forcon
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Post by forcon on Mar 16, 2021 10:35:10 GMT
Gorby dying on US soil would be very interesting, even if it was legitimately an accident or natural causes - nobody would believe it.
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
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Post by oscssw on Mar 16, 2021 14:45:54 GMT
I've been reading WWIII stories for a while now, and that's got me thinking, why not write my own? So here we go. Rather than go down the well trodden path of a 1989 world war, I want to address an idea and a question: 1. 1993 was, according to the US DOD, when NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reach a level of parity again. This is before systems like the B2, F22, typhoon and the Seawolf come online properly, and has given time for Su-27, Akula and Tu-160 to come online in significant numbers 2. The Russian military of today in fiction is often portrayed like that of the Soviets, big, lumbering and full of tanks. But this may not be the case. As of now the Russians have fully embraced Orgakov's ideas of a precision strike complex. What if the Soviets were able to carry out the revolution in military affairs in the 1980s instead of 2010s? or basically what if today's russian army fought an 80s WWIII? So we are going to need several PODs on both sides of the Iron Curtin to get both sides to a point where they can fight on even terms: 1. The Soviets don't roll back Kosygin's reforms and and carry out their internet project- this has the advantage of a) the soviets having more time before things go economically tits up and b) allowing the soviets to close the gap in terms of electronics, as they adopt computer technology. 2. Gorbachev is killed during his 1988 visit to the US. this breaks any good will on the Soviet side so things get out of hand. 3. Afghanistan is proto-Syria- a testing ground where Soviet usage of UAVs is proved out. 4. The Leipzig massacre, Honecker out in 1986- DDR gotta survive somehow opinions? I'll post more timeline stuff and orders of battle later. I want to use this thread to refine my ideas before I start writing this monster, so if that's not ok, modmins please delete. I have a problem with NATO and SOVIET Parity. You either get a war of attrition which eventually goes nuclear when one side or the other knows it is loosing or it goes nuclear early. Everyone looses.
How do you prevent that?
To make this work we got to come up with a way to take the nukes out of the new time line.
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Mar 16, 2021 15:07:30 GMT
I've been reading WWIII stories for a while now, and that's got me thinking, why not write my own? So here we go. Rather than go down the well trodden path of a 1989 world war, I want to address an idea and a question: 1. 1993 was, according to the US DOD, when NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reach a level of parity again. This is before systems like the B2, F22, typhoon and the Seawolf come online properly, and has given time for Su-27, Akula and Tu-160 to come online in significant numbers 2. The Russian military of today in fiction is often portrayed like that of the Soviets, big, lumbering and full of tanks. But this may not be the case. As of now the Russians have fully embraced Orgakov's ideas of a precision strike complex. What if the Soviets were able to carry out the revolution in military affairs in the 1980s instead of 2010s? or basically what if today's russian army fought an 80s WWIII? So we are going to need several PODs on both sides of the Iron Curtin to get both sides to a point where they can fight on even terms: 1. The Soviets don't roll back Kosygin's reforms and and carry out their internet project- this has the advantage of a) the soviets having more time before things go economically tits up and b) allowing the soviets to close the gap in terms of electronics, as they adopt computer technology. 2. Gorbachev is killed during his 1988 visit to the US. this breaks any good will on the Soviet side so things get out of hand. 3. Afghanistan is proto-Syria- a testing ground where Soviet usage of UAVs is proved out. 4. The Leipzig massacre, Honecker out in 1986- DDR gotta survive somehow opinions? I'll post more timeline stuff and orders of battle later. I want to use this thread to refine my ideas before I start writing this monster, so if that's not ok, modmins please delete. I have a problem with NATO and SOVIET Parity. You either get a war of attrition which eventually goes nuclear when one side or the other knows it is loosing or it goes nuclear early. Everyone looses.
How do you prevent that?
To make this work we got to come up with a way to take the nukes out of the new time line.
Unless MAD works, in which case neither side is willing to push it that far. Basically, barring total insanity [and some would say that would be required for any nuclear use but not me] whoever is 'winning' won't push the loser into such a corner as it means both lose VERY, VERY badly.
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
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Post by oscssw on Mar 16, 2021 15:31:09 GMT
I was taking a look at the 1993 USN and found we would have 24 Tycos. That make a huge difference for the CSGs ability to survive Soviet naval aviation multi regimental attacks.
We also get Improved 688 class subs with major improvements in sensors, boat quieting and 12 cell cruise missile VLS.
By 1993 you only get two Burkes.
We should look at PACEX-89 It was a Massive Naval Exercise In 1989 and Was the Pinnacle Of U.S. Cold War Maritime Might. It was the largest gathering of allied warships since World War II and a month later the Berlin Wall would begin to crumble.
54 ships of U.S., Korean, Japanese, and Canadian origins—as well as a number of submarines that were never disclosed—combined forces to show just how outgunned Russia was in the Pacific and how they could operate together as a cohesive fighting force. These include the aircraft carriers USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), the battleships USS New Jersey (BB-62) and USS Missouri (BB-63), the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser USS Long Beach (CGN-9) and the amphibious command and control ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19). A number of the cutting-edge Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers were present.
For the sub war I strongly suggest you look at
The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines
Dr. Owen R. Cote, Jr. Associate Director MIT Security Studies Program
E-mail: owencote@mit.edu
You will find the section Phase III of the Third Battle: ASW and the Happy Time: 1960-1980
covers the subject very well.
Phase III of the Third Battle: ASW and the Happy Time: 1960-1980
SOSUS, the quiet, ASW-optimized SSN, and Jezebel/Codar/Julie for VP and VS aircraft were all developed by the end of the 1950s. These were the key elements of a new approach to ASW emphasizing passive acoustics, and it was this approach which became central in the ASW battle against Soviet nuclear submarines. But to be fully exploited, these new tools needed to be integrated into a combined arms team that still included more traditional tools. Furthermore, once a new concept of operations was established, sufficient numbers of platforms needed to be deployed to support it in peacetime. Thus, where the 1950s was a period of radical technological ferment in the ASW mission area, the 1960s saw a series of doctrinal debates over how best to exploit the technological bonanza that resulted. As always, the chief protagonists in these debates tended to be the individual ASW platform communities.
The Barrier Strategy Embraced
The core of the new concept of operation was to place barriers between Soviet home ports and open ocean patrol areas wherever maritime geography made them possible. Barriers were feasible in deep water wherever SOSUS arrays could be emplaced in such a way as to cover a chokepoint, and given SOSUS' range, these chokepoints could be quite wide. For example, the waters separating Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (GIUK) became a key chokepoint, and the 1965 decision to emplace SOSUS arrays and create a barrier there was part of a general strategy that sought to push SOSUS barriers as far forward as possible. NavFac Keflavik was established in 1966, and by 1974 a total of 22 SOSUS installations existed along the East and West coasts of the United States and at various forward chokepoints.(41) By 1981, unclassified depictions of SOSUS described it has having 36 installations, including facilities located in CONUS, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Japan, the Aleutians, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Bermuda, Barbados, Canada, Norway, Iceland, the Azores, Italy, Denmark, Gibralter, the Ryukus, Panama, the Philippines, Guam, and Diego Garcia.(42)
Within such a chokepoint or barrier, submarines and/or VP could be cued by long range SOSUS detections. In the earlier sub-air barriers, submarines spaced at twice the average range of their bow sonar provided the initial detections. This produced requirements for more submarines than could be afforded in peacetime, hence the interest in experimental designs like K-1 and, later, Tullibee, which could hopefully be produced in numbers large enough to man these barriers. Furthermore, even with the peacetime submarine force that could be afforded, forward barriers could not be maintained in peacetime because of the normal requirements for training, upkeep, and crew rotation. Therefore, warning was needed in advance to create a barrier, and the degree of warning received determined how far forward these barriers could be established. But this had always implied a certain circularity of logic, because forward barriers were one of the primary means of confirming a large Soviet submarine deployment. For example, five Soviet submarines deployed from the Kola peninsula area in early October to support Soviet naval operations in late October, 1962 in the Caribbean during the Cuban Missile crisis. They were not detected until they encountered American quarantine forces in the region, and the sub-air barrier off Argentia that was established after the quarantine began therefore missed them.(43)
SOSUS directly addressed both of these problems. Because SOSUS made the initial detections, barriers now needed to be manned by platforms sufficient only to prosecute contacts, which was a much smaller number than that required to make the initial detections. Furthermore, SOSUS was a permanent peacetime installation that could and was in fact designed to provide advance warning of Soviet submarine movements. Thus, far forward arrays might give warning sufficient for barriers further back to be manned in time to interdict a deployment. For SOSUS-VP barriers, basing rights in the region would allow permanent detachments of air ASW aircraft to man barriers in peacetime.
The new concept of operations also envisioned independent, far forward operations by SSNs. In peacetime, these would provide intelligence and warning, and in wartime would constitute the first barrier Soviet submarines would encounter when they left their bases. Even within the deep water SOSUS barriers further back, SSNs would operate largely independently of VP forces. Sub-air tactics had always been hampered by communication and IFF problems. Because SOSUS eliminated the need for close cooperation between the two communities, both were happy to go off on their own. Thus, main barriers like the GIUK consisted of alternating layers in which VP and submarines conducted the prosecutions. In the forward areas, submarines operated alone, and in the rear areas, along friendly coastlines, VP dominated and submarines were largely absent. These independent operations contrasted with the cooperative tactics that were central to the effectiveness of a HUK group's air-DD team.
The big doctrinal question created by the new barrier concept revolved around what was needed, if anything, in addition to the barriers. One view was that ASW strategy had fundamentally changed in such a way as to make those additional requirements much smaller than in the past:
"Advanced nuclear attack submarines in barriers could exact considerable attrition as Soviet submarines surged into the North Atlantic shipping lanes, and as they attempted to return to their bases for replenishment. The evolving SOSUS network could direct long-range ASW aircraft and destroyer-carrier-hunter-killer (HUK) forces against submarines at sea in the North Atlantic; as shore-based aircraft performance improved, even the HUK units became less important�Thus, the balance of the ASW effort would shift from escort operations to offensive patrol, with escort ships employed as a backup."(44)
In some eyes, this was fortunate because, as the then Chief of the Bureau of Ships Admiral James argued in 1961:
"the time has come when we should seriously question the wisdom of continuing to emphasize the surface ship as our primary ASW vehicle�we are trying to accomplish the job the hard way, expending tremendous effort to get our sonars deep in the water where the acoustic problems will disappear�there is no question but that a surface platform is not a good sonar platform, nor, indeed, is it likely that we will ever succeed in making it anything more than marginal. A submarine, on the other hand, represents a near optimum sonar platform�"(45)
For those who accepted this position, the consequence was a diminution in the importance of surface ship ASW programs and an overall reduction in the size of the destroyer force. In a war there would be some leakage of Soviet submarines through the barriers, and destroyers would be needed to protect those forces so valuable that even limited losses needed to be avoided, such as carrier battle groups. But early losses to merchant shipping would be accepted on the assumption that the submarine threat would soon become manageable due to steady attrition by the barriers.
By the mid-1960s, a consensus developed which embraced the passive acoustics-based barrier strategy, while also supporting investment in a two tiered ASW escort force, with small numbers of multipurpose destroyers assigned to battle groups and other high value units, and larger numbers of single purpose destroyer escorts devoted largely to ASW for use in screening mid-ocean convoys. One cause of this consensus being reached was the establishment of Op-95 in 1964 as both the CNO's and the Secretary of the Navy's chief adviser for ASW. The first occupant of this office was Vice Admiral Charles Martell.
This office was formed in the midst of a Navy-wide review of ASW programs and of future Soviet submarine developments. At the most general level, this review led to some relaxation in the near term concern over the Soviet submarine threat but continued anxiety about the more distant future. The following exchange in a 1964 congressional hearing on Navy R&D is illustrative. The main participants in the exchange are Congressman Robert Sikes and Rear Admiral E.B. Hooper, Director of ASW Research and Development.
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oscssw
Senior chief petty officer
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Post by oscssw on Mar 16, 2021 15:56:48 GMT
I have a problem with NATO and SOVIET Parity. You either get a war of attrition which eventually goes nuclear when one side or the other knows it is loosing or it goes nuclear early. Everyone looses.
How do you prevent that?
To make this work we got to come up with a way to take the nukes out of the new time line.
Unless MAD works, in which case neither side is willing to push it that far. Basically, barring total insanity [and some would say that would be required for any nuclear use but not me] whoever is 'winning' won't push the loser into such a corner as it means both lose VERY, VERY badly.
So we bet everything on MAD (which I always considered insane and still doubt any US president would implement it for anything less than a devastating nuclear attack on US soil), limited Soviet objectives and NATO willing to loose West Germany with massive loss of NATO troops?
That could work.
So we are stuck with the meat grinder of attrition warfare as both sides destroy a generation of young men and cripple the economies of the world leading to who knows what consequences for victor and looser alike. No good ending here that I can see.
Given what we know about high tech weapons systems and especially smart munitions usage, I'd guess we would soon run out of both. So does this degenerate into a WWII or even WWI? Maybe not, if the US and Russia agree not to target either nation both can continue to supply high tech killing machines to feed the meat grinder. I'd think the quality of the troops would degenerate as the prewar trained pros are used up and those high tech weapons are wielded by raw replacements.
So we avoid Mad Max and what are we stuck with?
Lots of possibilities for a really interesting but ultimately tragic time line.
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Mar 16, 2021 18:45:30 GMT
Unless MAD works, in which case neither side is willing to push it that far. Basically, barring total insanity [and some would say that would be required for any nuclear use but not me] whoever is 'winning' won't push the loser into such a corner as it means both lose VERY, VERY badly.
So we bet everything on MAD (which I always considered insane and still doubt any US president would implement it for anything less than a devastating nuclear attack on US soil), limited Soviet objectives and NATO willing to loose West Germany with massive loss of NATO troops?
That could work.
So we are stuck with the meat grinder of attrition warfare as both sides destroy a generation of young men and cripple the economies of the world leading to who knows what consequences for victor and looser alike. No good ending here that I can see.
Given what we know about high tech weapons systems and especially smart munitions usage, I'd guess we would soon run out of both. So does this degenerate into a WWII or even WWI? Maybe not, if the US and Russia agree not to target either nation both can continue to supply high tech killing machines to feed the meat grinder. I'd think the quality of the troops would degenerate as the prewar trained pros are used up and those high tech weapons are wielded by raw replacements.
So we avoid Mad Max and what are we stuck with?
Lots of possibilities for a really interesting but ultimately tragic time line.
The issue is more complex as both Britain and France have their own nukes so attempts to invade them would be a huge risk for the Soviets. As, if their deterred from such a continuous war in which the greater forces of the western powers would threaten to defeat the Soviets and drive back any initial gains. As such unless the Soviets decide to risk invading either of those two powers - and Britain would also be difficult because of the channel - then a western rejection of acceptance of Soviet gains would be a significant problem for them. Most predictions seem to assume that W Germany is lost in a conventional war but if the west continues fighting the Soviets have significant problems.
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Post by griml0ck122 on Mar 17, 2021 3:02:16 GMT
oscssw, stevep, By parity I do not mean man for man that both sides are equivalent, i mean that neither side has a truley descisive advantage (they may think contrary) In terms of nuclear use, I would like to point out tht attitutes to nuclear warfare are similar to pre-WWII chemical warfare. Neither the Axis or Allies were willing to gas each other, fearful of the concequences. As to escalation to nuclear use, even though the nuclear powers may have had plans for carpet-glassing each other should some pre-condition be met, I would expect that those involved would put it off for as long as possible. Breznhev once hesitated with the decision to fire in a command and control excercise, so i would expect there would be hesitation until nukes were in the air. Neither side is being run by sucidal madmen, so preventing nuclear escalation is still part of the plan. Preventing this stage is a key part of Ogarkov's reforms to the military, as it was for NATO's modernisation. If i have a core message to this story it is- even without nuclear warfare, there is no positive outcome. WWIII will be a tragedy on a grand scale, much like it's predacessors. Once again thanks for the feedback on my inital ideas.
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Post by fieldmarshal on Mar 17, 2021 3:19:02 GMT
oscssw , stevep , By parity I do not mean man for man that both sides are equivalent, i mean that neither side has a truley descisive advantage (they may think contrary) In terms of nuclear use, I would like to point out tht attitutes to nuclear warfare are similar to pre-WWII chemical warfare. Neither the Axis or Allies were willing to gas each other, fearful of the concequences. As to escalation to nuclear use, even though the nuclear powers may have had plans for carpet-glassing each other should some pre-condition be met, I would expect that those involved would put it off for as long as possible. Breznhev once hesitated with the decision to fire in a command and control excercise, so i would expect there would be hesitation until nukes were in the air. Neither side is being run by sucidal madmen, so preventing nuclear escalation is still part of the plan. Preventing this stage is a key part of Ogarkov's reforms to the military, as it was for NATO's modernisation. If i have a core message to this story it is- even without nuclear warfare, there is no positive outcome. WWIII will be a tragedy on a grand scale, much like it's predacessors. Once again thanks for the feedback on my inital ideas. Speaking of chemical weapons -- will they see use in this story, or will NATO/WARPACT refrain? Chemical Weapons Convention was ratified in 1993 and as early as the mid-80s both sides had begun destroying stocks of chemical weapons -- but at the same time we've seen how states like Syria and North Korea maintained arsenals well into the modern day and Russia was still at work developing Novichok in the early 1990s Also: any thoughts on the flashpoint? I know Gorby dying will help send relations into a nosedive but what will actually push the US and USSR to war? Yugoslavia, perhaps? |
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Post by griml0ck122 on Mar 25, 2021 6:37:02 GMT
fieldmarshal, I do have an idea for a flashpoint, but I may leave that off the net for now. When it comes to chemical weapons use, i'm on the fence about having the CWC be signed as per OLT. I'm thinking of leaving it in place, with chemical weapons not being used till later in the conflict. As to Yugoslavia, I don't know enough about the conflict atm, so i need to do more reseach, but I don't think it would be a proxy conflict between the US and USSR, at least not immediatly. Also thinking of moving TL one year forward to 1994, to get a new president in the US who is not as skilled as Bush foreign policy wise. Any feedback on this? Updates are going to be more sporadic as things get busy IRL, but I don't want to abandon this.
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Post by fieldmarshal on Mar 25, 2021 18:15:53 GMT
fieldmarshal , I do have an idea for a flashpoint, but I may leave that off the net for now. When it comes to chemical weapons use, i'm on the fence about having the CWC be signed as per OLT. I'm thinking of leaving it in place, with chemical weapons not being used till later in the conflict. As to Yugoslavia, I don't know enough about the conflict atm, so i need to do more reseach, but I don't think it would be a proxy conflict between the US and USSR, at least not immediatly. Also thinking of moving TL one year forward to 1994, to get a new president in the US who is not as skilled as Bush foreign policy wise. Any feedback on this? Updates are going to be more sporadic as things get busy IRL, but I don't want to abandon this. Honestly I strongly prefer 1994 to 1993 for some reason lol I don't like the look of years that end in 3 for some reason and I've always thought the phrase "World War '94" has a nice ring to it Definitely interested on who this new president may be - will 1992 elections be so butterflied as to be completely different from OTL or might we see some familiar faces? I assume Clinton might be too close to OTL, so...might it be Kerrey? Perot? Buchanan? |
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forcon
Lieutenant Commander
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Post by forcon on Mar 29, 2021 13:31:38 GMT
I always figured that nuclear first use would be pretty unlikely in a conventional war purely by way of both sides being led by rational actors: at the end of the day, one side may believe that starting a conventional war may have a net positive outcome, but the same side knows that a nuclear war will inevitably see their country destroyed, with no positive outcome. Using nukes is just not rational, even if starting a conventional war is. Any rational actor would simply rather lose a conventional war than fight a nuclear war where the only victory would be being slightly less destroyed than the opposition.
If you are the Soviet General Secretary, you may believe that NATO is trying to subvert your control over Eastern Europe and orchestrate a rebellion to overthrow you. In which case, sending the Third Shock Army to the Rhine is a somewhat rational choice, because victory will prevent you from being overthrown and will ensure your reign over Europe lasts; both personally and strategically, you are winning. However, if your advance falters, the rational choice is to fight conventionally as long as victory is a possibility or accept a net loss of empire while retaining your own personal survival if victory is impossible. Given the choice between accepting defeat that will leave you lacking power or using nuclear weapons and thus initiating our own demise and the demise of modern civilization, the rational actor must choose accepting a limited defeat. The same argument applies for NATO. While it may not apply to the West German, Dutch, Belgian, Danish, and Austrian High Commands, it does apply to the leadership's of the US, UK, and France. So long as there is not a direct threat of invasion to either or those three nations, accepting defeat is always more inherently rational that starting a nuclear war, partially because acceptance of defeat ensures national survival and partially because it ensures the personal safety of the individuals making the decisions, while a nuclear war does the exact opposite.
Essentially, you prevent nuclear war by relying on rationality and the desire for personal survival.
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Mar 30, 2021 15:37:31 GMT
I always figured that nuclear first use would be pretty unlikely in a conventional war purely by way of both sides being led by rational actors: at the end of the day, one side may believe that starting a conventional war may have a net positive outcome, but the same side knows that a nuclear war will inevitably see their country destroyed, with no positive outcome. Using nukes is just not rational, even if starting a conventional war is. Any rational actor would simply rather lose a conventional war than fight a nuclear war where the only victory would be being slightly less destroyed than the opposition. If you are the Soviet General Secretary, you may believe that NATO is trying to subvert your control over Eastern Europe and orchestrate a rebellion to overthrow you. In which case, sending the Third Shock Army to the Rhine is a somewhat rational choice, because victory will prevent you from being overthrown and will ensure your reign over Europe lasts; both personally and strategically, you are winning. However, if your advance falters, the rational choice is to fight conventionally as long as victory is a possibility or accept a net loss of empire while retaining your own personal survival if victory is impossible. Given the choice between accepting defeat that will leave you lacking power or using nuclear weapons and thus initiating our own demise and the demise of modern civilization, the rational actor must choose accepting a limited defeat. The same argument applies for NATO. While it may not apply to the West German, Dutch, Belgian, Danish, and Austrian High Commands, it does apply to the leadership's of the US, UK, and France. So long as there is not a direct threat of invasion to either or those three nations, accepting defeat is always more inherently rational that starting a nuclear war, partially because acceptance of defeat ensures national survival and partially because it ensures the personal safety of the individuals making the decisions, while a nuclear war does the exact opposite. Essentially, you prevent nuclear war by relying on rationality and the desire for personal survival.
I would say that, assuming rational actors on all sides that is the key point. Paris or London is unlikely to risk nuclear destruction to prevent an ally being occupied but Moscow would be taking a hell of a risk assuming they would accept conquest of their home territories without at least a nuclear warning shot.
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Post by griml0ck122 on Apr 19, 2021 9:29:17 GMT
A quick question
For the US Navy (and other nato ones i suppose)
How many submarines are roughly at sea at any one time? I'm roughly using 1/3 of a fleet at sea as a peacetime yardstick, than ramping up to 2/3 in wartime.
And how long would it take NATO's navies to get to sea on a war footing once they have the order to go?
Trying to work out mobilization timing so it's realistic.
thanks
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