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Post by EwellHolmes on Jan 4, 2020 0:30:05 GMT
Not at all; London had already publicly stated it was willing to sell if the inhabitants of the territories in question were in favor of it. Seward's Attempt to Annex British Columbia, 1865-1869 by David E. Shi ( Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 (May, 1978), pp. 217-238): The Oxford professor, Goldwin Smith, who later emigrated to Canada, advised Seward that Canada "seems likely (unless our statesmen adopt a different policy) to fall into your hands of itself, perhaps before you want it." The London Times echoed Smith's assessment, reporting that Britain would not object if Canadians wished to join the United States, but if a union was promulgated by force, Her Majesty's government would protest. This was a common view of British scholars and politicians, who had little faith in Canada's future and even less regard for her aspirations for dominion.
Read your own words. What a couple of US politicians talking to each other of their desires is not a reliable presentation of the situation.
I did, and it decisively supports what I'm saying; it's not quoting U.S. politicians but instead archival research supported by both British and Canadian news reporting: " In such an unstable situation, growing support among the colonists for annexation to the United States represented a logical development. Many were painfully aware of the prosperity and lower taxes prevalent in the neighboring American states. Agitation for annexation began in 1866 and remained a prominent issue for several years. Vancouver Island emerged as the center of support for the movement, particularly the port town of Victoria. " "For several months prior to this last dispatch, Seward had been receiving additional evidence from British Columbia indicating substantial support in the colony for annexation. Allen Francis, the American consul in Victoria, reported in September 1866 that "the people of Vancouver Island, and of British Columbia, are almost unanimous in their desire for annexation to the United States." He included an article excerpted from the Victoria Evening Telegraph of September 5, 1866, which characterized British Columbia's relations with the United States as being closer "than our relations with any of the colonies." Two weeks later a public meeting in Victoria voted to request Great Britain to permit annexation to the United States." The British rejected the notion of ceding all of Canada, but did appear willing to concede British Colombia; their willingness to submit to arbitration after Seward broached the issue is telling. |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Jan 4, 2020 0:56:48 GMT
No one else existed to replace the United States as the supplier of the Entente. Once Entente credit run out, their war machines collapses. To quote Hew Strachan's The First World War: "By 1st April 1917 Britain had an overdraft in the United States of $358 million and was spending $75 million a week. The American entry to the war saved the Entente - and possibly some American speculators - from bankruptcy." For a contemporary source, the British Treasury Committee issued a report in October of 1916, stating that: "Our financial agents tell us in effect that, by the use of every available device, and possibly at the cost of postponing payments by bank overdrafts, we shall still be solvent on 31st March [1917]. They cannot tell us how this result is to be achieved, but they hope and believe it will be possible". The well was dry, and their last hope was the United States. For want of no USW or, at the least, no Zimmerman Telegraph, the Entente would've fallen apart by that Summer at the latest.
If no USW there is a lot of shipping and supplies that doesn't get sunk. This can be used to bring food, oil and the like from other places, including the dominions and the empires of the EP power. The allies supplied the vast majority of their own weaponry and even much of the equipment that the US used when it entered the conflict.
In terms of funds they can do what Germany did and rely more on internal loans, forced if necessary as in Germany. [With non-essential imports cut people will have less spending opportunity and hence can invest in war loans]. Likely to cause some nasty problems post war but will see the alliance through the problem. Especially since the allies have no choice. As shown by German war aims and what happens in the east after the Bolsheviks took Russia out of the war there is no option for peace with imperial Germany other than victory.
No other sources of supply exist and if they did, they'd be irrelevant. Britain had an overdraft in her New York accounts, which she was, by the admission of her own Committees, completely unable to service by April of 1917. In other words, once this juncture had arrived, her currency would collapse and all of her holdings would be evaporated, annexed by the United States to service her existing accounts; within the space of the day, the British economy would cease to function and her entire credit worthiness would cease to exist with it. And no, she cannot meet her own needs nor did Germany even: Even ignoring the inability of the British to pay for such goods, they lack any sellers. For example, on food: Production of weapons matters not, because the British were extremely dependent on the Americans for that: Finally, Oil itself:  Deprived of American food, oil, machinery, explosives, and Credit, the Entente is doomed to collapse. |
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Post by TheRomanSlayer on Jan 4, 2020 8:47:59 GMT
I would have loved to see a scenario that leads to Russia taking over all of Hawaii because I wonder if they would have a different set of colonial policies in place than the ones they historically used for their control of Alaska.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jan 4, 2020 11:33:47 GMT
Read your own words. What a couple of US politicians talking to each other of their desires is not a reliable presentation of the situation.
I did, and it decisively supports what I'm saying; it's not quoting U.S. politicians but instead archival research supported by both British and Canadian news reporting: " In such an unstable situation, growing support among the colonists for annexation to the United States represented a logical development. Many were painfully aware of the prosperity and lower taxes prevalent in the neighboring American states. Agitation for annexation began in 1866 and remained a prominent issue for several years. Vancouver Island emerged as the center of support for the movement, particularly the port town of Victoria. " "For several months prior to this last dispatch, Seward had been receiving additional evidence from British Columbia indicating substantial support in the colony for annexation. Allen Francis, the American consul in Victoria, reported in September 1866 that "the people of Vancouver Island, and of British Columbia, are almost unanimous in their desire for annexation to the United States." He included an article excerpted from the Victoria Evening Telegraph of September 5, 1866, which characterized British Columbia's relations with the United States as being closer "than our relations with any of the colonies." Two weeks later a public meeting in Victoria voted to request Great Britain to permit annexation to the United States." The British rejected the notion of ceding all of Canada, but did appear willing to concede British Colombia; their willingness to submit to arbitration after Seward broached the issue is telling.
Your previous comment was largely about what two American politicians were saying, even disregarding Steward's past record for outrageous statements about war with the UK and annexing Canada. Along with vague comments about people in BC being in favour of annexation to the US. Were they the majority of the people or simply a few misfits and American migrants who were shouting loudly?
Britain agreed to arbitration over the US claims to resolve an issue that disrupted trade with the US. Forcing people into the US was never an option.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jan 4, 2020 11:51:37 GMT
If no USW there is a lot of shipping and supplies that doesn't get sunk. This can be used to bring food, oil and the like from other places, including the dominions and the empires of the EP power. The allies supplied the vast majority of their own weaponry and even much of the equipment that the US used when it entered the conflict.
In terms of funds they can do what Germany did and rely more on internal loans, forced if necessary as in Germany. [With non-essential imports cut people will have less spending opportunity and hence can invest in war loans]. Likely to cause some nasty problems post war but will see the alliance through the problem. Especially since the allies have no choice. As shown by German war aims and what happens in the east after the Bolsheviks took Russia out of the war there is no option for peace with imperial Germany other than victory.
No other sources of supply exist and if they did, they'd be irrelevant. Britain had an overdraft in her New York accounts, which she was, by the admission of her own Committees, completely unable to service by April of 1917. In other words, once this juncture had arrived, her currency would collapse and all of her holdings would be evaporated, annexed by the United States to service her existing accounts; within the space of the day, the British economy would cease to function and her entire credit worthiness would cease to exist with it. And no, she cannot meet her own needs nor did Germany even: Even ignoring the inability of the British to pay for such goods, they lack any sellers. For example, on food: Production of weapons matters not, because the British were extremely dependent on the Americans for that: Finally, Oil itself: Deprived of American food, oil, machinery, explosives, and Credit, the Entente is doomed to collapse.
No the entente has a lot of slack it can cut if the US decided to end trading with them. Going to be bad but not a total collapse as your suggesting. The EPs imported from the US largely because it was the cheapest and most acceptable source but not the only one. Especially if Germany hasn't gone for USW then there is a lot of shipping available for imports of foodstuff and other raw materials from the empires and the southern dominions as well as Canada. Basically what such a cut of trade would do would be to put the allies in the position Germany had been in since pretty much the start of the war but their still got access to a large part of the rest of the world and can stagger on for longer than an already faltering Germany.
Again due to the idiotic ideological belief in free trade and laissez faire Britain had become over-dependent on some manufactured items from overseas, and this showed in the early years of the war when a lot of shells and other material were imported from the US - sometimes of very poor quality - until British production was set up which by 1917 was largely the case. The EPs are not going to run out of weapons and munitions. They might have to cut back sometime but they will still have a lot more than the CPs. As the link you posted said Britain made an huge effort to rebuild its industrial base and had largely done so by this period along with a considerable contribution by Canada and the French reconstructing a lot of their own industry.
25% of the cost of the war by current taxes is actually a bloody large amount by historical standards, especially for a war as large and expensive as something like WWI. I'm actually surprised that the small American central government of the period covered a similar amount of their admittedly much smaller war costs by raised taxes. As your link says Britain raised most of the rest by borrowing, largely from its own population. The US deciding not to trade with the EPs any longer would cause problems but not the total disaster your assuming.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Jan 4, 2020 12:40:20 GMT
No other sources of supply exist and if they did, they'd be irrelevant. Britain had an overdraft in her New York accounts, which she was, by the admission of her own Committees, completely unable to service by April of 1917. In other words, once this juncture had arrived, her currency would collapse and all of her holdings would be evaporated, annexed by the United States to service her existing accounts; within the space of the day, the British economy would cease to function and her entire credit worthiness would cease to exist with it. And no, she cannot meet her own needs nor did Germany even: Even ignoring the inability of the British to pay for such goods, they lack any sellers. For example, on food: Production of weapons matters not, because the British were extremely dependent on the Americans for that: Finally, Oil itself: Deprived of American food, oil, machinery, explosives, and Credit, the Entente is doomed to collapse.
No the entente has a lot of slack it can cut if the US decided to end trading with them. Going to be bad but not a total collapse as your suggesting. The EPs imported from the US largely because it was the cheapest and most acceptable source but not the only one. Especially if Germany hasn't gone for USW then there is a lot of shipping available for imports of foodstuff and other raw materials from the empires and the southern dominions as well as Canada. Basically what such a cut of trade would do would be to put the allies in the position Germany had been in since pretty much the start of the war but their still got access to a large part of the rest of the world and can stagger on for longer than an already faltering Germany.
Again due to the idiotic ideological belief in free trade and laissez faire Britain had become over-dependent on some manufactured items from overseas, and this showed in the early years of the war when a lot of shells and other material were imported from the US - sometimes of very poor quality - until British production was set up which by 1917 was largely the case. The EPs are not going to run out of weapons and munitions. They might have to cut back sometime but they will still have a lot more than the CPs. As the link you posted said Britain made an huge effort to rebuild its industrial base and had largely done so by this period along with a considerable contribution by Canada and the French reconstructing a lot of their own industry.
25% of the cost of the war by current taxes is actually a bloody large amount by historical standards, especially for a war as large and expensive as something like WWI. I'm actually surprised that the small American central government of the period covered a similar amount of their admittedly much smaller war costs by raised taxes. As your link says Britain raised most of the rest by borrowing, largely from its own population. The US deciding not to trade with the EPs any longer would cause problems but not the total disaster your assuming.
As I've stated, and provided citations for, the Entente was doomed. No amount of tightening of belts or seeking alternative supply sources can fix this. You bring up seeking supplies from Canada or Australia; neither can furnish the needed goods. The entirety of land under cultivation in Canada was 30 Million and 10 Million for Australia- 13% of the amount the United States. Even if you seized every single bit of agricultural production-and thus throw two whole Dominions into mass starvation-you would be unable to meet the needs of France and Britain both, given their lacking in production is 57 Million acres equivalent. This is also being generous by ignoring the issue of Italy entirely or the further loss of cultivation due to lack of oil. Likewise, no amount of internal borrowing will work; as I've already cited, the British looked at that and discarded it because it would not yield enough to service their accounts. Both the contemporary British committees-upon which Keynes was a member I might need to add-and modern research confirms this. By April, the Pound was going to utterly collapse into being worthless, as would the British credit rating. They would be unable to make purchases anywhere, nor pay for their own goods; unless 10 Downing goes full Communism, they can't force anybody to give them goods or, for that matter, pay their own troops. As it currently stands, you've yet to provide evidence to the contrary of this. Indeed, one wonders why Britain would so indebt itself and completely fail to pay off the debt in the 1920s if this was so easy. That the oil issue was not addressed at all is very telling. That alone renders the Royal Navy defunct by the Summer of 1917, thus removing the blockade of Germany and any hope of countering the U-Boats. |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Jan 4, 2020 13:11:25 GMT
I did, and it decisively supports what I'm saying; it's not quoting U.S. politicians but instead archival research supported by both British and Canadian news reporting: " In such an unstable situation, growing support among the colonists for annexation to the United States represented a logical development. Many were painfully aware of the prosperity and lower taxes prevalent in the neighboring American states. Agitation for annexation began in 1866 and remained a prominent issue for several years. Vancouver Island emerged as the center of support for the movement, particularly the port town of Victoria. " "For several months prior to this last dispatch, Seward had been receiving additional evidence from British Columbia indicating substantial support in the colony for annexation. Allen Francis, the American consul in Victoria, reported in September 1866 that "the people of Vancouver Island, and of British Columbia, are almost unanimous in their desire for annexation to the United States." He included an article excerpted from the Victoria Evening Telegraph of September 5, 1866, which characterized British Columbia's relations with the United States as being closer "than our relations with any of the colonies." Two weeks later a public meeting in Victoria voted to request Great Britain to permit annexation to the United States." The British rejected the notion of ceding all of Canada, but did appear willing to concede British Colombia; their willingness to submit to arbitration after Seward broached the issue is telling.
Your previous comment was largely about what two American politicians were saying, even disregarding Steward's past record for outrageous statements about war with the UK and annexing Canada. Along with vague comments about people in BC being in favour of annexation to the US. Were they the majority of the people or simply a few misfits and American migrants who were shouting loudly?
Britain agreed to arbitration over the US claims to resolve an issue that disrupted trade with the US. Forcing people into the US was never an option.
My previous comment included those parts as I was directly quoting from the work. The author of said, using contemporary sources, shows the entire population of British Columbia was 10,000 at the time and that Victoria, the capitol and largest settlement at 3,200 persons, voted in favor of annexation to the United States. To further quote from the same source: "The Oxford professor, Goldwin Smith, who later emigrated to Canada, advised Seward that Canada "seems likely (unless our statesmen adopt a different policy) to fall into your hands of itself, perhaps before you want it."8 The London Times echoed Smith's assessment, reporting that Britain would not object if Canadians wished to join the United States, but if a union was promulgated by force, Her Majesty's government would protest.9 This was a common view of British scholars and politicians, who had little faith in Canada's future and even less regard for her aspirations for dominion status." "In such an unstable situation, growing support among the colonists for annexation to the United States represented a logical development. Many were painfully aware of the prosperity and lower taxes prevalent in the neighboring American states. Agitation for annexation began in 1866 and remained a prominent issue for several years. Vancouver Island emerged as the center of support for the movement, particularly the port town of Victoria." "Seward hoped to delay the claims negotiations, thus allowing annexation support in British Columbia to increase to a point where the British government would have no alternative but to consent to the union. Most indications were that such would be the case. In May 1867, C. B. Adderly, parliamentary undersecretary for the colonies, predicted in a speech: " It seems to me impossible that we should long hold British Columbia from its natural annexation."51 51 A few weeks later, the New York Times characterized the "entire press of Vancouver's as "unanimous in representing that annexation is now the only
possible remedy for the political grievances of the colony."52 Seward, the Montreal Gazette reported, "has his eye on British Columbia and he wishes to make a settlement with England for the Alabama claims by the annexation of that territory." "At approximately the same time, Bruce [Sir Frederick Bruce, the British minister in Washington] advised the Foreign Office that unless Canada met the demands of British Columbia for a connecting railroad, the American effort to obtain the colony "will be powerfully reinforced by the material interests of the Northwest which will be enlisted in favor of...annexation." |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jan 4, 2020 15:04:43 GMT
Your previous comment was largely about what two American politicians were saying, even disregarding Steward's past record for outrageous statements about war with the UK and annexing Canada. Along with vague comments about people in BC being in favour of annexation to the US. Were they the majority of the people or simply a few misfits and American migrants who were shouting loudly?
Britain agreed to arbitration over the US claims to resolve an issue that disrupted trade with the US. Forcing people into the US was never an option.
My previous comment included those parts as I was directly quoting from the work. The author of said, using contemporary sources, shows the entire population of British Columbia was 10,000 at the time and that Victoria, the capitol and largest settlement at 3,200 persons, voted in favor of annexation to the United States. To further quote from the same source: "The Oxford professor, Goldwin Smith, who later emigrated to Canada, advised Seward that Canada "seems likely (unless our statesmen adopt a different policy) to fall into your hands of itself, perhaps before you want it."8 The London Times echoed Smith's assessment, reporting that Britain would not object if Canadians wished to join the United States, but if a union was promulgated by force, Her Majesty's government would protest.9 This was a common view of British scholars and politicians, who had little faith in Canada's future and even less regard for her aspirations for dominion status." "In such an unstable situation, growing support among the colonists for annexation to the United States represented a logical development. Many were painfully aware of the prosperity and lower taxes prevalent in the neighboring American states. Agitation for annexation began in 1866 and remained a prominent issue for several years. Vancouver Island emerged as the center of support for the movement, particularly the port town of Victoria." "Seward hoped to delay the claims negotiations, thus allowing annexation support in British Columbia to increase to a point where the British government would have no alternative but to consent to the union. Most indications were that such would be the case. In May 1867, C. B. Adderly, parliamentary undersecretary for the colonies, predicted in a speech: " It seems to me impossible that we should long hold British Columbia from its natural annexation."51 51 A few weeks later, the New York Times characterized the "entire press of Vancouver's as "unanimous in representing that annexation is now the only
possible remedy for the political grievances of the colony."52 Seward, the Montreal Gazette reported, "has his eye on British Columbia and he wishes to make a settlement with England for the Alabama claims by the annexation of that territory." "At approximately the same time, Bruce [Sir Frederick Bruce, the British minister in Washington] advised the Foreign Office that unless Canada met the demands of British Columbia for a connecting railroad, the American effort to obtain the colony "will be powerfully reinforced by the material interests of the Northwest which will be enlisted in favor of...annexation."
Again a lot of those references are from US sources. There was genuine concern in BC about its isolation, and also in the rest of Canada it is true. Possibly that might have been a factor in some settlers using talk of annexation to the US as a pressure point on Ottawa to get the desired railway. As history shows they did and Steward's delusions were never a serious problem.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jan 4, 2020 15:19:07 GMT
No the entente has a lot of slack it can cut if the US decided to end trading with them. Going to be bad but not a total collapse as your suggesting. The EPs imported from the US largely because it was the cheapest and most acceptable source but not the only one. Especially if Germany hasn't gone for USW then there is a lot of shipping available for imports of foodstuff and other raw materials from the empires and the southern dominions as well as Canada. Basically what such a cut of trade would do would be to put the allies in the position Germany had been in since pretty much the start of the war but their still got access to a large part of the rest of the world and can stagger on for longer than an already faltering Germany.
Again due to the idiotic ideological belief in free trade and laissez faire Britain had become over-dependent on some manufactured items from overseas, and this showed in the early years of the war when a lot of shells and other material were imported from the US - sometimes of very poor quality - until British production was set up which by 1917 was largely the case. The EPs are not going to run out of weapons and munitions. They might have to cut back sometime but they will still have a lot more than the CPs. As the link you posted said Britain made an huge effort to rebuild its industrial base and had largely done so by this period along with a considerable contribution by Canada and the French reconstructing a lot of their own industry.
25% of the cost of the war by current taxes is actually a bloody large amount by historical standards, especially for a war as large and expensive as something like WWI. I'm actually surprised that the small American central government of the period covered a similar amount of their admittedly much smaller war costs by raised taxes. As your link says Britain raised most of the rest by borrowing, largely from its own population. The US deciding not to trade with the EPs any longer would cause problems but not the total disaster your assuming.
As I've stated, and provided citations for, the Entente was doomed. No amount of tightening of belts or seeking alternative supply sources can fix this. You bring up seeking supplies from Canada or Australia; neither can furnish the needed goods. The entirety of land under cultivation in Canada was 30 Million and 10 Million for Australia- 13% of the amount the United States. Even if you seized every single bit of agricultural production-and thus throw two whole Dominions into mass starvation-you would be unable to meet the needs of France and Britain both, given their lacking in production is 57 Million acres equivalent. This is also being generous by ignoring the issue of Italy entirely or the further loss of cultivation due to lack of oil. Likewise, no amount of internal borrowing will work; as I've already cited, the British looked at that and discarded it because it would not yield enough to service their accounts. Both the contemporary British committees-upon which Keynes was a member I might need to add-and modern research confirms this. By April, the Pound was going to utterly collapse into being worthless, as would the British credit rating. They would be unable to make purchases anywhere, nor pay for their own goods; unless 10 Downing goes full Communism, they can't force anybody to give them goods or, for that matter, pay their own troops. As it currently stands, you've yet to provide evidence to the contrary of this. Indeed, one wonders why Britain would so indebt itself and completely fail to pay off the debt in the 1920s if this was so easy. That the oil issue was not addressed at all is very telling. That alone renders the Royal Navy defunct by the Summer of 1917, thus removing the blockade of Germany and any hope of countering the U-Boats.
As your stated by assertion. Where do you get that 57 million acres figure from? If that has weight you may have a point but given the large effort to increase production in Britain and the many other sources available to the EP's I'm doubtful. You will see a lot of belt-tightening and changes in diet but the EPs are still a lot better off than the CPs.
I fail to see the idea that the British economic is set up for a total collapse, n historically unparalleled anywhere in the world. Simply because they have been able to use world markets to meet demand and still can to some degree doesn't make it impossible for them to continue to use the standard internal fund raising methods.
The 2nd bit of that paragraph is inaccurate. I never said it would be easy. Furthermore the UK OTL continued to maintain high defence spending due to activities such as the interventions in Russia and elsewhere which it might not in this case. The big problem, other than the very high level of debt resulting from the wars, especially as so many allies defaulted on their debts to the UK - else it would have had a net surplus from the war debts - were internal political decisions post war. One was the US's continuation of very high tariffs to prevent people selling to it. Even more import were decisions to attempt to return to the laissez faire approach that had so clearly failed pre-war. Most famously Churchill's idiotic decision to return to the gold standard at the 1914 level!
Very good reasons for not mentioning oil.
a) Britain had secured access to the Persian oil fields to ensure that the RN's demands for oil were met. b) You are aware that the majority of the fleet at this time were still coal fueled?
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Post by EwellHolmes on Jan 15, 2020 9:20:34 GMT
My previous comment included those parts as I was directly quoting from the work. The author of said, using contemporary sources, shows the entire population of British Columbia was 10,000 at the time and that Victoria, the capitol and largest settlement at 3,200 persons, voted in favor of annexation to the United States. To further quote from the same source: "The Oxford professor, Goldwin Smith, who later emigrated to Canada, advised Seward that Canada "seems likely (unless our statesmen adopt a different policy) to fall into your hands of itself, perhaps before you want it."8 The London Times echoed Smith's assessment, reporting that Britain would not object if Canadians wished to join the United States, but if a union was promulgated by force, Her Majesty's government would protest.9 This was a common view of British scholars and politicians, who had little faith in Canada's future and even less regard for her aspirations for dominion status." "In such an unstable situation, growing support among the colonists for annexation to the United States represented a logical development. Many were painfully aware of the prosperity and lower taxes prevalent in the neighboring American states. Agitation for annexation began in 1866 and remained a prominent issue for several years. Vancouver Island emerged as the center of support for the movement, particularly the port town of Victoria." "Seward hoped to delay the claims negotiations, thus allowing annexation support in British Columbia to increase to a point where the British government would have no alternative but to consent to the union. Most indications were that such would be the case. In May 1867, C. B. Adderly, parliamentary undersecretary for the colonies, predicted in a speech: " It seems to me impossible that we should long hold British Columbia from its natural annexation."51 51 A few weeks later, the New York Times characterized the "entire press of Vancouver's as "unanimous in representing that annexation is now the only
possible remedy for the political grievances of the colony."52 Seward, the Montreal Gazette reported, "has his eye on British Columbia and he wishes to make a settlement with England for the Alabama claims by the annexation of that territory." "At approximately the same time, Bruce [Sir Frederick Bruce, the British minister in Washington] advised the Foreign Office that unless Canada met the demands of British Columbia for a connecting railroad, the American effort to obtain the colony "will be powerfully reinforced by the material interests of the Northwest which will be enlisted in favor of...annexation."
Again a lot of those references are from US sources. There was genuine concern in BC about its isolation, and also in the rest of Canada it is true. Possibly that might have been a factor in some settlers using talk of annexation to the US as a pressure point on Ottawa to get the desired railway. As history shows they did and Steward's delusions were never a serious problem.
The London Times, Montreal Gazette and Sir Fredrick Bruce are American? Likewise, even if a source is American that does not make it wrong. |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Jan 15, 2020 9:55:26 GMT
As I've stated, and provided citations for, the Entente was doomed. No amount of tightening of belts or seeking alternative supply sources can fix this. You bring up seeking supplies from Canada or Australia; neither can furnish the needed goods. The entirety of land under cultivation in Canada was 30 Million and 10 Million for Australia- 13% of the amount the United States. Even if you seized every single bit of agricultural production-and thus throw two whole Dominions into mass starvation-you would be unable to meet the needs of France and Britain both, given their lacking in production is 57 Million acres equivalent. This is also being generous by ignoring the issue of Italy entirely or the further loss of cultivation due to lack of oil. Likewise, no amount of internal borrowing will work; as I've already cited, the British looked at that and discarded it because it would not yield enough to service their accounts. Both the contemporary British committees-upon which Keynes was a member I might need to add-and modern research confirms this. By April, the Pound was going to utterly collapse into being worthless, as would the British credit rating. They would be unable to make purchases anywhere, nor pay for their own goods; unless 10 Downing goes full Communism, they can't force anybody to give them goods or, for that matter, pay their own troops. As it currently stands, you've yet to provide evidence to the contrary of this. Indeed, one wonders why Britain would so indebt itself and completely fail to pay off the debt in the 1920s if this was so easy. That the oil issue was not addressed at all is very telling. That alone renders the Royal Navy defunct by the Summer of 1917, thus removing the blockade of Germany and any hope of countering the U-Boats.
As your stated by assertion. Where do you get that 57 million acres figure from? If that has weight you may have a point but given the large effort to increase production in Britain and the many other sources available to the EP's I'm doubtful. You will see a lot of belt-tightening and changes in diet but the EPs are still a lot better off than the CPs.
I fail to see the idea that the British economic is set up for a total collapse, n historically unparalleled anywhere in the world. Simply because they have been able to use world markets to meet demand and still can to some degree doesn't make it impossible for them to continue to use the standard internal fund raising methods.
The 2nd bit of that paragraph is inaccurate. I never said it would be easy. Furthermore the UK OTL continued to maintain high defence spending due to activities such as the interventions in Russia and elsewhere which it might not in this case. The big problem, other than the very high level of debt resulting from the wars, especially as so many allies defaulted on their debts to the UK - else it would have had a net surplus from the war debts - were internal political decisions post war. One was the US's continuation of very high tariffs to prevent people selling to it. Even more import were decisions to attempt to return to the laissez faire approach that had so clearly failed pre-war. Most famously Churchill's idiotic decision to return to the gold standard at the 1914 level!
Very good reasons for not mentioning oil.
a) Britain had secured access to the Persian oil fields to ensure that the RN's demands for oil were met. b) You are aware that the majority of the fleet at this time were still coal fueled?
French cultivation Pre-War was 60 million acres, and this had collapsed by half during the war: a net loss of 30 million acres. The British, with 18 million acres under cultivation, could only supply 40% of their needs, thus necessitating the importation of 27 million acres equivalent or 60% of their needs. Combined, that is 57 million acres. At the time, Admiral Sims cabled Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels on April 14, 1917, "Mr Hoover informs me that there is only sufficient grain supply in this country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail stores." Basically, if nothing else, the Entente was going to be starved out very quickly if no American intervention occurred. Likewise, as I said, the British Treasury itself said they had no options and no other source. To once again quote from them: "Our financial agents tell us in effect that, by the use of every available device, and possibly at the cost of postponing payments by bank overdrafts, we shall still be solvent on 31st March [1917]. They cannot tell us how this result is to be achieved, but they hope and believe it will be possible." This is the British Treasury saying every means they have is only enough to get them to April, with nothing left past that. I mean, for all the talk of "tightening of belts", the British themselves stated they had no other sources to rely upon and even making to April required a prayer. Too Proud To Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality by Patrick Devlin, from which this is quoted, also includes the following on the state of the French: "France had in October [1916] completely exhausted her gold and dollar resources, and in order to finance her American expenditures for the next six months needed at least £40,000,000 [about $200 million at 1916 exchange rates] from the British Treasury in addition to the sums already promised." Further, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page by Burton J. Hendrick puts it succinctly: "It should always be remembered, however, that Great Britain was financing not only herself, but her Allies, and that the difficult condition in which she now found herself was caused by the not too considerate demands of the nations with which she was allied in the war. Thus by April 6, 1917, Great Britain had overdrawn her account with JP Morgan to the extent of $400,000,000 and had no cash available with which to meet this overdraft. This obligation had been incurred in the purchase of supplies, both for Great Britain and for the Allied governments; and securities, largely British-owned stocks and bonds, had been deposited to protect the bankers. The money was now coming due; if the obligations were not met, the credit of Great Britain in this country would reach the vanishing point. Though at first there was a slight misunderstanding about this matter, the American government finally paid this overdraft out of the proceeds of the First Liberty Loan. This act saved the credit of the Allied countries. The first danger that threatened, the isolation and starvation of Great Britain, was therefore overcome." As for the matter of oil, Persia was insufficient for Allied needs and the lack of oil would've immobilized the newest ships of the British fleet, in particular much of destroyers:    Some other highlights: "Earlier in the month Sir Albert Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade, had pointed out that UK petrol stocks were declining because demand exceeded imports. Shortages of shipping meant that imports in 1917 were likely to be lower than in 1916. Civilian consumption of 10,000,000 gallons per month could be reduced to 8,000,000. Any further cuts would severely disrupt the life and commerce of the country. Military use at home had to be restricted; the War Office and the Admiralty were both taking measures to economise on the use of petrol." ___ "Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, informed the War Cabinet on 24 May that naval oil stocks amounted to less than three month's supply. Five large tankers had been sunk during the last month. The cruising of the Grand Fleet had consequently been restricted. In early June Tothill said in a memorandum that: '[t]he situation as regards oil is critical. Under present circumstances, oilers must be considered the most valuable vessels afloat. They should be convoyed.' On 30 June he warned the War Cabinet that stocks of naval oil fuel had fallen because of delays in the completion of tankers, losses of tankers, greater activity by oil burning vessels and an increase in the number of warships burning oil. Further supplies of oil had been requested from the USA, but had not yet been received. Long was in contact with Lord Northcliffe, Head of the British War Mission to the USA, over this issue. In Britain the construction and repair of tankers had been speeded up. The speed of oil-burning warships had been restricted, 'except in the gravest emergency and except in the Southern part of the North Sea.' Fleet movements were to be as restricted as much as possible. Tankers were to be convoyed both on route to and from Britain and on coastal passage and to be escorted in the submarine area. The number of tankers with the Fleet was to be reduced to the minimum possible number. Oil fuel was being imported from America in the double bottoms of cargo ships. Home production was being increased; this could have only a small impact in the immediate future." ___ "Restrictions on oil imports affected food supplies in two ways. The first was that importing oil in double bottoms of cargo ships meant that ships not designed to carry oil could transport it. It did not increase the cargo capacity of the ship so there was a trade off between oil and other goods such as food. On 13 August Maclay told the First Lord of the Admiralty and Hankey that imports from the USA and Canada had fallen by about 1,250,000 tons per annum because of the need to carry oil in the double bottoms of liners and cargo ships. To replace losses 480,000 tons of tankers were being constructed annually, a fifth of the total merchant ship construction programme. The absence of the cargo ships that otherwise would have been built meant a fall of 1,750,000 tons of imports over twelve months. These figures were for naval oil only: another 250,000 of capacity must be allocated to double bottom imports to maintain commercial stocks and 240,000 tons of construction used to replace sunk commercial tankers.The shortage of oil also impacted domestic food production because of attempts to increase output by replacing farm animals with motorised tractors. On 17 July Rowland Prothero, the President of the Board of Agriculture, wrote to Long regarding a letter sent by Cadman to the Board of Agriculture asking it to consider cutting its demands for petrol for tractors. Prothero wanted to help as much as possible but could not do so without reducing a ploughing programme that had been approved by the Cabinet. If insufficient petrol was available to carry out this out then he felt that it was up to the Cabinet rather than himself to reconsider the situation.254 Long explained that Cadman was acting on his authority; he was responsible to the Cabinet for all issues regarding oil. In November Prothero warned the War Cabinet that insufficient fuel had allocated to the motor tractors ordered as part of a programme to increase agricultural output in England and Wales. He argued that food production should be given the same status as the armed forces and munitions output, giving it priority over other civilian and industrial uses. The Cabinet should make sure that more oil was imported and that enough of it was allocated to food production. Otherwise the part of the ploughing programme to be carried out by motor tractors would have to be abandoned. In that case the Cabinet must give the order or the Board of Agriculture would lose all credibility with farmers.256 Long explained that oil stocks still were dangerously low despite the importation of 100,000 tons per month in double bottoms. Doing so reduced the imports of food and other essentials so all new tankers would have to be used to replace the use of double bottoms. The Ministry of Shipping estimated that overall imports must be reduced by 8,000,000 tons per annum (666,000 tons per month), showing that the use of double bottoms must end as soon as a safety margin of oil stocks was secured. Demand for petroleum products from the Armed Forces was rising; almost all new warships burnt oil. The required level of naval stocks was rising each month. Prothero's requests placed demands on tanker tonnage that Long would do his 'utmost to meet, but which it is impossible to guarantee in the existing conditions of the Admiralty and War Office stocks.'257 Adoption of Prothero's proposal to treat agriculture the same as the armed forces would contradict the Cabinet's ruling, and would return to the situation that the current structure was intended to avoid. Shipping resources were already operating at maximum effort. In December Maclay told the Petroleum Committee that Britain was 'faced with a very serious deficit in the tonnage now required to be allotted to Government services. The wheat position is particularly grave.'258 By the end of January, wheat stocks would be only 15-16 weeks demand, a very low level since half was held by the farmers. Wheat was available in the USA; the problem was finding ships to transport it. Maclay said there was a shortage of 40 ships, and it was 'of the utmost importance that every possible step be taken to reduce this deficit.'259 He suggested that half the deficit could be covered by abandoning the use of double bottoms for oil for a month. J. A. Salter, the Director of Shipping Requisition, attended the 12th meeting of the committee on 12 December 1917. He explained that the main problem was the failure of the French and Italian harvests, meaning that imports had to be diverted from Britain to those countries. The meeting concluded that a telegram should be sent to Sir Frederick Black in New York urging that the Americans release more tonnage for the North Atlantic route. Stopping use of double bottoms was discussed. Long insisted that naval fuel had to be prioritised." ___ The situation was much the same for the French: "On 11 December Bérenger reported that France was dependent on its Allies for supplies and transport of oil. Three days later Clemenceau attended a meeting of the Comité Général du Pétrole. The immediate need was for tanker tonnage to bring oil to France; the next day Clemenceau issued a plea to President Wilson for extra tanker tonnage. There was a risk that a 'shortage of gasoline would cause the sudden paralysis of our armies and drive us all into an unacceptable peace.' French stocks of gasoline were currently 28,000 tons, compared with a target minimum of 44,000 and consumption of 30,000 tons per month. Wilson must get the US oil companies to allocate an additional 100,000 tons of tankers to France. These could come from the Pacific and from new construction. Clemenceau's final lines to Wilson were: "There is for the Allies a question of public salvation. If they are determined not to lose the war, the fighting French must, by the hour of supreme Germanic blow, have large supplies of gasoline which is, in the battle of tomorrow, as necessary as blood."Citation here. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jan 16, 2020 13:37:42 GMT
EwellHolmes , Here you are presenting a lot of facts and it does seem that if the US decided not to start offering unsupported loans to the UK the allies would have suffered serious problems in terms of cutting imports. This would have seriously affected both military and civilian activities but not sure it would have caused a collapse of the EPs ability to wage war. If nothing else they could have gone more onto the defensive to reduce comsumption and also possibly freed up manpower and other resources to help civilian activity.
The points on food and fuel are more decisive probably. There would have to be severe cuts in consumption, especially in non-food related civilian use of oil. It might have forced the EP to look for a peace settlement but when Germany refused they would have had no choice but to continue fighting. Things could well become as bad in some areas as in Germany and it would have caused serious problems but I repeat given German desires for conquest the allies had no alternative.
Steve
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Zyobot
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Just a time-traveling robot stranded on Earth.
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Post by Zyobot on Jan 19, 2020 21:50:32 GMT
'No KKK'.
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insect
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Post by insect on Jan 19, 2020 21:51:56 GMT
Howard Stassen ran for president from 1948 to at least 92 how about a Stassen president t.l.
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Zyobot
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Just a time-traveling robot stranded on Earth.
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Post by Zyobot on Jan 29, 2020 19:44:10 GMT
Howard Stassen ran for president from 1948 to at least 92 how about a Stassen president t.l. Um, that’d be a PoD for the ‘Underused After 1900’ thread, friend. Also, ‘Medieval Industrial Revolution’. Or, perhaps even less commonly discussed, ‘No Industrial Revolution’ at all, which completely butterflies modern life and the contemporary political paradigm for better or for worse. |
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