WI: No Lend Lease in WWII

stevep
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WI: No Lend Lease in WWII Aug 19, 2020 12:55:29 GMT

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Post by stevep on Aug 19, 2020 12:55:29 GMT

Right here is the data. after manual editing so that I could manufacture the tables here and include data cell by cell. Bloody labourious but got it done. One faulty table as you can't change or even delete a table once you put it in a file here. Will ask Lordroel about that.

Comparative figures for forces and production in WWII, from John Ellis's World War II Databook

1) Total British and Commonwealth/Imperial divisions.

Row 1 column 1	Arm Div	Inf Div	Para Div	Arm Brig
UK	8	25(12)*	2	16
India	0(4)*	17(4)*	0	3
Australia	2	11(5)*	0	2
Canada	2	3	0	2
African colonies	0	5	0	0
S Africa	1	2	0	0
New Zealand	0	2(4)*	0	1
Poland	1	2	0	1
Total	14(4)	67(25)*	2	25

Notes:
a) * denotes addition formations that never left the home country or saw no action.

b) The Australian total includes 2 Motorised divisions which I have included in the general Inf Div as other than possibly the African colonial units and some units later involved in Burma all British divisions were fully motorised.

c) Arm Brigs were included as each held as many tanks as a normal Arm Div. [Think they were usually working in combination with Inf Divs.

d) Have included Polish units as they are very unlikely to return home but not sure how many came from the Soviet occupied zone – or rather men imprisoned further east – and may not make it out.

This gives a grand total of 18 Arm, 92 Inf, 2 Para divisions and 25 Arm Brigades. It excludes home defence units inside Britain like the Home Guard but is smaller for Britain than the totals of 43 Ind Divs that EH has quoted.

He has also argued that Britain would have markedly smaller forces in the proposed alternative scenario. Since manpower losses in the period 41-43 will largely not occur and Britain will avoid the OTL material losses [other than in a conflict with Japan] as well as have markedly easier tasks in producing weapons and other materials this seems dubious.

2) For comparison the same source book gives for the Axis powers.
German Divisions: 38 Arm, 29 Mot/PG, 5 Cav, 280 Inf, 17 Light/Jagar, 13 Mtn, 11 Air, 21 LW

Notes
a) This is obviously a lot more and a fair number of those units were rebuilt at times but then Germany is fighting continuously while Britain isn't and at a very large scale. Even after the defeat and occupation of the western USSR it will have large numbers of garrison units across most of Europe, Furthermore the Inf total include SS and VG units and the latter are unlikely to see action outside Germany.

Of course the other big problem for Germany is logistics and transportation and getting its forces to where they need to fight.
b) Most of those Airborne units, which include 2 Air Landing were formed late in the war and never had any airborne capacity.

c) LW stands for Luftwaffe divisions which were created using excess LW manpower as the latter declined but stayed under LW control in most cases. They may not exist in this scenario if the LW is dramatically expanded.

Italian Divs: 5 Arm, 3 Mobile, 2 Mot, 69 Inf, 2 Para, 6 Mtn, 5 Blackshirt, 7 African [2 in Libya and 5 in E Africa.

Japanese Divisions: 4 Arm, 107(51) Inf
a) The 51 Inf divisions never left Japan

b) only 1 Arm and 42 Inf served at one time or another outside the Japan/China/Manchuria/Korea/FIC regions.

3) Total Moblised Manpower.

The details in the base table seeks to give 1939, 1945 and peak values for total, and also service breakdown of the same for most powers involved in WWII but many details are missing so only giving total manpower with some additional notes where practical.

Nation	Total Moblished Manpower
Australia	0.99M
Canada	1.1M
China	14M
India	2.58M
New Zealand	0.19M*
S Africa	0.25M
UK	5.9M
Germany	17.9M
Italy	9.1M
Japan	9.1M

Notes:
a) The NZ total is at the end of the war.

b) For Germany there is an army peak size of 9.5M

c) I'm rather dubious about that Italian figure but it does give a value of 2.56M as the maximum size of the army.

4) Battle of Britain key stats

Date	FC SEF	LW SEF	LW TEF	LW DB	LW Bomber
06/07/40	644	760*	220*	280*	1200*
28/09/40	732	276	230	343	750

This shows the level of decline especially of LW SEF [single engined fighters] by the effective end of the day-time battle. While Fighter Command units increased, albeit by a small amount the German total plummeted.

Notes:
a) The * denotes “Actual Strength, only ~50% were serviceable” according to the book.

b) German forces only include those in N France. As such not counting units in Norway, although I think they only made a couple of attacks after which they realised that unescorted bombers were too vulnerable.

Have an associated note that OTL LW SEF strength reached a peak of 2,260 in Dec 44 and never reached >1,500 prior to Mar 43. Not sure if this included any single engined fighter used in the night fighter role over Germany.

5) Japanese Combat A/C strength, 8/12/41

	Army	Naval Carrier	Naval Land
Fighter	550	371	0
Bomber	660	320	324
Recon	290		30
Other	70		334
Total	1570	691	688

Notes:
a) Army figures [*] are noted as operation whereas Naval ones [+] are classified as front line so obviously more a/c and pilots but how much I don't know.

b) The Naval 'Other' category doesn't differentiate between carrier and land based so have placed under the land.

Those units are generally very high quality but they lack depth and once used up the elite units are never really replaced in anything like the quality. Also a lot of the army units are busy in China so surprising how few a/c Japan had for its drive south and east. I am dubious that the naval recon level is so low however as I know a lot of IJN ships had reconnaissance a/c. Possibly their been included in the other total by error

Checked the details again, which are on P239 of the book if anyone has it and an accompanying paragraph says:

The army deployed 725 a/c in the initial campaigns in Malaya & the Philippines while the navy deployed 371 a/c against Pearl, 556 in Malaya/Philippines and between 50-100 on Guam and Wake. Army units not used in the southern offensive, 81 out of 150 squadrons were at Manchuria (56), China (16) and Japan, Korea and Taiwan (9)

6) WWII RAF Fighter squadrons by theatre

	UK	NWE	Med	Far East	Total
Sept 39	41	4	6	4	55
July 40	65	0	8	4	77
Dec 41	114	0	29	13	156
Dec 42	93	0	47	19	159
Dec 43	83	0	49	29	161
Sept 44	58	48	41	29	176
Mar 45	46	51	33	30	160

Again without heavy losses from continued and disruption of production fighting totals are likely to be higher, at least prior to the resumption of the war in Europe. Also there is likely to be less production of strategic bombers so more resources available for tactical a/c including fighters.

7) Front Line Combat A/C

Date	German A/C	British A/C
Sept 39	2916	1660
Aug 40	3015	2913
Dec 40	2885	1064*
Jun 41	3451	3106
Dec 41	2561	4287
Jun 42	3573	4500^
Dec 42	3440	5257
Jun 43	5003	6026
Dec 43	4667	6646
Jun 44	4637	8339
Dec 44	5041	8395
Apr 45	2175	8000^

Notes:
a) Figures for RAF for Dec 40,* are fighters only

b) Figures marked with an ^ are estimates.

c) Those figures exclude FAA numbers, which initially were small and further handicapped by the early loss of two CV but by Sept 43 had reached an additional 688 and peaked at 1,326 in Apr 45.

8) Production Figures

Production of Tanks, including SP Guns and of Artillery, including AT and AA guns for Britain, Germany and Japan. This excludes tankettes and light tanks.

Date/Type	UK Tanks	German Tanks	Japanese Tanks	UK Artillery	German Artillery	Japanese Artillery
1939	969	247	?	538	1214	?
1940	1399	1643	315	4700	6730	?
1941	4841	3790	595	16700	11200	2250
1942	8611	6180	557	43000	23200	2550
1943	7476	12063	558	38000	46100	3600
1944	4600	19002	353	16000	70700	3300
1945	?	3932	137	5939	?	1650
Total	27896	46857	2515	124877	159144	13350

Note:

a) That total figures will be off because years without figures are counted as zero. Also that British decline in production from 43 onwards is presumably because of increasing use of US material which isn't going to happen while the latter is neutral but demanding cash and carry.

b) There were some 5678 tanks produced in Canada and 15767 Artillery units elsewhere in the Commonwealth than Britain. As such in both categories they exceed the Japanese totals.

Production of Trucks, again for the UK, Germany and Japan.

Date/Nation	UK Truck Prod.	German Truck Prod.	Japanese Truck Production
1939	?	32558	?
1940	89582	53348	38056
1941	88161	51085	46389
1942	87499	58049	35386
1943	113912	74181	24000
1944	54615	67375	20356
1945	47174	9318	1758
Total	480943	345913	165945

Again assuming that British decline from 44 onwards is due to increasing use of US L-L vehicles for standardisation reasons. Japanese and German declines similarly due to increasing shortages, which are likely to be the case for Japan but not for Germany in the proposed scenario.

Production of Military A/C

Year Nation	UK	Germany	Japan
1939	7940	8295	4467
1940	15049	10826	4768
1941	20094	11776	5088
1942	23672	15558	8861
1943	26263	25527	16693
1944	26461	39807	28180
1945	12070	7544	8263
Total	131549	106347*	76320

Notes:
a) The German total was calculated manually as what was displayed in the book was obviously in error being ~180k, which didn't fit the summed values.

b) There are also some 19,519 a/c produced by other parts of the Commonwealth during the war.

Production of Merchant Shipping

Date/Nation	British MS	Other C/W MS	Japanese MS
1939	629705	36142	320466
1940	824910	18886	293612
1941	1185894	90595	210373
1942	1270714	720172	260059
1943	1136804	1002850	769085
1944	919357	692405	1699203
1945	393515	141893	599563
Total	6358899	2702913	4032361

No figures were given for German MS production but Italian production, presumably during 39-43 was recorded as 469,606 tons.

Have some other info but this gives some idea of British production even while under the limitations of blockade and bombardment. Details for Germany and Japan the primary opponents where appropriate and available.

Steve

Last Edit: Aug 19, 2020 15:06:09 GMT by lordroel

stevep
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WI: No Lend Lease in WWII Aug 19, 2020 13:07:52 GMT lordroel and EwellHolmes like this

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Post by stevep on Aug 19, 2020 13:07:52 GMT

Damn it tried editing the post itself but while it will allow a table to be added it won't allow any real editing of that table, like changing column or row counts or size or adding info other that by cutting and pasting every single cell individually. After getting one column in it wouldn't even allow that. Breaking for lunch.

EwellHolmes
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WI: No Lend Lease in WWII Aug 25, 2020 11:21:41 GMT

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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 25, 2020 11:21:41 GMT

Aug 18, 2020 15:24:50 GMT stevep said:

Aug 17, 2020 12:37:52 GMT EwellHolmes said:

I eagerly await your further response but I'll go ahead and answer what you've already provided.

A) During the entire course of the war, the UK lose 15,844 tanks and 42,020 aircraft. To put that into perspective:
Want to look at small arms?
It'll take until 1943 to make up for what the U.S. sent them in just eight weeks in 1940.

B) Same reason he didn't make a formal peace with France in 1940-1941; he needed to loot the French economy to ready up for Barbarossa. As for the Dutch, how, exactly could he do that when the Dutch government evacuated to London and refused to surrender? NEI was respecting their authority.

C) Vichy had a limited Army, so no reinforcements are available; why would they resist, either? Particularly with German pressure and the Japanese formally leaving them in charge.

D) Again, this isn't the case as I've already cited Tooze to show. To requote from The Wages of Destruction:
The entire reason Hitler attacked the USSR was to free up Japan to attack Britain. You might argue that he has no reason to do so if Britain has made peace but the second half of the quote answers that; Hitler wanted an alliance with Japan as a means of fighting the endgame against the Anglo-American bloc. This doesn't change whether Britain makes peace or not.

E) Where, exactly, are these better equipped forces to be had and where does that leave the British weak? Again, they're not going to make good their 1940 losses until 1943, they will be short two thirds of their tanks and trucks, and one fifth to one third of the RAF? If they've heavily reinforced the Far East, then Italy and Spain say thank you before overrunning Egypt, Malta, Gibraltar, etc. The UK IOTL only raised 43 Infantry Divisions during the entire war, and here their equipment situation is much worse.

F) Air power which the Germans will be able to decisively destroy via their superior production? Coastal artillery they can suppress with said air power? Ships operating at night? See German aircraft operating at night, in particular their operations against the Allies in the North Sea. See Norway where the Germans defeated heavy coastal defenses, their own operations in the Baltics in 1941, Crete and the Aegean also in 1941, etc. The Germans have the skills and here will have the resources. Even better, their opponent is much, much weaker as described above and has obliged them by concentrating their resources in the Far East. If the British pull those resources out of the Far East or never send them in the first place, Japan says thank you and overruns them in the Pacific.

Case in point, by 1943 the Caucasus oil is well in German hands and producing enough tonnage to allow Germany to achieve its goal of 3,000 planes per month for 36,000 per year. 1943, 1944, and 1945 production allows for 108,000 aircraft; Britain during this same time span only produced 64,000. Take in note, this is also assuming the UK can maintain the high level of production seen in 1943-1944 despite the lack of imports of American steel and aluminum. Ah, but you might argue home field advantage, no?

Battle of Britain ratio: 1.13 German aircraft lost to every British
ATL production ratio: 1.7 German aircraft to every British

The British could do exactly as good as they did during the BoB and they still lose.

Dug up one of my own reference books and sorted through some of the data there. Will try and put it into some tables and post although probably not for a while as I want to take a break and have other things to do. Hopefully sometime this evening. In response to the items above.

A) To put that into prospective the US nearly covered British war losses in some areas. In others it was less important while in some its impact was magnified by the fact that with L-L in place Britain took items from the US that otherwise it could have produced itself. For instance in some areas British production of items peaked in 43 which I suspect is largely because it was cheaper and more practical to standardise on US produced equipment. Ignoring that British production was massive and in many areas exceeded that of Germany for much of the war.

TTL that L-L isn't available so Britain and its allies will have to produce their own stuff. At the same time with peace a lot of losses will be avoided and it will be easier for Britain to manufacture more, without the impacts of bombing, blackout, import restrictions etc. Also with no war in the Med it can be used for shipping both imports and military equipment far more efficiently. Plus assuming Japan attacks on ~Dec 41 and Germany in spring 43 that gives the option of crippling one opponent before the other is a serious threat again.

B) Wrong. Germany and France signed an armistice because a peace agreement wasn't possible while Britain was still fighting. If Britain makes peace, which also pretty much forces all the governments in exile to come to terms as well. Hitler can decide to refuse to sign a peace agreement with France to continue looting it but that not only makes clear the nature of his regime and could end up, since Britain is still able to continue on for some time at least, with a French revolt and the break away of much of the empire to resume the conflict. Vichy would be occupied fairly quickly but Libya would be exposed if the French fleet moved to FNA and the latter also provided a basis for British forces which could reach there markedly easier than to Egypt. More likely to get the peace he desires Hitler is going to sign a formal peace with France. There will still be serious restrictions on the latter and some basing of German forces in N France as well as continued tribune but there will almost certainly be a peace agreement. After all he's expecting Russia to be defeated within a few months so he can always backstab France again later if he wishes.

This gives France the opportunity to send reinforcements to FIC to protect against encroachments from either Thailand or Japan. They might not do enough in time but they might.

Similarly without Britain the exile governments can't survive and Hitler will want to have his puppets in control of the home countries and where possible formal control of colonial resources. This would be especially important with the DEI as it can supply oil, rubber and other such resources that will be lost once he strikes east. Also without British support DEI is also vulnerable to Japanese pressure so its in the interests of the colonial authorities to make some agreement with Berlin. Both they and London will want to restrict German control on this and other colonies and given its distance from Europe while the oil is being supplied that shouldn't be too difficult. As such, especially once Japan refuses to join the attack on the Soviets Hitler has no reason to support Japanese seizure of oil supplies and other resources he wants for Germany.

C) As I mentioned above the situation is different enough here that while Japan may still gain control of all FIC its far from certain. If it doesn't have the southern part of it then an attack on Malaya and the DEI is markedly more difficult.

D) Wrong again. Hitler wanted to attack and destroy the Soviet Union period. He may have actually believed that Britain was relying on the Soviets to fight Germany at some point - which we know was wrong as Churchill was looking to Washington. However he wanted to destroy the SU because of his desire to establish that continental empire and because of his distinctly deranged hatred of Slavs, of communism and of Jews. He may well have planned future wars against Britain and the US but he often made deals with countries he intended to attack later, Poland and the SU being obvious examples. Your quote showed that he underestimated the US but also assumes that other things are as OTL. If Germany is getting oil from the Dutch then he has no interest in allowing Japan any influence there.

E) What part of no combat losses do you fail to understand? Britain is taking no combat losses for a year and then fairly minimal ones for another 18 months and during that time is able to be more productive at home and to trade fairly freely across most of the world. There's no problem with getting modern a/c and more ground forces to Malaya and with enough reserves to also support much of the DEI against Japan. Britain and its allies only need to hold that line until Japan is out of oil even if they never sink a single IJN warship. Japan is fighting on a shoestring because of its limited industrial capacity, its critical dependence on foreign imports and the quagmire of its invasion of China. OTL Britain was as well because it was fighting against three opponents and staggering from crisis to crisis.

Britain can now rebuild its regular forces without massive panic and continued heavy losses. It can time upgrades and do some decent level of planning. The BEF can be reequipped more steadily and also the regular forces expanded as they did OTL. Remembering that Britain only applied conscription in early 1939 so a lot of people haven't been mobilised and trained yet. Also with peace in the Med as the military expands British forces will replace the ANZAC forces and at least some of the Indians which can be deployed in SEA as well as some British forces. Its also unlikely that Bomber command will be built up as massively as OTL. Even if it did without the huge losses of OTL that's going to release a lot of resources.

F) Wrong again. British forces by 1943 are almost certain to be larger and better equipped than OTL simply because the UK can produce more and isn't taking continued heavy losses. Also the technical edge was markedly great for the allies than in 1940. Britain is developing both more advanced versions of existing a/c such as the Spitfire but also new fighters such as the Typhoon and Tempest. It will have better radar and much better AA fire with proximity fuses. According to the source I'm using, John Ellis's World War II Databook, Germany did produce more military a/c than Britain in one year and that was 1944. Furthermore this was in a world where it also uses a lot of US a/c which isn't going to be the same option now. Germany in the different circumstances might produce more a/c than OTL and possibly here even more than the UK but that's not certain and probably not by much. Especially since again Britain is likely to be producing far less 4 engined strategic bombers and I doubt you would argue they can produce those more easily than fighters.

Also again your ignoring the lack of German experience of amphibiously attacking defended positions. Norway was still at peace and very lightly armed with many units not able to moblise. Not going to be the case with the UK given its much greater resources, the warning that will be given by a German buildup and via electronic intelligence. Even then they inflicted some significant blows on the attackers. The Germans landed by surprise not having to fight their way across fortified beaches and are likely to get slaughtered if they try that against a 1943 Britain. Even if the Germans can get air superiority, which is far from certain supporting landing forces is going to be very difficult. Germany lacks heavy bombers to really threaten prepared defences while if they try sending their few heavy ships into the Channel, with its narrow waters their going to suffer badly even without have RN ships being involved. As I said in a previous post the Luftwaffe fighters have a far more difficult task to cover all the roles they will have in an invasion rather than supporting a simple bombing campaign.

Skimming back through your post before the last one I'll try and summarise some further points.

1) The Nazis made many plans and often they came to nought because of either the endemic corruption, incompetence and infighting among the Nazi elite. There will be some possibly fairly dramatic increases in German production as OTL but its still going to take a while to overhaul the greater British production, especially if your assuming early attempts at an invasion or a new day-time battle of Britain. [Not sure what the situation would be with a new blitz attempt.] Germany might win in the end but such operations would be very bloody for Germany. For Britain as well but then it knows its got no choice.

2) Logistics will be made a bit easier by the vehicles not involved in N Africa although when and where did the Axis get those 20-40k trucks? Rommel often used captured British vehicles to make up for his shortfall in German supplies and that won't be happening here as the fighting ends before he gets involved. Those railway tracks in France and Italy won't help much in an invasion of Russia.

Also this assumes that there is no real additional military forces being used as otherwise their going to soak up those extra vehicles and the supplies they carry. Furthermore its not simply a case that say increasing the trucks by X% increases the supplies to the front by X%. As well as the long supply lines another big problem was the very poor roads. Adding more vehicles to the logistical operation not only demands more fuel and spares for them but is going to tear up those dirt tracks even more. You could even make it so bad that less gets through but I suspect that in the short term at least you will get some addition to the total supplies reaching the front.

You mention the extra forces you say that Germany could have sent to the eastern front - over a 2 year period - without fighting the western powers. This also assumes I suspect no occupation of France and other locations - which you assume is continuing - and that those additional forces could have been supported there. Furthermore were those AA guns in Germany being operated by regular army units? In the UK most AA guns were being operated by volunteers, reservists or rear echelon forces. It might not be possible to move them from Germany as well as support them on the eastern front, as with those additional tanks and other forces.

15,000 additional a/c is a hell of a lot as that's pretty much the total military production for Germany in 1942. Again it assumes that your leaving both the Reich and occupied areas in western Europe unprotected and that you can supply them on the front. Its a lot easier to feed and house men in your industrial heartland and supply munitions and spares for the equipment than trying to do so several hundred miles to the west over rugged terrain with poor roads.

3) I was working on the assumption that with the greater area to occupy and a lot more resistance than they expected that ~80 divs would be a suitable number for a basic presence over such a vast area. Of course they could still prove inadequate if Soviet resistance plans its moves carefully. Plus Germany still have to occupy other areas such as Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece plus yous plans for France and other countries in western Europe. IIRC they kept 300,000 men in Norway for most of the war as well. Not to mention your leaving all of Siberia and central Asia to any successor state which is a sizeable resource base for continued opposition.

4) By 43 at least some of the German leadership might be wanted to secure their gains rather than risk a new war with a now strongly defended Britain which has had about 30 months to make up shortfalls in its military and develop new weapons and doctrines. They can expect to win but also that it would take a long time and be very bloody.

Also forget Madagascar. If Hitler was willing to let Jews survive, even as brutalised slaves, which I'm uncertain of, he could have had it with a peace deal with France. However I doubt that was ever a significant element in his planning. The fanatics want to conquer everybody and Hitler will definitely want to do so before his declining health catches up with him as he's so convinced he's the only one who can lead Germany to world conquest. However there could be growing reluctance to go for further war among other elements. As a wild car one of those many assassination events could remove Hitler but I'm not assuming this. However you could see something like the OTL 44 coup attempt in this situation.

5) German invasion by say 45/46 stands a chance of succeeding. Depending on how much effort their put into amphibious facilities and what's happened elsewhere. Its still going to be damned bloody for them and if they try in 44/43 its almost certain to be a costly failure.

If any rational leadership in Britain Egypt can be held at El Alamein fairly simply. Axis logistics would be a serious cripplying factor in getting and maintaining substantial forces that far east while Britain would probably as OTL have a railway to the defensive area to greatly ease moving of supplies. Older BBs and supporting elements, especially with the Japanese threat clearly in decline, and land based maritime air would make attempts at an amphibious assault somewhere east of that very difficult.

I notice you say

In 1942 the United States supplied 9,253 tanks and 5,898 aircraft, while British industry had turned out just 8,611 tanks and 23,672 aircraft.

Those are similar figures for what I've got for OTL British production. It seems odd your saying just when in terms of both tanks [which included SP Guns] and a/c that was more than Germany produced in 1942. Also as I said above how much of British production decline in some categories in the last years was because it decided to standardise on US equipment? Given less strain on the British economy in the period of peace especially it could quite possibly produce more. Especially with priorities being different and less threat elsewhere.

6) - German chances in a new BoB - I have made some mention of this elsewhere. You mention the Ta-152 which OTL entered service in Jan 45 OTL having been prompted by reports of the B-29 and the height it could fly at. Earlier FW190 variants were prompted by problems with USAAF attackers coming in at higher levels and struggled with that. Neither of those are likely to happen TTL so there's no direct incentive for either a/c. Given that Germany is at war with Russia for most of this time and its technology is undemanding in most areas its very likely that the higher authorities will be mainly concerned with building as many as possible of existing designs rather than developing new ones, especially since changing production lines would disrupt production. The earlier FW 190s and the BF-109G may have the range to cover more of Britain than in 1940 but their still going to be restricted somewhat by range and will suffer heavier losses rates simply because an a/c damaged over say Liverpool or Newcastle is less likely to make it home. I would fear more a return of the Blitz as even with improved radar, proxy fuses etc its going to be more difficult to intercept attackers.

7) The U boat threat causes a lot of fears and heavy losses and Britain will have seen a fair amount of losses prior to the peace agreement. They won't have the same level of experience as OTL by 1943 and could make some mistakes in doctrine but their going to be a lot better prepared than they were in 1940/41. A lot of escort vessels will have been constructed including probably a number of CVEs. Also especially if the Bomber Baron's have been reigned in a fair number of VLRPA. Expect items like squid and hedgehog to appear as well as probably the idea of support groups. The U boat force will be larger than in 1941 almost certainly but they are as unlikely to have been given the resources they were OTL in 41-43. Especially if Hitler had annexed Denmark, something he considered, Britain would definitely keep Iceland out of German hands and have bases there. Also Britain has avoided the heavy MS losses of 41-42 and has some additional construction so its fleet is probably larger than at the start of the war. Again there is a threat but its going to take a fair amount of time and effort for it to succeed.

The other factor to consider here is the US. Its unlikely to welcome U boats sinking shipping off its coastline or in the Caribbean so there's likely to be some form of Neutrality Zone, albeit probably starting further west than by OTL 41. Unless Hitler wants to start a war with the US now, which would change a hell of a lot, that's going to avoid the sort of disaster of the 2nd Happy Time. Also with more maritime air and improved radar surface raiders are unlikely to have much scope, at least the formal military ones. Disguised raiders could still be dangerous but something like the Hipper class or one of the Twins will have far less chance and any bigger ships are likely to have even less chance, if Hitler would risk them for commerce raiding.

8) Depends on what you mean will definitely happen by D)? I can see most of the ME falling over time especially if Turkey is forced to allow passage, although again I think your assuming its going to be a lot easier than its likely to be. Possibly Hitler decides to invade Vichy and or Spain although again just because the US is more isolationist doesn't mean it will keep its head up its rear about the rabid dog devouring most of the old war indefinitely.

You miss my point on what Britain wants. Britain wants to stay an independent state. By attacking in 43 the Nazis are formally declaring they won't allow that. As such Britain has no option but to fight to the bitter end. Especially given reports about what's happening in other parts of occupied Europe and the insane action your assuming in terms of Hitler refusing to make peace with France, the Netherlands etc its clear surrender is not an intelligent option while resistance is practical. Even Japan was likely to inflict appalling losses on a US invasion in 45 and I think you once suggested that such an invasion would fail. Britain is in a markedly stronger position in comparison so don't rely on the Germans not running out of people/will before they conquer the UK.

As I've pointed out a Britain not heavily engaged and fighting for its life on multiple fronts easily has sufficient resources to prevent a Japanese conquest of SEA, or at least the bits of it that really matter. Even with the stupidly reduced military your for some reason assuming Britain will have the empire and dominions as a whole can manage that.

Anyway I've spent another 1-2 hours replying to your points so need to get some other things done.

Sorry for the delay in responding.

A) By 1937, we know the German economy was a third larger than the British and that was before the wave of conquests brought vast swathes of both resources and captured industry under their control. Even if we assume Britain is manufacturing at full pace, it will never be able to match-nevermind defeat-the German Reich in an industrial war. This also ignores the previously pointed out factors that the British were dependent on American steel inputs and food to sustain not only raw production, but the work force required to do the actual work.

Also, I don't think the "cheaper Lend Lease" makes much sense as an argument. In 1939-1941, the British didn't have Lend Lease and for most of that were fighting for their very lives; even with their output then, it would take until 1943 just to replace what was lost in the 1940 campaigns.

B) The war with Britain had nothing to do with Hitler's decision to make peace or not with France; his calculus was driven solely by economic concerns such as the large number of French prisoners being used as laborers in Germany and the ability to loot the French economy. Adam Tooze goes into great detail on this, and how Hitler decided it was more important to him than an alliance with Vichy. I think it's also rather obvious Hitler did not care what others thought of him to say the least and if the French have an issue with this, Operation Anton occurs and finishes them forever as a problem.

Even if we ignore this, the French Army was limited to that which was only sufficient to garrison North Africa and some minor security forces in the unoccupied zone itself; there is nothing to send to the Far East.

With regards to the NEI, which, exactly, would Hitler allow regimes that explicitly opposed to him back in control of their territory on the continent? Take the Belgians, for example, where he has men like Leon De Grelle and the Rexists. He has no reason to do this and the Dutch, in particular, have no reason to do so given they can flee to the NEI itself should London prove unwelcoming. Further in this vein, Hitler had been seeking a Japanese alliance since 1939 and had explicitly offered not just the areas in question, but Australia and New Zealand too as compensation for such; why would he suddenly change his entire strategic thinking and upon which we seem continuously re-occurring in 1941?

Even after Tokyo didn't join against the Soviets, he offered them an offensive alliance against the United States that July; clearly, he was deadset on this.

C) I see no reason to expect any differences. Indeed, without a Japanese strike on the Philippines, you've just freed up another 100,000 IJA troops and associated shipping.

D) It's not wrong at all and is directly quoted from Tooze's book, The Wages of Destruction. His hatred of Slavs, Jews, etc is well known, but the primary motivating factor was the need to acquire the resources of the USSR in order to fight the coming air war against the Anglo-Americans. This is universally agreed upon in all recent histories of the war, from David Glantz, to Tooze, to Mark Harrison and more. Indeed, one need only look at Hitler's second book to understand this; in Hitler's Geo-Political conception, the United States was the end enemy, and to fight that war against them, he needed the resources there.

If you feel this is wrong, the onerous is on you to cite from academic sources to prove such, as the entire establishment is in agreement this was Hitler's goal. Just saying it is wrong is insufficient, particularly given I've already cited from Tooze on this very point at least twice in this very thread.

E) Because you're ignoring that just to replace losses in 1939-1940 would take until 1943, as I've already cited numerous times. Even taking conceding the point the British don't lose further equipment in late 1940-1941, just to replace their Spring 1940 losses would take three years based on their OTL equipment output. In short, there can and will not be any BEF to deploy to the Far East compared to the one in 1940 or the 8th Army in North Africa. If they somehow do, however, that would leave Britain and North Africa so exposed as to invite the Germans and Italians to occupy them with no losses.

Let me ask you something: if the Royal Navy is busy with Japan in the Far East, what, exactly is stopping the Kriegsmarine and Regia Marina from enabling their respective Armies from occupying whatever they want?

F) It is not wrong, as I've repeatedly cited and have further elucidated in this very post. To once again quote Havlat:

A dozen ships fully loaded with weapons and supplies sailed for Britain in June and a further 15 from July to early August.22 In total, Britain received 500,000 rifles, 85,000 machine guns, nine hundred 75 mm field guns, 25,000 automatic rifles, and 21,000 revolvers, including substantial amounts of ammunition.23 In order to comprehend the value of these deliveries, one has to compare them to British production of these items, which amounted to 193,712 rifles and 85,924 machine guns in the years 1939–1941.24 Within eight weeks, the United States had delivered two and a half times as many rifles and the same amount of machine guns as British industry had managed to produce in three years. 

Based on what they lost in 1940, the British in 1943 would only be where they where at in 1940 assuming they are able to maintain the same production. This is not me, but from an accredited Historian whose work was published in a peer reviewed academic journal. You may disagree with it, but these are the facts of the matter and if you do wish to disagree with them, the onerous is on you to cite something in retort from another academic, rather than to just claim they are wrong. Further, it should be noted Havlat in this part is saying this based on the British maintaining their historical levels of production. As he further explains, there is every reason to assume they will not achieve such:

British industry was incapable of producing the range and quantity of armaments required to win the war. Even those items that could be manufactured domestically were heavily dependent on imports of raw materials and products such as steel. Most of these imports came from the United States and had to be paid for either in gold or dollars… . The day of reckoning was rapidly approaching. From a total of £775 million at the beginning of 1940, Britain’s gold and dollar reserves … had fallen [by August 1940] by over a third to £490 million… . They would last another three to four months at most. By the end of 1940, therefore, Britain would be unable to carry on the war by its own efforts.31

How, exactly, is Britain supposed to better equipped with fewer resources?

Last Edit: Aug 25, 2020 11:27:34 GMT by EwellHolmes

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EwellHolmes
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WI: No Lend Lease in WWII Aug 25, 2020 11:31:22 GMT

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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 25, 2020 11:31:22 GMT

Aug 18, 2020 17:06:53 GMT stevep said:

EwellHolmes ,

A few points I forgot to mention.

By the way we really need to decide what the hell's happening with the US in the Pacific. Just because its isolationist in regards to Europe doesn't mean its staying out of things in the Pacific and FE. If it was isolationist there as well and still willing to trade with Japan that means no sanctions and hence probably the war in China gets even bloodier but removes the primary incentive for a Japanese drive south. If they are supporting the KMT against Japan anything like OTL then it would be virtually unthinkable for Japan not to go to war with the US as well. [Which doesn't necessarily means Hitler leaps in as OTL of course]. Or some vague area in the middle.

For the peace in ~Oct 40 I'm assuming something happens to remove Churchill. Possibly a victim of an early blitz attack, an accident while drunk, stroke or some other incident. Chamberlain was already clearly dying by this time. Halifax was not yet sent to Washington but he hadn't been willing to become PM in May so unlikely he would do now, although possibly a figurehead leader? Could be one of the younger Tories such as Eden or Macmillan with a continued coalition with Labour and probably other parties. That might give a technocratic tendency to the leadership in the following difficult years.

In terms of the poll you mentioned I can remember a long discussion, think it was on a naval site a couple of years back about US public opinion in this period. Very much depended on what question was asked as slightly different wording often made a considerable difference to the result. US public opinion would be growing wary of Nazi Germany especially after the fall of both France and much of the SU but their unlikely to go to war unless either Hitler forces them or there's some significant trigger. A major prolonged attack to remove Britain as the primary buffer between the US and Nazi Germany is a potentially very powerful one here, especially since its clearly naked aggression. However I'm willing to assume its possible that the US stays in denial about their best interests.

Steve

With regards to the Pacific, if there is no Pearl Harbor and the ruling government in Washington is isolationist, the U.S. will remain neutral and Japan has no reason to bother them. I have no doubt Nazi success will increase concerns in America, but the question becomes one of when and how it relates to U.S. actions; say if they decide to get more actively involved following the 1944 elections? It's far too late at that point.

In terms of the British, they either make peace in June of 1940 or collapse utterly in 1941 via starvation. So, Lord Halifax takes command in the Summer of 1940 and through Italian intermediaries, establishes a peace.

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stevep
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WI: No Lend Lease in WWII Aug 25, 2020 11:57:26 GMT

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Post by stevep on Aug 25, 2020 11:57:26 GMT

Aug 25, 2020 11:31:22 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Aug 18, 2020 17:06:53 GMT stevep said:

EwellHolmes ,

A few points I forgot to mention.

By the way we really need to decide what the hell's happening with the US in the Pacific. Just because its isolationist in regards to Europe doesn't mean its staying out of things in the Pacific and FE. If it was isolationist there as well and still willing to trade with Japan that means no sanctions and hence probably the war in China gets even bloodier but removes the primary incentive for a Japanese drive south. If they are supporting the KMT against Japan anything like OTL then it would be virtually unthinkable for Japan not to go to war with the US as well. [Which doesn't necessarily means Hitler leaps in as OTL of course]. Or some vague area in the middle.

For the peace in ~Oct 40 I'm assuming something happens to remove Churchill. Possibly a victim of an early blitz attack, an accident while drunk, stroke or some other incident. Chamberlain was already clearly dying by this time. Halifax was not yet sent to Washington but he hadn't been willing to become PM in May so unlikely he would do now, although possibly a figurehead leader? Could be one of the younger Tories such as Eden or Macmillan with a continued coalition with Labour and probably other parties. That might give a technocratic tendency to the leadership in the following difficult years.

In terms of the poll you mentioned I can remember a long discussion, think it was on a naval site a couple of years back about US public opinion in this period. Very much depended on what question was asked as slightly different wording often made a considerable difference to the result. US public opinion would be growing wary of Nazi Germany especially after the fall of both France and much of the SU but their unlikely to go to war unless either Hitler forces them or there's some significant trigger. A major prolonged attack to remove Britain as the primary buffer between the US and Nazi Germany is a potentially very powerful one here, especially since its clearly naked aggression. However I'm willing to assume its possible that the US stays in denial about their best interests.

Steve

With regards to the Pacific, if there is no Pearl Harbor and the ruling government in Washington is isolationist, the U.S. will remain neutral and Japan has no reason to bother them. I have no doubt Nazi success will increase concerns in America, but the question becomes one of when and how it relates to U.S. actions; say if they decide to get more actively involved following the 1944 elections? It's far too late at that point.

In terms of the British, they either make peace in June of 1940 or collapse utterly in 1941 via starvation. So, Lord Halifax takes command in the Summer of 1940 and through Italian intermediaries, establishes a peace.

EwellHolmes,

Your missing the point. If there is an deeply isolationist US that is ignoring what is happening in China, including the economic losses due to Japanese control and the pretty skilled Chinese propaganda campaign to win support, aided of course by the Japanese, then there is no economic embargo. Possibly no aid to China from the US at all. In which case while Japan will do somewhat better as a result against the Chinese they will still be embedded in the long conflict there. As such what is the incentive for Japan to open a war in the south - at least before it runs out of funds. Unless of course whatever regime is established in the Netherlands starts 'selling' their oil and other resources to Berlin rather than Tokyo. At that point Japan either simply continues to buy from the US or if it strikes south its attacking an 'ally' of Germany.

If the US was to finally wake up in Nov 44 that its vital interests are threatened its going to make things a lot harder than OTL but still not impossible as Britain is almost certainly still fighting at that time. Possibly badly battered if the Germans are starting to win the battle in the Atlantic or in the air over Britain but it isn't going to be invaded before then simply because the Germans don't have the capacity to successfully invade Britain until they construct it and gain experience in its use. Even then its going to be touch and go.

I can't see the former scenario. Not only would you have to butterfly Churchill and make sure he wasn't replaced by another opponent of fascism but Halifax basically didn't want the job. He wasn't willing to take it when it was offered to him on a plate. That's why I'm suggesting something happens to Churchill in say Oct 40 with the BoB won and hence a stronger political and military position.

Will answer your other post shortly.

Steve

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WI: No Lend Lease in WWII Aug 25, 2020 13:52:22 GMT

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Post by stevep on Aug 25, 2020 13:52:22 GMT

Aug 25, 2020 11:21:41 GMT EwellHolmes said: