Who to fight - Kingdom of the Neterlands in 1914

   Lordroel

I assume if the Netherlands joins Germany then Japan will look to capture the biggest price the can get, the Dutch East Indies, even with the German East Asia Squadron joining the Royal Netherlands Navy East Indies Squadron, the Netherlands will be screwed as there is nothing its arsenal that can go head to head with a Japanese battleship.

If the Netherlands joins the United Kingdom, then the Royal Netherlands Navy East Indies Squadron will join in the hunt for the German East Asia Squadron, after they have been defeated, the majority of the ships will most likely joining the Home Squadron operating out of Den Helder if it is not occupied by the Germans ore out of the United Kingdom.

The provinces of North and South Holland down to Antwerp who will not fall to the Germans is what i think they will hold.

Did not find a video of the Royal Netherlands Navy in 1914, but did find one of 1917, as most of the major ships still served in 1917, you still can see what we had.



And here is one of the Army during World War I 1914-1918.

These articles posted below might give you some more insight in the Neterlands in 1914, will try to create a Orbat for the Neterlands Army in 1914, also will change the name of the Thread, to refelchet the Neterlands and who best side they could join in WW I.

From this site comes: Military Matters - Netherlands World War I

Army Organisation↑

The primary task of the armed forces (army and navy) was to discourage any belligerent power from incorporating Dutch territory in its military operations or in a worst-case scenario, to try to occupy the Netherlands. Also, theoretically the Dutch army could, in case the country got involved in a war, ally itself with one of the warring parties; at least this was an option that had some advocates in higher military circles.

After the Franco-German War the Dutch military establishment kept a close eye on the German Empire, not only because potentially it was the most dangerous adversary, but also because its military organisation was regarded as an ideal blueprint. The Dutch copied the German General Staff organisation and mobilisation planning and after 1900 developed a mobile field army based on a divisional structure. Germany and Austria were the main suppliers of modern armaments, as Holland itself had no military production to speak of.

Of course the Dutch army differed significantly from its German counterpart. Firstly, it was only organised for defence, and had neither offensive capabilities nor aggressive intentions. Secondly, the defence was based on two pillars, a field army for the outer provinces and a fortified defence around the western heartland of the country. The field army needed to deter violations of Dutch territory but was not to confront an enemy head on. In case of a major attack, it was to withdraw behind the inundated defence lines. These lines protected the main ports and naval bases on the North Sea, the major cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague) and the country’s main industrial complexes. Thirdly, the Dutch army differed from the German in its short period of military training, eight and a half months for an infantry recruit. This had been a political concession, opposed by most military authorities and one that did not enhance trust in the Dutch army internationally. On the other hand, from 1898 onwards, conscription was modernised following Prussian examples: personal conscription (no substitution) and a Prussian like division between militia (for the field army), Landweer (with older conscripts for the fortresses) and Landstorm (for local defence and army reserve). Also, reserve officers were introduced, albeit on a small scale. All in all, in 1914 the Dutch could bring 200,000 men to the field when they mobilised militia and Landweer, out of a population of 6.5 million.

Mobilisation

The Dutch mobilization of army and navy on 1 August was remarkable for both the timing and its smooth execution. Already on 25 July, the day Serbia mobilized, a Dutch General Staff officer had received a telegram from a former Dutch officer in Cologne warning him that war threatened.[10] At the time the Dutch Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General C.J. Snijders (1852-1939) was still on holiday, but he returned immediately. Snijders had worked on the Dutch mobilisation plans since 1910, basing them on one central premise: only if the Dutch army mobilized before the surrounding great powers could it function as a credible deterrent. Snijders thought a German invasion of France, possibly via Dutch territory, the most dangerous war scenario. He knew the Dutch army would, in that eventuality, not be able to confront the Germans directly. If deterrence failed, the Dutch would retreat in a northern direction, to the province of Brabant, and hinder the Germans in their right flank.

On 26 July the Dutch army started preparations for the demolition of bridges and the setting of inundations. Putting areas under water was a complicated, time consuming and very expensive undertaking; it could not be done at the last minute, but inundations were essential for the defence of the Fortress Holland and its inner core, the Fortress Amsterdam. From 28 July the government and Snijders took all necessary steps for the declaration of the general mobilisation on 31 July, a full day before the German mobilisation. From 1 to 3 August the Dutch army and navy positioned itself according to the plans the General Staff had prepared: the fortress lines were manned, inundations prepared but not yet set and the field army spread over the country, ready to concentrate in response to any international developments.

On 2 August Germany declared it would respect Dutch neutrality. Two days later the German armies poured into Belgium, skirting the Dutch border without ever crossing it. Snijders concentrated the field army in the southern province of Brabant as the war in Belgium developed, but only refugees and wounded soldiers crossed the border.

Not only was the south-eastern part of the country in potential danger, but also the south-west. Antwerp was the main Belgian port and also the country’s reduit nationale, only accessible to foreign help via the Scheldt Estuary, which lies on Dutch territory. When Britain joined the war, on 4 August, the Dutch closed the Scheldt to any foreign war ships destined for Antwerp. Tension eased quickly when Britain, like Germany, declared to respect Dutch neutrality.

Mobilisation Maintained

In October 1914 the German army besieged the Fortress Antwerp. After heavy bombardments, the Belgian army fled the city. Some 30,000 Belgian soldiers sought refuge in the Netherlands and were interned for the duration of the war. Over 700,000 Flemish civilians also fled to the north. They were housed all over the Netherlands and most returned home after a few weeks. Several tens of thousands Belgian refugees stayed in the Netherlands during the entire war, mostly in specially erected refugee camps.

The German invasion of Belgium, and especially the widely reported atrocities that went with it, as well as the influx of refugees alarmed the Dutch military. The fate of Belgium was seen as a shocking example of modern warfare. To prevent the worst excesses in Holland, the civil and military authorities stressed to local authorities that in case of an invasion, the population was to refrain from any franc-tireur activities that could result in reprisals by the invader.

The German occupation of Belgium had serious consequences for the Dutch and posed a potential threat to the country’s neutrality. From a military point of view, Dutch neutrality favoured the Germans: it safeguarded their right flank and their logistical lines between the front and the Heimat. On the other hand, the Dutch could never rule out the possibility that, should the British want to attack overseas, they would make use of Dutch ports and territory to attack German positions in the rear. Also, Holland was very close to the front in France and Flanders. Any serious movement, especially a German retreat, could endanger Dutch neutrality. Snijders and his staff were well aware that the Dutch position was strategically precarious. That is why he stressed it was important not to demobilise, not even partially, as other neutrals like Denmark and Switzerland did. The government had to balance these military claims with economic and social demands, which in the end led to a rather liberal granting of leave, while a full mobilisation was maintained.

Easter Alarm↑
The so-called Easter Alarm of 1916 illustrates most clearly the difficult position the Netherlands, wedged between the different blocs, found itself in. On 29 March 1916 the German Foreign Minister reported to the Dutch envoy in Berlin that the Germans had got hold of information suggesting an imminent British attack on Zeeland. He added ominously that, although Berlin valued Dutch neutrality highly, the German government would do all it deemed necessary to protect its interest. The Dutch government had no evidence whatsoever of British invasion plans, but it knew it had to act to show Germany the continued military value of its neutrality – a decision not unlike that made by its Danish counterpart in August 1914 which led to the mining of the Belt. So, though there was no sign of military danger, the government cancelled all leave, increasing the army’s size by 10 percent overnight. This was a big step, as the Easter holiday was coming up. Furthermore, on 1 April the Dutch government informed the Entente governments of its decision to step up military security in response to a potential threat from their governments. The very next day, however, Berlin informed The Hague that their intelligence had been false and Entente invasion was, in fact, not imminent. Interestingly, neither the Dutch parliament – nor the public – was ever informed of the fact that the Easter Alarm had been a false one. They were made to believe there had been a serious threat so that unpopular military measures would be supported in the future. The Germans got what they wanted: the Dutch would act if their North Sea coast, the south-western border province of Zeeland in particular, seemed threatened. That was the crucial German military-strategic interest: no British amphibious operations in the Netherlands which might threaten their possession of the Belgian North Sea coast.

This crisis was important for the Dutch political and military leadership for two fundamental reasons. First, it made clear how important it was to present a credible defence of the country’s neutrality. Both the Central Powers and the Entente had to be given convincing signals and proof that in no way whatsoever a Dutch lack of vigilance on one of its borders would give the other side a potential military advantage. For the Dutch military leadership this meant both a continuation of full readiness for the army and navy and at the same time it added to the value of behind-the-scene contacts in The Hague between Dutch leaders and representatives of the warring powers. This was all the more pertinent since Dutch Army Command knew full well that it would not be able to withstand an invasion from either of the belligerents, and in fact worried that its inability to procure adequate supplies or implement the wartime innovations of the belligerents increased its vulnerability ever more. Snijders tried to do the very best with what he had, but sometimes his country was even better served by keeping up appearances.

Secondly, and at the same time, the Easter Alarm made painfully clear that Dutch neutrality had, in practice if not in theory, significantly changed character. The army was no longer the tool the government wielded to defend its sovereignty, but an element in an intricate game of power politics. In fact, some of the country’s sovereignty had to be yielded in order to protect its neutrality,

Parallel to deterrence, the army had other, new and demanding tasks: the housing of refugees and the internment of troops from the belligerent states. In addition it had to prevent smuggling along the borders. For this reason these areas were placed in a "state of siege", which shifted power to the military authorities. They introduced censorship, restrictions on the movements of people, the monitoring of aliens and suspected spies, and the tracing of illegal radiotelegraphy.

Successful Deterrence?

For Snijders, military deterrence was the main pillar of Dutch neutrality on which the army should focus most prominently. That is why he insisted on the Dutch army being maintained at full strength. But decisive for the preservation of Dutch neutrality, from a military point of view, were also the belligerents’ strategic advantages in keeping Holland neutral, be it as flank protection or to keep the enemy away from the North Sea coast. Moreover, neither Entente nor Central Powers were keen on a longer frontline, positioned in an uninviting, wet and muddy terrain. It was this shared interest in Dutch neutrality, albeit for different motives, that kept Holland out of the war.

And from this site comes: Military and Strategy (The Netherlands)

Introduction

In early December 1913 the Dutch General Staff held its yearly strategic map exercise. After a sudden rise in international tensions, resulting from a Balkan-crisis, so the scenario went, Europe was set ablaze by a war between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers. The Netherlands chose to implement its well-prepared armed neutrality to safeguard its territory and refused a British request to station warships in the Dutch North Sea port of Flushing. History would quickly prove the Dutch General Staff right. The exercise was the third in a row. Earlier exercises had analysed the Dutch reaction to a German march through the southern Maastricht appendix as part of a Franco-German war (1912) and a war between the Anglo-French entente and Germany, with the Dutch choosing the German side (1912-1913). These exercises were part of the Dutch General Staff’s efforts to keep its Strategic Instructions (Strategische Aanwijzingen) for military and civilian authorities in case of war, or the threat of war, up to date. This was one of the cornerstones of the chief-of-staff Lieutenant General Cornelis Jacobus Snijders’ (1852-1939) policy.

Strategic Outlines

Snijders was appointed chief-of-staff in June 1910. He was convinced that the Netherlands needed both a strong, modern, and sizable field army that could be positioned in the northern, eastern or southern provinces, responding to where danger was most imminent, and, alongside it, a modern, defensive fortress system around the “heart of the country,” making a protracted defensive war possible, and securing a safe line of communications via the North Sea. Advanced engineering works, water level regulation, and carefully prepared inundations made “Fortress Holland” a formidable barrier. Although this system of military defence, aimed at upholding neutrality, made good sense, as the Dutch had no territorial ambitions in Europe, it did not give any guarantee against a violation of Dutch territory. In case of an enemy attack, the field army would resist, but not fight to the last man as it would subsequently have to assist in repelling an attack on the fortified lines for at least a few months. This scenario would make the country a credible ally if a major power came to its rescue and would increase the Dutch chance for a seat at the negotiating table in a future peace conference. However, complicating factors existed, mainly related to two eccentrically located areas: Limburg and Zeeland. The field army could not be positioned there in any strength as the risk of its destruction was substantial and it would no longer be able to man the fortified line against an invading army. But it was exactly Zeeland and Limburg that attracted the most interest from the neighbouring powers.

Limburg in the southeast was important for the German army in planning a quick and easy route towards France through Belgium as the Dutch military authorities were well aware. They had observed the large railway yards built in German border towns in the 1880s. Zeeland controlled the Scheldt, the waterway to Antwerp, with its large and modern fortress ring planned as the reduite nationale of neutral Belgium and presumably the location for British military assistance if Belgian neutrality was violated. International interest in these questions partly explains the appointment of foreign military and naval attachés to The Hague. Until 1907 only the British army and navy were represented here, but were joined thereafter by the French and, in 1910, the Germans. Moreover, the French became the most frequent visitors to Dutch military exercises, as the Dutch might well be the first to confront a German advance towards France.

On sea another danger loomed: a conflict between Germany and Britain. Such an eventuality would make the Dutch coast of extreme strategic value to the belligerents. In a British-German war, the Dutch expected the British to blockade the German coast, possibly including the Dutch coast as well. Most Dutch experts agreed that such a blockade, even outside Dutch territorial waters, was in fact a violation of Dutch neutrality and thus a possible casus belli. The question of a blockade was dealt with in the 1909 London Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War that did indeed protect neutral rights, but as it was never ratified, the Dutch were rather doubtful about its validity in wartime. These international developments were reflected in Dutch war planning. In September 1907, for the first time in several decades, large military exercises were held along the coast, in which not only the army and navy participated, but also a new organization, the military coastguard, founded in 1906 to increase readiness in case of an undeclared invasion by hostile naval forces.

Formative Years, 1910-1911

That international events could take a potentially dangerous turn became apparent in 1910-1911, formative years for Snijders’ military strategic policy. First, the Dutch plan to fortify Flushing and the mouth of the Scheldt turned into a European affair, which was unprecedented for any Dutch defence initiative. In 1909 the Dutch government had announced it would strengthen its coastal defences in order to deter any violation of neutral Dutch territory. It was the most expensive Dutch military proposal ever made and led to fierce polemics all through 1910 and 1911, as the government and the military revealed the plans in more detail. It was the French press that made the plans into a European issue. Roland de Marès (1874-1955), a francophone Flemish journalist, published articles from October 1910 onwards to stir up French and Belgian public opinion against the Dutch plans, calling them pro-German and accusing the Dutch of hindering the British in assisting Belgium in case of a German attack. On 16 January 1911, the Dutch plans were discussed in the French parliament. Foreign Minister Stéphen Pichon (1857-1933) even toyed with the idea of making the issue the subject of an international conference, but support for this suggestion outside France was low.

In Great Britain, The Times stated that German strategic interests probably inspired the Dutch plan, but with the exception of some French and Francophone Belgian sources, most comments stressed Dutch freedom of choice in the defence of their neutrality, while also pointing out that the question of the Scheldt could aggravate a European crisis. Speculations involving different war scenarios were put forward, as was the widely-circulating idea that criticizing the Dutch would only make them more stubborn.

The question kept political and military commentators, journalists, lawyers, and diplomats busy for several months, but in the end, the Dutch themselves reduced the tension by postponing the final decision and scaling down their expensive plans: the defence works at the mouth of the Scheldt were to protect the harbour of Flushing against a coup de main, not to close off the Scheldt effectively. Flushing was important for the Dutch Navy as an additional base for submarines and torpedo boats. This meant, according to the government, that it was a purely national affair and not related to the ambitions of any foreign country. When Great Britain joined the war on 4 August 1914, the Dutch declared the Scheldt closed to all belligerent ships, a declaration Britain accepted. The fortress was never built.

The second confrontation with sudden European developments came in the summer of 1911 when the second Moroccan crisis reached its peak. The Dutch army increased vigilance on the borders and in the coastal fortresses. Two officers left for Germany incognito to gather intelligence, alertness on the Meuse bridges was increased, and the garrisons close to the bridges were strengthened. Conscripts who were about to be demobilized were retained, the activation of inundations was prepared, and Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands (1880-1962) informed foreign representatives involved that the Netherlands was prepared for an armed defence of its neutrality. Winston Churchill (1874-1965), Home Secretary at the time, toyed with the idea of British military support for Belgium via the Scheldt River, and appeared prepared to block the Dutch coast if the Dutch resisted. This idea never became formal British policy, but in general the parallels in the Dutch reaction to the Moroccan and the July 1914 crisis are striking.

Third, in 1910 Snijders pointed out that the country’s defence preparations would benefit substantially if the government indicated which major power would be a potential ally. The government, however, argued that military preparations that were patently one-sided would endanger neutrality. Snijders, in return, frequently and publicly expressed his dismay at Dutch politicians’ ignorance of the strategic implications of their strict, legal interpretation of neutrality. From 1914 those two opinions proved to be incompatible and led to serious tensions between the government and military leadership. The military point of view was that preparations, including informal talks with foreign powers, were essential in times of danger and were the only way to defend the country after neutrality had been violated.

Finally, in 1910-1911 Snijders whole-heartedly supported legislation which gave the Netherlands a Prussian-style army organisation, enlarging the army to 200,000 men in case of a mobilisation, with the potential to grow to almost half a million out of a population of 6.5 million. Parliament also approved substantial improvements in field artillery and logistic support. The first major division-size manoeuvres, also following the German example, were held in 1911 shortly after Snijders had begun compiling his Strategische aanwijzingen in order to smoothen the call up and dislocation of the army in times of crisis. The aforementioned exercises on the map were part of this effort.

Snijders’ Preparations put to the Test: August 1914↑

The smooth and timely call-up of the Dutch army on 1 August 1914, the first general mobilisation in Western Europe, proved the quality of Dutch military staff work. Within three days, the field army consisting of 200,000 men was positioned in a dispersed way throughout the country in order to protect neutral Dutch territory “on all sides.” Both Germany and Britain declared to respect Dutch neutrality and did so. The Dutch army closed off the Scheldt, but Britain no longer used Antwerp as its main port on the continent. The German army meticulously respected the Dutch-Belgian land border in Limburg. When the fighting in Belgium took place, Snijders ordered the field army to concentrate more than half its strength in the southern provinces, to fulfil its role as a deterrent force.

Snijders led an extensive general headquarters in The Hague and considered himself the sole authority to decide on military operational and strategic matters. As commander-in-chief, he resisted any government interference when military affairs were involved. Although both he and the government agreed fully on the Dutch course to stay neutral, Snijders’ opinion could deviate notably from the government’s on how this was to be achieved. For instance, Snijders stressed the need to keep the whole army mobilised at full strength. Demobilisation of substantial parts of the army after the stabilization of the Western Front, as Switzerland and the Scandinavian neutrals had done, he considered out of the question. He emphasized the dangerous geographical position of the Netherlands, the speed with which foreign armies could reach the country en masse, and considered time the most precious commodity the Netherlands had to prepare its defences. The army had to be permanently at full strength to be effective when the strategic situation around the Netherlands changed. This point of view also meant Snijders did not consider the repression of smuggling, practiced in large scale in all border areas, to be a task for the army as it diminished its operational value, especially in the case of a quickly developing crisis situation. Furthermore, he pleaded repeatedly for the declaration of a state of siege in the entire country, enhancing military powers in combatting espionage, practising censorship, and controlling both the press and local government.

Snijders managed to convince the government to keep the army at full strength but it was heavily contested in parliament, as demobilisation obviously was an attractive option for social and economic reasons. He failed to get a state of siege declared in the western provinces but he did get the government to have the Ministry of Finance assist the army in fighting smugglers. Snijders focused primarily on strictly military matters, and stressed operational readiness, level of training and quality of Dutch weaponry as his professional domain in which he did not take interference kindly.

Furthermore, in case tensions around the Netherlands increased, Snijders, as he had said in 1910, wanted complete liberty to prepare for possible violations of neutrality and to anticipate future allies. The country would not be able to react adequately to possible war scenarios if it lacked preparation time. The government, however, felt that Dutch military preparations favouring one of the belligerents were incompatible with neutrality. As it was unlikely to remain a secret, Snijders was explicitly forbidden to anticipate or secretly prepare any form of military cooperation or to concentrate the Dutch army against one of the belligerent states. Snijders’ military logic was completely contrary to what he called the government’s neutralité par outrance, which gave the army no time to prepare adequately and, in the most extreme case, would have it face both belligerent blocks. The first time this conflict came into the open was during the Easter Alarm of 1916. It reached dangerous proportions two years later.