The Second Battle of Britain - a Soviet Sealion
Feb 12, 2020 20:42:35 GMT
lordroel, stevep, and 2 more like this
Post by James G on Feb 12, 2020 20:42:35 GMT
197 – Give peace a chance
Since he had been evacuated from Washington in the war’s first few minutes, President Reagan had been away from the White House. He’d returned only twice. The first time had been to give a statement to the American people from inside the Oval Office – pre-recorded and transmitted later – and then he had come back once more to his official residence when meeting with a high-level delegation sent by the Chinese to the United States. With the latter, there had been a hope that China would enter the war and Reagan had been convinced that it would be best if he met them at the White House rather than elsewhere. The whole China thing had been maskirovka of the highest order: the Soviets had promised the Chinese the world to stay neutral, beating anything that the United States would be willing to offer to join in, and Moscow had known about the visit too. Where Reagan had been the majority of the time was either moving about or in ‘secured locations’. When not airborne either on Air Force One, the Doomsday Plane, Marine One or a ground convoy, the president was at Mount Weather where there was an alternate national command post or the Greenbrier resort where Congress was. Washington, the White House especially, was considered a dangerous place for him to be when the country was at war. A decapitation strike was feared… one followed by thousands of nuclear warheads raining down in the country as a follow-up. This all took its toll on Reagan. His health was monitored but there were those who feared for him. Vice President Bush was ready to step up if the need be but no one, not even him, wanted to see that happen. There was belief that Reagan would see them through this war with the United States emerging victorious in the end.
Foreign government leaders didn’t have an easy time being in contact with Reagan. They often found themselves on hold even when phone calls had been pre-arranged. The delays were down to security fears, ones unexplained to those on the other end. Their national intelligence heads would usually get a heads-up later as to the cause – odd activity at a Soviet missile silo being observed from a satellite or a suspected strategic missile submarine right off the American coast – but it did leave many frustrated. Reagan didn’t always have the time either. His country was at war just like theirs were. There were things that needed his attention, Congress especially, at a time like this. To spend long amounts of time hand-holding allied leaders just wasn’t what he should be doing with World War Three underway. Some leaders understood this better than others. Those who fell into the latter category were usually assuaged by Bush or another high-level administration figure. Still, this didn’t always work. The belief in certain places overseas was that the Americans had forgotten about them or if not totally put their woes out of their mind, then considered other countries more important. The leaders of two nations in particular felt this way about the American leadership. Maybe they didn’t blame Reagan directly… maybe it was more about his administration people. Regardless, that feeling was there. The two in question were Chancellor Wörner and President Evren.
West Germany’s wartime leader, there because Kohl couldn’t do so after seeing his wife slain before his very eyes, had almost all of his country occupied by the Soviet Army. Most of his army was gone: what was left was forced into the very southwestern corner down in the Black Forest. Nuclear weapons were being used and Wörner was aware that his allies in America and France were lining up targets in West Germany almost with glee for when the exchanges moved from the sea onto land. Wörner didn’t want to see West Germany a nuclear battlefield. He wanted Reagan to promise him that America wouldn’t do that. He had been told that there was absolutely no desire to do that: the United States, Reagan had told him, didn’t want to see Wörner’s country left an atomic ruin. That wasn’t the same as a promise not to do it, was it?
As to Evren, this Turkish general had seized power from weak civilians seven years beforehand in a coup d’état. Evren’s rule was harsh – not overly cruel yet still unpleasant for those deemed enemies – but he had decided that that it was military rule which had saved Turkey when the war begun. Turkey had been invaded with enemies all around. Turkey had fought off those invaders, mainly alone too. There had been some American air support and the Med. was full of NATO warships, but, near alone, Turkey had to fight the Soviets who had the support of their allies (Bulgaria, Romania and Syria) in trying to bring Evren’s country to heel. There were US Marines sent into Lebanon and not to Istanbul. There were troops from other NATO countries who had fought in Greece, not in Turkey. Evren had not been impressed with any of this but had held his tongue. Now, things were different. The Americans had been first to use nuclear weapons. Turkey had been informed after the fact. Evren wanted something similar to what Wörner wanted: the United States to not use nuclear weapons anywhere near its soil. He received a not so different reply too. First Bush and then when Evren could get ahold of Reagan – the latter not very easy to do – had told him that there was no desire to do that but stopped short of promising not to. Unrealistic, Evren was told his demand was, especially since the Soviets were using theirs and United States had to respond.
In recent days, the Soviets had been using intermediaries to contact many NATO governments. As they had first done with France, offers of war termination were sent to several countries. The Belgian & the Dutch, then the Danes & Norwegians, followed by the Greeks and, finally, both the Turks and West Germans had received these. Rejection had come. NATO partners were made aware of what was sent and how the rejection had come. The same line alliance-wide was trotted out each time: there would only be a cessation of fighting should the Soviet Union do what NATO wanted in withdrawing completely and fulfilling other terms which NATO had already agreed upon. The intent of the Soviets was clear. They wanted to divide NATO and get countries to break from the alliance. Even if one of them got a deal with the Soviets which was highly favourable to them, to a point where they could with a straight face say that they had emerged as a winner of the fight, it was understood that they would end up alone at the mercy of the Soviets down the line. Promises from Moscow couldn’t be trusted either. Only with all NATO nations agreeing, likely bringing in the countries of the Coalition in the Middle East first formed to fight Iraq, and probably other allies worldwide too, could there be any peace with the Soviets. Their list of war crimes was long and horrific with that meaning that they just couldn’t be trusted to keep their word: the alliance would have to force them to.
This meant that for all that Wörner and Evren were angry at how the United States was regarded as behaving with treating them as not so important and being reckless with nukes, they were locked into this conflict at this time. Breaking with NATO and seeking a separate peace with the Soviets appeared suicidal. Yet… the nuclear use continued. The Americans kept on employing them like the Soviets did. It was they who used them first too. Reagan and his administration couldn’t assure these two men that their countries (the Turks considered their country to not just be the land but the seas close-in including the waters of the Turkish Straits) weren’t soon to be nuclear battlefields. Wörner and the West German government were now in Paris, no longer in the Saarland after Soviet tanks entered there yesterday. His wartime cabinet weren’t so understanding of the wider situation. They weren’t complete fools but they were willing to give peace a chance: ‘better red than dead’ it was said, meaning they were willing to see their country survive even in a sorry state than nuked. Wörner told them that if they tried to force his hand into surrendering, he’d resign first. He received no promise that they wouldn’t do that. His government members were thinking of taking the Soviet offer on the table even if it meant a Red Germany. A Dead Germany was too much for them so stand idly by and allow to happen. Evren didn’t have the same pressures from domestic figures. Turkish armies, all alone, were on the cusp of victory now in liberating home soil so he was in a better position without having to worry about the KGB putting in new leaders for his nation. His mind had turned to thinking that if need be, if the choice was between a Turkey being nuked and a Turkey with severe external pressures, Turkey would have no choice but to take the latter option. He didn’t want to do that unless he had no other choice. Time was running out to have both options in hand though.
The Soviets knew that two NATO countries were on the tipping point of ending their participation in this war due to the matter of nuclear weapon use. They had that Stasi spy co-opted now for GRU use in Paris high up within West Germany’s diplomatic representation to the alliance in a formal manner. One of Turkey’s president’s inner circle was reporting less substantial yet important intelligence from out of Ankara too which allowed the KGB to known that Evren was considering taking Turkey out of the conflict. Such sources of intelligence on this was joined by easier-to-obtain information on the wider mood among NATO leaders when it came to the craziness of the ongoing nuclear conflict. Other nations weren’t thinking about withdrawing from the fight but they wanted that particular aspect of the conflict to stop. This wasn’t just the European and Canadian members of NATO either: the Americans themselves realised that things had gone too far. The KGB’s head, Chebrikov, suggested to him comrades on the Defence Council that now was the time to really pile the pressure on with that. He suggested some ways that NATO could be forced to fall apart with rapid haste. Those involved using nuclear weapons in some creative means. This idea didn’t appeal to the others, Ligachev and Gromyko especially. Even Sokolov who had been at the initial forefront of pushing for nuclear usage early on before the Americans began the process for him, was weary of Chebrikov’s cunning plans. The Defence Council heard from Ryzhkov. He suggested that they give peace a chance, unknowingly echoing the words of West Germany’s interior minister… and a famous singer too. The time was ripe, Ryzhkov said, to do what we always intended: bring an end to this war.
Haven’t we won all of our objectives in Europe now? Are we really going to keep upping the nuclear ante any further? Do we want to see our country obliterated in nuclear fire even something goes terribly wrong? His rhetorical questions concentrated minds among the Soviet leadership. He won Gromyko over and then Ligachev too. Sokolov swayed a bit before coming onside: Chebrikov eventually raised no objection either. In his cunning mind, he considered that this was a win-win for him. If what Ryzhkov convinced the others was worth doing saw victory, the Soviet Union won. If it did not, they would turn to him and his alternative plan of action which would see him win.
The Hotline came back into play. Messages were sent from the Kremlin to the Pentagon. An end to the war was proposed as it had long ago been decided by these very men that would happen at the right time. That time was now. The Soviet leadership would wait on a response with the Defence Council having Sokolov send out a flash message to Soviet forces to hold their fire with nuclear weapons until ordered to return to usage too. At a time like this, with a lot at stake, there was no time for mixed messages. Out the defence minister’s instructions went to combat forces spread far and wide, many of them engaged in ongoing fighting. Meanwhile, Ligachev and his comrades waited to see how Reagan would respond to an end to all of this madness.
Since he had been evacuated from Washington in the war’s first few minutes, President Reagan had been away from the White House. He’d returned only twice. The first time had been to give a statement to the American people from inside the Oval Office – pre-recorded and transmitted later – and then he had come back once more to his official residence when meeting with a high-level delegation sent by the Chinese to the United States. With the latter, there had been a hope that China would enter the war and Reagan had been convinced that it would be best if he met them at the White House rather than elsewhere. The whole China thing had been maskirovka of the highest order: the Soviets had promised the Chinese the world to stay neutral, beating anything that the United States would be willing to offer to join in, and Moscow had known about the visit too. Where Reagan had been the majority of the time was either moving about or in ‘secured locations’. When not airborne either on Air Force One, the Doomsday Plane, Marine One or a ground convoy, the president was at Mount Weather where there was an alternate national command post or the Greenbrier resort where Congress was. Washington, the White House especially, was considered a dangerous place for him to be when the country was at war. A decapitation strike was feared… one followed by thousands of nuclear warheads raining down in the country as a follow-up. This all took its toll on Reagan. His health was monitored but there were those who feared for him. Vice President Bush was ready to step up if the need be but no one, not even him, wanted to see that happen. There was belief that Reagan would see them through this war with the United States emerging victorious in the end.
Foreign government leaders didn’t have an easy time being in contact with Reagan. They often found themselves on hold even when phone calls had been pre-arranged. The delays were down to security fears, ones unexplained to those on the other end. Their national intelligence heads would usually get a heads-up later as to the cause – odd activity at a Soviet missile silo being observed from a satellite or a suspected strategic missile submarine right off the American coast – but it did leave many frustrated. Reagan didn’t always have the time either. His country was at war just like theirs were. There were things that needed his attention, Congress especially, at a time like this. To spend long amounts of time hand-holding allied leaders just wasn’t what he should be doing with World War Three underway. Some leaders understood this better than others. Those who fell into the latter category were usually assuaged by Bush or another high-level administration figure. Still, this didn’t always work. The belief in certain places overseas was that the Americans had forgotten about them or if not totally put their woes out of their mind, then considered other countries more important. The leaders of two nations in particular felt this way about the American leadership. Maybe they didn’t blame Reagan directly… maybe it was more about his administration people. Regardless, that feeling was there. The two in question were Chancellor Wörner and President Evren.
West Germany’s wartime leader, there because Kohl couldn’t do so after seeing his wife slain before his very eyes, had almost all of his country occupied by the Soviet Army. Most of his army was gone: what was left was forced into the very southwestern corner down in the Black Forest. Nuclear weapons were being used and Wörner was aware that his allies in America and France were lining up targets in West Germany almost with glee for when the exchanges moved from the sea onto land. Wörner didn’t want to see West Germany a nuclear battlefield. He wanted Reagan to promise him that America wouldn’t do that. He had been told that there was absolutely no desire to do that: the United States, Reagan had told him, didn’t want to see Wörner’s country left an atomic ruin. That wasn’t the same as a promise not to do it, was it?
As to Evren, this Turkish general had seized power from weak civilians seven years beforehand in a coup d’état. Evren’s rule was harsh – not overly cruel yet still unpleasant for those deemed enemies – but he had decided that that it was military rule which had saved Turkey when the war begun. Turkey had been invaded with enemies all around. Turkey had fought off those invaders, mainly alone too. There had been some American air support and the Med. was full of NATO warships, but, near alone, Turkey had to fight the Soviets who had the support of their allies (Bulgaria, Romania and Syria) in trying to bring Evren’s country to heel. There were US Marines sent into Lebanon and not to Istanbul. There were troops from other NATO countries who had fought in Greece, not in Turkey. Evren had not been impressed with any of this but had held his tongue. Now, things were different. The Americans had been first to use nuclear weapons. Turkey had been informed after the fact. Evren wanted something similar to what Wörner wanted: the United States to not use nuclear weapons anywhere near its soil. He received a not so different reply too. First Bush and then when Evren could get ahold of Reagan – the latter not very easy to do – had told him that there was no desire to do that but stopped short of promising not to. Unrealistic, Evren was told his demand was, especially since the Soviets were using theirs and United States had to respond.
In recent days, the Soviets had been using intermediaries to contact many NATO governments. As they had first done with France, offers of war termination were sent to several countries. The Belgian & the Dutch, then the Danes & Norwegians, followed by the Greeks and, finally, both the Turks and West Germans had received these. Rejection had come. NATO partners were made aware of what was sent and how the rejection had come. The same line alliance-wide was trotted out each time: there would only be a cessation of fighting should the Soviet Union do what NATO wanted in withdrawing completely and fulfilling other terms which NATO had already agreed upon. The intent of the Soviets was clear. They wanted to divide NATO and get countries to break from the alliance. Even if one of them got a deal with the Soviets which was highly favourable to them, to a point where they could with a straight face say that they had emerged as a winner of the fight, it was understood that they would end up alone at the mercy of the Soviets down the line. Promises from Moscow couldn’t be trusted either. Only with all NATO nations agreeing, likely bringing in the countries of the Coalition in the Middle East first formed to fight Iraq, and probably other allies worldwide too, could there be any peace with the Soviets. Their list of war crimes was long and horrific with that meaning that they just couldn’t be trusted to keep their word: the alliance would have to force them to.
This meant that for all that Wörner and Evren were angry at how the United States was regarded as behaving with treating them as not so important and being reckless with nukes, they were locked into this conflict at this time. Breaking with NATO and seeking a separate peace with the Soviets appeared suicidal. Yet… the nuclear use continued. The Americans kept on employing them like the Soviets did. It was they who used them first too. Reagan and his administration couldn’t assure these two men that their countries (the Turks considered their country to not just be the land but the seas close-in including the waters of the Turkish Straits) weren’t soon to be nuclear battlefields. Wörner and the West German government were now in Paris, no longer in the Saarland after Soviet tanks entered there yesterday. His wartime cabinet weren’t so understanding of the wider situation. They weren’t complete fools but they were willing to give peace a chance: ‘better red than dead’ it was said, meaning they were willing to see their country survive even in a sorry state than nuked. Wörner told them that if they tried to force his hand into surrendering, he’d resign first. He received no promise that they wouldn’t do that. His government members were thinking of taking the Soviet offer on the table even if it meant a Red Germany. A Dead Germany was too much for them so stand idly by and allow to happen. Evren didn’t have the same pressures from domestic figures. Turkish armies, all alone, were on the cusp of victory now in liberating home soil so he was in a better position without having to worry about the KGB putting in new leaders for his nation. His mind had turned to thinking that if need be, if the choice was between a Turkey being nuked and a Turkey with severe external pressures, Turkey would have no choice but to take the latter option. He didn’t want to do that unless he had no other choice. Time was running out to have both options in hand though.
The Soviets knew that two NATO countries were on the tipping point of ending their participation in this war due to the matter of nuclear weapon use. They had that Stasi spy co-opted now for GRU use in Paris high up within West Germany’s diplomatic representation to the alliance in a formal manner. One of Turkey’s president’s inner circle was reporting less substantial yet important intelligence from out of Ankara too which allowed the KGB to known that Evren was considering taking Turkey out of the conflict. Such sources of intelligence on this was joined by easier-to-obtain information on the wider mood among NATO leaders when it came to the craziness of the ongoing nuclear conflict. Other nations weren’t thinking about withdrawing from the fight but they wanted that particular aspect of the conflict to stop. This wasn’t just the European and Canadian members of NATO either: the Americans themselves realised that things had gone too far. The KGB’s head, Chebrikov, suggested to him comrades on the Defence Council that now was the time to really pile the pressure on with that. He suggested some ways that NATO could be forced to fall apart with rapid haste. Those involved using nuclear weapons in some creative means. This idea didn’t appeal to the others, Ligachev and Gromyko especially. Even Sokolov who had been at the initial forefront of pushing for nuclear usage early on before the Americans began the process for him, was weary of Chebrikov’s cunning plans. The Defence Council heard from Ryzhkov. He suggested that they give peace a chance, unknowingly echoing the words of West Germany’s interior minister… and a famous singer too. The time was ripe, Ryzhkov said, to do what we always intended: bring an end to this war.
Haven’t we won all of our objectives in Europe now? Are we really going to keep upping the nuclear ante any further? Do we want to see our country obliterated in nuclear fire even something goes terribly wrong? His rhetorical questions concentrated minds among the Soviet leadership. He won Gromyko over and then Ligachev too. Sokolov swayed a bit before coming onside: Chebrikov eventually raised no objection either. In his cunning mind, he considered that this was a win-win for him. If what Ryzhkov convinced the others was worth doing saw victory, the Soviet Union won. If it did not, they would turn to him and his alternative plan of action which would see him win.
The Hotline came back into play. Messages were sent from the Kremlin to the Pentagon. An end to the war was proposed as it had long ago been decided by these very men that would happen at the right time. That time was now. The Soviet leadership would wait on a response with the Defence Council having Sokolov send out a flash message to Soviet forces to hold their fire with nuclear weapons until ordered to return to usage too. At a time like this, with a lot at stake, there was no time for mixed messages. Out the defence minister’s instructions went to combat forces spread far and wide, many of them engaged in ongoing fighting. Meanwhile, Ligachev and his comrades waited to see how Reagan would respond to an end to all of this madness.
