stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 27, 2019 15:54:48 GMT
They won't get a chance to attack if AGC instead of regrouping and sending part of its forces south continues plowing straight on. Of course one additional factor here is that more Soviet forces are escaping pockets as the German moblised forces aren't waiting for food infantry to catch up. Unless the mobile forces are split up with some pushing on while others seek to hold the isolated Soviet forces? Also note I was talking about the troops lost in Soviet counter attacks while AGC paused. By definition they are existing forces not the new army raised around Leningrad. Here those forces are going to be forced onto the defensive so are likely to do more damage to the attacking Germans.
As far as I'm aware the defences around Moscow were largely constructed by moblising the civilian population. The additional armies in October will make it easier to hold them but their still going to largely be constructed. The Germans might be able to capture more of them before the defence stiffens but as I pointed out the main problem for the Germans is taking Moscow itself, even when you get through the defences in front of it. Unless the Germans, already greatly down on numbers and logistical support can successfully encircle the urban area and then hold that encirclement against the inevitable counter attacks their going to have to rely on frontal assaults, which are going to be very costly and largely reduce their qualitative edge.
I was thinking its was September when the mud hit but it was actually early October, with early November when the early frosts helped restore movement briefly. As such its likely to see the mud hit and largely paralysis movement as the Germans, at the limit of their logistics close in on the actual defenses around Moscow itself. They will still take the earlier existing defensive lines centred around Vyazma and Mozhaisk but now find themselves largely immobile and out of supply facing the main defences as their boosted by new units. They might get moving again in November when the first frosts come but its doubtful they can storm the entire city within a couple of weeks before the extreme weather really cripples their remaining forces.
Is this using the Soviet tracks or those converted to standard gauge? I know the German army had taken Smolensk but didn't clear the Soviet armies from the vicinity of the region until the start of August. However does sound unlikely that they have converted the tracks all the way by then. In which case their relying on captured Soviet locomotives and wagons. 24 trains a day isn't a massive lot when your considering an entire army group and it depends on how large the trains actually are and how well their organised and loaded.
One advantage of pushing forward earlier is that the logistical system is in better condition having seen less wear and tear. The down side of course is that it has to do more faster which will increase that same attrition. Especially on the horses and trucks that are seeking to keep in touch with the forces pushing on.
Actually, since we're assuming that more German forces are involved in the invasion, with AGS being significantly stronger, that is a larger logistical demand. You won't have the diversion south of 2nd Pz Group but it will still have to be supported as it drives towards Moscow. Likely to be some savings as their going a shorter route rather than stuff being sent to Smolensk by trains, then transferred to wagons for a longer trip southwards but their still going to need to support the panzers while others will be needed to support the additional forces in the south.
As you say Stalin did find out about it. Plus does this speed of German advance rely on the diversion of forces from AGC northerwards, which presumably wouldn't occur if AGC is dashing for Moscow? Even if it does Leningrad might still get Zhukov, as he was OTL sent when Moscow was still under threat, or some other general with orders to hold and fight. Leningrad possibly might fall, although more likely during the winter/early spring but that while a blow to the USSR wouldn't be as important as the near crippling and possible virtual destruction of AGC.
Yes an Italian fascist state is more powerful than colonial Algeria and Egypt but what about a generation or two later? Egypt did make peace with Israel and might do so earlier in TTL. Similarly having a border with a colonial state, especially if its been involved in mass deportations of the local population is likely to concentrate minds in both Egypt and Algeria. The latter has had disputes with Morocco especially but their never really been on the verge of conflict. In TTL Algeria, looking eastwards instead might come to terms rather than support the SADR in this case.
A lot of the oil is fairly deep in the desert. Assuming its all still discovered at the same level, which might not be the case with Italy as a pariah fascist state attacks on both drilling fields and pipelines, either by guerilla activity or regular forces in a more substantial conflict could make extracting that oil a somewhat erratic process. Its also an additional reason, economic as well as religious and strategic for the neighbouring Arab states to be hostile to an Italian presence. Especially if a politically isolated Italy has other distraction. As I said, I see absolutely no reason to assume the Soviets don't continue with their counter-attacks, which can be screened by 2nd Army allowing for the rest of AGC to proceed quickly on Moscow. The largest tank battle in history-the Battle of Brody-was initiated by the Soviets in June, for example, despite the devastating ongoing German offensive. STAVKA continued to conduct them at Leningrad, Kiev, and, as previously stated, along the Moscow approaches even during Typhoon IOTL. Even assuming they do switch to the defensive, that's just asking for the Germans to utterly crush them as they demonstrated during October IOTL where they took fewer casualties but inflicted greater losses upon the Soviets as compared to Kiev. This makes a fair amount of military sense, given the superiority of the Germans in the air and in armored combat, as going on the defensive concedes the initiative to the Germans. Speaking of the defenses, the whole "civilians made the city a fort" thing only occurred in Moscow itself, with the defensive belts around the city being done by the Red Army. As for the fortifications within Moscow itself, when Stalin nearly abandoned the city in October, the only forces on hand were NKVD internal troops and they had been ordered to demolish said fortifications along with government buildings. Basically, they present no issue at all and once the Germans overrun the RKKA outside the city, they'll take it on the march. Logistically, the situation is good. As stated, by August the Smolensk railway was capable of 24 trains per day and this rate was increasing into September; whether or not it is was converted track is irrelevant to the capacity flowing on it successfully. For reference, the RB typically had 450-800 tons per train so taking the middle at 600 tons per 24 trains in August results in 14,400 tons. A typical German infantry division used about 400 tons a day in heavy combat, so the August total alone is enough to support 36 infantry divisions. With that increasing into September and the 3000 ton lift capacity of the integral trucks, AGC has the ability to do this. Now add in that it only took them two weeks to come within a hair of Moscow, and here they have over a month before the muds set in, and you realize they're going to be sitting in Red Square pretty easily. With regards to Leningrad, Stalin sent Zhukov to relieve Voroshilov, and not doing so leaves Leningrad without a senior commander. Basically, Stalin can either have his best commander defending Moscow, or he can defend Leningrad. He can't do both. Finally, with regards to Italy yes, now several generations later Italy remains far more powerful than both Egypt and Algeria combined both industrially and militarily and that's without a militaristic government in power that would be committed to defending a majority Italian-Libya. There is absolutely no reason for Italy to abandon a Libya that is rich in oil and majority Italian and to do so would be political suicide because that would be abandoning their people. 90% of the oil is in the Sirte basin, relatively close to Benghazi and thus easily defended; very people live there IOTL beyond Oil workers, whom we can expect to be overwhelmingly Italian ATL. Egypt took until the 1980s to make peace with Israel and it resulted in Sadat's murder. Algeria has literally fought multiple border conflicts with Morocco meanwhile and even to this day both sides are in a standoff conducting expensive modernization of their forces to combat the other. In that context, I really fail to see the rationale for Egypt and Algeria to combat Italy given they have actual threats to their sovereignty in other enemies, including one that most Arab nations remain officially at war with to this day. Seriously, why would they have any issues with Italy? Egypt didn't try to dislodge other colonialist regimes around it IOTL, nor did Algeria.
So the Germans can get about ~14.5 tons of supplies to Smolensk and some 3k can be carried on further east, at least until the mud hits and the increasing attrition of the trucks bite in. True there is probably a similar amount from horse drawn wagons. However that's not a lot for an entire army group, even if somewhat denuded by earlier losses. Or is that 3k integral lift the total at any one time, in which case when their carrying loads several days to the front its going to be a lot less. Of course motorised/mechanised units need a lot more supplies than foot units.
As I said the population built the defences outside Moscow and the Germans made no real impression on them. Their likely to get further if attacking in Sept/Oct, even through the number of units will be less, since a lot of infantry will still be a long way to the west. However such units are vulnerable attacking defensive positions and probably even more so in heavy fighting in built up urban areas. You don't need sophisticated defences inside the city itself as the buildings themselves provide a lot of cover for small and lightly armed units. The Germans failed against a weaker defensive force in Stalingrad so I don't see it being the walk over you expect here. Especially since shortly into such an attack on the defences their going to have the supply situation worsened further by the mud.
Zhukov can't be in two places at once but then he's not the only general available to the Soviets. Leningrad might fall although the crisis when AGC is stuck in front of Moscow and sees its flanks threatened while Hitler is probably still demanding completion of the conquest of Moscow could change that.
A bit of a misleading statement on Egypt and Algeria. The latter was about the last place to become independent, simply because the French commitment was that great politically to keeping it so they didn't have much prospect of fighting colonisation elsewhere. Egypt was mainly concerned with removing the British presence in Egypt and then the canal zone. In terms of incentives as well as political ones we both mentioned a big economic one.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 27, 2019 16:42:34 GMT
As I said, I see absolutely no reason to assume the Soviets don't continue with their counter-attacks, which can be screened by 2nd Army allowing for the rest of AGC to proceed quickly on Moscow. The largest tank battle in history-the Battle of Brody-was initiated by the Soviets in June, for example, despite the devastating ongoing German offensive. STAVKA continued to conduct them at Leningrad, Kiev, and, as previously stated, along the Moscow approaches even during Typhoon IOTL. Even assuming they do switch to the defensive, that's just asking for the Germans to utterly crush them as they demonstrated during October IOTL where they took fewer casualties but inflicted greater losses upon the Soviets as compared to Kiev. This makes a fair amount of military sense, given the superiority of the Germans in the air and in armored combat, as going on the defensive concedes the initiative to the Germans. Speaking of the defenses, the whole "civilians made the city a fort" thing only occurred in Moscow itself, with the defensive belts around the city being done by the Red Army. As for the fortifications within Moscow itself, when Stalin nearly abandoned the city in October, the only forces on hand were NKVD internal troops and they had been ordered to demolish said fortifications along with government buildings. Basically, they present no issue at all and once the Germans overrun the RKKA outside the city, they'll take it on the march. Logistically, the situation is good. As stated, by August the Smolensk railway was capable of 24 trains per day and this rate was increasing into September; whether or not it is was converted track is irrelevant to the capacity flowing on it successfully. For reference, the RB typically had 450-800 tons per train so taking the middle at 600 tons per 24 trains in August results in 14,400 tons. A typical German infantry division used about 400 tons a day in heavy combat, so the August total alone is enough to support 36 infantry divisions. With that increasing into September and the 3000 ton lift capacity of the integral trucks, AGC has the ability to do this. Now add in that it only took them two weeks to come within a hair of Moscow, and here they have over a month before the muds set in, and you realize they're going to be sitting in Red Square pretty easily. With regards to Leningrad, Stalin sent Zhukov to relieve Voroshilov, and not doing so leaves Leningrad without a senior commander. Basically, Stalin can either have his best commander defending Moscow, or he can defend Leningrad. He can't do both. Finally, with regards to Italy yes, now several generations later Italy remains far more powerful than both Egypt and Algeria combined both industrially and militarily and that's without a militaristic government in power that would be committed to defending a majority Italian-Libya. There is absolutely no reason for Italy to abandon a Libya that is rich in oil and majority Italian and to do so would be political suicide because that would be abandoning their people. 90% of the oil is in the Sirte basin, relatively close to Benghazi and thus easily defended; very people live there IOTL beyond Oil workers, whom we can expect to be overwhelmingly Italian ATL. Egypt took until the 1980s to make peace with Israel and it resulted in Sadat's murder. Algeria has literally fought multiple border conflicts with Morocco meanwhile and even to this day both sides are in a standoff conducting expensive modernization of their forces to combat the other. In that context, I really fail to see the rationale for Egypt and Algeria to combat Italy given they have actual threats to their sovereignty in other enemies, including one that most Arab nations remain officially at war with to this day. Seriously, why would they have any issues with Italy? Egypt didn't try to dislodge other colonialist regimes around it IOTL, nor did Algeria.
So the Germans can get about ~14.5 tons of supplies to Smolensk and some 3k can be carried on further east, at least until the mud hits and the increasing attrition of the trucks bite in. True there is probably a similar amount from horse drawn wagons. However that's not a lot for an entire army group, even if somewhat denuded by earlier losses. Or is that 3k integral lift the total at any one time, in which case when their carrying loads several days to the front its going to be a lot less. Of course motorised/mechanised units need a lot more supplies than foot units.
As I said the population built the defences outside Moscow and the Germans made no real impression on them. Their likely to get further if attacking in Sept/Oct, even through the number of units will be less, since a lot of infantry will still be a long way to the west. However such units are vulnerable attacking defensive positions and probably even more so in heavy fighting in built up urban areas. You don't need sophisticated defences inside the city itself as the buildings themselves provide a lot of cover for small and lightly armed units. The Germans failed against a weaker defensive force in Stalingrad so I don't see it being the walk over you expect here. Especially since shortly into such an attack on the defences their going to have the supply situation worsened further by the mud.
Zhukov can't be in two places at once but then he's not the only general available to the Soviets. Leningrad might fall although the crisis when AGC is stuck in front of Moscow and sees its flanks threatened while Hitler is probably still demanding completion of the conquest of Moscow could change that.
A bit of a misleading statement on Egypt and Algeria. The latter was about the last place to become independent, simply because the French commitment was that great politically to keeping it so they didn't have much prospect of fighting colonisation elsewhere. Egypt was mainly concerned with removing the British presence in Egypt and then the canal zone. In terms of incentives as well as political ones we both mentioned a big economic one. The Germans can move 14,400 tons through Smolensk in August and their trucks can carry an additional 3,000 to the front; that's ~18k tons per day in August, and it'll increase from there on as the Germans restore more and more railway capacity into September. That's enough to sustain over 40 infantry divisions or 25 infantry divisions and 10 mechanized/Panzer divisions in August alone; by the start of the attack in September that's the entirety of Army Group Center. Mud is about six weeks out, so plenty of time to overrun Moscow before that becomes an issue; IOTL it only took them two weeks to come within about a day's drive of it, as Stalin nearly abandoned the city on October 15th until the desperate defense of the 32nd Rifle Division allowed Zhukov to reform the defenses. Speaking of the defenses, the civilian population had nothing at all to do with the defensive belts constructed outside of the City, which was solely done by the Soviet Army. They did construct defenses within the city itself, but even in October they (the Red Army) only had NKVD troops for internal order and to demolish the city if needed to utilize them. Once the Germans break through the weaker defenses surrounding the city, they'll take it off the march. Stalingrad is a misleading example because the 62nd and 64th Armies were able to retreat into it, something that wasn't available in Moscow even IOTL 1941. Even despite that, by November the Germans had conquered 95% of the city. I am unaware of any other Soviet commanders available for duty in September that weren't already heavily engaged. As for Egypt and Algeria, even today Italy is more industrially powerful than both and the points about the Anglo-French is critical to my case; they (the Arabs) can't even doing anything to oppose Italy until well into the 1960s, at which point they're engaged in conflicts with their neighbors. I see absolutely no reason for Egypt to ignore Israelis in Sinai to attack Italy which has no claims on them, nor can I see Algeria leaving it's backdoor open for Morocco to, again, attack someone it has no real issues with. If Libyan oil was indeed that attractive for either, we would've seen one of them attack a much weaker Libya IOTL instead of one that is considered the 4th Shore of Italy. |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 27, 2019 18:45:14 GMT
On the matter of logistics, I sit down and did the math. In August of 1941, Army Group Center consisted of:
3rd Panzer Group - 3 PZ, 2 MD, 3 ID
9th Army - 15 ID
2nd Army - 8 ID
2nd Panzer Group - 6 ID, 5 PZ, 4 MD
Total: 8 Panzer Divisions, 6 Motorized/Mechanized Divisions, and 32 Infantry Divisions.
A standard German infantry division used 400 tons per day in heavy combat while a German Panzer (and presumably Mechanized/Motorized too) used 350 tons, surprisingly. Apparently this was a function of German infantry divisions being artillery heavy, while the mobile units were less so. Anyway, this means that Army Group Center requires the following:
12,800 tons per day for the IDs
2,800 tons per day for the PZs
2,100 tons per day for the MD
Total: 17,700 tons per day for AGC
German railway network in August was already capable of 24 trains per day, averaging that at 600 tons per train gives us 14,400 tons per day. As also previously stated, 3,000 tons of truck capacity was diverted to AGS in this timeframe during OTL, so that brings up to 17,400 tons per day in the ATL in August. By September, the Germans were able to run, based off what I can find, 26-28 trains per day along the Smolensk railway, meaning railway capacity was thus expanded to between 15,600 to 16,800 tons per day.
Basically, Army Group Center is free to kick off the attack by late August.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 28, 2019 16:06:07 GMT
On the matter of logistics, I sit down and did the math. In August of 1941, Army Group Center consisted of: 3rd Panzer Group - 3 PZ, 2 MD, 3 ID 9th Army - 15 ID 2nd Army - 8 ID 2nd Panzer Group - 6 ID, 5 PZ, 4 MD Total: 8 Panzer Divisions, 6 Motorized/Mechanized Divisions, and 32 Infantry Divisions. A standard German infantry division used 400 tons per day in heavy combat while a German Panzer (and presumably Mechanized/Motorized too) used 350 tons, surprisingly. Apparently this was a function of German infantry divisions being artillery heavy, while the mobile units were less so. Anyway, this means that Army Group Center requires the following: 12,800 tons per day for the IDs 2,800 tons per day for the PZs 2,100 tons per day for the MD Total: 17,700 tons per day for AGC German railway network in August was already capable of 24 trains per day, averaging that at 600 tons per train gives us 14,400 tons per day. As also previously stated, 3,000 tons of truck capacity was diverted to AGS in this timeframe during OTL, so that brings up to 17,400 tons per day in the ATL in August. By September, the Germans were able to run, based off what I can find, 26-28 trains per day along the Smolensk railway, meaning railway capacity was thus expanded to between 15,600 to 16,800 tons per day. Basically, Army Group Center is free to kick off the attack by late August.
Surely the trucks and horse drawn wagons were what took the supplies from the rail heads to the fighting front. As such they can't be added in such case. Its a matter of 3000 tons of truck capacity, which if say on average it took then two days to go from the railhead to the front line units and back again would mean 1,500 tons of supplies a day arriving from the railhead stockpiles. Possibly not for non-foot units but the foot infantry definitely relied heavily on horse drawn as well as motor transport. So there would be some additional capacity there. Also if those figures are for heavy combat then a reduced capacity would be needed for those not in combat but there are still going to be shortages by the sound of it.
I also assume those are base figures for full strength units. By now they will be some way below such strength so there would be less demand from the units but also a reduced transport capacity from railhead to the front.
The other question, apart from having to hold any pockets not yet destroyed is that the forces have no time to rest and do more than minimal repairs of damaged equipment.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 28, 2019 16:11:49 GMT
On the matter of logistics, I sit down and did the math. In August of 1941, Army Group Center consisted of: 3rd Panzer Group - 3 PZ, 2 MD, 3 ID 9th Army - 15 ID 2nd Army - 8 ID 2nd Panzer Group - 6 ID, 5 PZ, 4 MD Total: 8 Panzer Divisions, 6 Motorized/Mechanized Divisions, and 32 Infantry Divisions. A standard German infantry division used 400 tons per day in heavy combat while a German Panzer (and presumably Mechanized/Motorized too) used 350 tons, surprisingly. Apparently this was a function of German infantry divisions being artillery heavy, while the mobile units were less so. Anyway, this means that Army Group Center requires the following: 12,800 tons per day for the IDs 2,800 tons per day for the PZs 2,100 tons per day for the MD Total: 17,700 tons per day for AGC German railway network in August was already capable of 24 trains per day, averaging that at 600 tons per train gives us 14,400 tons per day. As also previously stated, 3,000 tons of truck capacity was diverted to AGS in this timeframe during OTL, so that brings up to 17,400 tons per day in the ATL in August. By September, the Germans were able to run, based off what I can find, 26-28 trains per day along the Smolensk railway, meaning railway capacity was thus expanded to between 15,600 to 16,800 tons per day. Basically, Army Group Center is free to kick off the attack by late August.
Surely the trucks and horse drawn wagons were what took the supplies from the rail heads to the fighting front. As such they can't be added in such case. Its a matter of 3000 tons of truck capacity, which if say on average it took then two days to go from the railhead to the front line units and back again would mean 1,500 tons of supplies a day arriving from the railhead stockpiles. Possibly not for non-foot units but the foot infantry definitely relied heavily on horse drawn as well as motor transport. So there would be some additional capacity there. Also if those figures are for heavy combat then a reduced capacity would be needed for those not in combat but there are still going to be shortages by the sound of it.
I also assume those are base figures for full strength units. By now they will be some way below such strength so there would be less demand from the units but also a reduced transport capacity from railhead to the front.
The other question, apart from having to hold any pockets not yet destroyed is that the forces have no time to rest and do more than minimal repairs of damaged equipment.
AGC had on hand 45,000 tons of truck life capacity, of which about 30,000-32,000 tons were operational at any one time, and from this pool they diverted 3,000 to support AGS with 2nd Panzer. As far as losses, 85% of tanks remained operation in August and several hundred more were in repair and thus could be expected back during Alt-Typhoon. My idea is AGC gets the go ahead from Hitler by the 15th and then kicks off the attack by the start of September, about five weeks ahead of schedule. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 29, 2019 12:09:16 GMT
Surely the trucks and horse drawn wagons were what took the supplies from the rail heads to the fighting front. As such they can't be added in such case. Its a matter of 3000 tons of truck capacity, which if say on average it took then two days to go from the railhead to the front line units and back again would mean 1,500 tons of supplies a day arriving from the railhead stockpiles. Possibly not for non-foot units but the foot infantry definitely relied heavily on horse drawn as well as motor transport. So there would be some additional capacity there. Also if those figures are for heavy combat then a reduced capacity would be needed for those not in combat but there are still going to be shortages by the sound of it.
I also assume those are base figures for full strength units. By now they will be some way below such strength so there would be less demand from the units but also a reduced transport capacity from railhead to the front.
The other question, apart from having to hold any pockets not yet destroyed is that the forces have no time to rest and do more than minimal repairs of damaged equipment.
AGC had on hand 45,000 tons of truck life capacity, of which about 30,000-32,000 tons were operational at any one time, and from this pool they diverted 3,000 to support AGS with 2nd Panzer. As far as losses, 85% of tanks remained operation in August and several hundred more were in repair and thus could be expected back during Alt-Typhoon. My idea is AGC gets the go ahead from Hitler by the 15th and then kicks off the attack by the start of September, about five weeks ahead of schedule.
Interesting. Just checked one of my source books, John Ellis's WW2 Databook. It actually gives slightly different figures from you with 31 Inf, 1 Cav, 5 Mot and 10 Panzer divisions. Even with that however it gives ~120 tanks per Panzer Div and none in the others, so a grand total of 1,200 in AGC. If 85% of them are still in working order at this point that is 1,020 with the other 180 damaged or destroyed so not sure how you get "As far as losses, 85% of tanks remained operation in August and several hundred more were in repair". If I take your figure of only 8 Panzer divs then that gives only 960 tanks so 85% in full working order would be ~840 and there would be another 120 demaged/destroyed. Again far from hundreds being repaired. That figure could include all motorised vehicles in all the mobile divs however, which might make sense.
Also somewhat confused as you said before that the Germans committed 3,000 tons of motorised lift capacity to AGC and now your saying it had about ten times as much and committed 10% of this to 2nd Panzer? Presumably you mean the panzer group rather than a 2nd Panzer division as I can't see such a unit on the eastern front at all at the start of the campaign?
This still doesn't answer the question that the motorised transport would operate between the railhead and the forward forces and hence can't be added to the rail lift total. Also of course if the motorised units get too far ahead then the transport units rapidly run into diminishing returns as before too long they using up most/all their carry capacity in terms of fuel to enable them [the supply trucks] to reach the front and then return to the railhead. True if fully fueled from the railhead the motorised units will have their own supply but that will only last so long and they will consume a lot, especially in terms of traveling fast and maneuvering to engage the enemy defences. This is a greater problem for the motorised rather than tracked units - both combat and supply - given the Soviet road system, lacking both quality and quantity and the fact they will often have to operate away from what roads they are.
In terms of attrition the video I mentioned, which gives sources for its figures not only had the German army very quickly run through its ~300k of reserves but was eating into the muscle of the starting forces as well. Furthermore this loss was concentrated in the front line fighting forces, in this case the armoured/motorised units so they will definitely be running short by this time. Basically the German army was probably at its qualitative peak in 1941 and lost ground afterwards.
One problem they had was that because of the Versailles Treaty, until Hitler restored conscription, 1935 IIRC they didn't have millions of men being conscripted and hence a generation of troops lacked real experience of military life and training. In later years many millions were conscripted into the army but they all had to be largely trained from scratch. This as well as the greater Soviet industrial base and level of moblisation meant that the German army struggled to organise the numbers anything like the Soviets managed in 41/42 especially.
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dayton3
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Post by dayton3 on Nov 9, 2019 22:35:09 GMT
Let's us say Mussolini decides that the time isn't right to enter the war before France falls. He hesitates during all of 1940 too as Britain doesn't collapse. Italy isn't now joining the war. How do things go without Italy? No Med campaign nor Western Desert fight. This surely changes things in the Balkans too? Does Britain have more strength to cause the Japanese to think twice? If Britain isn't fighting in North Africa, is it in the Balkans instead: soft underbelly of Europe? Churchill doesn't get a chance to make one of his all time funniest statements. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 10, 2019 9:37:01 GMT
Let's us say Mussolini decides that the time isn't right to enter the war before France falls. He hesitates during all of 1940 too as Britain doesn't collapse. Italy isn't now joining the war. How do things go without Italy? No Med campaign nor Western Desert fight. This surely changes things in the Balkans too? Does Britain have more strength to cause the Japanese to think twice? If Britain isn't fighting in North Africa, is it in the Balkans instead: soft underbelly of Europe? Churchill doesn't get a chance to make one of his all time funniest statements.
You mean "its only fair, we had them last time"?
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Post by EwellHolmes on Nov 18, 2019 1:12:34 GMT
AGC had on hand 45,000 tons of truck life capacity, of which about 30,000-32,000 tons were operational at any one time, and from this pool they diverted 3,000 to support AGS with 2nd Panzer. As far as losses, 85% of tanks remained operation in August and several hundred more were in repair and thus could be expected back during Alt-Typhoon. My idea is AGC gets the go ahead from Hitler by the 15th and then kicks off the attack by the start of September, about five weeks ahead of schedule.
Interesting. Just checked one of my source books, John Ellis's WW2 Databook. It actually gives slightly different figures from you with 31 Inf, 1 Cav, 5 Mot and 10 Panzer divisions. Even with that however it gives ~120 tanks per Panzer Div and none in the others, so a grand total of 1,200 in AGC. If 85% of them are still in working order at this point that is 1,020 with the other 180 damaged or destroyed so not sure how you get "As far as losses, 85% of tanks remained operation in August and several hundred more were in repair". If I take your figure of only 8 Panzer divs then that gives only 960 tanks so 85% in full working order would be ~840 and there would be another 120 demaged/destroyed. Again far from hundreds being repaired. That figure could include all motorised vehicles in all the mobile divs however, which might make sense.
Also somewhat confused as you said before that the Germans committed 3,000 tons of motorised lift capacity to AGC and now your saying it had about ten times as much and committed 10% of this to 2nd Panzer? Presumably you mean the panzer group rather than a 2nd Panzer division as I can't see such a unit on the eastern front at all at the start of the campaign?
This still doesn't answer the question that the motorised transport would operate between the railhead and the forward forces and hence can't be added to the rail lift total. Also of course if the motorised units get too far ahead then the transport units rapidly run into diminishing returns as before too long they using up most/all their carry capacity in terms of fuel to enable them [the supply trucks] to reach the front and then return to the railhead. True if fully fueled from the railhead the motorised units will have their own supply but that will only last so long and they will consume a lot, especially in terms of traveling fast and maneuvering to engage the enemy defences. This is a greater problem for the motorised rather than tracked units - both combat and supply - given the Soviet road system, lacking both quality and quantity and the fact they will often have to operate away from what roads they are.
In terms of attrition the video I mentioned, which gives sources for its figures not only had the German army very quickly run through its ~300k of reserves but was eating into the muscle of the starting forces as well. Furthermore this loss was concentrated in the front line fighting forces, in this case the armoured/motorised units so they will definitely be running short by this time. Basically the German army was probably at its qualitative peak in 1941 and lost ground afterwards.
One problem they had was that because of the Versailles Treaty, until Hitler restored conscription, 1935 IIRC they didn't have millions of men being conscripted and hence a generation of troops lacked real experience of military life and training. In later years many millions were conscripted into the army but they all had to be largely trained from scratch. This as well as the greater Soviet industrial base and level of moblisation meant that the German army struggled to organise the numbers anything like the Soviets managed in 41/42 especially.
Instead of doing a point by point response, for ease of time and usage, I'm going to respond in general. First, the differences in numbers is probably a factor of the fluctuations experienced by Army Group Center in August; transfers of forces were undertaken to both the North and South Army groups while they were reinforced towards the end. On the overall question of the strength of German forces, I honestly have no idea where you are coming from on that. By 16 July 1941, the date of the capture of Smolensk, they had lost only 102,488 men and by 2 August this had increased to 179,500 casualties. In comparison, OKW planning had anticipated 275,000 casualties for June to August, and they had that number available in field replacement battalions among the Field Replacement Army to replenish these expected losses. In actuality, losses for the time period of June to the start of September ended up being 257,000 in total; in other words, German strength was not on the decline at all. Much the same is found in Panzers for the Germans. Operation Barbarossa saw them enter the USSR with 746 German Pz.Kw. II, 812 TNHP 38, 1,065 Pz.Kw. III and and 489 Pz.Kw. IV tanks. This total does not count command variants or Panzer Is, as a note. Army Group Center had started the campaign with 1,780 battle tanks and by August returns showed they had 1,157 tanks running with 356 in repair. As far as logistics, When the campaign opened, the high command of the army provided Army Group Center with approximately 45,000 tons of trucks to deliver supplies from the rail heads on the border to the advancing armies. One third was usually under repair or inoperable, so in practice they managed about 30,000 in function at anytime. German thought held that 60 ton freight truck columns could cover the 400 km distance between rail heads and the field armies on the offensive. As new rail lines came online in White Russia from Brest to Minsk, the Germans expected on 17 July to take off most of the 60-ton truck columns from the frontier to Minsk between 20 and 30 July 1941. The columns continued to run from the border in decreasing numbers until finally stopping in early August, by which point rail lines were completed beyond Minsk. The Germans would also now be operating from rail heads approaching Smolensk, with extensions to the railways underway; by August 13th, 24 trains per day was achieved, as previously cited, and this increased going into September, reaching 28 per day or so by the end of August. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 18, 2019 11:54:16 GMT
Interesting. Just checked one of my source books, John Ellis's WW2 Databook. It actually gives slightly different figures from you with 31 Inf, 1 Cav, 5 Mot and 10 Panzer divisions. Even with that however it gives ~120 tanks per Panzer Div and none in the others, so a grand total of 1,200 in AGC. If 85% of them are still in working order at this point that is 1,020 with the other 180 damaged or destroyed so not sure how you get "As far as losses, 85% of tanks remained operation in August and several hundred more were in repair". If I take your figure of only 8 Panzer divs then that gives only 960 tanks so 85% in full working order would be ~840 and there would be another 120 demaged/destroyed. Again far from hundreds being repaired. That figure could include all motorised vehicles in all the mobile divs however, which might make sense.
Also somewhat confused as you said before that the Germans committed 3,000 tons of motorised lift capacity to AGC and now your saying it had about ten times as much and committed 10% of this to 2nd Panzer? Presumably you mean the panzer group rather than a 2nd Panzer division as I can't see such a unit on the eastern front at all at the start of the campaign?
This still doesn't answer the question that the motorised transport would operate between the railhead and the forward forces and hence can't be added to the rail lift total. Also of course if the motorised units get too far ahead then the transport units rapidly run into diminishing returns as before too long they using up most/all their carry capacity in terms of fuel to enable them [the supply trucks] to reach the front and then return to the railhead. True if fully fueled from the railhead the motorised units will have their own supply but that will only last so long and they will consume a lot, especially in terms of traveling fast and maneuvering to engage the enemy defences. This is a greater problem for the motorised rather than tracked units - both combat and supply - given the Soviet road system, lacking both quality and quantity and the fact they will often have to operate away from what roads they are.
In terms of attrition the video I mentioned, which gives sources for its figures not only had the German army very quickly run through its ~300k of reserves but was eating into the muscle of the starting forces as well. Furthermore this loss was concentrated in the front line fighting forces, in this case the armoured/motorised units so they will definitely be running short by this time. Basically the German army was probably at its qualitative peak in 1941 and lost ground afterwards.
One problem they had was that because of the Versailles Treaty, until Hitler restored conscription, 1935 IIRC they didn't have millions of men being conscripted and hence a generation of troops lacked real experience of military life and training. In later years many millions were conscripted into the army but they all had to be largely trained from scratch. This as well as the greater Soviet industrial base and level of moblisation meant that the German army struggled to organise the numbers anything like the Soviets managed in 41/42 especially.
Instead of doing a point by point response, for ease of time and usage, I'm going to respond in general. First, the differences in numbers is probably a factor of the fluctuations experienced by Army Group Center in August; transfers of forces were undertaken to both the North and South Army groups while they were reinforced towards the end. On the overall question of the strength of German forces, I honestly have no idea where you are coming from on that. By 16 July 1941, the date of the capture of Smolensk, they had lost only 102,488 men and by 2 August this had increased to 179,500 casualties. In comparison, OKW planning had anticipated 275,000 casualties for June to August, and they had that number available in field replacement battalions among the Field Replacement Army to replenish these expected losses. In actuality, losses for the time period of June to the start of September ended up being 257,000 in total; in other words, German strength was not on the decline at all. Much the same is found in Panzers for the Germans. Operation Barbarossa saw them enter the USSR with 746 German Pz.Kw. II, 812 TNHP 38, 1,065 Pz.Kw. III and and 489 Pz.Kw. IV tanks. This total does not count command variants or Panzer Is, as a note. Army Group Center had started the campaign with 1,780 battle tanks and by August returns showed they had 1,157 tanks running with 356 in repair. As far as logistics, When the campaign opened, the high command of the army provided Army Group Center with approximately 45,000 tons of trucks to deliver supplies from the rail heads on the border to the advancing armies. One third was usually under repair or inoperable, so in practice they managed about 30,000 in function at anytime. German thought held that 60 ton freight truck columns could cover the 400 km distance between rail heads and the field armies on the offensive. As new rail lines came online in White Russia from Brest to Minsk, the Germans expected on 17 July to take off most of the 60-ton truck columns from the frontier to Minsk between 20 and 30 July 1941. The columns continued to run from the border in decreasing numbers until finally stopping in early August, by which point rail lines were completed beyond Minsk. The Germans would also now be operating from rail heads approaching Smolensk, with extensions to the railways underway; by August 13th, 24 trains per day was achieved, as previously cited, and this increased going into September, reaching 28 per day or so by the end of August.
Look at the link I gave and you will see the quoted sources for those figures. Don't know where your getting your figures from so can't comment on them. Is the 'they' for all German forces in the east or only AGC?
As you say by August - start or end? - AGC has lost over a 3rd of their armour strength, albeit that about 50% of those losses many be repairable. This is still very early in the campaign, especially the start of the month. It also wouldn't include any armour tied up guarding pockets until the foot infantry catch up or the ever expanding flanks as the front extended.
With those 60 ton truck convoys how much of their cargo load are they themselves consuming to cover 400km over rough roads, and probably some non-road distances to find the front line?
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Post by EwellHolmes on Nov 18, 2019 17:23:19 GMT
Instead of doing a point by point response, for ease of time and usage, I'm going to respond in general. First, the differences in numbers is probably a factor of the fluctuations experienced by Army Group Center in August; transfers of forces were undertaken to both the North and South Army groups while they were reinforced towards the end. On the overall question of the strength of German forces, I honestly have no idea where you are coming from on that. By 16 July 1941, the date of the capture of Smolensk, they had lost only 102,488 men and by 2 August this had increased to 179,500 casualties. In comparison, OKW planning had anticipated 275,000 casualties for June to August, and they had that number available in field replacement battalions among the Field Replacement Army to replenish these expected losses. In actuality, losses for the time period of June to the start of September ended up being 257,000 in total; in other words, German strength was not on the decline at all. Much the same is found in Panzers for the Germans. Operation Barbarossa saw them enter the USSR with 746 German Pz.Kw. II, 812 TNHP 38, 1,065 Pz.Kw. III and and 489 Pz.Kw. IV tanks. This total does not count command variants or Panzer Is, as a note. Army Group Center had started the campaign with 1,780 battle tanks and by August returns showed they had 1,157 tanks running with 356 in repair. As far as logistics, When the campaign opened, the high command of the army provided Army Group Center with approximately 45,000 tons of trucks to deliver supplies from the rail heads on the border to the advancing armies. One third was usually under repair or inoperable, so in practice they managed about 30,000 in function at anytime. German thought held that 60 ton freight truck columns could cover the 400 km distance between rail heads and the field armies on the offensive. As new rail lines came online in White Russia from Brest to Minsk, the Germans expected on 17 July to take off most of the 60-ton truck columns from the frontier to Minsk between 20 and 30 July 1941. The columns continued to run from the border in decreasing numbers until finally stopping in early August, by which point rail lines were completed beyond Minsk. The Germans would also now be operating from rail heads approaching Smolensk, with extensions to the railways underway; by August 13th, 24 trains per day was achieved, as previously cited, and this increased going into September, reaching 28 per day or so by the end of August.
Look at the link I gave and you will see the quoted sources for those figures. Don't know where your getting your figures from so can't comment on them. Is the 'they' for all German forces in the east or only AGC?
As you say by August - start or end? - AGC has lost over a 3rd of their armour strength, albeit that about 50% of those losses many be repairable. This is still very early in the campaign, especially the start of the month. It also wouldn't include any armour tied up guarding pockets until the foot infantry catch up or the ever expanding flanks as the front extended.
With those 60 ton truck convoys how much of their cargo load are they themselves consuming to cover 400km over rough roads, and probably some non-road distances to find the front line?
OKW returns for the whole of the German operational groups for June to August (end of). As for the Panzer strength, German strength during Typhoon fluctated from a low of 1,000 to as high as 2,000 so 1,200 to 1,500 is basically what they were operating IOTL against stronger Soviet forces anyway. As for the trucks, not much, given they continued to do so until August and were utilizing the existing road network. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 19, 2019 11:22:23 GMT
Look at the link I gave and you will see the quoted sources for those figures. Don't know where your getting your figures from so can't comment on them. Is the 'they' for all German forces in the east or only AGC?
As you say by August - start or end? - AGC has lost over a 3rd of their armour strength, albeit that about 50% of those losses many be repairable. This is still very early in the campaign, especially the start of the month. It also wouldn't include any armour tied up guarding pockets until the foot infantry catch up or the ever expanding flanks as the front extended.
With those 60 ton truck convoys how much of their cargo load are they themselves consuming to cover 400km over rough roads, and probably some non-road distances to find the front line?
OKW returns for the whole of the German operational groups for June to August (end of). As for the Panzer strength, German strength during Typhoon fluctated from a low of 1,000 to as high as 2,000 so 1,200 to 1,500 is basically what they were operating IOTL against stronger Soviet forces anyway. As for the trucks, not much, given they continued to do so until August and were utilizing the existing road network.
I would be very surprised if German panzer strength during Typhoon ever approached 2,000 given the weather conditions and wear and tear, let alone battle losses. What is the link for those returns, either on line or paper? Or do you mean for the entire eastern front including those under repair and rear areas? Just possibly that might be the case but from most accounts very few were actually active by the last stages of the 41 campaign.
So those trucks are going at least 200km, with a full load, unloading then 200k back on Russian roads, which are largely poor quality dirt roads without consuming substantial amounts of their loads on their own fuel? Not a great problem for those carrying only fuel possibly but going to detract from every mission, let alone the high level of wear and tear on the vehicles.
Have you actually looked at the source I provided?
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James G
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Post by James G on Nov 20, 2019 18:58:47 GMT
Let's us say Mussolini decides that the time isn't right to enter the war before France falls. He hesitates during all of 1940 too as Britain doesn't collapse. Italy isn't now joining the war. How do things go without Italy? No Med campaign nor Western Desert fight. This surely changes things in the Balkans too? Does Britain have more strength to cause the Japanese to think twice? If Britain isn't fighting in North Africa, is it in the Balkans instead: soft underbelly of Europe? Churchill doesn't get a chance to make one of his all time funniest statements. Was it his funniest? I recall the comment he apparently made to a lady who called him a drunk. He admitted that was true but said that in the morning he would be sober. As to her, Churchill said that she was ugly now and would still be in the morning. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Nov 20, 2019 22:08:43 GMT
Churchill doesn't get a chance to make one of his all time funniest statements. Was it his funniest? I recall the comment he apparently made to a lady who called him a drunk. He admitted that was true but said that in the morning he would be sober. As to her, Churchill said that she was ugly now and would still be in the morning.
He did say "one of his funniest". Plus I think I prefer the joke about Italy more than the cheap shot from the drunkard. |
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1bigrich
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Post by 1bigrich on Feb 14, 2020 16:37:30 GMT
In the shorter term there are some advantages to Germany as it doesn't get involved in the Balkans - assuming Italy doesn't attack Greece as OTL which is likely to bring them into war with Britain - nor later in N Africa and Italy. However the big winner here is likely to be Britain. Concur, as I said in the other thread, just not having combat in the Med and Africa and being able to bring commerce across the Mediterranean will be a huge advantage to the UK Italy could get very wealthy dealing with both sides. She was already contracted to sell Re2000s to the RAF; she might be building fighters for both sides. It's also possible German and/or Britain will come calling with contracts to build their own designs of aircraft, vehicles and engines for their war efforts. Italy at the time is not exactly the United States, but she does have industrial capacity close to both powers that could be utilized. Agreed, it's over once the US is in. As I said again in the other thread, Tom Phillips might have a real fleet when he's dispatched to Singapore. He might be able to keep his big ships in port while his lighter forces deal with the Japanese invasion of Malaya. With modern RAF aircraft committed to its defense, Malaya will be a tough nut to crack. Even A-20 Havocs and P-40 Warhawks will be better in defense of the peninsula than Vickers Vildebeeast and Brewster Buffalos. And a commitment of experienced troops and even light armor could give the Japanese fits in the fight for Singapore, assuming they make it that far. If Roundup goes off in 1943, I don't think it's unreasonable to expect the division to be further East. Perhaps an East and West Poland, or a the Western Allies stopping the Belorussian boarder. Several years ago I posted a hypothetical on the BC board (ez board days, long gone now) about a Monarchist coup in Italy deposing of Mussolini and the Fascist. The hypothetical revolved around the RM selling the rebuilds abroad while continuing with the Venetos to modernize the Fleet. Many posters commented on who they thought the customers would be from Sweden and Argentina to Germany and France. But the likely ones turned out to be the Netherlands for the NEI (in the role of the 1047s while those ships are building) and the RN, to keep the other pair out of other powers' hands. I've worked intermittently on an AH with that as the premise, focusing on the careers of the ships in RNN and RN service. I hope to complete it in the future. But such sales by the RM could well be part of Italy staying out, especially light forces. My thoughts, |
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