Alternate 1990s ORBAT

That is a shed load of submarines for an area with a very limited naval threat; I am factoring in the Russians and Iran to that statement.

10th Mountain always ends up getting a guernsey in the Middle East as part of XVIII Airborne Corps, but it’s only asset is speed of deployment. A light infantry division does have a certain role in the Norway contingency of XVIII Corps, but in a different environment, the flaws in its TOE show up. 9th ID in its mixed up 1980s experimental motorised format has a better chance, but even then, the light philosophy runs into issues. Essentially, the 1980s build up resulted in 4 light infantry divisions of limited flexibility and quite a few weaknesses. The 82nd and 101st already supply rapid deployment light infantry, alongside the arguably medium USMC divisions. Keeping more than 2 other divisions as light is a potentially problematic legacy; 6th and 7th can cover the Alaskan/Pacific contingencies well enough with a secondary role in Norway, but 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry are unsuited for their main and secondary contingency roles. Even as ROAD infantry divisions, they had a bit more staying power. There is the issue of getting heavies into the necessary theatre in good time, but prepositioning, although not cheap, is cheaper than having enemy tanks roll through and over a light infantry speed hump.

Long story short, I’d swap around 7th ID for 10 ID when going to the Middle East. That would still only give a force that could defend Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, if the stars align. For an offensive option, another 3 heavies would be good.

Overall, you might be starting to try and squeeze too much mission out of too small a force. It might be time to consider IV MEF for Norway alongside II MEF, as there is a hefty threat and a loss of forces to elsewhere. Getting a 20 Army + 4 Marine division force to do the job that a 28 division + 4 Marine division force was too small to do in the 80s is difficult. Looking at the missions and a little of the threat, my estimation is that you’d wanted 36 total divisions to cover it, raising some interesting options.

Having Russian forces on the ground in Syria, although it is something we are used to over the last few years, was quite anathema for some time; keeping Soviet troops out of the ME was a US aim for many a long year. The particular circumstances whereby they end up there is a function of decisions made under a particular administration.

There is no lack of TLAM launchers amongst the surface fleet and there is the SSGN option if those conversions have occurred. Other than that, it is a waste of submarines that are better off in the Atlantic and Pacific.

Whilst the Pentagon being told to do more than what is possible with a minimal amount is not unprecedented, the issue is that the force is spread far, far too thinly. The minimum force level is sufficient combat power to fight 1 major theatre war and hold a defensive front in one minor area simultaneously, or the 1.5 war rule.

This is how your current force breaks down:
Korea: 2ID, 7ID, 25ID, 3 MEF + 40ID
Europe: 1AD, 1CD, 1ID, 3ID, 4ID + 29ID, 35ID, 38ID, 42ID, 49AD (10 divisions)
Scandinavia: 2 MEF
Middle East: 82ABN, 101AA, 10ID, 24ID + 28ID

You've also got a smaller number of carriers, deploying smaller and shorter range CAWs compared to pre 1989

Europe: Hold. 5 US, 6 German, 6 Polish, 6 French, 2 British is sufficient to take on 3 x their size in Russians
Korea: Sufficient force to barely hold, but no counterattack capacity.
Scandinavia: Lose
Middle East: Lose. One heavy division that will take a while to get there isn't sufficient to counter the regional armies, let alone the Russians

The solution that would be offered is to drop a mission or increase the force.

Strykers and Griffins (which I'm not familiar with) is fine for dealing with an infantry enemy or counterinsurgency. It has never been tested against a heavy mechanised opponent and indications are that it would be an interesting engagement.

The Russians were not there until 2015 in @ under very particular circumstances. Now, a Soviet sized Red Army could afford to deploy 2 divisions to Syria, but for the much reduced Russians, it is a significant fraction of their strength essentially cut off behind NATO lines. It doesn't make sense, but rather seems to be cherrypicking the situation rather than fully planning it through from a PoD.

The ROKA in the 1990s and 2000s is a powerful force, but for a true offensive option, a US heavy corps is needed.

NATO has an advantage in Eastern Europe, but it isn't an open and shut situation. I'm still not sold on supporting 1989 force levels on post 1990s reduced total force numbers and budgets, particularly for the European states.

Scandinavia would need 10th Infantry; the airborne components of XVIII Corps stand a better chance there than in the Middle East. The geography is not only advantageous to the defence, but has a lovely oceanic flank tailormade for NATO advantage.

At the moment, there isn't the force level to do anything in the Middle East with what you've put together. This force cannot accomplish everything from 1989 with 6 fewer regular divisions, no matter which way you chop it. Using the same plans when the world has changed is not the most optimal course of action. If you want to explore the issue with any sense of realism, you may have to cut into Europe or Korean contingency forces. The 1980s plans did feature the XVIII Corps + I MEF from an early stage, but even then, it was something of a folorn hope backed up by much larger reserves and a much bigger nuclear stick.