A Coup In The Night: Hirohito Deposed In 1945 Oct 1, 2020 17:11:51 GMT
Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 1, 2020 17:11:51 GMT
As for the Kamikazes, we don't have to speculate they would be better than previous kamikazes because we know for an indisputable fact they were. IGHQ, as already stated, was throwing in their last reserves that they had withheld for this exact purpose. The IJAAF having 2,000 pilots with at least 70 hours of flying time while the IJN had 4,200 on hand who were considered sufficiently trained for night or low light missions; given the type of challenges those conditions presented, that means they were well trained. I think it should be also a basic matter of math here, even if they were of the same training as the previous cohorts. Let's do the math, shall we?
At Okinawa, the Japanese achieved a 6:1 ratio of expenditure in aircraft in terms of achieving a successful hit. For Kyushu defense, the Japanese formulated KETSU-GO with the plan calling for 9,000 aircraft to be brought to bare against the invasion fleet, with 6,255 to be used as Kamikazes. Let's round this down to 6,000 for ease.
6,000/6 = 1,000 successful hits.
Just to put that into perspective, there was 1,000 transports in total within the invasion fleet. Take in note, this is also assuming the Japanese only achieve the rate they did at Okinawa despite several new advantages.
Finally, with regards to starvation, 10 million in the abstract is a lot and a humanitarian disaster, sure. It's also about the same thing the USSR and China endured during the war, so I have no doubt Japan can survive it.
So its actually ~300,000 troops defending near the beaches with the rest probably being fed in as the battle continues and suffering heavily from US/allied firepower as they do so. [Yes the Japanese formal plan may be for them to defend deeper in but given the lack of discipline repeatedly shown by the Japanese army during the conflict I suspect a lot of commanders will decide their 'honour' requires them to throw their forces into an immediate attack to throw back the invaders. [Iwo Jima was so tough for the US because the Japanese commander managed to enforce discipline and keep his forces fighting from deep defensive positions. Then after he died the vast majority reverted to extremely costly banzai attacks which made the conquest much easier.]
Your saying that the Japanese, during battles they considered vital in the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa decided to only send 3rd class pilots into the battle and retained their only real trained pilots hundreds of miles from the actual fighting? I suspect a fair chunk of this force was probably no better trained than them but the Japanese decided they were adequately trained because that's all they had. Its the standard approach with autocratic systems facing collapse and clutching at straws.
Also you haven't answered my question about are they trying to organise one massive attack with the kamikazis all on one go, which would be hugely difficult or throwing them in over several days probably/
Actually flying at night or in low light is bloody difficult, even with more reliable a/c and highly trained air-crew. The earlier attacks often had one or two experience pilots leading the others, who could just about fly in a straight line, so they could find the enemy. Distance will be less of a problem in landings on Japan itself but trying to fly at night makes the above impossible and a hell of a lot of those a/c are likely to be unable to find their target at all and probably run out of fuel at sea, or simply crash into the mountains in the darkness.
Your also assuming that all those hits are both fatal and on different ships. Losses are likely to be heavy for the US but not the virtual total wipe-out your assuming. Especially since are the kamikazes go for the transports or the warships?
The USSR and China suffered heavier losses in WWII but that was from all losses and with larger [in China's case markedly larger populations] Plus they didn't have much choice as surrender would be very bad for them. 10 million from starvation alone in this period, coupled with losses from other causes and the fact that so much suffering has already been inflicted is likely to make many start thinking surrender won't result in the annihilation that the authorities were threatening for Japan. Plus if 10M die of starvation then tens of millions of others will be malnourished and hence unable to do any real work. Who's going to maintain the basic services that the military needs to enable it to function? If people are seeing their families dying are they going to be reporting for work or desperately seeking any foodstuff they can get for them.
As I say its possible that the US initial invasion will be defeated but its far from as certain as your assuming and its going to cost the Japanese far far more. Not to mention the US just keeps up the pressure and prepares more forces. Sooner or later enough of the Japanese population and/or military are going to decide enough is enough and turn on the fanatics. You could actually see a freed Hirohito coming out as some sort of 'hero' when he then announces the Japanese surrender.
No, they were in prepared defensive positions extending in continuous lines of defense extending back from the beach. I have no idea how you got that idea about the Japanese defenses of Okinawa and Iwo Jima behaving like that, as they didn't at all and the results were reflected in the heavy casualties sustained by the U.S. at those two battles. I'm a big fan of statistics and math, so let's do a little math, shall we?
Okinawa: 1:1 casualty ratio
Iwo Jima: 2:1 casualty ratio
So the U.S. is invading with 700,000 troops and the Japanese have 900,000 in place to be reinforced by another 90,000 after the start of the invasion. Even at the 1:1 ratio of Okinawa, what's 700,000 divided by 990,000? Take in note, this is just using the Iwo Jima and Okinawa casualties as a baseline, despite the fact there would be notable advantages to the Japanese defense; this would be the first battle of the war that U.S. naval gunfire could not reach Japanese rear areas due to the size of Kyushu. This means they could reorganize if pushed out of defensive lines, deploy reinforcements to lines and even organize counter-attacks in peace. Tell me, why do you think NGF would be more effective in Kyushu than it was on Iwo Jima, where it categorically failed to damage the Japanese garrison? There is a reason, after all, we have the following casualty projections from the contemporary sources:
- In a letter to General Curtis LeMay when LeMay assumed command of the B-29 force on Guam, General Lauris Norstad told LeMay that if an invasion took place, it would cost the US "half a million" dead.
- In July MacArthur's Intelligence Chief, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, warned of between 210,000 and 280,000 battle casualties in the push to the "stop line" one-third of the way up Kyushu. Even when rounded down to a conservative 200,000, this figure implied a total of nearly 500,000 all-causes losses, of whom perhaps 50,000 might return to duty after light to moderate care.
- n the spring of 1945, the Army Service Forces under Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell was working under a figure of "approximately" 720,000 for the projected replacements needed for "dead and evacuated wounded" through December 31, 1946, which was for the whole invasion including Honshu. These figures are for Army and Army Air Force personnel only, and do not include replacements needed for the Navy and Marine Corps.
- A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William Shockley estimated that invading Japan would cost 1.7–4 million American casualties, including 400,000–800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.
- The US Sixth Army, the formation tasked with carrying out the major land fighting on Kyushu, estimated a figure of 394,859 casualties serious enough to be permanently removed from unit roll calls during the first 120 days on Kyushu, barely enough to avoid outstripping the planned replacement stream.
With regards to the Japanese airpower, this was precisely the case; the Japanese had even ceased contesting the American bombing campaign over Japan itself to conserve their remaining pilot cadre for the expected decisive battle when the American landings took place. This is because of the Japanese doctrine emphasizing Decisive Battle, and their desire to mount an effective defense of their Home Islands. For one example of the output of this thinking, several thousand pilots who were the Japanese air training cadre, were released for combat duty; in other words, the Japanese were putting everything into the coming battle in a final roll of the dice; that's why these last several thousand pilots were so well trained. I've already linked to a Gianreco article on the matter and I think I need to quote from it directly:
After Okinawa, however, the Japanese high command had more pressing concerns than aircraft design – the imminence of a U.S. invasion of Japan’s home islands. In expectation of a fall 1945 invasion, the Japanese devised a simple method for the immediate organization of fully equipped and completely staffed“Special Attack”(kamikaze) formations – they assigned existing training units to the suicide mission. This mid-July mass conversion of training units into combat units not only added thousands of experienced flight instructors, but also 5,400 largely wood and fabric trainer planes plus other outmoded aircraft types containing varying amounts of wooden construction. U.S. intelligence analysts speculated on what the Japanese were up to; but perhaps because they perceived Japan’s interest in wood as related to its perpetual aluminum shortage, the Americans made no connection to the fact that the sputtering antiques were nearly impervious to some of America’s most state-of-the-art technologies – early warning radar and the VT (variable time or “proximity”) anti-aircraft artillery projectile fuze, which used radio waves reflected off a target to detonate the projectile at the optimum distance to achieve maximum explosive impact.
Even if you believe-despite the evidence to the contrary-that these pilots were poorly trained despite having years of experience training Japan's preceding airpower-then using the Okinawa ratio(s) still forces us to come to the conclusion they would utterly decimate the American invasion fleet. Let's use those 5,400 wooden planes for example, and ignore the remaining thousand. Let's also be really generous and assume they only achieve the 6:1 Okinawa ratio (In reality, at Okinawa, the combat testing showed a 100% success rate in strikes) by metal planes.
5,400/6 = 900 successful strikes
Just as a reminder, there was only 1,000 APDs (Transports) and we still have 800 Kamikazes left for airstrikes.
900/3 = 300 successful sinkings, 30% of the invasion fleet
900/3 = 300 ships damaged/crippled, requiring removal from the battle area
Combined total: 60% of the Invasion fleet sunk or crippled
Even using the results from Okinawa, almost two thirds of the American invasion fleet is sunk or crippled. As for the Japanese plan on such, I've already stated that repeatedly:
The Japanese planning called for a maximum sustained effort in the first 10 days, with the goal of sinking or damaging as much of the invasion fleet as possible before they could finish unloading their men and supplies. To this end, the Japanese had already constructed 60 airfields on Kyushu by August and expected another 15 completed by October, although some of the Kamikazes were to be based on Honshu as well. This meant they had the capacity, the pilots, the fuel and the intelligence-all the crucial measures of success-to conduct this operation; again, the Japanese knew the exact beaches the U.S. was going to be invading which meant the loaded transports would be just a handful of miles off the coast by necessity, thus making them easy prey for the Japanese.
That last bit is perhaps the most important, as experience at Okinawa had shown that a 6:1 ratio existed in the expenditure of kamikazes to achieve a successful ship sinking. Japanese planning held, and U.S. estimates agree with them, that they believed in the initial 10 days of the invasion they could sink at least 500 transports out of the expected 1,000 the U.S. was bringing for the attack. This would've amount to the loss of about five divisions and much of the logistical network, crippling the invasion before it even stormed the beaches.
As for the starvation issue, please re-read what was posted; according to both the U.S. and Japanese authorities, the remaining population would be at subsistence level and thus not malnourished, with 50% of the population already living on farms anyway. The size of the Chinese population or Soviet population are irrelevant, as we're talking about by proportions; i.e. account for the difference in population sizes. Japanese would lose-at a maximum-about the same proportion of its population to starvation that the Soviets lost. As the mass suicides on Okinawa showed, the Japanese civilian population considered American victory just as terrifying as the Soviets considered German victory, so please explain to me why the Soviets could carry that and the Japanese couldn't? It's a logical fallacy to claim otherwise.
Finally, absolutely no reason to assume such; they would have defeated the American landings and the food situation would stabilize by early 1947 if the war even continues on that long. It would take the U.S. until about 1948 to be able to attempt another invasion, which means it's far more likely they'll seek a peace between October of 1945 and January of 1948 than the other way around. As I said in my earlier posts, the U.S. was incredibly lucky Japanese leaders elected to surrender instead of fighting on.