanks were similar except in armor (and consequently weight) and suspension. The T25E1 weighed approximately 38 tons and the T26E1 approximately 43 tons; both employed a 90mm gun and torsion bar suspension; the latter, however, had 24-inch tracks compared with 19-inch tracks on the T25E1. Army Ground Forces urged, therefore, on the assumption that T25E1 service tests would prove satisfactory, that plans be drawn for re-equipping half of divisional and separate tank battalions with the T25E1 and that M4 production be terminated. Two major changes were proposed. At the insistence of General McNair, the 90mm gun was to be replaced with a 76mm gun and the wider suspension system of the T26E1 was to be incorporated. These changes would further decrease the unit ground pressure of the T25E1, and the lighter 76mm ammunition would facilitate firing and permit greater ammunition stowage. The War Department returned this recommendation for further study and at the same time increased the T26E1 production by 2,000, 1,800 of which were to be armed with the 90mm gun, and 200 with the 105mm howitzer.

T25E1

I have only one comment here. I do not understand why McNair would rob the American tank force of the 90mm/50 gun. It, the 90 was the next step up in dual use guns from the 75mm/40. If tank fighting had taught the Americans anything, it was that tanks spent most of their time fighting infantry. They needed a gun that could lay in a good high explosive shell to scatter enemy infantry or kill them in their earthworks as well as an armor piercing round for tanks and concrete bunkers. The 76.2mm/50 fired a worse high explosive shell than the 75mm/40. It also lacked a 90 mm shell's punch through armor plate. KE=1/2 MV^2 and all that jazzy.

As one will see, McNair was promptly told to shut up and adapt to the 90 or else. Devers won that one.

General McNair reconsidered his proposal and now modified his policy regarding the T25E1 tank. He was persuaded to accept the views of the European Theater that tanks would unavoidably meet tanks and that our armor and fire power must be sufficient to fight tank duels with German armor. He agreed, therefore, to concur in production of the T26E1 in place of the T25E1 in the 1945 tank program, which had now been increased to almost 6,000 of these tanks, although they were still in the process of service test. Army Ground Forces did, however, ask for development of both the T25E1 and the T26E1 with a 75mm and a 76mm gun and with the provision of stowage for at least 100 rounds of ammunition. Ordnance wanted to place this development on very low priority, but Army Ground Forces asked that it be carried forward as soon as the design of T26E1 with the 105mm howitzer was completed. [Chieftain’s Note: This vehicle would, of course, be developed as the M45. See M45 article]

Nevertheless: McNair threw in his various monkey wrenches to prove his points about the 76 and ETO commanders wanted their 75s as well.

Again, in August 1944, Ordnance moved to obtain combat tests of the 90mm T25E1 and T26E1 tanks, and the War Department directed formation of a tank platoon in NATO for this purpose. This course of action was strenuously objected to by both the Armored Board and Army Ground Forces. The War Department finally approved Army Ground Force’ stand and cancelled the proposed combat tests, as it had that of the T23.

McNair was now dead at this point; thanks to the USAAF, but his decisions still carried inertia with AGF. Devers was headed to Europe and a field army command. This will open the route for this guy at last.

Ordnance then attempted to obtain standardization of the T26E1 before completion of the service tests. Army Ground Forces did not concur in this proposal, pointing out that remedial actions found necessary by the Armored Board had not yet been taken and that standardization at that time would facilitate neither the development nor the production of the tank. Army Ground Forces would not move toward standardization until the modified model had been service tested and found battleworthy. They knew that modification of a standard item in production was more difficult to achieve than of one still classified only as a development type. There the matter rested until the end of the year.

This was AGF covering their rear ends. By now the American congress was up in arms about the news reports that M4 Shermans were being slaughtered by German armor in France. What is not generally understood, was that of course Shermans were being slaughtered. So were the German tanks at about a one for one exchange rate. The German tanks were being "shot from the side and being rammed." Patton and other American generals were correct that inside the overall maelstrom of weapon effects, a Sherman could do the job, as long as one was not too squeamish about the blood calculus. American tank crews usually mostly survived being punched in their late war fire-proofed Shermans by German antitank weapons which only punched holes in them and failed all top often to explode or fragment properly or create spall. The reverse statement for German tank crews who burned to death in their flamenwagens was not as true. As for the super-miracle T-34? Try this bloody calculus. The Russians built some 70,000 T-34s. The Germans killed 58,000 of them. An estimated 296,000 Russians perished in those tanks, all burned to death because they could not bail out. US tankers killed in about 15,000 Shermans of which 6,000 were killed? About 3,000 men.

What was the best tank of WWII, again?

Assault Tank M4A3E2 – 1944

As early as February 1944, the Developments Division, Army Ground Forces, was convinced that more heavily armored tanks were going to be needed in the coming assault on Fortress Europe, and that they would be needed before either the T25E1 or the T26E1 would become available. Colonel Dean, Chief of the Armored Branch, believed that an expedient could be provided by providing additional armor to the M4 series of tanks, using extended end connectors to offset somewhat the additional weight. To achieve the same result, Ordnance favored modernizing the turret of the M6 heavy tank and instituted an Ordnance Committee action to that end. Army Ground Forces opposed this idea and pointed out in its non-concurrence that there were many other deficiencies in the M6 tank. To make the vehicle battleworthy would require complete modernization. Army Ground Forces had urged modernization in 1943 when tests of the M6 showed its inferiority. Nothing had been done and Army Ground Forces was unwilling to subscribe to any development of the tank unless it included a complete redesign.

The M6 was a disaster with outdated 1930s ideas that could not be fixed. AGF was correct this time.

A conference of War Department, Army Service Forces, Ordnance, and Army Ground Forces representatives was held, and Army Ground Forces prevailed in obtaining a limited procurement of modified M4 tanks. It was proposed to mount a new final drive casting with 5 ½ inches of armor and to weld an additional 1 ½ inches to the front plates and upper side plates. A new turret with 6 inches of armor would replace the standard turret. This tank would weigh about 42 tons, but was limited to 15 pounds ground pressure. A limited procurement of 250 was established, 200 to be made available by 15 August, and the remainder by the end of August. The Chief of Engineers did not concur in this production because of the lack of tactical bridging, but Army Service Forces was ready to go ahead over the non-concurrence of the Chief of Engineers as soon as War Department G-4 gave its approval. Ordnance emphasized the need for immediate approval, because of the labor situation. A 10-day delay might mean a 20 or 30- day setback in the start of production. War Department G-4 supported Army Ground Forces and issued its directive as requested.

Say hello to the Sherman "Jumbo"

Ordnance Department did a “magnificent job” in producing the M4A3E2 tank. The project was handled by the Ordnance Production and Engineering Divisions and the Technical Division was little concerned. All possible shortcuts were used, and the tanks rolled off as promised. Actually, the last of the limited procurement was delivered only two weeks after the original schedule had been agreed upon, and this delay was due to the time interval necessary to get the production program approved by the War Department.

The tanks proved to be an unqualified success. These vehicles reached France as the US Army came up against the highly fortified German lines, and in the close infantry combat of the fall of 1944 they proved their worth. Some commanders even requested that all medium tank production be in this type, and Army Ground Forces considered re-opening production of this tank in December 1944 [Chieftain’s note: Now I’m reading it, it explains the drawings for a new, improved turret which I found in the National Archives . And yes, the lads in Minsk have it, if they want to use it]. Army Service Forces believed that to make even 500 or 1,000 would require additional facilities which would not be available until late in 1945. Production of all M4A3 tanks was to be completed by April. The Armored Board in February 1945 joined the theaters in asking for further development of this tank, based on an M4 chassis. They recommended using the T26 turret, new horizontal volute suspension, and a 7 to 8 inch armor basis. Army Ground Forces did not favour this in view of the Ordnance information on production possibilities and the fact that the T26 series was now becoming available.

Instead, Army Ground Forces recommended that a similar development be undertaken using the T26E1 chassis and increasing its armor basis to equal that of the M4A3E2 without increasing the ground pressure. Army Service Forces approved this action, but Ordnance pointed out that there would be a 50% loss in tank production for at least 60 days and that six months’ lead time would be needed to produce this heavier armored tank (which in the meantime had been classified as the Heavy Tank T26E5).

The successful development of the M4A3E2 tank indicated more than ever to Army Ground Forces the desireability of getting the M6 out of the picture once and for all. Accordingly, it recommended in July 1944 that it be declared obsolete. This proposal was not brought to the Ordnance Technical Committee, because the Ordnance Department was now attempting to revive the M6 by incorporating a 105mm gun. A wooden mock-up was inspected by representatives of the Armored Board and Army Ground Forces Developments Division. When the formal action was brought before the Technical Committee, Army Ground Forces again assembled all its arguments against the M6 in a strong non-concurrence. It concluded that since the vehicle could not proceed to the point of employment under its own power and could not be transported(because of width and weight), it would be able to reach the scene of an engagement “only through a combination of the most unusual, unexpected, and fortunate events.” The item was withdrawn.

In January of 1945, Ordnance again sought to revive interest in the M6 tank by proposing to offer the available models to the theaters. Army Ground Forces opposed this move (in a statement signed by the Commanding General himself), in spite of the heavy tank losses suffered in the winter campaign of 1944-45. This memorandum was presented by General Waldron at a conference attended by General Somervell and representatives of the War Department General Staff, the Ordnance Department, and Army Ground Forces, held on 5 January 1945. Utilization of this tank and also the equally obsolescent T23 in the theaters was discussed. The M6 was dropped from further consideration but the question of the T23 was left open for the time being.

By this time AGF was General Ben Lear who was about to be fired for incompetence and replaced by General Joseph Stillwell who would be fired in his turn for much the same reason. Who winds up as Army Ground Forces Actual?

His name is Jacob L. Devers. Now one knows why the M48 PATTON was developed.

Last Edit: Jan 23, 2022 16:10:28 GMT by miletus12

miletus12
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What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s. Jan 23, 2022 16:29:59 GMT

Quote

Post by miletus12 on Jan 23, 2022 16:29:59 GMT

I did promise daily updates on this series, but other things interfered. Sorry. Will try to clean it up.

The Chieftain's Hatch: Equipping the Force, Pt 4 02/01/2016 The Chieftain's Hatch

We continue, yet again, with AGF’s tank requirements history. We’re now towards the end of 1944, as we rejoin AGF’s attempts to stop Ordnance from telling them what’s best for AGF’s forces.

__________________________________________________

Last of the T23

In order to insure a completely fair evaluation of the T23 tank, Army Ground Forces had proposed in the spring of 1944 to equip the 785th Tank Battalion and expose the tank to extended field service tests in this country. Army Ground Forces was convinced that the tank was not satisfactory but did not want to be in a position of overlooking any advancement which the electric drive might accomplish. Ordnance had claimed that all the initial deficiencies found had been corrected in the ten production models, which were tested by the Armored Board in the summer of 1944. But again results were very disappointing. It was found, for example, that 300 man-hours of maintenance were required for each 100 hours of operation. The track and suspension system was inadequate; the cooling system was easily clogged with dust and prevented satisfactory operation in high ambient temperatures or dusty conditions; no steering or braking was possible if the engine failed, and finally the tank could not be operated satisfactorily at slow speeds without imposing a heavy burden on the traction motors. The Board listed 26 urgent deficiencies in this vehicle. Army Ground Forces approved the Board’s recommendation for a correction of these deficiencies and stated that if they were corrected two battalions would be equipped with the tank and sent to the theater. It was also found in the field test of the tank by the 785th Tank Battalion that the armored engine compartment grilles could not withstand even 20mm fire from the ground or plunging fire from aircraft.

The Ordnance Department admitted that it would be unable to undertake the modifications proposed by Army Ground Forces, but countered with a proposal that one battalion be sent overseas for a combat test of the electric drive. Army Ground Forces agreed only that ETO and MTO be notified of the availability of 150 of these tanks and be provided with full copies of the test reports. The War Department thought that the tank could be used for training, but Army Ground Forces pointed out the many objections to this proposal. After the January 1945 conference on the M6 and T23 tanks, the War Department decided not to send these tanks to the theater and directed that one company be equipped for further test and that the remainder was salvaged.

The Ordnance Department was not content to accept this ruling. It still had some 125 of the tanks on its hands. Ordnance wanted, if possible, to get somebody to say that the tanks were satisfactory. General Barnes went to Europe on a tank mission connected with the introduction of the T26E3 tank in combat. He returned with a report that General Eisenhower suggested using the T23 tank with a 76mm gun, and that all commanders contacted would be happy to have it. Colonel Dean, who accompanied this mission, returned with a directly contrary report. Among those fully informed on the problems incident to using the tank, Colonel Dean could find no one who looked with favor on the proposal. As later substantiated by the comments of the ETO commanders on the Barnes report, it was flatly stated that there was no requirement for the T23, and that it was unlikely that the commanding generals interviewed by General Barnes had personal knowledge of the problems involved, and that their wishes were probably based simply on a desire to get more tanks with 76mm guns.

Thus ended the long history of the T23 tank. What was learned from the production of 250 could have been equally well learned from the first ten pilot models, but such was the urgency ion 1942-1943 of getting promising equipment into large-scale production at once.

Heavy Tanks T28, T29 and T30

While Army Ground Forces was considering the construction of the M4A3E2 tank as an expedient, and the Ordnance Department was attempting to revive the obsolescent M6 in the spring of 1944, Ordnance proposed a new development for a very heavily armored assault tank designated as Heavy Tank T28. This tank was to weigh in the neighborhood of 80 tons and would mount a 105mm AA gun. Its total width would be 178 inches, but this was reducible to 135 inches by removing outer tracks and outer bogie wheels. The width of the double track was to be 38 inches, so that the unit ground pressure would remain in the neighborhood of 12 pounds per square inch. This tank would carry twelve inches of armor. No turret was provided, and the gun would therefore have only limited traverse. The vehicle was in reality a self-propelled assault gun – not a tank. It was proposed to manufacture twenty-four of these vehicles. Army Ground Forces took the position that five would be sufficient for development purposes for several reasons. The use of a 500-horsepower engine in a tank of over 80 tons was questioned. It was felt that a better development would be to improve the M6 or T26 by addition of the 105mm AA gun. Such improvement would, of course, depend on the development of a suitable suspension system. Army Ground Forces also objected to the use of the electric drive in this tank in view of the very poor results that had been experienced by Army Ground Forces in all other tanks incorporating this unit. Faced with these cogent objections, Ordnance agreed to the development of the five pilots only.

I have a soft spot for the T-28. That thing is surprisingly small for a superheavyweight tank. I could see about a thousand of those things crawling through the Hurtgen forest and the Wehrmacht and Hitler Jungen soldiers freaking out as their PAK 40s and Panzerfausts and Shrecks bounced off or exploded uselessly against battleship style belt armor on those turtle-backed comedy acts. But getting the 80 tonne monsters there was the problem.

Later in the year, Ordnance brought up two other developments in the heavy tank program. These were heavy tanks T29 and T30 and were based on a chassis similar to that of the T26 series. The T29 was intended to mount the 105mm gun and the T30 to mount a 155mm gun. The weight of these tanks would be approximately 60 tons, the additional weight over that of the T26 series being attributable to the heavier turret armor and heavier armament. The hull armor was equivalent to that of the T26 series. A 23-inch track with extended end connectors was contemplated. Here again, as in the M4 series of tanks, extended end connectors would be only an expedient and could in no sense be considered an answer to the problem of lower ground pressure. On the other hand, a recently developed Ford V12 engine of 750 horsepower, with a cross-drive transmission, would provide the tanks with a modern power pland.

This program was disappointing to the Armored Board, the Armored Medical Research Laborary [Chieftain’s Note: AMRL was involved with evaluating vehicles from the ergonomic/usability standpoint], and Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. All of these agencies believed that Ordnance was approaching the problem from the wrong standpoint. It was the desire of Ground Forces to develop better, but not necessarily bigger tanks, to arm these tanks with harder-hitting, but not necessarily bigger guns, to increase power and mobility without increasing unit ground pressure, and not to increase armor unless an increase in fire power was also achieved without significant increase in ground pressure. Both of the weapons designed for these tanks had lower muzzle velocities than the 90mm gun M3, then used in the T26 tank, and both required separate loading ammunition. This last factor alone would have been sufficient to arouse Army Ground Forces’ condemnation. The difficulties of servicing tank cannon in the restricted space of a turret are serious enough without adding the complication of separate loading ammunition requiring hand or automatic ramming. The weight of the 155mm projectile (100 pounds) also exceeded the practical limits for one-man loading. The total of these objections meant a reduced rate of fire, less ammunition stowage, greater fatigue factors in the gun loaders, and fire power increased only through mass and not muzzle velocity.

Floatation is imporant. The white circle was the result of some savage not caring where the hole punch would go.

All of these objections were pointed out in a qualified concurrence in which Army Ground Forces agreed to the construction of two pilot models of each type for development and engineering purposes only. For one thing Army Ground Forces desired to obtain data on the performance of the V12 engines in such heavy tanks and the suitability of the cross-drive transmission. It was stated definitively that no known requirement existed for either of the vehicles.

To counter this recurring tendency to build only bigger and not better tanks, Army Ground Forces supplied military characteristics for a new medium tank in September 1944. These were based on the desires of the theaters and the experience of the using arm. The characteristics were not as spectacular as those of the mammoth T28, T29 and T30, but they were designed to provide a vehicle that would accomplish what the armored people wanted. Detailed characteristics, occupying fourteen pages, were prepared, which analyzed the qualities desired in physical characteristics, performance, armor basis, armament, fire control, engine and drive, running gear, turret, stowage, communications, fuel system, vision, ventilation, gas protection, hatchways, seats, driving controls, lighting, and other similar components and accessories. Individually, the characteristics did not present a radical departure from those of existing tanks, but considered collectively, they sketched a vehicle admirably adapted to its intended purpose in every detail.

The development of this tank centered on the provision of a suitable gun to be designed specifically for the space limitations imposed by tanks, with as short a chamber as possible, as short a distance from trunnnions to breech as consistent with a balanced turret, compact recoil mechanism, short recoil and semi-automatic breech. With a caliber not to exceed three inches, it was to be capable of penetrating eight inches of armor at 1,000 yuards on a 30 degree obliquity using special ammunition. For comparison, the 90mm gun M3 firing standard ammunition (23 ½ pounds) at a muzzle velocity of 2,650 foot-seconds penetrated 4.4 inches of armor under the same conditions, with the newer HVAP ammunition (tungsten carbide core) at 3,350 foot-seconds it penetrates 6.8 inches. The German 8.8cm gun, firing a 22-pouind projectile at 3280 foot-seconds penetrates 6.5 inches, and using the new German tungsten carbide core ammunition reaches a muzzle velocity of 3,775 foot-seconds and was rated at 7.6 inches of penetration.

Ammunition for the weapon was to be fixed and to not weigh more than 35pounds. An integrated fire control system with complete stabilization was called for which would include a built-in range-funder, an auxiliary sight changeable from three to eight power, and a seven-power periscopic binocular. Army Ground Forces called attention to the fact that provision of gun and ammunition was one of the most important features of the design.

The vehicle was to weigh approximately 45 tons with an overall width of 134 inches. It was to have a ground pressure of 7 points per square inch, carrying a minimum of 6 inches of armor on the front hull and turret.

The Ordnance reaction was immediately unfavorable. It claimed that the basic features were not much different from T26E3, T26E4 and T26E5, except that some of the latter had more armor and armament. To the Ordnance Department it appeared that for the most part current developments had surpassed the ideals proposed by Army Ground Forces. Army Service Forces accepted the Ordnance contention that all of the components sought by Army Ground Forces were under development and that as these were developed and tested they should be used later in a final tank design.

Actually, the statement of Ordnance created a false impression with respect to some of the most important characteristics. No medium or heavy tank under development had as low a ground pressure as seven pounds. No gun under development fired fixed ammunition of three inches or less caliber with armor penetrative qualities specified by Army Ground Forces. Finally, no tank under development possessed a completely integrated fire control system desired for this tank. What is more important, no tank was under development as a unit which would incorporate all the desired features. The core of the proposal was for development integrated from the start rather than piecemeal incorporation. But for the time being, the proposal was not taken up.

Army Ground Forces followed up this proposal by recommending that the T26 series be modified to incorporate eight inches of armor, the 750 horsepower Ford V12 engine, and the cross-drive transmission which were to be used in the T29 and T30 tanks. Additional flotation was to be provided by adding another bogie wheel on each side. Ordnance concuirred, the tank was designated T32, and authorization given for the construction of four pilot models.

Introduction of the T26E3 tank.

By the end of 1944, while the development programs for the new heavy tanks mentioned above were being thrashed out between Army Ground Forces and Ordnance, the tests of the T26E1 had been substantially completed, and it was found that such extensive modifications were necessary that the improved tank should be given a new designation. This was done by Ordnance Committee action and the modified tank was designated T26E3. At the same time, two pilot models with the 105mm howitzer were authorized and designated T26E2. This same action terminated all development programs for the earlier T20 series except the T23 series, the T25 electric drive, and the T26 electric drive, which Ordnance still hoped to bring into the picture.

In February 1945, the first twenty of the T26E3 tanks were used in combat by the 9th and 3rd Armored Divisions in the assault of the Roehr River Line. The introduction of these tanks was observed by the mission headed by General Barnes. Initial reports were exceptionally favorable, but after further use during the spring of 1945, a better evaluation of the tanks could be made. As Army Ground Forces had always recognized, the T26E3 was far from being the complete answer to the desires of armored units even after the many improvements incorporated on its recommendations. The using troops objected to the reduced mobility and felt that added armor was still not sufficient for the tactical employment of such a tank. The 90mm gun was received enthusiastically as a substantial improvement over the 76mm gun. The tank was found to be fairly reliable although a number of minor deficiencies were experienced. It was standardized in April 1945, but the war ended before great numbers of these tanks were used and a complete battle evaluation could not be obtained. Even so, further immediate improvements were to stem from this basic vehicle.

Later Tank Developments.

In 1944, Ordnance had under development a longer-barrelled 90mm gun (T15) than the M3 (Used in the T26E3) which produced a muzzle velocity of 3,200 foot-seconds with 24-pound standard ammunition, and 3,800 foot-seconds with a 16-pound tungsten carbide shell still under development (T30E16). At 1,000 yards and 30 degree obliquity, the former shell was calculated to penetrate 5.6 inches of armor and the new tungsten carbide shell 8.7 inches. This gun with the new projectile was the closest approach to the requirement established by Army Ground Forces for a medium tank cannon, and a limited procurement of 100 was authorized. It had two serious defects. The ammunition was semi-fixed instead of fixed, and its recoil system was not as compact as desired. Although Ordnance termed the gun “super velocity”, its muzzle velocity was only comparable to that of the new German 8.8cm PaK 43 – and the latter had already been in combat use for some months.

The turret mounting of the new gun was purely an expedient, and Army Ground Forces believed a new turret should be developed. Accordingly, Army Ground Forces did not concur in a proposal to procure 1,000 T26E3 tanks, equipped with this gun and re-designated T26E4, and procurement was fixed at 100, to accord with the initial procurement of the guns.

In addition to its proposal to develop the T32 tank, Army Ground Forces made a further effort to obtain a completely integrated tank and tank destroyer program for Ground Forces. In a comprehensive memorandum to the Chief of Staff, it reiterated its principle that greater striking power, but not necessarily a larger gun, was needed. It reiterated the original doctrine of General McNair that in the race between gun and armor, the gun will win, and that tanks should be opposed by tank destroyers relying primarily on mobility and a more powerful gun than the tanks they were fighting. It was admitted that tank battles became inevitable and that therefore our tanks should have guns and armor making them more than a match for any enemy tank. It emphasized the fact that even the new T15 90mm gun, which would not be ready until July 1945, would still have a lower velocity than the German 88, and it repeated the desire of Army Ground Forces to have a gun specifically designed for tank use which would penetrate 8 inches of armor at 1,000 yards. Army Ground Forces admitted that the accuracy of our tubes exceeded that of the German high velocity cannon (a fact emphasized by Ordnance) but pointed out that the life expectance of the tanks in combat was much less than the tube life of the gun. Consequently, guns of shorter life could be provided so that life expectancy of tanks and their weapons would be more in accord. Characteristics were prepared for light tanks, medium tanks, heavy tanks, and a heavy tank destroyer, all based on the performance characteristics of the weapons to be mounted. The vehicle was to be built around the gun, rather than the reverse – the principle followed under Ordnance programs.

At about the same time (January 1945) the New Developments Division of the War Department prepared a study on tank and anti-tank weapons which contemplated the standardization of the T26E3, construction of a thousand T29 and five hundred T30 tanks, and even went so far as to propose the development of a heavy tank mounting an 8-inch gun. Army Ground Force’s reply to this study was in the same tenor as its own development program.

A conference was held by New Developments Division in an attempt to reconcile conflicting aims. Ordnance objected to using the T15 90mm in all of the T26 tanks although Army Ground Forces had emphaised that its HE effect was the same as that of the M3 90mm, and its armor penetrative performance much better. It was agreed finally to include 1,000 of these guns in the 1945 program. The conference also agreed on the production of twelve hundred T29 tanks. General Barnes urged comparable procurement of the T30. He argued that it should be used to support the 105mm tanks in much the same way as the 105mm howitzer tanks lent artillery support to the 76mm M4s. General Borden supported General Barnes on this point, but General Maxwell (G-4) supported the objections of Army Ground Forces. It was agreed that Army Ground Forces would restudy possible requirements for the T30 in the light of General Barnes’ “tactical concept”. After objection by the other conferees, New Developments withdrew its recommendation for an 8-inch gun tank. General Barnes promised also to provide mechanical loading for the T30 tank.

As directed by the conference, Army Ground Forces restudied the T30 tank. It concluded that it should not be put into limited procurement. The weapon had less accuracy and less armor effect than the 105mm. ETO had also begun to swing away from “supporting tanks” by reducing its ratio of howitzer to gun tanks. Army Ground Forces believed that if the T30 proved suitable after service tests, a portion of the production of the T29 could better be converted. Also Army Ground Forces had proposed that additional fire power in the T30 tank could much better be obtained by a gun that was a more effective “hole puncher”, and suggested consideration of adapting the 120mm AA Gun M1 for this purpose. This weapon fired a 50-pound projectile at 3,100 feet per second as compared with the 100-pound projectile and the 2,200 foot-second velocity of the 155mm gun. Ordnance replied that such development had already been undertaken and the tank designated Heavy Tank T34.

On recommendation of the New Developments Division, the War Department directed procurement of 504 of the T30 tanks although Army Ground Forces’ non-concurrence was duly recorded at the Ordnance Technical Committee meeting. The Engineers also refused to concur because of the excessive weight and width of the vehicle which exceeded allowable limits of AR 850-15, even after its recent revision.

Gradually, the T28 dropped from the picture. Recognizing the fact that it was not really a tank, Ordnance Department changed its nomenclature to Carriage, Motor, 105mm Gun T95. On this subject General Hodges wrote a personal letter to General Barnes in which he stated that there was no requirement for such a super-heavy tank and that for practical purposes the T26E4 had the maximum weight and width for anything but a strictly defensive operation. At the termination of hostilities, the pilot model of this vehicle had not yet been completed.

The program recommended by Army Ground Forces for better tanks did not meet with success. General Campbell, speaking for the Ordnance Department, assured Army Ground Forces that they would develop materiel desired by Army Ground Forces. But it was hard to believe that the AGF was being supported with full co-operation from Ordnance. After the passage of almost a year, personnel still either was not available or had not been made available to initiate these projects. By V-J Day, Ordnance Technical Committee actions had not even been instituted.

_________________________________________________

So that brings us to the end of the War. In the final part of this series, we'll go over the summary overview, and I'll throw in a few cents of my own.

That is a lot to digest, but the main takeaway is that the American army tried to cram a decade and a half of lost technological and doctrinal development into about three years while they fought a war. How did they do? They won the war but did not get to where they needed to be at the end of it. Stay tuned for the Korean War and "the tank panic."

miletus12
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What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s. Jan 25, 2022 12:39:13 GMT

Quote

Post by miletus12 on Jan 25, 2022 12:39:13 GMT

I edited Part4. Now on with part 5.

The Chieftain's Hatch: Equipping the Force, Pt5 16/01/2016

I’ll finish off AGF’s history of tank development here, and then put a couple of observations at the end. We’re probably not going to be done with this, though. There is another file on AGF's perspective on tank destroyers, though Armored Force's is more worried about organisation and doctrine than about equipment procurement. Still, that's all for some weeks in the future.

So, back to AGF’s historian again.
___________________________________________________________

The heavy and medium tank progressed through four distinct phases during the war:

1) Original heavy tanks. Up to the end of 1943, the development program for increase in tank effectiveness visualized super-heavy tanks. These were found by test to exceed the limitations on the mechanical capabilities and firepower imposed by existing technical achievements.

my comment is that the problem was with the lack of a good small 1000 kWatt engine and with the suspension technology for high speed movement of 70 tonne monstrosities as well as strategic lift and bridging for the aforesaid monsters. Otherwise a 12 k/h crawler (T28) was quite doable.

2) Improvement of the M4 Series. Faced with the necessity of providing many thousands of tanks not only for American but for all Allied armies, the emphasis shifted from heavy tanks to production and improvements of the new M4 tank, which was to be the bulwark of the armored forces. During the war, extensive improvements were made in armor, suspension, fire power, flotation and mechanical reliability.

After a decade of tinkering the base vehicle was good enough. "Bird in Hand" was the thinking.

3) Development of new heavy tanks. The third phase was ushered in as a result of the many conferences in the winter of 1943-44, when it was definitely decided to continue the development program of the T20 series, which could be classed as heavy tanks (45 tons) in contrast to the M4 series (35 tons). After some false starts with the untried electric drive (T23, T25, T26), a successful tank of this series was finally developed and modified to become battleworthy in time to be used in France and Germany (T26E3/M26). In this tank, forward strides were taken in lowered silhouette and greater fire power but with no corresponding improvement in maneuverability, reliability, or flotation over the dependable M4 series. Although used only in the latter phases of the conflict and in small quantities, the using troops generally considered the tank to be a definite improvement over the M4 series. Analysis of reports indicates that much of this praise was directed to the greater fire power provided by the 90mm gun.

The LESSON here was the troops could live with thin armor., What the troops wanted; was a competitive gun and ammunition to can-open the enemy's tanks at range. What the tacticians wanted; was a tank or vehicle with a gun that could perform dual role missions of killing enemy tanks and enemy infantry while providing direct support fires in offensive missions without the folderoy of having to maneuver and use fancy-smanchy tactics to obtain flank and rear shots that slowed down operations speeds and tempos.

4) New tank developments. The tanks on the drawing boards at the termination of hostilities, if designed in accordance with military characteristics prepared by Army Ground Forces, would initiate a new principle in tank development. Guns would be designed for the single purpose of tank employment, and vehicles would be developed to mount those guns. Extensive improvements in flotation, suspension, and power trains would be incorporated in these tanks in order to make their increased fire power and armor usable under battlefield conditions.

Can-openers. This was the wrong lesson. That Russian infantry, despite its inept leadership at battalion and below, was not going to kill itself. One needed anti-infantry capability to help those lads along.

Certain conclusions can be deduced from the history of tank development in World War II. The following bear directly on the problems of development encountered by Army Ground Forces under the wartime organization of the War Department.

What else did they get wrong?

Experience in combat proved illusory the assumption that additional armor and weight and bigger guns would guarantee superiority over enemy tanks: In other words, that a bigger tank was a better tank. The problem was more difficult. In this war the better tank was the one which met tactical requirements by combining, in a balanced relation, a number of factors to which weight and size were only incidentally related. These include, first, mechanical reliability and fire power. A tank that does not provide reliable performance under combat conditions with a minimum of maintenance is no tank at all. Of almost equal importance is fire power – Not measured by projectile mass and explosive effect, but by the ability to penetrate armor of considerable thickness at ranges of 1,000 yards and over with the smallest feasible caliber. This attribute calls for guns of very high muzzle velocity. Subsidiary advantages were derived from such tank cannon – the smaller, lighter projectiles permit easier handling, firing, and greater ammunition stowage, and the short, flat trajectory greatly improves direct fire against moving targets.

I see they forgot MOVE fast, SEE clearly, and REPORT contacts. Tactical speed, see and report first, and engage with supported elements as part of a combined arms team fell by the wayside. Radios and artillery spotter capability and training is not important for the tank or its crew?

Maneuverability and good flotation (low ground pressure) were almost as important in the balanced relation as reliability and fire power, for the tank must be where it is needed when it is needed. Armor protection for the crew is perhaps of less importance than any of the other characteristics, highly desirable as it is. It remained true that the best gun on the battlefield has, and will in the future, pierce the best armor.

At least they got that part right.

Another point to consider is that any slight addition to armor of existing thickness only adds weight and creates a false sense of security without providing material additional protection. The penetrative power of large-calibre tank and anti-tank weapons was such that existing armor would almost need doubling to provide real protection within medium ranges. Additional protection afforded at longer ranges by slight increases in armor would hardly justify the additional weight and consequently increased load on engines and suspension.

This is called strategic mobility. The better cure for crew protection was to design first look / first shoot / first kill ergonomics. Flame proof the tank and compartmentalize it, so that crew bail-out was an 80% solution instead of the T-34's 15% survival rate. As one famous tanker said: "All of those whining (expletive deleted) Sherman bailout survivors complaining about how our tanks are death traps, forget two things. All those dead burned up Germans inside those dead burned up German tanks they killed before their Sherman was hit; and the factety fact that the Sherman survivors are SURVIVORS of that Sherman hit.

Experience also proved that the best tank in the world could be defeated by a numerical superiority of tanks which were individually inferior in many respects. There is no substitute for quantity in tank warfare if both quantity and quality can not be achieved. This was the decision made by Army Ground Forces in the trying days of 1943. It was one that contributed immeasurably to the sweeping successes of our armored forces, even though the desired quantities were never quite attained.

They send two, we send a troop.

The difficulties encountered by Army Ground Forces in getting effective action on recommendations justified by existing and subsequent experience in the field indicate the necessity for the closest kind of co-operation between the using arm and the developing agency in successful development of tanks. Stating the problem suggests the logical solution. The agency controlling the using arm should likewise control the actual development program. This principle is all the more valid since a tank has not even a remote civilian counterpart, and following commercial practices in tank development only promotes failures and delays. Had such unified control existed on levels lower than the War Department General Staff in, say, 1937 or 1938, the appearance of modern tanks, possessing attributes desired by those who had to fight them in combat might have been accomplished. Instead they were still, at best, on the drawing boards when the war ended. The M26, perhaps the best tank we had because of increased fire power and heavier armor, fell far short of the tank desired by the Army Ground Forces. But there was no reason to believe that it could not have been achieved if the proper personnel, time and effort had been devoted to the purpose.

Someone needs to make sure that there is someone over them; to overrule the Leslie McNairs and Gladeon Barnes of the future. Incidentally the WRONG lesson is to let the Army handle the technology end of things. It was the Private Sector that product improved the Sherman which was always a suboptimal design. The T23 program shows what the army does to "tanks".

________________________________________________________

Chieftain’s Observations.

Now that that salvo is over, let’s have a gander at the whole lot, and compare/contrast with Ordnance’s view of things.

Gladeon Barnes was a piker.

It is interesting to compare the line just above, “The agency controlling the using arm should likewise control the actual development program", with the position of General Barnes over at Ordnance: “For these reasons, it is necessary for the Ordnance Department to take a strong lead over the using services in the development of new equipment and then to get the help of those using services in determining where the weapon best fits into battlefield operations.”

Confusion and the top, chaos at the bottom.

Put simply, they are mutually exclusive propositions. In effect, you have the scientists saying “If we just let the using arms come up with the equipment needs, nothing ‘new’ or revolutionary would ever be developed”, and you have the using arms saying “Stop focusing on hypothetical wonderweapons, and put all your energy into this thing we know we need right now.”

The Chieftain calls this the technology / doctrine dichotomy or the "Chicken / Egg" argument. What drives the end result desired?

One can see arguments both ways. Certainly: the military branches can be some of the most conservative organizations which ever existed, but I think General Barnes may have been doing them a disservice. The US Army has an “Operational Needs” process, whereby a field unit can pass up the line a requirement for a capability which they really would like to have. For example, in WWII, one unit sent up to Ordnance a requirement for a device which could detect mines sufficiently in front of a tank that it would give them enough time to brake. We still don’t really have that today, let alone in 1942. On the other hand, there are also times when someone in a line unit might go “Hmm. I didn’t know that was even physically possible in order to ask for it” (I’ve done it myself, when I found out about some classified US military capabilities overseas) when they discover that the engineers have come up with something that could be used.

Hedgerow clippers.

What I find a little less acceptable in Ordnance’s position though was its belief that it apparently knew better than the using arms what they wanted, with its attempts to ramrod new stuff into production, or bypass normal processes, almost in an effort to justify itself. Which is silly, as Ordnance was doing absolutely sterling work as it was.

Barnes was a true believer in 19th Century "science" (engineering) will solve everything. One might almost think he was a closet Marxist materialist in denigrating human factors.

AGF’s position, on the other hand, seems a lot more supportable. They really didn’t mind the R&D boffins spending effort on researching new things, but they had to win a war, and it was much easier for them to do this when they knew what their equipment could and could not do, as efficiently as possible, as opposed to having equipment whose capability was really more a roll of the dice on that particular morning. Their steadfast refusal to accept T23, T25 and T26 until they were sure that the tank would do what they wanted it to do cannot be faulted, especially in view of the earlier disasters such as the M7 Light-ish/Medium Tank or the M5 GMC. Ordnance did not have to pay the money for vehicles which may sit around rusting (as T23 did) or have to figure out how to get thousands of tanks to Berlin.

That is the chicken squawking.

That said, AGF could be argued to have gone a bit too far the other direction. They had a definite insistence to keep with what they knew was working at that time. Perhaps they had a bit too much faith in Ordnance to be able to provide the materiel that they desired, such as a 76mm cannon capable of punching through anything it faced. Ordnance did well, there is no doubt that the 76mm Sherman was an outstanding tank overall, but it was to Ordnance’s credit that the 76mm tank was as capable as it was as soon as it was given that Barnes had been advancing its development. If only AGF had realized how much it needed the tank in mid 1944. That said, even at that it wasn’t as if AGF had their heads in the sand, but there was no emphasis, no sense that a better punch was required. Then again, it might be perhaps a bit hypocritical to say that AGF should have told the theater commanders to take the equipment into France whether they wanted it or not, while also maintaining that AGF should have the ability to not bring the equipment which Ordnance attempted to push onto them. It is also, perhaps, fortunate that AGF (Read: McNair) did not have final say on things like tank armament, but then, neither did Ordnance. The people making that decision were the end users.

Lots of egg there, but the takeaway was that in this specific case, AGF and Ordnance both screwed up. What was not needed was a 76 mm Sherman. What was needed was a 90 mm gun platform that weighed as much as a Sherman, was transportable as a Sherman, was as mobile as a Sherman and was as protected as a Sherman, as reliable, was see first, report first, shoot first and infantry user friendly as a Sherman. The 76 Sherman failed the infantry user friendly test in that it did not have a dual use gun and it did not adequately even hole punch to the extent desired without the use of tungsten cored ammunition. Remember, the Americans were short of tungsten. KE=1/2MV^2. When in doubt, use a bigger gun.

It’s important, of course, to remember that both parties were doing what they strongly felt was in the country’s, and the front-line soldier’s, best interest. That may both raise the question, and explain, why the official histories don’t necessarily say good things about the other branch, even though after the war one would probably excuse some rose-tinted glasses. It’s the difference between the micro and the macro levels of war. Ordnance was concerned about any individual item of equipment. They tested the M4 medium. They tested the M18 Gun Motor Carriage. And that’s as far as they took the analysis. Figuring out if it could cross a river on an Engineering Corps’ bridge wasn’t their problem. On the other hand, AGF looked predominantly from the higher level. Whether or not the tank had an extra inch of armor was of much less relevance to them that the tank had about as much armor as it could carry while still being able to get to where it needed to be. As the AGF line says, “a tank that does not provide reliable performance under combat conditions with a minimum of maintenance is no tank at all”

Or if the French had been asked (and they were), the answer was; "Any tank is better than no tank, but a reliable tank is better than any German tank."

Now, that’s not to say that a tank has to be absolutely bullet-proof. I will long remember the one and only telephone conversation I had with Tom Jentz (in which he somehow made me realize I knew basically nothing in comparison without in any way being demeaning or belittling) where he challenged me on the common assertion that M4 was particularly more reliable than any other tank commonly found. And it’s a fair question. Was M4 more reliable, as measured by mean time or distance between failures, than anything else? Does a commander care? Or, more importantly, does the commander care about the operational readiness rate? What’s important to him is that when he launches the assault tomorrow morning, he has all his tanks present. If the tank is sitting in a motor pool today because the transmission housing is off for three hours to replace a component it’s of no consequence because the mechanics will have it back together again in short notice, and then move onto the next tank. The tank was easily repairable. The tank was built with interchangeable components. The tank was given to an Army with sufficient mechanics to do it all. So when the ‘advance’ signal was given to move to the front line, the commander had almost all of his tanks. It can be argued that the 'quantity over quality' statement above refers not only to the production line, but also the quantity of tanks which makes it to any particular fight. It's a long way from the shipping department in Detroit to the Lorraine Valley. Of course, there is also the question of 'just how much more reliable did the British tanks become after the testing disasters of 1943?" in order for the M4 to lose its relative advantage.

The answer to the Chieftain's question (bolded) is that the British have never paid as much attention to "field servicing" or first echelon maintenance either in ease of repair, parts interchangeability, parts availability, trained mechanics or overall supply as the Americans. Neither did nayone else.

It is far too easy for us to criticize Army Ground Forces for not putting the best, most awesome equipment into the field immediately, and certainly there were occasions where they got it wrong. But AGF didn’t care about whether gun A could reliably penetrate armor plate B. AGF was worried about whether Tank X, if produced in sufficient quantity, was the most effective way of helping the Theater Commanders win the war if units were equipped with them.

Are the fighting arms winning with the junk issued? They are? What is the problem?

The last paragraph, about tank development in the late 1930s probably bears a bit of analysis at a future point. There is no denying the truth of it. The US military was not building fantastic tanks, and neither were they being produced to acceptable standards of economy and scale. Contrast with the building of airplanes, where Boeing just had to convert production from airliners to cargo aircraft and bombers, but the raw technologies were predominantly the same. However, the economy and the political climate in the 1930s was what it was.

It is true the tank is a specialist vehicle, but there was no excuse for at least not keeping a small industrial base going.

Ultimately, however, one cannot argue with success. There may have been other ways of getting there, but with AGF responsible for anything from kitchen trailers through artillery, to training infantrymen, it’s difficult to say that their philosophies were wrong.

In the American army's defense, it can be argued that the tank fiasco was nothing like the torpedo crisis. The USN has never apologized to the families of the 30,000 sailors killed because their fish did not work, for that mistake.

Last Edit: Jan 25, 2022 13:45:54 GMT by miletus12

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What if? The Americans succeed with these projects in the 1930s.

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