eurofed
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Post by eurofed on Nov 12, 2019 23:32:21 GMT
1st PoD: Douglas MacArthur dies in WWI. 2nd PoD: Division of Germany persuades Stalin a neutral united Austria is not a practical or gainful objective in 1949-50. Therefore, he agrees to the requests of Austrian Communists for a division of Austria on the German model and imposes Communist rule in the Soviet occupation zone. The Western Allies, not trusting West Austria's ability to resist Communism on its own, allow it to unite with West Germany. East Austria too eventually merges with East Germany as an exclave. Vienna becomes the second divided city in Europe besides Berlin. Increased evidence of Soviet aggressiveness despite the end of the Berlin Blockade makes America step up its efforts to rearm and improve the preparedness of the US Army after post-WWII demobilization. It also persuades France to accept the European Defence Community project, ensuring the European integration process shall include an European common army and a federalist political dimension (thanks to the related European Political Community system) from the very beginning. Success of the other 'pillars' also slightly accelerates the onset of the European Economic Community project, ensuring all three main components of the European integration process start at the same time as an integrated whole in the early-mid 1950s. It also ensures the European common army, with West German rearmament under supranational command and control as an integral component, is established since the early-mid 1950s. European rearmament makes the Americans more trusting the Europeans shall help them defend Western Europe from Soviet aggression, so they are more confident to make a major military effort elsewhere.
When the Korean War starts, Matthew Ridgway becomes commander of the UN forces. When the US-RoK troops invade and overrun most of North Korea and the Chinese start their intervention, he takes the first reports of Chinese forces south of the Yalu most seriously and prepares a strong defensive line across the neck of the Korean Peninsula, only sending a few cautious probes towards the Chinese border. He keeps UN forces wary for a Chinese attack and ready to defend themselves and fall back on the 'neck' line if necessary. When the Chinese offensive does take place, the UN forces make an ordered redeployment to the 'neck' defensive line and hold it against the Chinese onslaught without excessive difficulty in late 1950. Ridgway's strategy and better US military preparedness than OTL turn the Chinese intervention in a complete strategic failure. Once the the PLA offensive drive is spent with huge Chinese losses, the subsequent UN counterattack supported by massive US bombing catches the exhausted Chinese on the wrong foot and pushes them back towards the Yalu during early 1951. The UN forces reach the Chinese border and fortify their positions on the Yalu in mid 1951.
Smarting from the defeat, and unwilling to accept American presence close to Manchuria, Mao refuses to make peace. Being mindful of the effectiveness of guerrila warfare during the Sino-Japanese War, he hopes to wear down the Americans with an attrition war. The Chinese continue to attack UN forces across the Yalu during mid-late 1951. They fail to make any significant gains, and a military stalemate develops. The Americans react to continued Chinese belligerence by bombing Manchuria, blockading the Chinese coast, and encouraging the RoC to intervene in the conflict. With US assistance, Chinese Nationalist forces invade and overrun Hainan, which had been conquered by the PLA the year before, and various other minor islands, effectively doubling the insular territory they control. KMT repression wipes out CCP presence in Hainan. US air and naval umbrella shields Taiwan and Hainan from any PLA threat. These setbacks make Mao double down on his commitment to attrition war on the Yalu and against Nationalist-held islands. In the face of Chinese stubborness, President Truman eventually authorizes American military to expand the US bombing offensive to any suitable military target across Chinese territory, send UN forces across the Yalu, support RoC landings on the Chinese mainland, and enact nuclear strikes against China. However, the American leaders remain reluctant to commit their own forces to a large-scale invasion of mainland China, being mindful of the Japanese quagmire during the Sino-Japanese War and anxious to spare the bulk of their forces for a possible extension of the conflict to Europe.
Stalin provides weapons and economic support to China, but he is aware of American nuclear supremacy and unwilling to get the USSR directly involved in a conflict with the USA if he can avoid it. Once the PRC loses Korea and Hainan, he would prefer Mao to cut his losses and make peace, but he fails to sway Mao's mind. His defiance and adventurism antagonize Stalin but he won't act on it and break the facade of Sino-Soviet solidarity as long as the Korean conflict continues. Once the dust settles, however, he may well take steps to ensure Mao does not turn into another Tito. By the way, he would very much like to send the Red Army to crush the defiant Yugoslav leader, but he hesitates since he fears this would drive the Americans to intervene and escalate. Increasing evidence of the Communist threat in Europe and Asia intensifies the Cold War, spurs NATO rearmament, and fosters swift ratification and implementation of the EDC system by Western European states. The Americans also encourage Japan to scrap the pacifist provisions of its new constitution and start rearming under their close supervision.
What do you think is going to happen later?
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dayton3
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Post by dayton3 on Nov 13, 2019 13:33:19 GMT
In the face of American nuclear attacks the new, and somewhat shaky communist government in China collapses and the civil war there is renewed. The Nationalists from Taiwan take advantage to invade and create a relatively small bridgehead on the mainland that mainly serves as a place for opposition to the Mao government and others to flee to.
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eurofed
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Post by eurofed on Nov 13, 2019 20:15:35 GMT
In the face of American nuclear attacks the new, and somewhat shaky communist government in China collapses and the civil war there is renewed. The Nationalists from Taiwan take advantage to invade and create a relatively small bridgehead on the mainland that mainly serves as a place for opposition to the Mao government and others to flee to. You make an interesting and plausible point. I would only argue that in these circumstances the KMT bridgehead on the mainland is not going to be that small. ITTL they recovered Hainan, which effectively doubles the RoC resources and their strategic projection on southeastern China, esp. Guangdong and Fujian. Unlike Taiwan, Hainan had a significant CCP presence during the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, but it is nothing a little Nationalist repression campaign can't wipe out for good. Moreover, southwestern China was the last region to fall to the Communists; a few pockets of Nationalist resistance lingered there and as a refugee army in Burma. In these circumstances I expect they can easily be revitalized and reassembled, and the Nationalists can use all of these resources combined with US military support to seize a large chunk of southern China from the CCP's failing grasp. At the very least I assume the RoC would be able to seize and hold a belt of territory across southern China from Yunnan to Fujian. Perhaps it won't be enough to retake all of mainland China (esp. if the Soviets intervene in North China), but quite possibly more than enough to cause a long-term North-South division of China. A few interesting points: How many American nukes would be necessary and sufficient to cause the CCP government to collapse and/or drive the Chinese Politburo, led by its moderate and/or pro-Soviet faction, to coup Mao and accept a cease-fire with the Americans? The Americans had 640 nukes in 1951 and 1005 in 1952. They would surely prefer to spare most of them for a possible confrontation with the USSR, but I guess they would be willing to use as many as 100-120 to bring China to its knees. They are all but surely going to start with an handful strikes and hit more targets in stages until the PRC begs for peace or collapses. Would the other CCP leaders purge Mao for bringing them to disaster with a bullet in the head or just allow him to go to house arrest? Would his fall foster a violent power struggle between rival factions of the CCP (a subsection of the wider civil war), or would the post-Mao CCP leadership be able to keep a united front (even if their grasp on mainland China gets feeble)? Would Stalin send the Red Army to occupy, err "provide fraternal assistance to" North China in order to prevent a total collapse of Communist rule and keep the CCP on a tight leash? I think he may well do it. If the KMT reconquest campaign of the mainland sees some serious success, of course the Americans are going to keep supporting the Nationalists by giving them weapons, money, and logistic support, and stay unwilling to commit their own land forces. I dunno if they would keep bombing the CCP, though, but they may well do since they are riding on success. Unlike the frustrating OTL stalemate and draw that drove Truman to decline seeking re-election, ITTL the Korean War has been a decisive and not so costly success for America that allowed it to retake all of Korea and at least one-third to one-half of China. Truman has the Democratic nomination and re-election in his pocket in 1952, and quite possibly, given his military background, Eisenhower may decline to run against such a successful incumbent war president. If the KMT retakes South China, the main source of external support for the Vietminh is going to go up in smoke and turn into a potential threat. This is a very serious strategic setback for Ho Chi Minh. The entire history of post-WWII Indochina may easily take a wholly different, much more pro-Western course. TTL lessons of the Korean War are: like Nazism, Communism is a bully willing and able to prey on weaker victims but quite vulnerable to military retribution and rollback from sufficiently strong opponents; limited nuclear war works, and ambitious states that lack a WMD deterrent are helpless; anti-Communist land wars in Asia and likely elsewhere can be won; WWII-spawned massive military prestige of America is unsullied and confirmed by the Korean venture, you challenge the Yankee giant to your peril; China stays the powerless paper tiger it was since the First Opium War; the CCP brand of "people's war" warfare that other Third-World revolutionaries might be tempted to imitate actually is not that great, it only succeeded for a while against the Japanese and the KMT thanks to external factors. |
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James G
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Post by James G on Nov 15, 2019 20:14:27 GMT
This is a well thought out scenario.
I can see a stalemate in the end developing in the military sense. I'm thinking of an earlier, bigger Vietnam type conflict throughout China.
In relation, how does this have an effect on neighbouring Vietnam?
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eurofed
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Post by eurofed on Nov 15, 2019 21:12:05 GMT
This is a well thought out scenario. I can see a stalemate in the end developing in the military sense. I'm thinking of an earlier, bigger Vietnam type conflict throughout China. In relation, how does this have an effect on neighbouring Vietnam? I would avoid labeling the second phase of the Chinese Civil War that is going to play out here a "Vietnam type conflict" since that term tends to channel excessively romanticized and aggrandized far-leftist tropes I am no fan of, such as greater military success and popularity, and eventual victory, of anti-Western revolutionary insurgents vs. pro-Western governments and proxies, that thankfully seem wholly inappropriate here. In these circumstances, the Chinese Communists have largely wasted the political capital they earned with the Chinese people with their land reforms, better organization, and anti-Japanese activities by stubbornly dragging China in a foolhardy military adventure all the way to nuclear devastation. The Nationalists had demonstrably learned their lessons about their past mistakes since they managed Taiwan well, so I assume they are not going to waste their chance again in the second round. The Americans are not going to put their own boots on the ground, although they may well keep providing air support to KMT forces. I would agree in these circumstances we can probably expect a OTL Korea-style lasting division between Communist North China and Nationalist South China. The latter is almost surely going to evolve like a giant version of OTL Taiwan, while the former probably would become a fairly typical Soviet-style Communist state, even if the worst case of a giant North Korea is also possible. As it concerns Indochina, Nationalist success in South China is going to cut off the Viet Minh from any meaningful source of support, supplies, and safe havens. If anything, Nationalist South China is going to be a serious strategic threat for them. Guerrilla insurgencies that face these circumstances tend to fare poorly in the end against well-organized conventional armies. In all likelihood the Communists are going to lose the First Indochina War (there won't be another) to the French and their Bao Dai allies, like the other Communist insurgencies were crushed or at least contained in the rest of Southeast Asia. United Vietnam is going to get independence under South Vietnamese leadership and follow a similar course to the other pro-Western states in the region. It is exceedingly doubtful the local Commies are ever going to get enough traction again to stage anything like the Vietnam War; at most it shall be a low-key insurgency as it sometimes occurred in the rest of the area. Without the Vietnam War, the Pol Pot crazies are never going to get anywhere close to power. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 16, 2019 10:22:40 GMT
This is a well thought out scenario. I can see a stalemate in the end developing in the military sense. I'm thinking of an earlier, bigger Vietnam type conflict throughout China. In relation, how does this have an effect on neighbouring Vietnam? I would avoid labeling the second phase of the Chinese Civil War that is going to play out here a "Vietnam type conflict" since that term tends to channel excessively romanticized and aggrandized far-leftist tropes I am no fan of, such as greater military success and popularity, and eventual victory, of anti-Western revolutionary insurgents vs. pro-Western governments and proxies, that thankfully seem wholly inappropriate here. In these circumstances, the Chinese Communists have largely wasted the political capital they earned with the Chinese people with their land reforms, better organization, and anti-Japanese activities by stubbornly dragging China in a foolhardy military adventure all the way to nuclear devastation. The Nationalists had demonstrably learned their lessons about their past mistakes since they managed Taiwan well, so I assume they are not going to waste their chance again in the second round. The Americans are not going to put their own boots on the ground, although they may well keep providing air support to KMT forces. I would agree in these circumstances we can probably expect a OTL Korea-style lasting division between Communist North China and Nationalist South China. The latter is almost surely going to evolve like a giant version of OTL Taiwan, while the former probably would become a fairly typical Soviet-style Communist state, even if the worst case of a giant North Korea is also possible. As it concerns Indochina, Nationalist success in South China is going to cut off the Viet Minh from any meaningful source of support, supplies, and safe havens. If anything, Nationalist South China is going to be a serious strategic threat for them. Guerrilla insurgencies that face these circumstances tend to fare poorly in the end against well-organized conventional armies. In all likelihood the Communists are going to lose the First Indochina War (there won't be another) to the French and their Bao Dai allies, like the other Communist insurgencies were crushed or at least contained in the rest of Southeast Asia. United Vietnam is going to get independence under South Vietnamese leadership and follow a similar course to the other pro-Western states in the region. It is exceedingly doubtful the local Commies are ever going to get enough traction again to stage anything like the Vietnam War; at most it shall be a low-key insurgency as it sometimes occurred in the rest of the area. Without the Vietnam War, the Pol Pot crazies are never going to get anywhere close to power.
Not so sure about those assumptions. Don't forget that the population of China will only really know what the regime tells them. Which will probably include that the war in Korea was necessary to prevent further 'western aggression' which will now be demonstrated by US bombings and attacks, supported by the hated KMT. Especially if the US don't put boots on the ground and rely on bombing attacks and bombardments as that will mean a lot of civilian deaths and virtually no knowledge of actual events on the ground. Plus I very much doubt that the KMT will have anything like the manpower, even if its more effective than it was in the previous civil war. At this point the KMT is still a military dictatorship, probably with a good amount of paranoia about its earlier defeat. It took several decades for them to become even basically democratic so I wouldn't expect them to be that much more efficient/less corrupt or interested in the concerns of the ordinary people. Many of the people who supported them have been purged and Mao hasn't made his worst mistakes yet so there will be a lot of mistrust of a foreign backed KMT invasion.
Its possible they might be successful enough to carve out a state in southern China, although that does require some sort of cease-fire, even if official at some point or another and how long before all three of the parties involved are willing to do that? If such a state is large then it might over time become more democratic, as with S Korea and Taiwan or it might not. Probably as OTL not much political change until Chiang Kai-shek died.
China has a long history of both autocracy and hostility towards non Chinese populations and cultures so whether a US backed invasion will succeed given how understandably hostile the bulk of the population would be to that or a lasting democratic movement in a large Chinese state would be certain are far from certain.
A KMT state in the south would make it easier for communism to be defeated in Vietnam but again far from certain. They were still leading the nationalist movement against French colonisation and the US, if its secured a strong anti-communist S China, may not be too bothered about supporting French imperialism or there might be a reaction against such a bloody and costly involvement. After all, despite being less than a decade after WWII the US appetite for the Korean conflict faded fairly quickly. There is a better chance of a less despotic Vietnamese emerging but again its far from certain.
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