Post by lordroel on Oct 16, 2019 2:58:11 GMT
Day 11 of Yom Kippur War, October 16th 1973
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat asks the Soviet Union to convene the United Nations and seek a cease-fire, he also proclaims that Egypt will continue to fight until it regains all territories lost by the Arabs in 1967 and "Palestinian rights are restored".
Shayetet 13 commandos infiltrated Port Said in two Hazir mini-submarines to strike Egyptian naval targets. During the raid, the commandos sank a torpedo boat, a coast guard boat, a tank landing craft, and a missile boat.
YouTube (Israelis take prisoners at Sinai)
Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing
The Egyptians meanwhile failed to grasp the extent and magnitude of the Israeli crossing, nor did they appreciate its intent and purpose. This was partly due to attempts by Egyptian field commanders to obfuscate reports concerning the Israeli crossing and partly due to a false assumption that the canal crossing was merely a diversion for a major IDF offensive targeting the right flank of the Second Army. Consequently, General Shazly ordered the 21st Armored Division to attack southward and the T-62-equipped 25th Independent Armored Brigade to attack northward in a pincer action to eliminate the perceived threat to the Second Army.
The Egyptians failed to scout the area and were unaware that by now, Adan's 162nd Armored Division was in the vicinity. Moreover, the 21st and 25th failed to coordinate their attacks, allowing General Adan's Division to meet each force individually. Adan first concentrated his attack on the 21st Armored Division, destroying 50–60 Egyptian tanks and forcing the remainder to retreat. He then turned southward and ambushed the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, destroying 86 of its 96 tanks and all of its APCs while losing three tanks.
Egyptian artillery shelled the Israeli bridge over the canal on the morning of October 17, scoring several hits. The Egyptian Air Force launched repeated raids, some with up to twenty aircraft, to take out the bridge and rafts, damaging the bridge. The Egyptians had to shut down their SAM sites during these raids, allowing Israeli fighters to intercept the Egyptians. The Egyptians lost 16 planes and 7 helicopters, while the Israelis lost 6 planes.
The bridge was damaged, and the Israeli Paratroop Headquarters, which was near the bridge, was also hit, wounding the commander and his deputy. During the night, the bridge was repaired, but only a trickle of Israeli forces crossed. According to Chaim Herzog, the Egyptians continued attacking the bridgehead until the cease-fire, using artillery and mortars to fire tens of thousands of shells into the area of the crossing. Egyptian aircraft attempted to bomb the bridge every day, and helicopters launched suicide missions, making attempts to drop barrels of napalm on the bridge and bridgehead. The bridges were damaged multiple times, and had to be repaired at night. The attacks caused heavy casualties, and many tanks were sunk when their rafts were hit. Egyptian commandos and frogmen with armored support launched a ground attack against the bridgehead, which was repulsed with the loss of 10 tanks. Two subsequent Egyptian counterattacks were also beaten back.
Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Part 2 of the Battle of the Chinese Farm
By 4:00 AM Reshef's brigade, which had begun the operation with 97 tanks, had lost 56 in just twelve hours of fighting, leaving only 41 remaining. Although seizing the crossing site had been accomplished easily, stiff resistance had prevented Reshef from achieving his remaining objectives, namely opening the routes to the canal and securing a corridor. Reshef's force would further drop to just 27 tanks by noon. As a whole, Sharon's division suffered some 300 killed and 1,000 wounded that night. To help Reshef secure the corridor, Sharon supplied him with two tank battalions by 6:00 PM, propping his numbers up to 81 tanks.
Hearing reports of the heavy fighting taking place between the junction and the Chinese Farm, Dayan suggested withdrawing Matt's brigade and canceling the operation. He voiced concerns that the paratroopers were threatened with annihilation and noted that all attempts to open a corridor for the bridges had failed. Gonen rejected the suggestion, stating that, "If we knew in advance this was going to happen we would not have started the crossing operation, but now that we have crossed then let us follow through to the bitter end." Bar-Lev concurred with Gonen, and Dayan decided not to press his suggestion. At around 6:00 AM, Golda Meir telephoned Dayan to inquire about the situation. Dayan informed her that the bridges had not yet been laid and that the Egyptians had closed the routes leading to Deveroir. He also stated there were high hopes that Egyptian resistance would be overcome and that the bridges would be laid during the morning. Dayan also told her that Matt's paratrooper brigade had crossed to the west bank without encountering resistance and that Southern Command, as yet, had no intentions of withdrawing the brigade, even if the bridge-laying was delayed.
Shortly after dawn, Reshef conducted a reconnaissance of the battlefield from a hilltop. He saw that the Egyptians had set up a strong blocking position defending the junction, composed of Egyptian tanks situated in hull-down positions and infantrymen in foxholes and the now-dry irrigation ditches of the Chinese Farm. The infantry were from the 16th Brigade's right-flank battalion and had the support of recoilless rifles, RPG-7s, and some manually guided AT-3 Sagger missiles. Reshef discovered that the Egyptians had mined both sides of Lexicon Road, to which he had lost several of his tanks.
Reshef decided to change tactics. He personally commanded the 40th Armored Battalions, after reinforcing it with tanks salvaged and repaired from the previous night's fighting, and maneuvered to attack from the west – from the direction of the canal – hitting Egyptian positions in the flank, while a tank company and an infantry company attacked from south to north. Reshef's forces engaged the Egyptians from long range, picking off defensive positions from afar, while using alternate fire and movement to advance to the crossroads. The defending infantry battalion, exhausted by continuous fighting and suffering from a severe lack of ammunition, soon withdrew allowing the Israelis to at last seize the junction.
In the meantime, other difficulties were surfacing. Sharon reported to Southern Command that one section of the roller bridge, being towed by Erez's brigade, had been damaged and that the engineers needed a few hours to repair it. He also requested additional forces to help secure the corridor, noting the stiff resistance facing Reshef's brigade. Sharon's report prompted Bar-Lev to alert Adan to prepare to open the corridor with his division. Sharon argued for Adan's division to cross the canal on rafts and to proceed with Operation Abiray-Lev without waiting for the bridges. Both Gonen and Bar-Lev rejected Sharon's suggestion since, without a secure corridor to the canal, Israeli forces on the west bank would be threatened with encirclement. Subsequently, Bar-Lev ordered that no more Israeli forces or equipment would cross to the west bank until the bridges had been laid.
After receiving reinforcements, Reshef focused on clearing the Tirtur Road. He left a battalion of around 30 tanks between the junction and the western part of the Chinese Farm, and prepared to attack with two armored battalions provided by Sharon. He concentrated on the section of the Tirtur Road defended by an Egyptian battalion forming the left flank of the 16th Infantry Brigade. One of Reshef's battalions attacked from the north-east, the other from the west. The Egyptian battalion managed to halt the advance, aided by fire from tanks and anti-tank weapons on the slopes of Missouri, a hill north-west of the Chinese Farm, causing Reshef to break off his attack.
This last attempt left Reshef's brigade in a desperate situation. He had 27 tanks remaining and was running short on ammunition and supplies. Reshef requested authorization from Sharon to withdraw his brigade to Fort Lakekan to regroup his forces and regain combat effectiveness.
Photo: Israeli armor knocked out near the Lexicon-Tirtur Junction.
Israeli reinforcement
The unexpected Egyptian resistance forced Israeli Southern Command to change its plans. Visiting Adan's advance command post, Gonen noted that "Sharon has disappointed us" and handed Adan the task of moving the pontoon bridge to the canal. Adan was to prepare to clear the Akavish and Tirtur Roads to deploy the bridges. Gonen informed Sharon of Adan's new orders and tasked Sharon with capturing the Chinese Farm and Egyptian positions near the farm and the canal. Needing to regroup his forces, Sharon suggested that he capture the farm once Adan had cleared the routes to the canal, and Gonen consented. In a later meeting with Dayan and Bar-Lev, Gonen reiterated the latter's statement that no more forces would cross until the bridges had been laid, and added that, should the situation worsen, the paratroopers could be withdrawn.
The 162nd Division, concentrated south of Tasa, had been standing by to cross the canal since dawn on October 16th. The division advanced towards the canal, but movement was hampered by the massive traffic jams on the roads leading to the canal. When Adan realized that Akavish was closed, he ordered a tank battalion to make a turning maneuver through the desert to reach Deversoir. When it arrived, Sharon contacted Adan, explaining Reshef's difficult situation, and requested that the battalion be placed under his command. Adan accepted, and Sharon in turn authorized Reshef's request to pull back and regroup, replacing his brigade with the tank battalion.
After receiving his new orders, Adan moved his division to occupy a series of positions opposite 'Abd el-Hamid's 16th Brigade. One of Adan's armored brigades had been placed as a reserve force under Southern Command. 'Abd el-Hamid's left-flank infantry battalion, blocking Tirtur, repelled Israeli tanks attacking westwards and thwarted Adan's efforts to clear the road. Adan realized that, without infantry support, breaking through the Egyptian positions would prove costly. However, at 2:00 PM, Southern Command notified Adan that he was soon receive the 35th Paratrooper Brigade, which had been transported by helicopters from Ras Sudar on the Gulf of Suez to Refidem 80 kilometers east of the canal. The brigade made its way to the canal in buses and was greatly delayed by the traffic on Akavish road. Adan had expected the unit to arrive well before dusk, but the brigade commander, Colonel Uzi Ya'iri, only arrived at 10:00 PM. The rest of his brigade soon arrived, transported by helicopters after the buses had come to a complete standstill.
Paratrooper effort
Adan met Ya'iri at Adan's former command post. Adan briefly explained the situation and, in a short discussion, Ya'iri laid out his plan. He was tasked with clearing Akavish and Tirtur. At 11:30 PM, the paratroopers began moving, with a battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Yitzhak Mordechai spearheading the advance. Ya'iri, acting with a sense of urgency, had decided to go into action without awaiting sufficient intelligence, or performing adequate reconnaissance on Egyptian defenses. His unit lacked artillery observers and, rather than wait for one to arrive, it was agreed the paratroopers would request fire support of the 162nd Division's command net. The brigade was acting without armor support.
After some time, Mordechai's battalion had reached an area where Tirtur and Akavish were closest, the distance between them no wider than 2 kilometers. At around 2:45 AM, they came into contact with Abd el-Hamid's left-flank battalion, positioned around Tirtur. The battalion directed effective artillery fire against the paratroopers, who were also receiving heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire from entrenched Egyptian infantry. The paratroopers attempted to assault the machine-gun positions, in places advancing to within a few meters of Egyptian lines. The paratrooper companies spread out, but repeatedly failed to reach the defenses. Israeli artillery fire was ineffective. Egyptian infantry were able to suppress the paratroopers' movement and thwart flanking attempts. Most company and platoon commanders were killed or wounded. Adan ordered Ya'iri to narrow his brigade's front and focus on clearing Akavish instead, but the lead paratrooper battalion was under such heavy fire that it was impossible to maneuver.
With dawn nearing, Adan realized that if the pontoon bridge could not be brought to the canal during the few remaining hours of dark, an entire day would pass without a bridge being laid across the canal, and in daylight, the paratroopers would sustain more casualties. He sent a half-track company to reconnoiter Akavish at 3:00. Half an hour later, the company reported it had reached the crossing site without encountering any resistance. The Egyptian battalion fighting the paratroopers had focused all their attention on the Israelis at Tirtur, ignoring activity on Akavish. Adan took a risky decision, sending the irreplaceable pontoons down Akavish to the canal. IDF bulldozers cleared the road of wreckage and debris, and the Israelis reached Fort Lakekan before turning northwards, finally reaching the crossing site. Bridge construction was started immediately by military engineers of the 143rd Division.
At dawn, Ya'iri requested approval from Adan to withdraw his brigade, the paratroopers having thus far been unsuccessful in reaching Egyptian lines. Gonen denied the request, approving only medevac for the wounded. This was countermanded after Bar-Lev visited Adan at his command post and realized the gravity of the paratroopers' situation. An armored battalion was tasked with covering the paratroopers, but was unable to locate them. The paratroopers released red smoke to pinpoint their position, but this backfired as the Egyptians also spotted the smoke, directing accurate artillery fire against them and inflicting further casualties. The tanks assaulted the defenses, but suffered losses and fell back. It became evident that withdrawal could not be accomplished in the open; APCs and half-tracks were brought up to extract the paratroopers and the wounded—all the while under fire. The Israelis finally withdrew under cover of friendly tanks. In 14 hours of almost uninterrupted combat, the paratroopers suffered heavy casualties, with some 40–70 killed and 100 wounded. Ya'iri would state that "We had suffered seventy casualties because we went into action too hastily, without proper intelligence on the enemy's defenses." Armored losses sustained during the withdrawal were also heavy.
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat asks the Soviet Union to convene the United Nations and seek a cease-fire, he also proclaims that Egypt will continue to fight until it regains all territories lost by the Arabs in 1967 and "Palestinian rights are restored".
Shayetet 13 commandos infiltrated Port Said in two Hazir mini-submarines to strike Egyptian naval targets. During the raid, the commandos sank a torpedo boat, a coast guard boat, a tank landing craft, and a missile boat.
YouTube (Israelis take prisoners at Sinai)
Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing
The Egyptians meanwhile failed to grasp the extent and magnitude of the Israeli crossing, nor did they appreciate its intent and purpose. This was partly due to attempts by Egyptian field commanders to obfuscate reports concerning the Israeli crossing and partly due to a false assumption that the canal crossing was merely a diversion for a major IDF offensive targeting the right flank of the Second Army. Consequently, General Shazly ordered the 21st Armored Division to attack southward and the T-62-equipped 25th Independent Armored Brigade to attack northward in a pincer action to eliminate the perceived threat to the Second Army.
The Egyptians failed to scout the area and were unaware that by now, Adan's 162nd Armored Division was in the vicinity. Moreover, the 21st and 25th failed to coordinate their attacks, allowing General Adan's Division to meet each force individually. Adan first concentrated his attack on the 21st Armored Division, destroying 50–60 Egyptian tanks and forcing the remainder to retreat. He then turned southward and ambushed the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, destroying 86 of its 96 tanks and all of its APCs while losing three tanks.
Egyptian artillery shelled the Israeli bridge over the canal on the morning of October 17, scoring several hits. The Egyptian Air Force launched repeated raids, some with up to twenty aircraft, to take out the bridge and rafts, damaging the bridge. The Egyptians had to shut down their SAM sites during these raids, allowing Israeli fighters to intercept the Egyptians. The Egyptians lost 16 planes and 7 helicopters, while the Israelis lost 6 planes.
The bridge was damaged, and the Israeli Paratroop Headquarters, which was near the bridge, was also hit, wounding the commander and his deputy. During the night, the bridge was repaired, but only a trickle of Israeli forces crossed. According to Chaim Herzog, the Egyptians continued attacking the bridgehead until the cease-fire, using artillery and mortars to fire tens of thousands of shells into the area of the crossing. Egyptian aircraft attempted to bomb the bridge every day, and helicopters launched suicide missions, making attempts to drop barrels of napalm on the bridge and bridgehead. The bridges were damaged multiple times, and had to be repaired at night. The attacks caused heavy casualties, and many tanks were sunk when their rafts were hit. Egyptian commandos and frogmen with armored support launched a ground attack against the bridgehead, which was repulsed with the loss of 10 tanks. Two subsequent Egyptian counterattacks were also beaten back.
Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Part 2 of the Battle of the Chinese Farm
By 4:00 AM Reshef's brigade, which had begun the operation with 97 tanks, had lost 56 in just twelve hours of fighting, leaving only 41 remaining. Although seizing the crossing site had been accomplished easily, stiff resistance had prevented Reshef from achieving his remaining objectives, namely opening the routes to the canal and securing a corridor. Reshef's force would further drop to just 27 tanks by noon. As a whole, Sharon's division suffered some 300 killed and 1,000 wounded that night. To help Reshef secure the corridor, Sharon supplied him with two tank battalions by 6:00 PM, propping his numbers up to 81 tanks.
Hearing reports of the heavy fighting taking place between the junction and the Chinese Farm, Dayan suggested withdrawing Matt's brigade and canceling the operation. He voiced concerns that the paratroopers were threatened with annihilation and noted that all attempts to open a corridor for the bridges had failed. Gonen rejected the suggestion, stating that, "If we knew in advance this was going to happen we would not have started the crossing operation, but now that we have crossed then let us follow through to the bitter end." Bar-Lev concurred with Gonen, and Dayan decided not to press his suggestion. At around 6:00 AM, Golda Meir telephoned Dayan to inquire about the situation. Dayan informed her that the bridges had not yet been laid and that the Egyptians had closed the routes leading to Deveroir. He also stated there were high hopes that Egyptian resistance would be overcome and that the bridges would be laid during the morning. Dayan also told her that Matt's paratrooper brigade had crossed to the west bank without encountering resistance and that Southern Command, as yet, had no intentions of withdrawing the brigade, even if the bridge-laying was delayed.
Shortly after dawn, Reshef conducted a reconnaissance of the battlefield from a hilltop. He saw that the Egyptians had set up a strong blocking position defending the junction, composed of Egyptian tanks situated in hull-down positions and infantrymen in foxholes and the now-dry irrigation ditches of the Chinese Farm. The infantry were from the 16th Brigade's right-flank battalion and had the support of recoilless rifles, RPG-7s, and some manually guided AT-3 Sagger missiles. Reshef discovered that the Egyptians had mined both sides of Lexicon Road, to which he had lost several of his tanks.
Reshef decided to change tactics. He personally commanded the 40th Armored Battalions, after reinforcing it with tanks salvaged and repaired from the previous night's fighting, and maneuvered to attack from the west – from the direction of the canal – hitting Egyptian positions in the flank, while a tank company and an infantry company attacked from south to north. Reshef's forces engaged the Egyptians from long range, picking off defensive positions from afar, while using alternate fire and movement to advance to the crossroads. The defending infantry battalion, exhausted by continuous fighting and suffering from a severe lack of ammunition, soon withdrew allowing the Israelis to at last seize the junction.
In the meantime, other difficulties were surfacing. Sharon reported to Southern Command that one section of the roller bridge, being towed by Erez's brigade, had been damaged and that the engineers needed a few hours to repair it. He also requested additional forces to help secure the corridor, noting the stiff resistance facing Reshef's brigade. Sharon's report prompted Bar-Lev to alert Adan to prepare to open the corridor with his division. Sharon argued for Adan's division to cross the canal on rafts and to proceed with Operation Abiray-Lev without waiting for the bridges. Both Gonen and Bar-Lev rejected Sharon's suggestion since, without a secure corridor to the canal, Israeli forces on the west bank would be threatened with encirclement. Subsequently, Bar-Lev ordered that no more Israeli forces or equipment would cross to the west bank until the bridges had been laid.
After receiving reinforcements, Reshef focused on clearing the Tirtur Road. He left a battalion of around 30 tanks between the junction and the western part of the Chinese Farm, and prepared to attack with two armored battalions provided by Sharon. He concentrated on the section of the Tirtur Road defended by an Egyptian battalion forming the left flank of the 16th Infantry Brigade. One of Reshef's battalions attacked from the north-east, the other from the west. The Egyptian battalion managed to halt the advance, aided by fire from tanks and anti-tank weapons on the slopes of Missouri, a hill north-west of the Chinese Farm, causing Reshef to break off his attack.
This last attempt left Reshef's brigade in a desperate situation. He had 27 tanks remaining and was running short on ammunition and supplies. Reshef requested authorization from Sharon to withdraw his brigade to Fort Lakekan to regroup his forces and regain combat effectiveness.
Photo: Israeli armor knocked out near the Lexicon-Tirtur Junction.
Israeli reinforcement
The unexpected Egyptian resistance forced Israeli Southern Command to change its plans. Visiting Adan's advance command post, Gonen noted that "Sharon has disappointed us" and handed Adan the task of moving the pontoon bridge to the canal. Adan was to prepare to clear the Akavish and Tirtur Roads to deploy the bridges. Gonen informed Sharon of Adan's new orders and tasked Sharon with capturing the Chinese Farm and Egyptian positions near the farm and the canal. Needing to regroup his forces, Sharon suggested that he capture the farm once Adan had cleared the routes to the canal, and Gonen consented. In a later meeting with Dayan and Bar-Lev, Gonen reiterated the latter's statement that no more forces would cross until the bridges had been laid, and added that, should the situation worsen, the paratroopers could be withdrawn.
The 162nd Division, concentrated south of Tasa, had been standing by to cross the canal since dawn on October 16th. The division advanced towards the canal, but movement was hampered by the massive traffic jams on the roads leading to the canal. When Adan realized that Akavish was closed, he ordered a tank battalion to make a turning maneuver through the desert to reach Deversoir. When it arrived, Sharon contacted Adan, explaining Reshef's difficult situation, and requested that the battalion be placed under his command. Adan accepted, and Sharon in turn authorized Reshef's request to pull back and regroup, replacing his brigade with the tank battalion.
After receiving his new orders, Adan moved his division to occupy a series of positions opposite 'Abd el-Hamid's 16th Brigade. One of Adan's armored brigades had been placed as a reserve force under Southern Command. 'Abd el-Hamid's left-flank infantry battalion, blocking Tirtur, repelled Israeli tanks attacking westwards and thwarted Adan's efforts to clear the road. Adan realized that, without infantry support, breaking through the Egyptian positions would prove costly. However, at 2:00 PM, Southern Command notified Adan that he was soon receive the 35th Paratrooper Brigade, which had been transported by helicopters from Ras Sudar on the Gulf of Suez to Refidem 80 kilometers east of the canal. The brigade made its way to the canal in buses and was greatly delayed by the traffic on Akavish road. Adan had expected the unit to arrive well before dusk, but the brigade commander, Colonel Uzi Ya'iri, only arrived at 10:00 PM. The rest of his brigade soon arrived, transported by helicopters after the buses had come to a complete standstill.
Paratrooper effort
Adan met Ya'iri at Adan's former command post. Adan briefly explained the situation and, in a short discussion, Ya'iri laid out his plan. He was tasked with clearing Akavish and Tirtur. At 11:30 PM, the paratroopers began moving, with a battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Yitzhak Mordechai spearheading the advance. Ya'iri, acting with a sense of urgency, had decided to go into action without awaiting sufficient intelligence, or performing adequate reconnaissance on Egyptian defenses. His unit lacked artillery observers and, rather than wait for one to arrive, it was agreed the paratroopers would request fire support of the 162nd Division's command net. The brigade was acting without armor support.
After some time, Mordechai's battalion had reached an area where Tirtur and Akavish were closest, the distance between them no wider than 2 kilometers. At around 2:45 AM, they came into contact with Abd el-Hamid's left-flank battalion, positioned around Tirtur. The battalion directed effective artillery fire against the paratroopers, who were also receiving heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire from entrenched Egyptian infantry. The paratroopers attempted to assault the machine-gun positions, in places advancing to within a few meters of Egyptian lines. The paratrooper companies spread out, but repeatedly failed to reach the defenses. Israeli artillery fire was ineffective. Egyptian infantry were able to suppress the paratroopers' movement and thwart flanking attempts. Most company and platoon commanders were killed or wounded. Adan ordered Ya'iri to narrow his brigade's front and focus on clearing Akavish instead, but the lead paratrooper battalion was under such heavy fire that it was impossible to maneuver.
With dawn nearing, Adan realized that if the pontoon bridge could not be brought to the canal during the few remaining hours of dark, an entire day would pass without a bridge being laid across the canal, and in daylight, the paratroopers would sustain more casualties. He sent a half-track company to reconnoiter Akavish at 3:00. Half an hour later, the company reported it had reached the crossing site without encountering any resistance. The Egyptian battalion fighting the paratroopers had focused all their attention on the Israelis at Tirtur, ignoring activity on Akavish. Adan took a risky decision, sending the irreplaceable pontoons down Akavish to the canal. IDF bulldozers cleared the road of wreckage and debris, and the Israelis reached Fort Lakekan before turning northwards, finally reaching the crossing site. Bridge construction was started immediately by military engineers of the 143rd Division.
At dawn, Ya'iri requested approval from Adan to withdraw his brigade, the paratroopers having thus far been unsuccessful in reaching Egyptian lines. Gonen denied the request, approving only medevac for the wounded. This was countermanded after Bar-Lev visited Adan at his command post and realized the gravity of the paratroopers' situation. An armored battalion was tasked with covering the paratroopers, but was unable to locate them. The paratroopers released red smoke to pinpoint their position, but this backfired as the Egyptians also spotted the smoke, directing accurate artillery fire against them and inflicting further casualties. The tanks assaulted the defenses, but suffered losses and fell back. It became evident that withdrawal could not be accomplished in the open; APCs and half-tracks were brought up to extract the paratroopers and the wounded—all the while under fire. The Israelis finally withdrew under cover of friendly tanks. In 14 hours of almost uninterrupted combat, the paratroopers suffered heavy casualties, with some 40–70 killed and 100 wounded. Ya'iri would state that "We had suffered seventy casualties because we went into action too hastily, without proper intelligence on the enemy's defenses." Armored losses sustained during the withdrawal were also heavy.
