Post by stevep on Jun 5, 2021 11:48:37 GMT
I agree that the belief in the bomber offensive was deluded. It wasted a lot of resources that could have been used better elsewhere.
What you said later in the post. Many of the Soviet losses in 41 especially but also later, such as in the offensive near Kharkov that Lordroel has been reported, were because he refused to allow withdrawals until too late. With an earlier and faster German advance this attitude could quite possibly change. The other issue is whether, without fighting in N Africa Stalin listens more to his military and intel staff and actually take precautions against an attack.
British common sense is what makes it impossible. Britain knows that such an attack is almost certain to fail, especially if Russia had already collapsed west of the Urals. Even OTL they knew that it would be a high problem with little/no amphibious assault resources and issues of supply and logistics. Churchill was eager to bend over backward toward the US but there was no way even he was going to sacrifice the bulk of the British army - as the vast majority of the forces involved would have been British land as well as air and sea - in a clear suicide mission. Given that also it would rely on British bases as well as forces that make it a dead duck. We might have to sacrifice some units at Dieppe as OTL unfortunately as OTL to make this clear.
I have read that the initial impulse was from Roosevelt. The Soviets sent a diplomat to both Britain and the US calling for a landing in France in 42. Churchill made it clear that this would be impossible and the US military initially took the same stance until Roosevelt badgered them into saying they would look at possibilities. The diplomatic then returned home via Britain claiming without any evidence that an invasion had been agreed, which caused some consternation in London.
Well not dumping huge US land units in Britain would probably help although I suspect that the USAAF would still push for their day bomber offensive. Most of the US army can't really be used in the Pacific unless the allies are doing that much better and the US are willing to commit them in fighting in SE Asia - which might be the case in this scenario. Their no good for island hopping on small Pacific atolls and the like. Its only if fighting for larger locations such as in the DEI, mainland Indo-China and possibly China that you need large ground forces. Of course if you secure the DEI and related then while politics inside the US will prompt a return to the Philippines there's no great need for large forces unless and until your willing to invade Japan itself if that proves necessary.
Well not dumping huge US land units in Britain would probably help although I suspect that the USAAF would still push for their day bomber offensive. Most of the US army can't really be used in the Pacific unless the allies are doing that much better and the US are willing to commit them in fighting in SE Asia - which might be the case in this scenario. Their no good for island hopping on small Pacific atolls and the like. Its only if fighting for larger locations such as in the DEI, mainland Indo-China and possibly China that you need large ground forces. Of course if you secure the DEI and related then while politics inside the US will prompt a return to the Philippines there's no great need for large forces unless and until your willing to invade Japan itself if that proves necessary.
The US planners did change their plans several times as you mentioned. Also note those references are memos, i.e. suggestions as to what might happen. Its quite possible that rather than concede domination of Europe and western Eurasia to an expansionist and extremely xenophobia regime that has repeatedly shown itself untrustworthy they would be willing to list to British advice about a longer containment operation. After all if they agree an armistice, for which an over-confident Hitler will probably demand territorial and other concessions how do they know that Hitler will this time keep his word? Or are they planning to maintain a huge army in places like the ME to guard against betrayal?
That was OTL with markedly higher British/allied losses and ongoing conflict in Libya and the Med. Here manpower and resource wise Britain and its allies should be a lot stronger. Especially probably avoiding the OTL early losses to Japan in SE Asia. You can argue about logistics but then I can point out one of the references linked to, a discussion about Germany improving logistical railways in Bulgaria. As the poster says "Don't you know the Germans are not allowed to act rationally in any respect whatsoever? " The same applies to the allies.
Hitler had no logical reason to start the war in the 1st place, or then to attack the Soviets while also heavily engaged against Britain. He was delusional about the desire of racial conflict and conquest and he desired an economic base at least as large as the US so he could fight it militarily as well as economically. He might decide to sign an armistice, especially if he can get concessions for free and also a free hand in mopping up more of the former Soviet state but the likelihood of him complying with such an agreement any longer than he wants to is slim and even the most die-hard isolationist in the US should know that by now.
That was OTL with markedly higher British/allied losses and ongoing conflict in Libya and the Med. Here manpower and resource wise Britain and its allies should be a lot stronger. Especially probably avoiding the OTL early losses to Japan in SE Asia. You can argue about logistics but then I can point out one of the references linked to, a discussion about Germany improving logistical railways in Bulgaria. As the poster says "Don't you know the Germans are not allowed to act rationally in any respect whatsoever? " The same applies to the allies.
Hitler had no logical reason to start the war in the 1st place, or then to attack the Soviets while also heavily engaged against Britain. He was delusional about the desire of racial conflict and conquest and he desired an economic base at least as large as the US so he could fight it militarily as well as economically. He might decide to sign an armistice, especially if he can get concessions for free and also a free hand in mopping up more of the former Soviet state but the likelihood of him complying with such an agreement any longer than he wants to is slim and even the most die-hard isolationist in the US should know that by now.
Expanding on the broader points of the U.S. and the UK, the shipping issue is based upon all available U.S. Army-reserved shipping being used to send forces to the Middle East; i.e. nothing for the UK itself, North Africa, the Pacific, etc. It's all going to the Middle East and the end result is a single Army Group by early 1943 which is poorly supplied and with no USAAF aircover. If we are assuming the British forces historically used in Egypt are being used in the Middle East as well, the picture is slightly better for the Allies there but now you have the added issue of the Italians having a clear shot to Suez and the Japanese are going to be running absolutely wild in the Pacific with no real ability by the Allies to contain them. Japan not being checked in 1942 and the Germans having effectively won the game in Europe is how FDR losses in the 1942 midterms and you get an armistice forced by Congress in 1943.
This also leans into some other things, which is what I'm getting at with regards to the size/resources of the British Army and RAF. If you have the OTL arrangements, the British can only be strong enough to deter invasion in the Home Islands and one other place; historically, that was Egypt because of the Italians and DAK. As a result, they were weak in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East, which allowed the Japanese to overrun them historically and they were only saved in the Middle East via the Red Army still fighting on. Here, they can be strong in the Middle East but not SEA and Egypt; what happens when Italy has finished its modernization and reorganization of its forces in 1942, sees the Germans and Japanese winning decisively everywhere, and suddenly has a virtually undefended Egypt sitting right next to Libya?
As for the Soviets, there's absolutely no reason to assume Stalin would suddenly break with his fundamental personality over 1941-1942 over the 12th Army's envelopment operations in Ukraine. Second Kharkov, which you are referring to I assume, was in May of 1942; this was after the disasters of Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Vyazma, and Bryansk in 1941. If the loss of quite literally over three million troops wasn't enough to make him see sense in early 1942-with the end result being the loss of another 700,000+ Red Army soldiers due to Second Kharkov and early Case Blue encirclements-why, exactly, would the 12th Army carrying out the encirclement in June of 1941 do such? Likewise, Stalin was as prepared for Barbarossa as he could be in 1941, a partial mobilization was ordered in April and by June the reservists were beginning to arrive; four new armies as a whole were also being deployed as the German invasion began. There was nothing else Stalin could do, the Germans just had that much of an advantage over them in all ways.
Shifting gears again, we need to clear up several misconceptions you have. First, these were memos, yes, but they were accepted by the JCS and the President as the basis of American policy, building upon earlier agreements. I know it's been cited to you several times now so I'm not sure why you continue to attempt to err upon this. See Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, From Page 72:
Eisenhower and his subordinates were far from alone or original in perceiving the overriding importance of continued Soviet participation in the war. As previously noted, in the summer and fall of 1941 Roosevelt and army planners had begun to recognize that victory over Germany might not be possible unless the Red Army continued to tie down the bulk of the Wehrmacht, and they consequently had made assistance to Russia a focal point of their global strategy. The JB had forcefully reiterated this conclusion by informing Roosevelt on December 21 that ‘‘Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in Europe.’’ 26 The Soviets’ late 1941 success in stopping the German advance on Moscow and launching a counteroffensive, occurring at a time when Axis forces were everywhere else successful, further reinforced this belief. As a result virtually all Allied planning papers in late 1941– early 1942 stressed the critical importance of aiding the Russians so that they could survive a renewed German onslaught. Roosevelt agreed. ‘‘Nothing would be worse than to have the Russians collapse,’’ he told Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau on March 11. ‘‘I would rather lose New Zealand, Australia, or anything else than have the Russians collapse.’’ Five days earlier the JUSSC had bluntly stated that ‘‘Russia must be supported now by every possible means’’ because the absence of a Russian front would postpone ‘‘indefinitely’’ the end of the war.27 And as army planners realized, such postponement would only increase public and naval pressure to turn away completely from the indecisive European theater in favor of the Pacific.
Marshall’s reasoning was based not only on Eisenhower’s February–March presentations but also on military and political events since then which had heavily reinforced the OPD’s original conclusions. Once again the focal point was the Soviet Union. ‘‘The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to Allied victory,’’ now acting chief of staff McNarney had emphasized on April 12; if German armies were allowed to turn west, ‘‘any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be virtually eliminated.’’ 56 In mid June the staff again warned that Russian collapse would necessitate a strategic reassessment, ‘‘possibly with the result of directing our main effort to the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.’’ 57
As early as April–May, OPD, g-2, and the joint committees had begun to explore the appropriate response should this ‘‘desperate situation’’ result in a Soviet collapse, and in early August the JUSSC completed and forwarded to the JPS a massive study of such a contingency. This study indicated that Russian collapse would be a ‘‘catastrophe’’ of such magnitude as to put the United States in a ‘‘desperate’’ situation too, one in which it ‘‘would be forced to consider courses of action which would primarily benefit the United States rather than the United Nations.’’
Indeed, it might be the only remaining major member of the United Nations, because the British Commonwealth might collapse and the British public react to Soviet defeat by overthrowing Churchill and agreeing to a negotiated peace that would leave Hitler in control of Eurasia. A revival of isolationism and an ‘‘increase in defeatism’’ within the country were also possible in this scenario. Even without British withdrawal, however, the only sound U.S. response to a Soviet collapse would be to ‘‘adopt the strategic defensive in the European Theater of War and to conduct the strategic offensive in the Japanese theater.’’ On August 19 the JPS the great strategic debate 93 approved this report, forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs as JCS 85, and ordered the preparation of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.40
Indeed, it might be the only remaining major member of the United Nations, because the British Commonwealth might collapse and the British public react to Soviet defeat by overthrowing Churchill and agreeing to a negotiated peace that would leave Hitler in control of Eurasia. A revival of isolationism and an ‘‘increase in defeatism’’ within the country were also possible in this scenario. Even without British withdrawal, however, the only sound U.S. response to a Soviet collapse would be to ‘‘adopt the strategic defensive in the European Theater of War and to conduct the strategic offensive in the Japanese theater.’’ On August 19 the JPS the great strategic debate 93 approved this report, forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs as JCS 85, and ordered the preparation of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.40
Finally, on a note about the Pacific Theater, you are fundamentally wrong about the role of the U.S. Army there to a degree that can't be emphasized enough. It wasn't until December of 1943 that American resources in Europe equaled those in the Pacific and it wasn't until 1944 that they exceeded them. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships. The U.S. only raised six marine divisions in WWII, but 91 U.S. Army divisions. The Solomons, New Guinea, the Philippines and even many of the island battles (especially Okinawa) were majority U.S. Army affairs, in some cases almost solely U.S. Army.
a) The bomber offensive was a huge waste of resources in the 1st half of the war and of limited effect in the 2nd half because of the way the two powers [UK and US] used it. The bomber only daytime raids by the US and the continual switching of targets. A fraction of that early effort would have been a significant force multiplier in the Atlantic, saving not only a lot of lives and materials but huge amounts of shipping to give only the most obvious example. It needed clearer heads to allocate resources. Developing a substantial strike force rather than continual political targets would have made it more efficient later on and if you can make the US see sense about needing long range escorts earlier their operations could have been more efficient.
German production wasn't limitless but was tightly constrained by both the mismanagement of the regime and the resource limits it faced. Its not going to come near to matching the western powers, especially in advanced areas like modern a/c. Its going to have problems accessing much of the material resources of the USSR even if the allies were stupid enough to allow them unimpeded access.
b) See my point above. Win the Atlantic battle earlier and there is a lot more shipping available. If this is largely done before Dec 41 then its also likely to mitigate the 2nd happy time when King's stupidity allowed a massive loss of shipping, especially tankers in US coastal and Caribbean waters.
You are again ignoring the actual POD in this scenario. With no war in the Med/N Africa both shipping and military resources are markedly greater for the allies. There is easily enough to stop the Japanese in their tracks with a bit of common sense so their not running wide 42 and probably bleeding the forces they can transport to the southern front dry with desperate frontal assaults against allied defences. Ditto with Italy that is unlikely to join the war at this stage because its going to be bloody vulnerable - plus if we accept your assumption of a 180 turn by Hitler he would oppose such a move. Further shipping can be saved by having less US ground forces sent to the UK as it wouldn't be needed to both carry them over in the 1st place and then supply them. Also a further saving is without the loss of a lot of agricultural land for such bases Britain will need less imports itself.
c) There's absolutely no reason why Hitler should change his attitudes either and he didn't. Stalin did when he realised the situation was reaching a crisis and could do earlier here. Alternatively a disaster leading to the loss of Moscow especially is likely to see him replaced and a more rational leadership in his place.
Actually Stalin could have done a lot more in June 41. Or rather not done the things he did. Refusing to allow any defensive preparations and even initially rejecting the reality of the invasion when it occurred.
d) They may have been accepted by the president but he ultimately had the sense to accept they were unrealistic. It would be even more so in this case and as I put out even Churchill isn't going to be rash enough to go along with it. As such its not going to happen no matter how many stupid ideas some idiots draw up for whatever reason.
You can say something as often as you like. That's not a cite that's an opinion. Quoting as you did this time is different but they are still opinions and I'm entitled to use common sense and the advantage of hindsight to say their stupid ideas.
e) The idea that a Soviet collapse would prompt some coup against Churchill and a British separate peace flies totally in the face of actual events. This didn't happen OTL in a worse situation and is unlikely to happen here where Britain's position is markedly stronger. I suspect it might be someone trying to find an escape for a US unwilling to fight to drop out of the war but blaming others for that unwillingness. Politics as so often influences decision making.
Also interesting to note that you say
the only sound U.S. response to a Soviet collapse would be to ‘‘adopt the strategic defensive in the European Theater of War and to conduct the strategic offensive in the Japanese theater.’’
Which isn't greatly different from what I'm suggesting. Other than accepting that Germany is still the primary threat so maintaining as much pressure as possibly on it to drain its resources. I'm definitely not suggesting some massive attempt at invading France in 42-43 or probably even 44 in this scenario.
I have read Tooze, in part because of your quoting him in earlier threads. Agree with his prime conclusion about the severe limitations on the German economy before and during the war. He may have a point about the bombing of the Rhur in 43 tightening those constraints further and hence ending that being a mistake. However as he says the Spree 'miracle' was only a limited success throughout the war, with key decisions being made before he gained power and by throwing more resources at issues. Given the constraints on their railways especially the conquest of most of European Russia if that was achieved wouldn't greatly affect that.
f) Frankly given what we know about Hitler and the Nazis, and even what the people knew at the time only a bloody idiot would expect him to keep his word any longer than it suited him. As such any border agreements would require a substantial military force needed to be maintained in the regions such as the ME to deter Germany attacking. Is the US going to be wiling to do that or is it basically willing to surrender most of western Asia and probably most of Africa to the Nazis? What concessions do you think the US is willing to make to achieve a settlement?
If they do basically give up on the old world then Britain will be forced to make peace as well with Germany. In which case, assuming that its held Burma and Malaya, which is very likely in this scenario then the obvious option for the UK would in turn come to an agreement with Japan. It needs to maintain large forces to deter Germany and can't afford massive drains in the Pacific under those circumstances.
g) Interesting figures on the division of US efforts. What is their source please? A lot would depend on the interpretations of them. For instance I suspect that a lot of those men in the Pacific were on logistical duties due to the great distances involved and the approaches the US took. It does give a lie to the claim that the US committed to the agreement to give Germany priority so makes one wonder what might have been practical if they had been willing to do so. The US effort in the Pacific was wasteful when it finally got going with a double line of attack. Plus i suggest you don't try telling any Aussies that New Guinea was a majority US affair. 
In TTL the Solomon's won't occur but as I understand it US ground forces involved in combat the Pacific were pretty low until 43. Here they might need to commit ground forces, as well as air and naval to securing the DEI and helping liberate those parts which had been occupied and then their likely to make the Philippines a solely US affair. After that difficult to say as depends on events but if they decided to make peace with Germany their likely to find the war in the Pacific costlier than OTL.
In TTL the Solomon's won't occur but as I understand it US ground forces involved in combat the Pacific were pretty low until 43. Here they might need to commit ground forces, as well as air and naval to securing the DEI and helping liberate those parts which had been occupied and then their likely to make the Philippines a solely US affair. After that difficult to say as depends on events but if they decided to make peace with Germany their likely to find the war in the Pacific costlier than OTL.
but its a possibility once he realises that Britain is going to continue fighting and Germany can't quickly know us out. Plus IIRC his military build up was planned to be completed in about 42-43 so it could be assorted military and political figures persuade him to wait until then and then throw a fully mobilised Italy into the fray especially if they think the other powers are exhausted. Of course if things go as OTL by 43 the US is in the war and sending masses of equipment to its allies as well as building up large forces itself so that could persuade him to continue staying out and making money. Of course the big issue might be regime survival as hard liners could oppose him not supporting other fascists, at least early in the war and if the allies are presenting it as a war against fascism at the very least he's going to be pretty isolated after an allied victory post war.[/quote