Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia in 1950

A thanks for the answer.

Is that a small East Austria then what i am seeing on the map then.

Excellent map, epichistory. My only nitpick (since you went to such detail as to include microstates such as San Marino and small exclaves such as West Berlin) is that West Vienna too is a West German territory within the East Austrian exclave of East Germany (and almost surely got its own Wall).

I was just wondering, since I recently posted two similar and compatible early Cold War scenarios, and I had the ideas for them in different stages, it might be cool and interesting to unify their effects in a single one. I.e. we get a TL where Austria got divided and its halves reunified with the respective halves of Germany, Stalin occupied and partitioned Yugoslavia (and somehow did not provoke America into nuking the Communist bloc into oblivion, according to evidence lordroel provided), Mao got his ass kicked in Korea and failed to back down, bringing more losses and humiliation to the PRC. I leave to you folks the choice whether the last point most likely means the PRC just loses Hainan to a US-backed RoC invasion but the CCP leadership makes peace before getting China nuked, or China gets nuked and divided into PRC North China and RoC South China. I would just avoid picking the variant of the PRC getting a sizable dose of artificial sunshine and somehow still repelling a KMT invasion of the mainland, since it endorses cliches about Commie invincibility I find insufferably exaggerated and romanticized.

Stevep, there was nothing unlikely or difficult in the USA winning a decisive victory in the Korean War and reunifying the country under South Korean leadership in 1950-53. It took a PoD just as easy as the UN forces getting a more competent commander than primadonna MacArthur. The Chinese were damn lucky to get as successful as they were thanks to him totally screwing up UN contingency preparation and initial reaction to their intervention. A more competent commander could have easily got the PLA stopped at the 40th parallel and pushed back to the Yalu.

I am entirely willing to concede in these circumstances a KMT (backed or not by US troops) invasion of the Chinese mainland may or may not occur, and if it occurs, it may or may not succeed to various degrees. So let's put that strawman off the table and assume a US-supported KMT invasion of the mainland is not going to happen. On the other hand, I am entirely persuaded it is a wholly unreasonable amount of pro-Communist/Chinese wishful thinking to expect the PRC was somehow entitled to reap any degree of success at all for its intervention in the Korean War regardless of circumstances. To a critical degree, its level of OTL success was an outlier enabled and prompted by MacArthur willfully ignoring the foreseeable contingency and early warnings of the PLA intervention and totally blundering preparation countermeasures and early response. The strategic window between the first signs of the Chinese getting on the move and the full onslaught of the PLA offensive was large enough that a different, more effective US strategy that would yield the final result of a decisive UN victory could easily be organized, and doing so was totally within the ability of the US forces in late 1950. A more competent UN commander (various options were available, starting with Ridgway) could have easily prepared a strong defensive line across the neck of the Korean Peninsula and kept the bulk of the US forces close or ready to make an ordered redeployment to it, only sending a few RoK probes towards the Chinese border to occupy and pacify the rest of northern Korea.

It is actually quite possible this kind of American restraint might give second thoughts to the Chinese and make them accept a pro-Western united Korea. But for the sake of the scenario let's assume Mao gets more paranoid and belligerent than that and is able to persuade the rest of the Chinese Politburo. There was some significant opposition to the intervention, he had to spend some serious political capital to get his way, therefore it is reasonable to expect he is going to be overruled or even purged at some point if the military situation turns unfavorable enough for the PRC. His grasp on power was not absolute in the 1950s-1960s, screwing up things may send him to the political doghouse like it happened IOTL with the Great Leap Forward until he engineered the Cultural Revolution to make a comeback.

When the Chinese attack, the UN forces fall back to the defensive line and hold that without excessive difficulty. OTL events indicate the PLA was able to rout the Americans for a while if they caught the US forces on the wrong foot and with their pants down due to MacArthur's mistakes, but they were unable to break through a well-organized American defensive stance. ITTL the Americans stop the Chinese on the 40th parallel just like IOTL they did south of Seul when they were eventually able to reorganize. OTL evidence also indicates that once the Chinese offensive drive was exhausted, they were vulnerable to an American counterattack that makes them lose a sizable amount of ground. ITTL the initial Chinese offensive is going to be a complete strategic failure, hence even more costly and exhausting for the PLA and making them even more vulnerable to US counterstrike. IOTL the American counteroffensive brought them from south of Seul to the 38th parallel. The distance between the 40th parallel and the Yalu is not much different and the terrain is similar, so it is entirely reasonable to assume ITTL the UN counteroffensive brings them to the Yalu. At this point a strategic stalemate very similar to the OTL one is in the cards, only at the Chinese border instead of the 38th parallel. OTL evidence shows the Chinese were unable to break it on their own, no matter how many troops they throw in the furnace. The wise thing to do for the PRC would be to accept the facts on the ground and make peace, but let's assume just like OTL they continue to stay belligerent for a while.

There is no realistic way they can push back the Americans from the Yalu by conventional means, guerrilla infiltration through well-fortified lines is not feasible, and Communist presence in Korea has been wiped out, so their only option to continue the conflict is attrition war. There is no way 1950s America is going to accept pulling back and ceding hard-won liberated ground to a rogue Commie power, and China being a stubborn sore loser that claims a right to control its neighbors is going to read like an untolerable level of aggressiveness. So the Americans have two options: escalate, or continue a limited defensive war like OTL on the Yalu, in the reasonable expectation the Chinese shall eventually accept the facts on the ground like they did IOTL. The new strategic situation is almost surely going to justify and persuade the USA to expand its bombing offensive to Manchuria if the war continues. Admittedly this alone is not likely going to win the war for the UN in the brief term, but surely it is not going to do any favors to the PRC economy, post-WWII reconstruction, or the effectiveness of its war machine, making the post-stalemate Chinese war effort even more costly and ineffective than OTL.

Alternatively, Americans can escalate, and the obvious next step is to bring the RoC in the fray, and the natural first target for that is Hainan. US air-naval superiority makes a RoC conquest of Hainan sure to succeed, and both Taiwan and Hainan safe from a PRC comeback. It would be entirely reasonable for the Chinese Politburo to see the writing on the wall at this point, cut their losses, and make peace. But let's assume hardliners like Mao somehow still get the upper hand for a while, and the Americans wise up against trying a large-scale invasion of mainland China, either by themselves or by KMT proxies, because of bad JLA and KMT precedents. The natural next step for the Americans is to start swinging the nuclear hammer like they did a few years before in similar circumstances to subdue another crazy-belligerent rogue power that would not accept defeat. And at that point there is no realistic way the Chinese can avoid total defeat, only different degrees of loss.

The USA had 640 nukes in 1951 and 1005 in 1952; the PRC won't have any for a dozen years, nor any effective means of delivery for even longer. Stalin won't lift a finger, he knows the only result would be to expand the nuclear onslaught to the USSR. The Americans were surely going to spare most of their arsenal in the case the USSR gets funny ideas, but just as surely they can afford to use 10-20% of it to crush China, which they can replace in a few months at most. They are going to start hitting a handful targets and keep going for more until either the sane guys in the Chinese leadership seize control and beg for peace, or China collapses back into warlord chaos. There is no way 1950s China can absorb the damage of potentially several dozens of nuclear strikes, keep the will to fight, and remain a functional state capable of an organized war effort. We might as well as expect Qin Shi Huang or Lenin to wake up with mass-destruction superpowers and an invulnerable army of golems to save the day. There is no way 1950s America is not going to have the political will to nuke China if it shows it won't ever accept peace except on its own terms. They built their nuclear arsenal precisely to cover this kind of contingency. Very few outside the circles of dedicated Commies are going to show much sympathy or handwringing for a rogue power that gets itself crushed because it claims a right to invade and occupy its neighbors to the bitter end.

As a matter of fact, with this ATL strategy the UN command is not automatically giving up reaching the Yalu. They hold the bulk of their US forces close to the 'neck' defensive line or ready to defend themselves and fall back to it. They send a few cautious, mostly RoK probes towards the border. If the Chinese threat does not materialize, they are in a position to occupy and pacify all of northern Korea since the NK army has basically melted away. If the Chinese do attack, they can shift to a defensive stance on the 'neck' with limited losses and little trouble.

Our assessment of the factors on the ground may vary but I am not convinced they are that favorable to the PLA being able to hold the space between the 40th parallel and the border in these circumstances. The terrain was a little more mountainous but not substantially more so, and the front significantly wider but not radically more so. I notice the 'oscillation' you speak of was almost entirely as follows: long US retreat due to the commander letting the PLA catch the UN forces with the pants down, stop and reorganization south of Seul, US counteroffensive to bring the front back to the 38th parallel, stalemate with a few minor adjustments in favor of the UN. The Chinese were pretty much entirely unable to make any significant gains once they became a known factor for the UN forces. I am skeptical the terrain and front length factors you quote are able to significantly improve their performance. Hence IF the Americans are able to move the border substantially north of the 40th parallel and reasonably close to the Yalu with their initial post-PLA intervention counteroffensive, I am skeptical the Chinese shall ever be able to recover any significant new ground with any subsequent offensive of theirs (also because in these conditions the Americans are almost sure to expand their bombing offensive to Manchuria, and that is going to disrupt the Chinese war effort considerably). On the contrary, any further adjustment to the front if any is going to bring it closer to the border.

On the other hand, if somehow the UN counteroffensive fails to make any major gains (possible but unlikely; it worked in worse conditions) I concede the Americans shall be unwlling to make the sacrifices necessary to break the strategic stalemate and eliminate a small Communist-held buffer zone in the 'cap' of the Korean 'mushroom'. They would easily accept a consolidation of the front on or slightly north of the 40th parallel, which is still going to look like a clear military and political success for them.

The Soviets are not going to be a relevant factor to oppose a full UN success: the drive to get a Communist buffer zone in northern Korea was almost entirely a PRC concern, the Soviets had an opportunist attitude to the whole Korea issue. They had welcomed the gift on a plate of America failing to occupy all of Korea after WWII, and greenlighted the NK attack thinking of SK as a low-hanging fruit, but they had been willing to co-exist with a Japanese Korea and Manchuria for decades. Stalin won't let the Red Army make any overt move to oppose total US control of Korea or threaten so if the NK/PLA proxies fail. He knows the Americans are sure to interpret a Soviet intervention as the start of WWIII.

I doubt the other Western members of the UN coalition are going to make much hand-wringing about an extension of US bombing to Manchuria or a US-supported RoC seizure of Hainan if the front comes close to the Yalu and the Chinese won't accept peace. Both events are going to look like a strategic necessity and/or the best means to deliver China some meaningful but relatively moderate retribution for its intervention. Plus the Americans are going to do all the heavy lifting, Hainan had fallen to PRC invasion as late as 1950, and there is no way China can retaliate short of doubling down on what it is already doing. Well, short of sending the PLA to intervene in the First Indochina War too, but at that point I expect even the Western Europeans would agree Mao is out of control and it is time to start dropping a few nukes.

Of course, it is entirely feasible and perhaps even likely if TTL front stabilizes on the Yalu or someplace between it and the 40th parallel, the Americans are simply going to do what they did for a couple years IOTL, keep fighting a limited conventional war, mostly defensive but quite possibly with a few moderate offensive probes if a slice of northern Korea remains under Commie control, and wait for the PRC to tire out of war. The main pro-Western differences would be the shift of the bombing offensive to Manchuria, RoC Hainan, and all or the vast majority of Korea firmly under UN control. They can certainly keep doing so for a couple years or so as usual. The US bombing offensive turned NK into rubble so I expect Manchuria is going to suffer the same exact fate, which shall considerably harm Chinese war effort and economy. By 1953, however, the Americans were seriously losing patience with Chinese stubborness and foot-dragging, and making not so subtle threats to use nukes to break the stalemate if an armistice didn't occur, so I assume the same kind of psychological threshold would apply.

The source I have (Global Nuclear Stockpiles 1945-2006, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.62, N.4, pp. 64-67, July/August 2006) gives 369 US nukes in 1950, 640 in 1951, 1,005 in 1952, and 1,436 in 1953. By comparison, the USSR had 5 in 1950, 25 in 1951, 50 in 1952, and 120 in 1953. I don't know about your sources but I trust my own.

The widening of the front is not going to help the Chinese that much. Even IOTL, they consumed pretty much all their good-quality forces in the furnace of the early phase of the war. ITTL the process is only going to accelerate and intensify, b/c the PLA is fighting in a substantially worse strategic situation; their initial offensive drive is going to break like a wave and get wasted all the more quickly on the rock of well-prepared American defenses. Moreover, they need to spare a sizable portion of their resources to protect the southeastern coast from a US-RoC invasion of the mainland, since the loss of Hainan makes the strategic threat all the more credible. US bombing of Manchuria means the Chinese shall suffer the same disruption of their logistic chain as OTL, only with the added loss of major damage to their main industrial heartland. The more the war goes on, the more the Chinese shall have to rely on poorly trained, supplied, and equipped green recruits and send them on increasingly futile and wasteful human-wave attacks against well-organized American defenses that efficiently cut them down with artillery and air superiority. Front conditions are increasingly going to minimize the effectiveness of PLA organization and tactics, and the war is going to resemble the Iran-Iraq War more and more, except with a much stronger Iraq equivalent.

Moreover, ITTL the Americans have the opportunity to deploy more forces in the Korean theater than OTL, since the success of the EDC project and the ongoing development of the European common army makes the American leaders more confident the Western Europeans are going to share the burden of defending Europe from the Red Army. Moreover, ATL shows of increased Soviet aggressiveness in Austria and Yugoslavia accelerate and intensify the pace of US rearmament after post-WWII demobilization. The combination of the two factors the Americans have more and better-prepared forces to fight in Korea and are more willing to deploy them to cover for a somewhat larger front.

It is true that setting the intra-Korean border on the 40th parallel is already a substantial strategic and political success for the Western bloc that turns the OTL draw into a clear net gain. On the other hand, securing the whole, undivided Korean nation for the Western bloc and ensuring no portion of it remains under the Communist yoke brings such an additional clear dividend, mostly political but also strategic, that I cannot see the USA not trying a good amount of effort to reap it, especially since ITTL they are all the much closer to begin with. The strategic and political justification for TTL America to bomb Manchuria and support RoC reconquest of Hainan is retaliation for China choosing to continue the war when UN occupation of the entire Korean territory brought it to a natural end-point. Extension of the bombing offensive to Manchuria also fulfils the strategic imperative of interdiction of the Chinese logistic chain once occupation of northern Korea removes the possibility of doing so outside of Chinese territory. Again, such an escalation occurs in reaction to the Chinese showing they are not going to tolerate a Korea outside their control.

I am extremely skeptical the Soviets are going to lift a finger to help China any more than OTL, especially as it concerns making any overt show of intervention in the conflict. Soviet troops engaging American ones under the threadbare 'volunteer' excuse are going to fool no one. There is a reason it never happened throughout the Cold War and the one time it nearly happened the world was on the brink of nuclear war. The guys in Washington are not going to buy it for a second. They are going to read it as the guarantee WWIII has begun and react accordingly. At the time they don't yet have to fear a Soviet counterstrike. Stalin knows it and knows how it ends, Mother Russia getting an extra-large dose of artificial sunshine. North Korea was orders of magnitude less important for Soviet interests than that. Russia had lived with Korea under control of an hostile power for decades and can easily keep doing so if need be. The strategic difference for their Far East security between Japan, Japan+1/2Korea, and Japan+Korea under American control is almost negligible. Taking half of Korea and trying to grab the rest had been opportunist reaching for a low-hanging fruit in the face of Japanese collapse and American obliviousness. During and after the Korean War, existence and stability of NK has been much more a Chinese concern than a Russian one. Even more so given the mutual distrust between Stalin and Mao, and the former's dislike of the latter's less than subservient attitude. As long as it does not mean a breakup or collapse of the PRC, Mao getting a full measure of bloody nose in Korea does not threaten the vital Soviet strategic interests in East Asia and is not devoid of value for Stalin. A humbled client is less likely to rebel.

Sure, China shall find it harder to accept a complete defeat in Korea and the loss of Hainan, but what they can really do they didn't IOTL? The Soviets already gave them all the non-fighting support they could/would in terms of weapons and materials, and a frontline on the Yalu won't make a real logistic difference. TTL American bombing of Manchuria shall be as devastating as OTL one of NK was for PLA logistics. If the Chinese try to throw even more cannon fodder in the furnace against a prepared US Army, it just means even more targets for the Americans to shoot. There is a reason the Chinese utterly failed to move the front again once they lost strategic surprise and initiative and the Americans regained their footing. They are not going to accomplish anything but forcing the USA to spend more time, effort, and ammo to kill PLA grunts and bombing Manchuria into a wasteland. In the end, the PRC shall be forced to cut its losses and accept the existence of an hostile neighbor, just like Iran did in similar circumstances. ITTL, the ship of Korea being a Chinese client sailed in 1894.

I am not averse to assume ITTL the Korean War has a broadly similar course as OTL, only with a much more favorable frontline and final outcome for the West, including no use of nukes and no Western invasion of mainland China, but also a pro-Western united Korea, Taiwan-Hainan RoC, and American bombing of Manchuria. Anything less than that, especially as it concerns the Communist bloc somehow being entitled to keep a portion of northern Korea no matter the circumstances, seems an unreasonable amount of OTL determinism and pro-Communist/Chinese wishful thinking. As scenario creator, I am not going to buy or endorse it.

Since my source about the size of US nuclear arsenal comes from an academic paper from a reputable source with specialist expertise on the issue, I am going to trust it more than a Wikileaks-style whistleblower with questionable political neutrality.