lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Oct 21, 2019 14:34:57 GMT
Why not drop a bomb on a Soviet front instead of a city. |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 21, 2019 14:48:03 GMT
Why not drop a bomb on a Soviet front instead of a city. Nuclear weapons in the 1940s aren't really optimized for tactical usage while destroying a city has much greater, long term effects. According to German planning documents for the raid(s), 80% of tank engines, 50% of radios, 60% of light tanks and motor vehicles, 50% of howitzers, and 50% of optics, to name a few, were located in the target areas or dependent upon the electrical turbines. Ball bearing production was also centered on Moscow. You'd basically cripple the entire RKKA as a force by hitting these targets, rather than just attempting to eliminate formations. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Oct 21, 2019 14:51:55 GMT
Why not drop a bomb on a Soviet front instead of a city. Nuclear weapons in the 1940s aren't really optimized for tactical usage while destroying a city has much greater, long term effects. According to German planning documents for the raid(s), 80% of tank engines, 50% of radios, 60% of light tanks and motor vehicles, 50% of howitzers, and 50% of optics, to name a few, were located in the target areas or dependent upon the electrical turbines. Ball bearing production was also centered on Moscow. You'd basically cripple the entire RKKA as a force by hitting these targets, rather than just attempting to eliminate formations. Even if you hit Moscow, how do the Germans know it will end the war. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 21, 2019 15:03:28 GMT
Nuclear weapons in the 1940s aren't really optimized for tactical usage while destroying a city has much greater, long term effects. According to German planning documents for the raid(s), 80% of tank engines, 50% of radios, 60% of light tanks and motor vehicles, 50% of howitzers, and 50% of optics, to name a few, were located in the target areas or dependent upon the electrical turbines. Ball bearing production was also centered on Moscow. You'd basically cripple the entire RKKA as a force by hitting these targets, rather than just attempting to eliminate formations. Even if you hit Moscow, how do the Germans know it will end the war.
It won't. Assuming that the Germans manage to strike the city with several bombs to largely destroy it - given its size that would be necessary for destruction rather than just damage, it would do a lot of harm to the Soviet war effort. However the Soviets know know even more they have to win, and win quickly, as do the western allies.
Or rather nuclear strikes by the Germans will end the war as the western powers counter strike is going to be massively destructive of an already rocking German economy.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 21, 2019 15:18:49 GMT
The destruction of logistical hubs will help as long as Germany can do it but they won't have nukes and delivery systems for long even if they can produce so many more bombs than the US despite their limitations. Nor will the Soviets collapse although damage to logistical centres will have a significant effect on their war effort as in the west. Its going to be the shattering of Germany that is likely to end the war in this scenario. Hopefully it will be limited to chemical attacks and Britain doesn't break out the anthrax bombs but I suspect they will refrain from that.
Accepting a surviving Nazi Germany with nukes and the ability to deliver them simply isn't a political option for the other powers. Even if there was some sort of military coup that partially replaced the Nazis in power in Germany the army is too linked to the Nazis and their shared desire for conquest to be trusted. Hence in the event the path your suggesting occurs the 1st few months of 1945 are likely to see the death toll for WWII leap dramatically compared to OTL and it won't be good for Germany.
One question is whether this might persuade the Japanese to surrender a little earlier. They will have seen the attitude of the allies to a surviving extreme fascist regime and with news that allied nukes are on the way it might be enough to persuade them to surrender before such weapons are used against them. Although there is the possibility with the lack of information and delusional nature of much of the regime and especially the military that might end up triggering some sort of civil war.
One for testing by October, serial production of 2-3 per month thereafter, which is slightly less than what the U.S. was projected to achieve after August of 1945; they were due for about six per month by December IOTL. I should also add that Bohemia and East Germany provided much of the initial materials needed for the Soviet nuclear program until about the 1960s, especially in regards to U-235. As for delivery devices, Operation Steinbock saw the Luftwaffe throw hundreds of HE-177s at London over the course of weeks, utilizing the well trained crews of JG 1000 (IIRC) that had originally been slated for Operation Eisenhammer. If the Germans have kept them in reserve, as I've posited, they've definitely got the means of a sustained nuclear campaign, particularly in the East where the Luftwaffe was able to maintain air superiority even into February/March of 1945. I'll also add a Soviet collapse is very likely if Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed, simply because too much leadership is focused there and inherent distrust between the Army, the NKVD and the Party as far as surviving, leaderless apparatus. Even if I'm wrong on this regard, the physical destruction of the means of production (Pun not intended) means a Soviet collapse, in a military sense, is assured through dearth of equipment to sustain the RKKA. As for the Anglo-Americans, their political will was already starting to be strained in 1944 and the heavy casualties and long war presented by a nuclear offensive by Germany would bring this to a head. It would take at least a year, if not longer, to recover from such a Nazi attack even if Britain itself is not directly impacted. Finally, for the Japanese, no civil war was possible nor would they be compelled to surrender by anything less than either the complete destruction of the state or the direct personal intervention of the Emperor. The 8/15 Incident is illustrative in this context.
Given that the US had a markedly larger programme, working on 4 development methods 2-3 by say Feb 45 might be practical for the Germans but such a capacity is unlikely to available immediately after the 1st test. Assuming that the test itself, which is going to be difficult to hide, unless its a underground one say doesn't trigger a massive further escalation in western allied attacks on the nuclear infrastructure. By Jan 45 Germany might have 2-4 warheads but their still go to deliver them and its quite likely that you could have a failure in at least some attempts. For attacking the west they can send a lot of suicide missions, albeit the that first few times the aircrew might not know that its a suicide mission but the sheer shortage of bombs will cause some restraints.
There is mistrust between the various factions in the Soviet system but your just given then a clear incentive to co-operate. Plus that assumes that the western allies and/or Soviet spies in either the west or Germany doesn't give Stalin details of German nuclear capacity. Once he knows about the October tests he's unlikely to stay in a clear target like Moscow and ditto probably with a lot of the rest of the establishment. Even if all the targets you mention are hit there is still a lot of capacity beyond range of such attacks and a lot of L-L supply which can now come from a number of routes.
Given the almost certain allied reaction Germany probably has a couple of weeks before pretty much total collapse of both civil order and the bulk of the economy. Coupled with those large amounts of forces outside the range of any attacks, albeit that logistics will be impacted by attacks on major ports, against a collapsing German resistance the allies could still overrun what's left of the Nazi empire. Plus as I say this action by Germany gives the allies, both east and west no choice but to remove all restraints and throw everything at what's left of Germany.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 21, 2019 17:11:00 GMT
Nuclear weapons in the 1940s aren't really optimized for tactical usage while destroying a city has much greater, long term effects. According to German planning documents for the raid(s), 80% of tank engines, 50% of radios, 60% of light tanks and motor vehicles, 50% of howitzers, and 50% of optics, to name a few, were located in the target areas or dependent upon the electrical turbines. Ball bearing production was also centered on Moscow. You'd basically cripple the entire RKKA as a force by hitting these targets, rather than just attempting to eliminate formations. Even if you hit Moscow, how do the Germans know it will end the war. You've just removed their ability to fight the war. Even leaving aside the political aspect, the material losses that would be incurred via the destruction of production facilities ensure that the RKKA lacks the means of fighting a protracted modern war. I'll also add that the Soviet state was not opposed to a separate peace at all. Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War IIThe Spectre of a Separate Peace in the East: Russo-German 'Peace Feelers', 1942-44 |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 21, 2019 17:18:53 GMT
One for testing by October, serial production of 2-3 per month thereafter, which is slightly less than what the U.S. was projected to achieve after August of 1945; they were due for about six per month by December IOTL. I should also add that Bohemia and East Germany provided much of the initial materials needed for the Soviet nuclear program until about the 1960s, especially in regards to U-235. As for delivery devices, Operation Steinbock saw the Luftwaffe throw hundreds of HE-177s at London over the course of weeks, utilizing the well trained crews of JG 1000 (IIRC) that had originally been slated for Operation Eisenhammer. If the Germans have kept them in reserve, as I've posited, they've definitely got the means of a sustained nuclear campaign, particularly in the East where the Luftwaffe was able to maintain air superiority even into February/March of 1945. I'll also add a Soviet collapse is very likely if Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed, simply because too much leadership is focused there and inherent distrust between the Army, the NKVD and the Party as far as surviving, leaderless apparatus. Even if I'm wrong on this regard, the physical destruction of the means of production (Pun not intended) means a Soviet collapse, in a military sense, is assured through dearth of equipment to sustain the RKKA. As for the Anglo-Americans, their political will was already starting to be strained in 1944 and the heavy casualties and long war presented by a nuclear offensive by Germany would bring this to a head. It would take at least a year, if not longer, to recover from such a Nazi attack even if Britain itself is not directly impacted. Finally, for the Japanese, no civil war was possible nor would they be compelled to surrender by anything less than either the complete destruction of the state or the direct personal intervention of the Emperor. The 8/15 Incident is illustrative in this context.
Given that the US had a markedly larger programme, working on 4 development methods 2-3 by say Feb 45 might be practical for the Germans but such a capacity is unlikely to available immediately after the 1st test. Assuming that the test itself, which is going to be difficult to hide, unless its a underground one say doesn't trigger a massive further escalation in western allied attacks on the nuclear infrastructure. By Jan 45 Germany might have 2-4 warheads but their still go to deliver them and its quite likely that you could have a failure in at least some attempts. For attacking the west they can send a lot of suicide missions, albeit the that first few times the aircrew might not know that its a suicide mission but the sheer shortage of bombs will cause some restraints.
There is mistrust between the various factions in the Soviet system but your just given then a clear incentive to co-operate. Plus that assumes that the western allies and/or Soviet spies in either the west or Germany doesn't give Stalin details of German nuclear capacity. Once he knows about the October tests he's unlikely to stay in a clear target like Moscow and ditto probably with a lot of the rest of the establishment. Even if all the targets you mention are hit there is still a lot of capacity beyond range of such attacks and a lot of L-L supply which can now come from a number of routes.
Given the almost certain allied reaction Germany probably has a couple of weeks before pretty much total collapse of both civil order and the bulk of the economy. Coupled with those large amounts of forces outside the range of any attacks, albeit that logistics will be impacted by attacks on major ports, against a collapsing German resistance the allies could still overrun what's left of the Nazi empire. Plus as I say this action by Germany gives the allies, both east and west no choice but to remove all restraints and throw everything at what's left of Germany.
Once the initial theoretical work is completed, production actually rather easy and by November of 1945 the U.S. was heading for at least six per month. Even an economy as backwards and poor as North Korea has been able to rapidly build up capacity and strength in this regard after its initial nuclear tests; given Germany, even in late 1944, has many times the productive and financial capacity of North Korea, there can be no doubt that 2-3 per month should be possible by November or December, giving them 6-9 weapons to use for a January offensive. If the Luftwaffe is able to take out Antwerp and Marseillaise, no Western Allies offensive is possible due to lack of logistics supply. This is what brought Patton to a halt in October and why Dever's 6th Army stalled out along the Rhine in November. Antwerp, which finally came online that month, made possible the Allied push into Germany from the West in the Spring of 1945. As for the East, Stalin wasn't opposed to a separate peace and would definitely find such advantageous in the event the Germans have completely knocked out his capacity to wage a modern conflict due to dearth of logistics and production.75% of Soviet military industrial output would be taken out if Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed. Lend-Lease can't make up for it either, as by 1944 it had been completely maxed out according to U.S. estimates due to the state of global shipping, port capacity, and the Soviet internal transportation network. In other words, the RKKA will collapse as a modern fighting force. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 21, 2019 18:48:07 GMT
Given that the US had a markedly larger programme, working on 4 development methods 2-3 by say Feb 45 might be practical for the Germans but such a capacity is unlikely to available immediately after the 1st test. Assuming that the test itself, which is going to be difficult to hide, unless its a underground one say doesn't trigger a massive further escalation in western allied attacks on the nuclear infrastructure. By Jan 45 Germany might have 2-4 warheads but their still go to deliver them and its quite likely that you could have a failure in at least some attempts. For attacking the west they can send a lot of suicide missions, albeit the that first few times the aircrew might not know that its a suicide mission but the sheer shortage of bombs will cause some restraints.
There is mistrust between the various factions in the Soviet system but your just given then a clear incentive to co-operate. Plus that assumes that the western allies and/or Soviet spies in either the west or Germany doesn't give Stalin details of German nuclear capacity. Once he knows about the October tests he's unlikely to stay in a clear target like Moscow and ditto probably with a lot of the rest of the establishment. Even if all the targets you mention are hit there is still a lot of capacity beyond range of such attacks and a lot of L-L supply which can now come from a number of routes.
Given the almost certain allied reaction Germany probably has a couple of weeks before pretty much total collapse of both civil order and the bulk of the economy. Coupled with those large amounts of forces outside the range of any attacks, albeit that logistics will be impacted by attacks on major ports, against a collapsing German resistance the allies could still overrun what's left of the Nazi empire. Plus as I say this action by Germany gives the allies, both east and west no choice but to remove all restraints and throw everything at what's left of Germany.
Once the initial theoretical work is completed, production actually rather easy and by November of 1945 the U.S. was heading for at least six per month. Even an economy as backwards and poor as North Korea has been able to rapidly build up capacity and strength in this regard after its initial nuclear tests; given Germany, even in late 1944, has many times the productive and financial capacity of North Korea, there can be no doubt that 2-3 per month should be possible by November or December, giving them 6-9 weapons to use for a January offensive. If the Luftwaffe is able to take out Antwerp and Marseillaise, no Western Allies offensive is possible due to lack of logistics supply. This is what brought Patton to a halt in October and why Dever's 6th Army stalled out along the Rhine in November. Antwerp, which finally came online that month, made possible the Allied push into Germany from the West in the Spring of 1945. As for the East, Stalin wasn't opposed to a separate peace and would definitely find such advantageous in the event the Germans have completely knocked out his capacity to wage a modern conflict due to dearth of logistics and production.75% of Soviet military industrial output would be taken out if Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed. Lend-Lease can't make up for it either, as by 1944 it had been completely maxed out according to U.S. estimates due to the state of global shipping, port capacity, and the Soviet internal transportation network. In other words, the RKKA will collapse as a modern fighting force.
That presumes the huge production facilities which also require a lot of energy and highly skilled staff are able to maintain full activity despite the flurry of bomber attacks that will occur. The German economy was already faltering OTL and with a hell of a lot more diverted to the nuclear project its going to be even worse here. Plus instead of so much of the allied strategic bombing operations being costly and wasteful carpet bombing of urban areas once the allies realise that Germany is getting close to a bomb that will become priority targets No. 1, No.2, No.3 and probably a few more on their list.
There was a fear of a separate peace between Hitler and Stalin and if their different views of the war situation wasn't so great it might even have occurred. However that is now impossible. Even if Hitler is willing to consider a 'peace' that doesn't involve massive annexations from the Soviets Stalin knows its suicidal to allow Germany any break to recover. Even if it meant another 5-10 million Soviet dead, which is unlikely, Stalin would gladly pay that price to avoid a Nazi Germany dominating Europe, especially since that's likely to mean many more Soviet dead.
The same applies for the western allies. The bombers will fly and a hell of a lot of Germans will die.
Yes those logistical centres are important but others are available and ground forces are closing in on other fronts. It won't be anything like as simple without them, presuming their all destroyed. Note your assuming 6-9 bombs being produced in the three months following the 1st test but most/all of those would be used in attacks your proposing targets, leaving little to reply to the allied response. Also this assumes that all reach their targets which is uncertain given at least in the west the air defence they will face. However the allies will have some ability to continue offensives even while the German position is collapsing. Its going to be hugely bloody for both sides.
L-L may be maxed out, but its still a massive amount and along with their existing forces and supplies on the front line means the Soviets can continue attacking for a while yet, which they will.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 22, 2019 3:19:43 GMT
Once the initial theoretical work is completed, production actually rather easy and by November of 1945 the U.S. was heading for at least six per month. Even an economy as backwards and poor as North Korea has been able to rapidly build up capacity and strength in this regard after its initial nuclear tests; given Germany, even in late 1944, has many times the productive and financial capacity of North Korea, there can be no doubt that 2-3 per month should be possible by November or December, giving them 6-9 weapons to use for a January offensive. If the Luftwaffe is able to take out Antwerp and Marseillaise, no Western Allies offensive is possible due to lack of logistics supply. This is what brought Patton to a halt in October and why Dever's 6th Army stalled out along the Rhine in November. Antwerp, which finally came online that month, made possible the Allied push into Germany from the West in the Spring of 1945. As for the East, Stalin wasn't opposed to a separate peace and would definitely find such advantageous in the event the Germans have completely knocked out his capacity to wage a modern conflict due to dearth of logistics and production.75% of Soviet military industrial output would be taken out if Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed. Lend-Lease can't make up for it either, as by 1944 it had been completely maxed out according to U.S. estimates due to the state of global shipping, port capacity, and the Soviet internal transportation network. In other words, the RKKA will collapse as a modern fighting force.
That presumes the huge production facilities which also require a lot of energy and highly skilled staff are able to maintain full activity despite the flurry of bomber attacks that will occur. The German economy was already faltering OTL and with a hell of a lot more diverted to the nuclear project its going to be even worse here. Plus instead of so much of the allied strategic bombing operations being costly and wasteful carpet bombing of urban areas once the allies realise that Germany is getting close to a bomb that will become priority targets No. 1, No.2, No.3 and probably a few more on their list.
There was a fear of a separate peace between Hitler and Stalin and if their different views of the war situation wasn't so great it might even have occurred. However that is now impossible. Even if Hitler is willing to consider a 'peace' that doesn't involve massive annexations from the Soviets Stalin knows its suicidal to allow Germany any break to recover. Even if it meant another 5-10 million Soviet dead, which is unlikely, Stalin would gladly pay that price to avoid a Nazi Germany dominating Europe, especially since that's likely to mean many more Soviet dead.
The same applies for the western allies. The bombers will fly and a hell of a lot of Germans will die.
Yes those logistical centres are important but others are available and ground forces are closing in on other fronts. It won't be anything like as simple without them, presuming their all destroyed. Note your assuming 6-9 bombs being produced in the three months following the 1st test but most/all of those would be used in attacks your proposing targets, leaving little to reply to the allied response. Also this assumes that all reach their targets which is uncertain given at least in the west the air defence they will face. However the allies will have some ability to continue offensives even while the German position is collapsing. Its going to be hugely bloody for both sides.
L-L may be maxed out, but its still a massive amount and along with their existing forces and supplies on the front line means the Soviets can continue attacking for a while yet, which they will.
I have no doubt the bomber attacks will engender delays but, just like the V-2 program (The Anglo-Americans were bombing the hell out of the facilities used for that in 1942-1943), it will survive such with delays and is entirely the reason I extended the development period by a year. As it were with the German economy, in October of 1944 Speer estimated they were still good to go until early 1946 if bombings were halted, so the issue in that regard won't halt the development. Afterall, North Korea has managed it with no functional economy anyway. As for the strategic picture, no other logistical hubs exist. The Western Allied advance was entirely dependent on those two and what little was coming from Cherbourg and the invasion beaches was already limiting advances by August/September. Without those two ports, they just completely lack the ability to advance into Germany as SHAFE documents show; 6th Army under Devers was literally having to halt its on advance on the Rhine just to keep Patton supplied enough for combat around Metz which was seeing little, if any, movement by American forces there. Monty was only able to do Market Garden via depriving Patton of his supply line. In the East, Stalin was completely willing to make a deal and still had peace feelers extended until late in 1944. When presented with a situation like he will here, which is he completely lacks the ability to engage in modern warfare due to a dearth of critical things like airplanes (No engines), tanks, and artillery, he's going to be forced to come to the table. If Hitler proves troublesome in this regard, Speer plotted an assassination attempt in February of 1945, coincidentally enough... As for air defenses, the PVO was pretty terrible in the East and the Germans were able to get the jump on them repeatedly. In the West, Steinbock lasted from January to May and Bodenplatte was able to achieve temporary success even in daylight operations. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 22, 2019 9:41:06 GMT
That presumes the huge production facilities which also require a lot of energy and highly skilled staff are able to maintain full activity despite the flurry of bomber attacks that will occur. The German economy was already faltering OTL and with a hell of a lot more diverted to the nuclear project its going to be even worse here. Plus instead of so much of the allied strategic bombing operations being costly and wasteful carpet bombing of urban areas once the allies realise that Germany is getting close to a bomb that will become priority targets No. 1, No.2, No.3 and probably a few more on their list.
There was a fear of a separate peace between Hitler and Stalin and if their different views of the war situation wasn't so great it might even have occurred. However that is now impossible. Even if Hitler is willing to consider a 'peace' that doesn't involve massive annexations from the Soviets Stalin knows its suicidal to allow Germany any break to recover. Even if it meant another 5-10 million Soviet dead, which is unlikely, Stalin would gladly pay that price to avoid a Nazi Germany dominating Europe, especially since that's likely to mean many more Soviet dead.
The same applies for the western allies. The bombers will fly and a hell of a lot of Germans will die.
Yes those logistical centres are important but others are available and ground forces are closing in on other fronts. It won't be anything like as simple without them, presuming their all destroyed. Note your assuming 6-9 bombs being produced in the three months following the 1st test but most/all of those would be used in attacks your proposing targets, leaving little to reply to the allied response. Also this assumes that all reach their targets which is uncertain given at least in the west the air defence they will face. However the allies will have some ability to continue offensives even while the German position is collapsing. Its going to be hugely bloody for both sides.
L-L may be maxed out, but its still a massive amount and along with their existing forces and supplies on the front line means the Soviets can continue attacking for a while yet, which they will.
I have no doubt the bomber attacks will engender delays but, just like the V-2 program (The Anglo-Americans were bombing the hell out of the facilities used for that in 1942-1943), it will survive such with delays and is entirely the reason I extended the development period by a year. As it were with the German economy, in October of 1944 Speer estimated they were still good to go until early 1946 if bombings were halted, so the issue in that regard won't halt the development. Afterall, North Korea has managed it with no functional economy anyway. As for the strategic picture, no other logistical hubs exist. The Western Allied advance was entirely dependent on those two and what little was coming from Cherbourg and the invasion beaches was already limiting advances by August/September. Without those two ports, they just completely lack the ability to advance into Germany as SHAFE documents show; 6th Army under Devers was literally having to halt its on advance on the Rhine just to keep Patton supplied enough for combat around Metz which was seeing little, if any, movement by American forces there. Monty was only able to do Market Garden via depriving Patton of his supply line. In the East, Stalin was completely willing to make a deal and still had peace feelers extended until late in 1944. When presented with a situation like he will here, which is he completely lacks the ability to engage in modern warfare due to a dearth of critical things like airplanes (No engines), tanks, and artillery, he's going to be forced to come to the table. If Hitler proves troublesome in this regard, Speer plotted an assassination attempt in February of 1945, coincidentally enough... As for air defenses, the PVO was pretty terrible in the East and the Germans were able to get the jump on them repeatedly. In the West, Steinbock lasted from January to May and Bodenplatte was able to achieve temporary success even in daylight operations.
Two points you keep ignoring. a) A nuclear programme is a lot larger and more centralised than something like the V programme and will attract a hell of a lot more attention.
b) No one is going to make peace with Hitler, or with any nuclear armed Nazi regime simply because it would almost certainly be fatal to them. The US may be an exception because they are pretty much immune to German attacks but that same reason means they don't have to make peace and they would much prefer a defeated and devastated Germany to a Europe dominated by, if not being overrun by a nuclear armed German militaristic empire. Not to mention in both east and west allied forces are already on German territory.
Operation Steinbock was in 1944 not 45. As for Bodenplatte to quote from Wiki
The Soviets will have greatly reduced amounts of heavy equipment reaching the front but still have massive stockpiles in their existing forces which haven't been hit. The Allies similarly will have logistical problems getting supplies to the front but at the very least should be able to hold against their heavily outnumbered opponents until the bombers do their work and when going through a broken Germany are unlikely to need a massive amount of munitions, fuel probably being a bigger factor delaying their advance.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Oct 22, 2019 14:49:46 GMT
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 22, 2019 19:01:29 GMT
Well that highlights some of the potential problems for the Nazis if they somehow managed to produce a nuclear bomb 1st. It would depend on when they developed it and what capacity they would have to deliver it but if the US was already in the war and especially it was say 43 or later your likely to see a massive reaction to a nuclear strike on London. If they can't deliver by air then suicide subs can do some nasty damage but again the allies can react with massed gas attacks and the Germans can't use such weapons against the Soviets to any degree.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 23, 2019 0:46:04 GMT
I have no doubt the bomber attacks will engender delays but, just like the V-2 program (The Anglo-Americans were bombing the hell out of the facilities used for that in 1942-1943), it will survive such with delays and is entirely the reason I extended the development period by a year. As it were with the German economy, in October of 1944 Speer estimated they were still good to go until early 1946 if bombings were halted, so the issue in that regard won't halt the development. Afterall, North Korea has managed it with no functional economy anyway. As for the strategic picture, no other logistical hubs exist. The Western Allied advance was entirely dependent on those two and what little was coming from Cherbourg and the invasion beaches was already limiting advances by August/September. Without those two ports, they just completely lack the ability to advance into Germany as SHAFE documents show; 6th Army under Devers was literally having to halt its on advance on the Rhine just to keep Patton supplied enough for combat around Metz which was seeing little, if any, movement by American forces there. Monty was only able to do Market Garden via depriving Patton of his supply line. In the East, Stalin was completely willing to make a deal and still had peace feelers extended until late in 1944. When presented with a situation like he will here, which is he completely lacks the ability to engage in modern warfare due to a dearth of critical things like airplanes (No engines), tanks, and artillery, he's going to be forced to come to the table. If Hitler proves troublesome in this regard, Speer plotted an assassination attempt in February of 1945, coincidentally enough... As for air defenses, the PVO was pretty terrible in the East and the Germans were able to get the jump on them repeatedly. In the West, Steinbock lasted from January to May and Bodenplatte was able to achieve temporary success even in daylight operations. Two points you keep ignoring. a) A nuclear programme is a lot larger and more centralised than something like the V programme and will attract a hell of a lot more attention. b) No one is going to make peace with Hitler, or with any nuclear armed Nazi regime simply because it would almost certainly be fatal to them. The US may be an exception because they are pretty much immune to German attacks but that same reason means they don't have to make peace and they would much prefer a defeated and devastated Germany to a Europe dominated by, if not being overrun by a nuclear armed German militaristic empire. Not to mention in both east and west allied forces are already on German territory.
Operation Steinbock was in 1944 not 45. As for Bodenplatte to quote from Wiki
The Soviets will have greatly reduced amounts of heavy equipment reaching the front but still have massive stockpiles in their existing forces which haven't been hit. The Allies similarly will have logistical problems getting supplies to the front but at the very least should be able to hold against their heavily outnumbered opponents until the bombers do their work and when going through a broken Germany are unlikely to need a massive amount of munitions, fuel probably being a bigger factor delaying their advance.
With regards to the scale of an Atomic program, it's important to note the U.S. had at least four major locations for the project and numerous satellites; you had facilities in Tennessee, New Mexico, Illinois and Washington, just to name the big ones. It was much the same for the V-weapons program and scale does not translate into threat. As the United States Strategic Bombing Survey stated in regards to just: Even IOTL, many of the German nuclear facilities were already underground and were unaffected by bombing; that's how the Allies overran them so intact and it's not because they knew the state of the Nazi program. It wasn't until November of 1944 that they, on the basis of captured intelligence, were able to discern how far behind the Germans were. Their only success was the attack on heavy water production in Norway, but that won't be an issue in a scenario where they (the Germans) know to use graphite as the moderator. As for the matter of peace, again, Stalin and the Russians were more than willing to make peace: Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War IIThe Spectre of a Separate Peace in the East: Russo-German 'Peace Feelers', 1942-44I don't foresee nuclear weapons changing this much, as it will be clear that further fighting risks the complete destruction of the USSR. The U.S. was able to muscle the Soviets out of Iran in 1946 with this same threat despite their conventional disadvantage. As far as any sort of strategic reserve, they didn't have one, particularly in the form of tanks; losses exceeded production every year except 1944 and they only scrapped by then by less than 100 tanks. Lend Lease only supplied 10% of their total, so it can't make up for it either. With the Russians out and their ability to advance non-existent, peace will follow in the West as well. If Hitler proves an obstacle, he'll get "replaced" at this point, if not by by Speer then by some Army official most likely. IIRC, the German commander at Berlin in 1945 almost shot him himself. As for Steinbock, that was indeed in 1944 and I wasn't arguing otherwise. My point with that particular operation was that the Germans were able to conduct a mass bomber offensive over the course of four months against the well established air defenses in England. Compared to that, individual bombing raids on targets in Western Europe is much easier and contains a vastly higher chance of success. With Bodenplatte, my point was much the same, in that even into 1945 the Germans retained the ability in the West to temporarily regain air control, just long enough to hit some targets with that window. In the East, there is no question of such, as even in 1945 they were able to gain air control for two weeks in February of 1945 and then effectively contested it for another month and did so again in March of 1945 against the Red Army in Hungary. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 23, 2019 15:25:04 GMT
With regards to the scale of an Atomic program, it's important to note the U.S. had at least four major locations for the project and numerous satellites; you had facilities in Tennessee, New Mexico, Illinois and Washington, just to name the big ones. It was much the same for the V-weapons program and scale does not translate into threat. As the United States Strategic Bombing Survey stated in regards to just: Even IOTL, many of the German nuclear facilities were already underground and were unaffected by bombing; that's how the Allies overran them so intact and it's not because they knew the state of the Nazi program. It wasn't until November of 1944 that they, on the basis of captured intelligence, were able to discern how far behind the Germans were. Their only success was the attack on heavy water production in Norway, but that won't be an issue in a scenario where they (the Germans) know to use graphite as the moderator.
Not quite clear of your point here? To get a full scale nuclear programme you would need a hell of a lot more facilities than what the Germans had OTL. That means its harder to hide and there's a lot more to hit. Can you imagine the impact of a large raid flattening the Germany atomic pile for instance? Yes a lot of the OTL much smaller German bomb projects, many of which didn't go beyond theoretical ideas may have been underground but that's going to be a lot of work for a huge nuclear programme. Plus if that happens and the Germans are able to construct such facilities without bombing interfering you still have the option of attacking power supplies and transport links to delay things. Once the Germans do have a successful test, which would be very difficult to hide, the allies might even start gas attacks then. Plus once its realised that the Germans have a bomb, especially a miniaturised one then He-117 facilities can also be targeted. Both production and airfields.
Its also likely that in such a scenario the allies don't waste so much effort on highly ineffective carpet bombing campaigns.
That was to make territorial gains and leave the Germans and the western allies still fighting. Also with a hell of a lot of fighting ahead to defeat Germany, for which the Soviets would pay by far the largest share of the resulting butcher's bill. Even if terms had been agreed, and the two sides were a bloody long way apart, and then the western powers later made a peace with the Nazis the latter would be in no real position to threaten Stalin's empire.
Here because of the nukes Germany poses an even greater threat than in 1941. However its also on the verge of collapse. If the Soviets and the western allies continue to fight they will win, especially with massive gas attacks by the western powers. If the Soviets make peace - presumably having to withdraw from occupied German territories and probably a lot else - there is the danger that the western powers might do likewise - albeit in reality this was unlikely. Then how long could Stalin trust Hitlers word before a new attack came, this time with more nukes and with Stalin having burnt his bridges with the western powers? Alternatively the western powers fight on and win. They then get all territory under German control as a result of Stalin's deal and their very pissed off with him.
The US was able to muscle the Soviets out of Iran because they had a nuclear monopoly, a massive industrial base and were far enough away that the Soviets had no opportunity to hurt them directly. For the Nazis they have a nuclear monopoly yes but the other two factors don't apply. Their on the verge of a crushing defeat.
They still have a considerably production capacity and with the farmlands of Ukraine and other areas 'liberated' there would be less need for food imports and other such supplies. Hence a higher proportion of the L-L might well go to armoured vehicles and the like. More to the point however are the massive forces in the field already in Jan 45. Their going to take some stopping even without Germany being devastated by the allied response.
The obstacle to peace isn't Hitler persay. Its that all of the allied leaders know they can't trust the Nazis AT ALL. Or for that matter much of the German military. They won't believe any German claims that if they get peace they will maintain it. Nor will the Germans most likely as they will fear that once one or more of their opponents get nuclear weapons they will attack Germany. [Especially the US which is the nearest to having such a capacity and is secure against German counter strikes.]
The point is that Steinbock didn't work either. Quick check from Wiki again:
In 45 their got less a/c and fewer bases, more distant than targets in Britain. If they try making large scale attacks on Britain, especially once the allies know that the Germans have nukes their going to meet a lot of opposition and while a bomber with a nuke might get through it might also get shot down and the Germans have relatively few bombs.
Yes if they gained surprise again they have a chance of devastating much of Antwerp - although once the allies know about a German nuke attention will be a lot higher and they might not get such a level of supply.
My argument is that the allies, all of them, will see it in their interest to finish the war quickly and have the capacity to do so. Since the Germans have used nukes on urban targets the gloves will be off immediately. As such even if so many things go just 'right' for the Germans so they get such a capacity for production of nuclear weapons small enough to be air delivered its only likely to make the last stage of the war in Europe much bloodier, albeit a bit shorter.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 25, 2019 18:52:12 GMT
With regards to the scale of an Atomic program, it's important to note the U.S. had at least four major locations for the project and numerous satellites; you had facilities in Tennessee, New Mexico, Illinois and Washington, just to name the big ones. It was much the same for the V-weapons program and scale does not translate into threat. As the United States Strategic Bombing Survey stated in regards to just: Even IOTL, many of the German nuclear facilities were already underground and were unaffected by bombing; that's how the Allies overran them so intact and it's not because they knew the state of the Nazi program. It wasn't until November of 1944 that they, on the basis of captured intelligence, were able to discern how far behind the Germans were. Their only success was the attack on heavy water production in Norway, but that won't be an issue in a scenario where they (the Germans) know to use graphite as the moderator.
Not quite clear of your point here? To get a full scale nuclear programme you would need a hell of a lot more facilities than what the Germans had OTL. That means its harder to hide and there's a lot more to hit. Can you imagine the impact of a large raid flattening the Germany atomic pile for instance? Yes a lot of the OTL much smaller German bomb projects, many of which didn't go beyond theoretical ideas may have been underground but that's going to be a lot of work for a huge nuclear programme. Plus if that happens and the Germans are able to construct such facilities without bombing interfering you still have the option of attacking power supplies and transport links to delay things. Once the Germans do have a successful test, which would be very difficult to hide, the allies might even start gas attacks then. Plus once its realised that the Germans have a bomb, especially a miniaturised one then He-117 facilities can also be targeted. Both production and airfields.
Its also likely that in such a scenario the allies don't waste so much effort on highly ineffective carpet bombing campaigns.
That was to make territorial gains and leave the Germans and the western allies still fighting. Also with a hell of a lot of fighting ahead to defeat Germany, for which the Soviets would pay by far the largest share of the resulting butcher's bill. Even if terms had been agreed, and the two sides were a bloody long way apart, and then the western powers later made a peace with the Nazis the latter would be in no real position to threaten Stalin's empire.
Here because of the nukes Germany poses an even greater threat than in 1941. However its also on the verge of collapse. If the Soviets and the western allies continue to fight they will win, especially with massive gas attacks by the western powers. If the Soviets make peace - presumably having to withdraw from occupied German territories and probably a lot else - there is the danger that the western powers might do likewise - albeit in reality this was unlikely. Then how long could Stalin trust Hitlers word before a new attack came, this time with more nukes and with Stalin having burnt his bridges with the western powers? Alternatively the western powers fight on and win. They then get all territory under German control as a result of Stalin's deal and their very pissed off with him.
The US was able to muscle the Soviets out of Iran because they had a nuclear monopoly, a massive industrial base and were far enough away that the Soviets had no opportunity to hurt them directly. For the Nazis they have a nuclear monopoly yes but the other two factors don't apply. Their on the verge of a crushing defeat.
They still have a considerably production capacity and with the farmlands of Ukraine and other areas 'liberated' there would be less need for food imports and other such supplies. Hence a higher proportion of the L-L might well go to armoured vehicles and the like. More to the point however are the massive forces in the field already in Jan 45. Their going to take some stopping even without Germany being devastated by the allied response.
The obstacle to peace isn't Hitler persay. Its that all of the allied leaders know they can't trust the Nazis AT ALL. Or for that matter much of the German military. They won't believe any German claims that if they get peace they will maintain it. Nor will the Germans most likely as they will fear that once one or more of their opponents get nuclear weapons they will attack Germany. [Especially the US which is the nearest to having such a capacity and is secure against German counter strikes.]
The point is that Steinbock didn't work either. Quick check from Wiki again:
In 45 their got less a/c and fewer bases, more distant than targets in Britain. If they try making large scale attacks on Britain, especially once the allies know that the Germans have nukes their going to meet a lot of opposition and while a bomber with a nuke might get through it might also get shot down and the Germans have relatively few bombs.
Yes if they gained surprise again they have a chance of devastating much of Antwerp - although once the allies know about a German nuke attention will be a lot higher and they might not get such a level of supply.
My argument is that the allies, all of them, will see it in their interest to finish the war quickly and have the capacity to do so. Since the Germans have used nukes on urban targets the gloves will be off immediately. As such even if so many things go just 'right' for the Germans so they get such a capacity for production of nuclear weapons small enough to be air delivered its only likely to make the last stage of the war in Europe much bloodier, albeit a bit shorter.
The Allies targeted the V weapons program, which was massive, and completely failed to inflict any meaningful destruction upon it. This is an illustrative example of what one could expect from them attacking the German atomic project, which was already mostly underground anyway IOTL and would be doubly so here. Attacking airfields and what not also isn't going to prevent it, as the Luftwaffe even IOTL was able to conduct mass operations into March of 1945 despite existing efforts by the RAF Bomber Command and the USAAF's 8th Air Force as well as tactical units based out of Western Europe. The He-177s were already on hand and actually were originally slated for Eisenhammer in late 1943/early 1944 when Hitler decided upon Steinbock; here, they just remain on reserve, or at least a good portion of them with trained crews. Speaking of Steinbock, the operation showed that even against densely packed AA defenses contained with the UK, the Luftwaffe could and still did operate successfully, as demonstrated by the fact they were able to maintain it for four months before losses compelled its end. Even for the Germans, however, is that the operational constraints that led to the failure of it won't exist here; you've got the limited objective of bombing a city once instead of attempting terror bombings with no set end goal. Even better, atomics don't require follow up raids. |
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