What if: Netherlands - Republic of China (Taiwan) relations

It is going to hurt the Dutch, but not as much as it would hurt them in 2020.

I found out that the order was for 2 submarines to be build in the Netherlands and 8-10 to be build under supervision in Republic of China (Taiwan), this would mean that they get experience in building submarines and can keep building them if they want to.

The United States will most likely keep selling former US Navy ships, have not found any new build ships they made for the Republic of China (Taiwan), the OTL Cheng Kung-class frigate where build under license, so let assume the ROC Navy build 8 Karel Doorman-class frigates types of their own and follows up with 8 Cheng Kung-class frigates before joining the Netherlands in the De Zeven Provinciën-class frigate (who will be designated as destroyer in the ROC Navy due its size) of which they will 4 ore more instead of buying the Kidd-class destroyer they did in OTL they might end up in 2020 with 16 modern frigates (more if they either also buy as they did in OTL the 6 La Fayette-class frigates) and 4 ore more modern destroyers.

They did by making it clear that the Netherlands would not be allowed to do any business ore that China would do any business in the Netherlands, they also kicked out the Netherlands ambassador out of China and recalled theirs while  downgraded the Chinese embassy to the level of Chargé d'affaires.

But if the Netherlands decided to stick to it and Republic of China (Taiwan) made it clear they would compensate by offering Dutch companies major contracts and promise to buy more naval ships in the future then the pain of losing the mainland China market could be soften a bit.  

True but if the Netherlands - PRC relations get worse in the 1980s it is not going to hurt the Netherlands as much as, lets day it would happen in 2020 where they have a annual trade of some couple of billions of dollars.

Doubt the EEC/EU would want to get involve in the Netherlands-PRC dispute and make it clear that its members states are free to trade wait who they want to.

Also the French have traded with the ROC in the past six Lafayette frigates and 60 Mirage fighter jets in 1992 and seems to do it now: Focus on COVID-19 battle, France tells China after Taiwan warning.

Found something, sorry for the Google translate but you can read much how the Netherlands handle what is known in the Netherlands as the Submarine Crisis:

Immediately after the visit of Van Agt (prime minster) and Van der Klaauw to China, very unhappy moment, a deep crisis in the Dutch relationship with China arose. What created a deep crisis between the Netherlands and China? What interests played here? How did the communication to the Dutch government and between different ministries? How this crisis went behind the scenes at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch government? What was decided? How did China react? The visit by Prime Minister Van Agt and Minister Van der Klaauw was successful, but flat for the visit, Van der Klaauw received a call from Allerd Stikker, president of the shipbuilding company Rijn-Schelde-Verolme. Stikker said that RSV to in all likelihood, could receive an order for the delivery of two submarines, with an option on two others. Because this involved the delivery of war material RSV needed an export license from the Dutch government, so Stikker called to inform Van der Klaauw in advance. The client for this order turned out to be Taiwan. Between 1950 and 1972 it was Taiwan a split between the Netherlands and China and this order would make history can repeat. Van der Klaauw immediately recognized this danger and told Stikker what he said of a possible order would say: “About my corpse”. Van der Klaauw consciously said nothing left to the Chinese:

“There was no point in asking the Chinese about their response to a possible submarine delivery to Taiwan. It would undoubtedly be completely negative and possibly cause suspicion about Dutch policy. I still hoped that the delivery would not go through.

Why did Van der Klaauw hope that the delivery of these submarines would not continue? And why would a delivery be a good thing for the Netherlands? China. There were five reasons why the Dutch government should not issue an export license to the RSV for two submarines to Taiwan. First, it was politically, legally and morally debatable to grant an export license for the sale of war equipment to an unrecognized state that is at odds with a country with which the Netherlands wanted to maintain good relations. The Netherlands had no diplomatic relations for a long time at ambassadorial level with China because it supported Taiwan's position in the UN. The Netherlands only changed position in 1971, 21 years after the legal recognition of China. In May 1972, an agreement was reached with China on diplomatic relations at ambassador level. In this agreement, the Netherlands confirmed that China had authority over Taiwan and that Taiwan was therefore a rebellious province. If a Dutch company subsequently supplied war material to this rebellious province, with the approval of the Dutch government, this would not only be against the agreements with Including China, but also implicit recognition of Taiwan as a state. Incidentally, the Netherlands has continued economic, cultural and scientific relations with Taiwan since 1950. Secondly, supplying submarines to Taiwan could help to increase the latent military tensions between China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait. This is not only against Dutch foreign policy, 'Peace', but also against the Note Disarmament and Security from 1975. This made clear what was important for the Netherlands in areas such as arms exports: "Arms control and arms restriction are necessary to achieve a safer and more peaceful world." Permitted submarine sales to Taiwan would clearly be against the violate policy. Third, international sales of war equipment to Taiwan are said to be very poorly timed. As of January 1, 1979, the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Taiwan
 stopped and transferred to China. As a result, the US now also recognized that China was China's only legitimate government and that Taiwan is part of China. Not everyone in American politics agreed, leading Congress to pass the Taiwan Relations Act shortly after this decision. As for US arms sales to Taiwan, this law was clear: “[T] he United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”  This Congressional law was painful not only for President Jimmy Carter, but also for China. If the RSV, with the approval of the Dutch government, proceeds to supply submarines to Taiwan, China could use this to indirectly warn the US: "Kill the chicken to warn the monkey."  Fourth, growing political and economic relations with China, which had been hard at work since 1972, be gone in one fell swoop. In that case, China would no longer trust the Netherlands, as a result of which Dutch delegations would no longer be welcome, existing contacts of Chinese with Dutch companies would be reduced or stopped. The agreements that Van der Klaauw signed during Prime Minister Van Agt's visit could also be thrown in the trash. This was clearly recognized internally at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"[There] should be expected that the supply would harm our relationship with Beijing for a long period, (...) especially (...) because of the, as is known, long" political "memory of the Chinese, especially at measures taken by foreign governments to make them feel disadvantaged, insulted or humiliated. "

Fifth, this decision would not be useful in the geopolitical field either. Since 1972, China had worked to establish close ties with Western Europe and the US to work together against the Soviet Union. Conversely, Western Europe, including the Netherlands,
 China desperately need in this area. Chinese suspicion about the real intentions of the Netherlands, and with it Western Europe, would be a strategic blunder. These five reasons were quite significant, so that any export license should be even more serious. Mainly for four reasons. First, this issue took place in a turbulent social context. In 1980, the Dutch economy was in severe weather. Although there was still economic growth, the economic after-effects of the oil crisis in 1973, the policy of the Den Uyl cabinet and a second oil crisis in 1979 were certainly felt. In addition, there was a deterioration in the balance of payments, the financing deficit increased, unemployment rose, employment decreased and the Dutch government spent a lot of money on benefits. In this social context, it was important for the Dutch government to as much employment as possible would be retained. After all, growing unemployment would have a disruptive effect on Dutch society. The Rijn-Schelde-Verolme company had already had very difficult years in 1980. The RSV group was founded in 1971, but the first problems started in 1973 during the first oil crisis. In 1977 it became clear that there was overcapacity, which made the closure of branches and layoffs inevitable. At the time, the Dutch government, fearing these mass layoffs, decided that RSV should be helped with state aid. In total, the government pumped 2.7 billion guilders into RSV to keep the company afloat. From this social context and the already provided and large-scale state aid to RSV, the order from Taiwan was seen by many as a gift from heaven:

“[T] he work will generate an estimated 6 million man-hours for the [RSV] group, or 4 years of work for 1,000 employees. In addition, this is expected to mean another one and a half million man hours for the Dutch supply companies.

Dutch relationship with China has not been labeled as important. Frits Bolkenstein explained this in an opinion article as a former Member of Parliament:

“Accepting this order [could] burden relations with China for some time (…). It is therefore important to see what is at stake on the other side. The concept of "good relations" must be completed. (…) Can China help the Netherlands in Europe? Barely. About relaxation? Neither. As for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? Beijing has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We don't write about human rights. (…) What economic interests are at stake? (…) Many projects are currently in the air castle stage. (…) Now it is quite possible that all kinds of transactions with Beijing are concocted that the outside guard has no idea about. Only the government can oversee the commercial field. (…) For the time being, however, [the balance sheet] seems to point to Taiwan. Taipei pays in cash. Beijing is only interested in loans on soft terms. (…) One bird in your hand is worth more than ten Peking ducks in the air. ”

It was also argued that it is with military tensions between Taiwan and China was not too bad. Also, delivery of the submarines would not be against the Note Disarmament and Security go hand in hand with relations between China and Taiwan since the gradual takeover of Deng Xiaoping has normalized. That's why there would be are less of a reason for China to be difficult about orders like this. Certainly not if the US also simply offensive and defensive military under the Taiwan Relations Act supplies equipment to Taiwan. For example, there are $ 600 million fighter planes shipped to Taiwan from the US without repercussions of any kind on the part of China.

And related to your EEC question, it seems China summoned the ambassadors of the EC countries to the Chinese Ministry to receive a request to exert pressure on the Netherlands. In addition, it was decided that Chinese ships should avoid the port of Rotterdam, the contacts and contracts of China with Shell would be suspended, the agreements signed by Van der Klaauw during the visit of Prime Minister Van Agt could be thrown in the trash and Dutch airlines that had submitted a request for landing rights in Beijing would be refused. This resulted in the end of the Netherlands - Republic of China (Taiwan) submarine deal minus the 2 submarines who where delivered as OTL.