James G
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Post by James G on Aug 18, 2019 14:51:39 GMT
Could a situation arise - short of nuclear war! - where the Soviet Union collapses in upon itself? Let us say in the 60s, 70s or 80s. Ideas as to how this might occur?
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 18, 2019 22:28:01 GMT
Could a situation arise - short of nuclear war! - where the Soviet Union collapses in upon itself? Let us say in the 60s, 70s or 80s. Ideas as to how this might occur?
Possibly the best chance would be if there was no Great Patriotic War for whatever reason. For all the deaths and devastation that resulted it gave the Soviet regime a serious boost in legitimacy in the eyes of many of its people as well as international acceptance it hadn't had been and with the conquest of most of eastern Europe much more resources to call upon.
Otherwise, after 1945 and without it collapsing into civil war or having a disastrous war with either the west or just possibly China I can't see it running out of steam much before it did.
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Post by lukedalton on Aug 20, 2019 19:43:43 GMT
Maybe if Stalin live long enough to launch his final purge and new boss get the same economic idea of 'Uncle Joe' we can see the URSS and the eastern bloc imploding economically in the 60's
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Post by TheRomanSlayer on Aug 23, 2019 5:33:18 GMT
Earlier Operation: Barbarossa with a PoD around a failed Yugoslav coup would give the Germans a bit of a crucial head start, long enough to see Moscow fall to the Wehrmacht. The Allies would still win, but it would be far longer, and far bloodier too.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 23, 2019 10:31:05 GMT
Earlier Operation: Barbarossa with a PoD around a failed Yugoslav coup would give the Germans a bit of a crucial head start, long enough to see Moscow fall to the Wehrmacht. The Allies would still win, but it would be far longer, and far bloodier too.
That was a popular view a while back. However apart from the basic limitations of the German army in such a massive operation there are issues. They might still have to intervene in Greece, which considering the Regency in Serbia was still trying to keep its distance from Berlin could trigger further unrest there. Also a number of sources have said that an earlier Barbarossa would have faced problems with the ground being too wet.
If they avoided any operations in the Balkans, which Hitler might decide/be persuaded to risk, they are a little stronger in that they haven't see the losses and wear and tear of OTL on equipment but whether that would make a significant difference I don't know. Might mean some earlier successes but in the longer run unlikely to matter.
Also such a scenario would see a SU that is weaker in terms of manpower and industrial resources and depending on the circumstances possibly having a lot less territory in eastern and central Europe its still going to be a major player in the post war world and the Nazi invasion will still give the regime revived status. At least unless you get the sort of situation in a WWII board game where a greater level of success means that Stalin and the party is replaced, say by a military regime but that does seem unlikely as well given how totally the party had sunk its hooks into just about everything.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 24, 2019 17:44:48 GMT
Yes.
In July of 1918, the Kaiser was presented with two policy options concerning the Bolsheviks in Russia. One, advocated for by the Foreign Office, was to leave them alone at present to be dealt with at a future time once the situation was decided in the West. The other, from Hindenburg and Ludendorff, advocated immediate action to remove the Bolsheviks from power by seizing Petrograd and Moscow. Now, Kasier Wilhelm II had a habit of picking the first policy directive he was presented with. As the fortunes of history would have it, this was the aforementioned proposal from the Foreign Office and Germany's later defeat by the Entente obviously prevented it from taking the action they had suggested be done later on.
Had the policy directives been presented differently or had Germany won the Spring Offensives, the nascent Soviet Union would've been killed before it was even formally the USSR.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 25, 2019 20:38:26 GMT
Yes. In July of 1918, the Kaiser was presented with two policy options concerning the Bolsheviks in Russia. One, advocated for by the Foreign Office, was to leave them alone at present to be dealt with at a future time once the situation was decided in the West. The other, from Hindenburg and Ludendorff, advocated immediate action to remove the Bolsheviks from power by seizing Petrograd and Moscow. Now, Kasier Wilhelm II had a habit of picking the first policy directive he was presented with. As the fortunes of history would have it, this was the aforementioned proposal from the Foreign Office and Germany's later defeat by the Entente obviously prevented it from taking the action they had suggested be done later on. Had the policy directives been presented differently or had Germany won the Spring Offensives, the nascent Soviet Union would've been killed before it was even formally the USSR.
Its doubtful if the spring offensive would have had much chance but if Germany had somehow won a victory it would have been a Pyrrhic one. They might have the power to re-open the war against the Bolsheviks and then drive them from Petrograd and possibly even Moscow. However an attempted German occupation of most of European Russia is going to be very difficult and enable the communists to represent themselves as the 'protectors' of Russia, as Stalin did after 1941. This is before they became too obviously murderous so their likely to become very popular as a result and also be even more attractive to some of the young conscripts in the Germany army than OTL.
The other alternative is a quick entry, establish a right wing government and then withdraw, which may be the initial aim, although I very much doubt they have any plans to give the massive gains their made already. I doubt they will find a right wing government that would be able to maintain itself without continued military support given that it would be seen as a German puppet.
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James G
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Post by James G on Aug 26, 2019 14:38:16 GMT
Yes. In July of 1918, the Kaiser was presented with two policy options concerning the Bolsheviks in Russia. One, advocated for by the Foreign Office, was to leave them alone at present to be dealt with at a future time once the situation was decided in the West. The other, from Hindenburg and Ludendorff, advocated immediate action to remove the Bolsheviks from power by seizing Petrograd and Moscow. Now, Kasier Wilhelm II had a habit of picking the first policy directive he was presented with. As the fortunes of history would have it, this was the aforementioned proposal from the Foreign Office and Germany's later defeat by the Entente obviously prevented it from taking the action they had suggested be done later on. Had the policy directives been presented differently or had Germany won the Spring Offensives, the nascent Soviet Union would've been killed before it was even formally the USSR. The whole issue with the formation of what became the USSR was in so many ways Imperial Germany's fault. They sent Lenin home to cause trouble and look what it eventually got them in the end. Those important people with power and wealth who were there in 1917 were the same lot who in 1945 the Soviets gave their full attention to. As to the point raised here, that would appear to be a good idea. Yet why did Berlin send Lenin? They aimed to win the war in the east by cheating like that. To then go in and occupy huge parts of the country even more than they were going to under Brest-Livotsk doesn't seem to be on-message with previous actions. Winning the war without having to keep fighting for seemingly ever seemed the best option: marching on Petrograd and Moscow once more wouldn't give them what they wanted.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 28, 2019 3:19:12 GMT
Yes. In July of 1918, the Kaiser was presented with two policy options concerning the Bolsheviks in Russia. One, advocated for by the Foreign Office, was to leave them alone at present to be dealt with at a future time once the situation was decided in the West. The other, from Hindenburg and Ludendorff, advocated immediate action to remove the Bolsheviks from power by seizing Petrograd and Moscow. Now, Kasier Wilhelm II had a habit of picking the first policy directive he was presented with. As the fortunes of history would have it, this was the aforementioned proposal from the Foreign Office and Germany's later defeat by the Entente obviously prevented it from taking the action they had suggested be done later on. Had the policy directives been presented differently or had Germany won the Spring Offensives, the nascent Soviet Union would've been killed before it was even formally the USSR. The whole issue with the formation of what became the USSR was in so many ways Imperial Germany's fault. They sent Lenin home to cause trouble and look what it eventually got them in the end. Those important people with power and wealth who were there in 1917 were the same lot who in 1945 the Soviets gave their full attention to. As to the point raised here, that would appear to be a good idea. Yet why did Berlin send Lenin? They aimed to win the war in the east by cheating like that. To then go in and occupy huge parts of the country even more than they were going to under Brest-Livotsk doesn't seem to be on-message with previous actions. Winning the war without having to keep fighting for seemingly ever seemed the best option: marching on Petrograd and Moscow once more wouldn't give them what they wanted. Installing a puppet Tsar and destroying the Bolsheviks, who represent a radically opposite system to that of Imperial Germany which is intent on destroying the same, is obviously in the German interest.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 28, 2019 3:24:49 GMT
Yes. In July of 1918, the Kaiser was presented with two policy options concerning the Bolsheviks in Russia. One, advocated for by the Foreign Office, was to leave them alone at present to be dealt with at a future time once the situation was decided in the West. The other, from Hindenburg and Ludendorff, advocated immediate action to remove the Bolsheviks from power by seizing Petrograd and Moscow. Now, Kasier Wilhelm II had a habit of picking the first policy directive he was presented with. As the fortunes of history would have it, this was the aforementioned proposal from the Foreign Office and Germany's later defeat by the Entente obviously prevented it from taking the action they had suggested be done later on. Had the policy directives been presented differently or had Germany won the Spring Offensives, the nascent Soviet Union would've been killed before it was even formally the USSR.
Its doubtful if the spring offensive would have had much chance but if Germany had somehow won a victory it would have been a Pyrrhic one. They might have the power to re-open the war against the Bolsheviks and then drive them from Petrograd and possibly even Moscow. However an attempted German occupation of most of European Russia is going to be very difficult and enable the communists to represent themselves as the 'protectors' of Russia, as Stalin did after 1941. This is before they became too obviously murderous so their likely to become very popular as a result and also be even more attractive to some of the young conscripts in the Germany army than OTL.
The other alternative is a quick entry, establish a right wing government and then withdraw, which may be the initial aim, although I very much doubt they have any plans to give the massive gains their made already. I doubt they will find a right wing government that would be able to maintain itself without continued military support given that it would be seen as a German puppet.
In the interests of keeping the thread on topic, I'll refrain from arguing on the Spring Offensive. As for the gist of the matter, by July of 1918 the only significant military formation the Soviets had was the Latvian Riflemen, while the Left SRs were in revolt and the Czech Legion was at work in Siberia; the Whites soon were to form as well. With Petrograd and the Moscow taken, the Bolsheviks are doomed.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 28, 2019 14:37:57 GMT
Its doubtful if the spring offensive would have had much chance but if Germany had somehow won a victory it would have been a Pyrrhic one. They might have the power to re-open the war against the Bolsheviks and then drive them from Petrograd and possibly even Moscow. However an attempted German occupation of most of European Russia is going to be very difficult and enable the communists to represent themselves as the 'protectors' of Russia, as Stalin did after 1941. This is before they became too obviously murderous so their likely to become very popular as a result and also be even more attractive to some of the young conscripts in the Germany army than OTL.
The other alternative is a quick entry, establish a right wing government and then withdraw, which may be the initial aim, although I very much doubt they have any plans to give the massive gains their made already. I doubt they will find a right wing government that would be able to maintain itself without continued military support given that it would be seen as a German puppet.
In the interests of keeping the thread on topic, I'll refrain from arguing on the Spring Offensive. As for the gist of the matter, by July of 1918 the only significant military formation the Soviets had was the Latvian Riflemen, while the Left SRs were in revolt and the Czech Legion was at work in Siberia; the Whites soon were to form as well. With Petrograd and the Moscow taken, the Bolsheviks are doomed.
They might well be in the short term but what I'm fearing is that if their clearly deposed by a German intervention then any regime imposed afterwards is going to look to many like a foreign puppet, even if the Germans don't annex any further territories to their sphere of influence and the Bolsheviks are going to be able to present themselves as the guardians of not just the revolution but also Russian independence. OTL while they had some doubts both the Menshiviks and the SRs ended up supporting the Bolsheviks rather than the Whites and that's even more likely in this scenario. As such given the size and poor communications across much of Russia there's going to be plenty of scope for resistance of many forms. Also if the right wingers start reducing those gains from the revolution, i.e. land reform especially and stamping down on criticism there's going to be a lot of support for such opposition.
In that case can a war weary German face the continued commitment to prop up a weak Neo-Czarist regime for a prolonged period? Militarily possibly but economically and socially could be a different matter. Even if its overrun most/all of France that doesn't mean that Britain and a growing American force aren't still fighting. There is even the potential - although less likely here - for western allied support for unrest in Russia.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 28, 2019 17:33:05 GMT
In the interests of keeping the thread on topic, I'll refrain from arguing on the Spring Offensive. As for the gist of the matter, by July of 1918 the only significant military formation the Soviets had was the Latvian Riflemen, while the Left SRs were in revolt and the Czech Legion was at work in Siberia; the Whites soon were to form as well. With Petrograd and the Moscow taken, the Bolsheviks are doomed.
They might well be in the short term but what I'm fearing is that if their clearly deposed by a German intervention then any regime imposed afterwards is going to look to many like a foreign puppet, even if the Germans don't annex any further territories to their sphere of influence and the Bolsheviks are going to be able to present themselves as the guardians of not just the revolution but also Russian independence. OTL while they had some doubts both the Menshiviks and the SRs ended up supporting the Bolsheviks rather than the Whites and that's even more likely in this scenario. As such given the size and poor communications across much of Russia there's going to be plenty of scope for resistance of many forms. Also if the right wingers start reducing those gains from the revolution, i.e. land reform especially and stamping down on criticism there's going to be a lot of support for such opposition.
In that case can a war weary German face the continued commitment to prop up a weak Neo-Czarist regime for a prolonged period? Militarily possibly but economically and socially could be a different matter. Even if its overrun most/all of France that doesn't mean that Britain and a growing American force aren't still fighting. There is even the potential - although less likely here - for western allied support for unrest in Russia.
Without Petrograd and Moscow, the Reds are doomed as they simply lack the population or industrial capability to fight on at all. IOTL 1919, the Whites very nearly did them in by themselves with the Denikin Offensive and that was without having lost the twin seats of the Revolution. Germany decisively showed in 1918 it could meet and relatively easily defeat Bolshevik resistance in the form of the Ukrainian uprising, this being done with overstretched B and C rated divisions mainly composed of older reservists. The Whites, herein used as those opposing the Bolsheviks by force, effectively control Siberia, most of Central Asia, Southern Russia, and the Germans now hold essentially everything else. Given the Bolsheviks were likewise the ones to sign Brest-Litovsk and the Left SRs had assassinated the German Ambassador with the intention of generating a renewed conflict between the USSR and Germany, the Reds are finished As for the Western Front, if Hazebrouck and Amiens are taken, the French are defeated, the BEF is destroyed and the Americans will be a non-entity.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 29, 2019 15:07:17 GMT
They might well be in the short term but what I'm fearing is that if their clearly deposed by a German intervention then any regime imposed afterwards is going to look to many like a foreign puppet, even if the Germans don't annex any further territories to their sphere of influence and the Bolsheviks are going to be able to present themselves as the guardians of not just the revolution but also Russian independence. OTL while they had some doubts both the Menshiviks and the SRs ended up supporting the Bolsheviks rather than the Whites and that's even more likely in this scenario. As such given the size and poor communications across much of Russia there's going to be plenty of scope for resistance of many forms. Also if the right wingers start reducing those gains from the revolution, i.e. land reform especially and stamping down on criticism there's going to be a lot of support for such opposition.
In that case can a war weary German face the continued commitment to prop up a weak Neo-Czarist regime for a prolonged period? Militarily possibly but economically and socially could be a different matter. Even if its overrun most/all of France that doesn't mean that Britain and a growing American force aren't still fighting. There is even the potential - although less likely here - for western allied support for unrest in Russia.
Without Petrograd and Moscow, the Reds are doomed as they simply lack the population or industrial capability to fight on at all. IOTL 1919, the Whites very nearly did them in by themselves with the Denikin Offensive and that was without having lost the twin seats of the Revolution. Germany decisively showed in 1918 it could meet and relatively easily defeat Bolshevik resistance in the form of the Ukrainian uprising, this being done with overstretched B and C rated divisions mainly composed of older reservists. The Whites, herein used as those opposing the Bolsheviks by force, effectively control Siberia, most of Central Asia, Southern Russia, and the Germans now hold essentially everything else. Given the Bolsheviks were likewise the ones to sign Brest-Litovsk and the Left SRs had assassinated the German Ambassador with the intention of generating a renewed conflict between the USSR and Germany, the Reds are finished As for the Western Front, if Hazebrouck and Amiens are taken, the French are defeated, the BEF is destroyed and the Americans will be a non-entity.
I think we have fundamental differences here on both points. The Bolseviks and other anti-German forces won't be able to oppose the Germany or their puppets in open combat but I don't see that as the end of resistance. Its one thing to occupy an area and another to actually control it.
Ditto that the defeat of France, even if it occupied the entire country, which would be very expensive for an already drained Germany would mean the end of resistance in the west. The US army is still pretty weak due to lack of experience and reliance on allied supplies but has the capacity to expand considerably and the British have a very experienced force that is unlikely to be totally destroyed simply because it can fall back to the coast and if necessarily evacuate. Also you would still have the large British and allied forces elsewhere.
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Post by TheRomanSlayer on Sept 14, 2019 3:41:45 GMT
There is a timeline on AH.com about a USSR that saw the survival of Stalin long enough to see a Second Great Purge that resulted in a war against Mao's China, and other nastiness that led to the division of what looks like the former USSR in terms of territory, aptly named "Twilight of the Red Tsar".
Another thing too is that if Italy didn't get involved in the whole Greek misadventure that dragged Hitler into the Balkans, that might have saved Hitler from a headache that the British would exploit. Perhaps if reconstruction was a far more important priority than reckless expansion for Mussolini, then it would have happened. However, Mussolini being Mussolini would needlessly get involved in one misadventure after another misadventure.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Sept 14, 2019 9:35:00 GMT
There is a timeline on AH.com about a USSR that saw the survival of Stalin long enough to see a Second Great Purge that resulted in a war against Mao's China, and other nastiness that led to the division of what looks like the former USSR in terms of territory, aptly named "Twilight of the Red Tsar". Another thing too is that if Italy didn't get involved in the whole Greek misadventure that dragged Hitler into the Balkans, that might have saved Hitler from a headache that the British would exploit. Perhaps if reconstruction was a far more important priority than reckless expansion for Mussolini, then it would have happened. However, Mussolini being Mussolini would needlessly get involved in one misadventure after another misadventure.
The 1st bit sounds a bit odd. Mao broke with Moscow over Khrushchev's denouncement of Stalin. However I suppose if Stalin held power long enough that his paranoia and desire to control everything would probably mean a clash with Mao at some point.
Mussolini being the person he was then something like his adventure in Greece was very likely. However the real disaster for the allies was the death of Metaxas as he as both PM and effective dictator had vetoed any British direct involvement in Greece because he feared that would prompt a German invasion. Which coupled with the anti-German coup in Belgrade it did. You might have seen it stay a purely Greek-Italian war at least until the Germans were committed to the invasion of Russia. [While Greece had been doing spectacularly well they were running out of manpower while Italy, with a much higher population had much more staying power.]
The general view is that the intervention in the Balkans didn't greatly affect Operation Barbarossa. Wet weather and the traditional spring mud period would have delayed the attack until pretty much historical date anyway. There is the question of the relatively light losses in the campaign and probably more importantly wear and tear on the men and machines involved but again its probably not significant in the wider campaign given that the German offensive was running out of steam by early Oct at the latest, given the heavy casualties and logistical problems.
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