War Between Brothers - The Story of the War of Southern Independence

While the War in the West seemed to be stalemated  with a slight Union edge due to certain events, the war in the East was, for all intents and purposes, dead in the water for the first few months of 1863. The disasters of the Peninsula Campaign, Upper Virginia Campaign, and Fredericksburg Campaign in 1862 had greatly demoralized and disorganized the Army of the Potomac to the point where the desertion rate was as high as 12.5% daily in Mid January of 1863. General Burnside had attempted to purge the Army of incompetent officers he felt were responsible for the disaster at Fredericksburg but without congressional approval, these purges went nowhere and General Burnside was promptly fired from the army by President Hamlin, who wanted to see results in the war more than anything else. The Union Command had, over the years, realized that the best way to win the war in the East was not to take Richmond, but instead to crush the Army of Northern Virginia, though the Union President and his cabinet knew that the only way to General Smith to engage the Union Army for a decisive, crushing victory, Richmond would need to be threatened as Confederate President Breckenridge had demanded that General Smith and his Army defend the city at all costs.

The Union President, running out of options due to the officer corps being stretched thin from countless years of war and multiple deaths in battle, believed the Army of the Potomac needed an aggressive man to lead the Union to victory. Generals McClellan, Heintzelman, and Burnside had proven to be duds and many in the war department was unsure of placing the overly aggressive Major Generals Dan Sickles or Phillip Kearny in charge of the army. So, instead, President Hamlin looked at the list of potential commanders listed by the late President Lincoln and decided to follow its instructions. Thus, on January 25th, "Fighting" Joe Hooker, the Commander of the Left-Wing of the Union Army and a pugnacious Major General that had proven a great man at battle planning when in subordinate commands. The newly christened commander of the Army of the Potomac quickly went to work, reorganizing the army into such a fashion that he believed was much more manageable. This reorganization had allowed him to win the support of the army and the reputation of an excellent administrator, with some of his changes being focused on diet, sanitation, hospitals, and other better things for the Army. His final re-organization was to create the Army into four, technically five wings, with the four main wings (Left-Wing, Center, Right-Wing, Reserves) having four corps each while Stoneman's Cavalry had 2 corps in it. With an Army of 150,000 and 10,000 men in the Cavalry, this mean that there was 35,000 men per wing and in each corps was 8,750 men.

Commanding the Left-Wing was Major General Phillip Kearny, who became a close friend of Major General Hooker during the latter half of 1862 along with their fellow general, Major General Dan Sickles, with all three respecting the other greatly. Under Kearny's Command was the I Corps under Major General John Sedgewick, II Corps under Major General John G. Parke, III Corps under Major General Jesse L. Reno, and the IV Corps under the command of Major General John J. Peck. Leading the Center was the cautious Major General George Meade, who Hooker, Kearny, and Sickles held little to no respect for due to his cautious and careful nature. Under Meade's Command was the V Corps under Major General Darius Couch, VI Corps under Major General John Newton (newly promoted after Major General William B. Franklin left upon Hooker receiving command), VII Corps under Major General John Dix, and VIII under Major General Major General David Hunter. At the head of the Right-Wing was Major General Daniel Edgar Sickles and he was given command of the IX Corps under Major General John F. Reynolds, the X Corps under Major General Israel B. Richardson, the XI Corps under Major General George Sykes, and the XII Corps under Major General Silas Casey. Placed at the head of the Reserve was Major General Erasmund D. Keyes and he led the XIII Corps under Major General Julius Stahel, the XIV Corps under Major General John Wool, the XV Corps under Major General Jacob D. Cox, and the XVI Corps under Major General Montgomery C. Meigs. Under George Stoneman's Command was the I and II Cavalry Corps under Major Generals George A. Custer and John Buford respectfully. Leading an extra 7,500 men was Brigadier General Marsena Patrick who would act as a guard for any Union withdrawal should the worse come to pass.

While the Army of the Potomac reorganized after the disasters of 1862, the Army of Northern Virginia under General Edmund Kirby Smith didn't change much, with there being 52,500 men in the army, an outnumbered ratio of 3 Federal Soldiers for every Confederate Soldier. However, the victories of late 1862 had given the Army a massive morale boost and the desertion rate was nearly non-existent, with a few soldiers saying that the Federals can send as many men as they like, but they will always be repulsed by Smith. The AoNV had restructured itself into 4 major wings just like the AotP with two Corps in each wing while Major General J. E. B. Stuart commanded the sole Cavalry Corps of the Army. In each of the major parts of the army was 12,500 men and in each corps was 6,250 men. While this meant the Army of Northern Virginia was much smaller, it also meant the Army was much more maneuverable especially in friendly territory. Confederate President John C. Breckenridge, fearing of Virginia leaving the Confederacy should Richmond fall, ordered Smith to keep the City safe no matter what, thus forcing Smith to take on a highly defensive posture during his time in the war.

Using improved military intelligence that had been built after the disasters of 1862 in the east under the direct order of President Hamlin, allowing Major General Hooker to have a clear view of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements and positioning. With the use of a newly created Bureau of Military Intelligence that allowed him to gain even more reconnaissance and military intelligence than before. This added information allowed Hooker to decide against frontal attacks that resulted in bloodbaths, like at Fredericksburg, and determined that the best way to avoid them was to try and outmaneuver Smith's Army and surround them. As his army camped at Falmouth across the Rappahannock River from Fredericksburg, the General devised a plan that many believed was superior than his predecessors' own plans. First, he ordered his cavalry under Stoneman to ravage the countryside, tearing up railroads and raiding supply lines that went towards Richmond, hoping to cut off Smith's own communications to Richmond and from there, Montgomery where he received direct orders from President Breckenridge himself. Smith, realizing he was outflanked and knowing full well that the Cavalry under Stuart was not a match for the Cavalry under Stoneman, ordered a general withdrawal from Fredericksburg to defend Richmond much more properly, allowing the Army of the Potomac to cross at Sulpher Spring on April 11th.

From this point onwards, General Hooker determined that best chance of success was for a double envelopment of the Confederate Army and detached Sickles and Kearny's Corps to complete that operation. While Hooker's adviser, and the man leading Garibaldi's Red Shirt Brigade, Brigadier General Giuseppe Garibaldi, who had arrived in the Union on January 20th and became an adviser and brigade commander directly under the command of Hooker on January 29th, advised caution. The Italian War Hero had seen the Wars of the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s in Europe and South America and knew that having numbers didn't always guarantee victory, though General Hooker would brush him aside. For the rest of April, both armies chased each other rather across the Rappahannock river area until they finally began to confront one another at the village of Chancellorsville, which would become one of the five most important battles in the Eastern Theatre in 1863.

On May 1st, the battle began with the Confederate Center and Left-Wing under Lieutenant Generals Ewell and Magruder held their ground with their two corps with General Smith ordering one of the Reserve's Corps to be near the defensive line should it look like the battle was turning against the Confederates. Meanwhile, the other Corps of the Reserves along with the Right-Wing under Lieutenant General John Bell Hood was planned to be sent around the Union Flanks to hopefully surprise them early in the morning. At the same time, with General Stoneman's Cavalry a large distance away from the battlefield, General Smith deemed it tactically sound to have his Cavalry under Stuart survey the surrounding area. The main driving force in the Union Army during this battle, surprisingly, was Meade's Center four Corps with an attack along Plank Road, with the V and VII Corps pushing the farthest into the Confederate line, though they would have to pull back or be allowed to be encircled by the Confederate forces.

Despite being in what seemed to be a good position for Battle, General Hooker demonstrated his lack of confidence in handling battles of such magnitudes, halted his brief offensive, determining that it was time to fight defensively, as he believed that the Union had paid dearly for acting aggressively at Fredericksburg. He hoped that this would force Smith, with his much smaller army, to attack his own, but instead, Smith did not fall for the bait, ordering the Army of Northern Virginia to remain behind their defenses for the rest of the day. While Major General Kearny did attempt a brief attack on the Confederate line at 5:30, he was eventually forced to pull back with the rest of the Union Army into the Wilderness. Hooker hoped that this would finally force Smith to choose one of two options : engage a superior army and suffer very heavy losses or withdrawal from the battlefield entirely, giving Hooker the win.

However, Hooker's withdrawal was exactly what General Smith had been waiting for and at 6:50 PM on May 1st, he would meet with Hood, Major General Gustavus W. Smith, Major General John G. Walker, and Jones. The three corps under their combined commands numbered a fresh 18,750 men that hadn't engaged in battle on May 1st and, from what Smith had heard, General Hooker hadn't even believed the Confederate Right-Wing was on the Battlefield, though Garibaldi himself wasn't so sure and had set up light patrols on Kearny's flank, believing that would be the weakest point in the Union line due to how aggressive the Irishmen was on the battlefield with his Corps. However, Smith believed the weakest part of the Union Army was the Right-Wing under the temporary command of Major General Abner Doubleday due to Sickles being near a cannonball shot that almost deafened earlier on in the battle. The quick change in leadership had indeed left the Union Right-Wing in heavy disarray and uneasiness, prime for a surprise attack. From 7:10 to 7:35 PM, the Confederate soldiers silently and carefully marched around the Union line and prepared themselves for the ambush early the next morning at 5:50 AM. Thanks to Stuart's interventions, the soldiers under Hood was kept largely undetected from Union patrols

While around 10 Union soldiers did give General Hooker a report of an apparent Confederate force amassing on the right flank when Garibaldi wasn't around to take note of the situation, the Union General believed that Smith was starting a general retreat from the battlefield and thus promptly ordered the Army to take a good long rest before they continued their march towards Richmond from Chancellorsville the following day. Unbeknownst to them, the Confederate soldiers had heard everything and was prepared to ambush the unsuspecting Federals. At 5:25 AM the next day, most of Hood's men were roused from their sleep, given a good early morning meal, and ordered to await the order to advance. For 30 minutes, the Confederates waited until finally, at 6 AM, Hood gave the order to advance and attack the Union line. Most of the Union Right-Wing was either still asleep or just waking up at this point in time and thus were suspecting of the Confederate attack, though indicated a massive assault was coming due to how many animals had left the woods.

8 minutes later, the Union soldiers began to hear the infamous Rebel Yell that scared many in battle and as they were still getting a grasp of what was going on, the Confederate forces poured over the Union Right-Wing quickly, effectively taking it apart with only half of the IX Corps and a quarter of the X Corps as well as their commanders escaping and fleeing in the general direction of North. The Commanders of the other two Corps as well as the Right-Wing's temporary commander were either killed in battle (Doubleday), wounded and forced to retire from the military (Casey), or captured (Sykes). As the Right-Wing practically disintegrated upon the Confederate assault, the Union Center was then hit with Major General Meade being among the first causalities of the attack, dying from a Confederate musket shot at 6:47 AM when attempting to mount his horse. It wasn't until the destruction of the VII Corps under Dix and the Death of Major General Couch for the Center to mount a better prepared defensive from 7:04 to 7:27 until they were eventually forced to route even more, with Major General Dix being captured and Major General Hunter being killed in the process.

Hearing about the assault, General Hooker immediately ordered in his reserves to stem the tide of the battle and while the Confederate advance was finally halted at 8:16 AM by the Army of the Potomac's Reserves, it would see the deaths of Major Generals Keyes, Cox, and Wool. At the same time, Patrick's guard division was practically destroyed in the initial attack, being placed closed to the center, and the Brigadier General was captured himself. The assault did not go without major Confederate losses, however, with Major General Smith being among one of the first to die when Hooker deployed his center to halt the Confederate assault. Kearny and Garibaldi, upon hearing the commotion, would link up with the remnants of the Right-wing and Center and convince the former to become the reserves and the latter to act as the temporary Union Right-Wing under the command of Garibaldi as Kearny once more secured the Union Left Flank. By 8:47 AM, the Union line was once more reorganized and prepare for battle, though the sudden surprise attack had taken General Hooker off guard and when giving a report about how many were expected to have died, been wounded, or captured, he almost ordered a general retreat only for Garibaldi and Kearny to stop him and remind him that doing so would only cause more disorder in the Union line. Thus, for the next two hours, the surprised and shaken Army of the Potomac engaged Hood's men in their own camp.

For the main Confederate Army, reports from General Stuart had reached Smith and had greatly pleased him. Initially, Smith believed that the attack would disorganize the Union Right-Wing even further before it petered out when it hit the Union Center only for the attack to be proven even more effective than initially thought. Cautiously, Smith moved the Army of Northern Virginia out of their defensive positions and pushed them to engage the shaken and newly formed Union Right that was unsuspecting of the main Confederate line advancing on them. At 12:03 PM, Magruder re-engaged the Union Line and began pushing them back as the exhausted men under General Hood began to pull back. Within 10 minutes, the temporary Union Right-Wing collapsed and the temporary reserves, scared of facing the main Confederate line again in a much more weakened state, withdrew from the battlefield in sheer terror, forcing the Union line to once again re-organize themselves in such a way that they could hold properly against the main Confederate Army. As the first Confederate soldiers reached Hood's men at 12:54 PM, General Smith surveyed the damage. Of Hood's 18,750 men, 47% was taken out of action, with 2,542 dead, 5,908 wounded, and 363 captured/missing. The Confederate commander ordered Hood's men to join the rest of the reserves and rest up for later use if needed.

For the next hour and a half, from 12:57 PM to 2:09 PM, General Hooker ordered the Army of the Potomac to hold the line for as long as possible, though it was clear that the federal troops were becoming strained against their fresher opponents, having fought since the early morning. With ammunition and morale starting to run low, Hooker decided to give the order for a general and orderly withdrawal, though he first needed an opening, one that Kearny offered to provide. At 3:41, the Union Left attacked the main Confederate line and held them off for 46 minutes before slowly disengaging and withdrawing themselves once the Union reserves had left the Battlefield. by 5:11 PM, only Garibaldi's Brigade remained and they would hold on for an extra 48 minutes themselves before finally withdrawing, both sides exhausted from the fight. For the Union, of the 150,000 men in the main army, 5,582 were killed, 11,218 were wounded, and 2,073 were captured/missing in the two days of battle combined, which was a 13% loss of the Army's combat effectiveness while for the Confederacy, combined with the 47% loss Hood suffered, the Army of Northern Virginia got 3,452 killed, 7,016 wounded, and 954 captured/missing on both days combined, a loss of 20,235 men in the two days combined, which was a loss of 40% of the entire Army. Combined, the Battle of Chancellorsville saw 39,108 causalities, though the Confederates suffered 52% of the causalities, making it a Pyrrhic victory. The battle was widely praised throughout the South, however, and many wrongly recognized it as being Hood's creation and not Smith's, calling Hood's masterpiece, though the Confederate Military believed it was anything but that. The day after, Confederate President Breckenridge ordered an immediate conscription of thousands of men to fill the ranks of the Army of Northern Virginia quickly before he ordered General Smith, now leading an Army of 82,500 men, to push North as, after all, the North was stunned by the defeat, with Hooker being fired and replaced with Kearny as the head of the Army of the Potomac while Sickles recovered and began to retake command of the shattered Right-Wing as Garibaldi was promoted to Major General and given command of the Army's reserves while Majors Generals Rosecrans and Fremont were given command of the Left-Wing and Center respectfully. Smith, however, refused, knowing that another advance into the Union could be disastrous to his Army and so, on May 23rd, Breckenridge relieved Smith of Command of the Army of Northern Virginia and placed it under the command of John Bell Hood, who was promoted to full General upon being given command.